UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

JAMES, Phillip Michael Thomas,
a.k.a. SIAGHA-COKE, Felibi Biladi,

Petitioner,

v.

ENGLISH, Brian,
Warden, Miami Correctional Facility, in his official capacity,

Respondent.

Case No. 3:26-cv-01225-DRL-SJF

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S RETURN

Petitioner Phillip Michael Thomas James, a.k.a. Felibi Biladi Siagha-Coke, respectfully submits this reply to Respondent's Return to Petition for Habeas Corpus ("Resp't's Return"). *See* ECF No. 13. Respondent contends that this Court "lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)" and should "dismiss this Petition." *Id.* at 1. Respondent's reading of Section 1252(b)(9) is wrong. Section 1252(b)(9) only bars review of claims "arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove *an alien* from the United States." (emphasis added). Because alienage is a threshold issue for deciding whether Sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) apply to Mr. James's petition, this Court must first resolve that jurisdictional fact. *See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (noting that "the first and fundamental question" that a court is "bound to ask and answer for itself" is "that of jurisdiction") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); *see also Ng Fung Ho v. White*, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("[A] claim of [U.S.]

citizenship is . . . a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact" against deportation proceedings and any attendant civil immigration detention).

Moreover, Mr. James here challenges his unlawful detention as a U.S. citizen, not the immigration judge's decision ordering him removed, which is currently on appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). Detention claims are distinct from removal claims. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." Respondent does not address the Non-Detention Act's dictate or dispute that it applies here. Many federal courts have agreed that courts sitting in habeas can resolve claims of unlawful detention based on U.S. citizenship so long as the petitioner "does not challenge any final order of removal" through their petition. *Flores-Torres v. Mukasey*, 546 F.3d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also, e.g.*, *Boulos v. Dir., U.S. DHS ICE ERO Miami Field Off.*, No. 25-cv-23792, 2025 WL 4092592, at *6 (S.D. Fl. Dec. 1, 2025); *Lopez v. Doe*, 681 F. Supp. 3d 472, 486–87 (E.D. Va. 2023); *see also Gonzalez v. O'Connell*, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) (habeas challenges to detention are "quite distinct from final orders of removal") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Mr. James seeks only this Court's determination over Respondent's authority—or lack thereof—to detain him, Sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) do not strip this Court of jurisdiction.

Respondent does not meaningfully challenge the substance of Mr. James's showing that he was born in Florida and is a U.S. citizen. He raises no factual challenges to the declaration of Carol Baker Wynn, Mr. James's mother, or to the evaluation reports of Lucia Lezama Tannenbaum, Ph.D., and Dana Brauman, Psy.D, MSCP. *See* ECF Nos. 3-2, 3-9, 3-10. Instead, Respondent's assertions of alienage rely almost exclusively on Mr. James's own statements and representations, none of which offer "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that Mr. James is a foreign

national, *Woodby v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966), particularly in light of his documented Delusional Disorder, which manifests in his belief that he is the secret illegitimate son of Jamaican politician Edward Seaga and descended from other prominent historical figures, *see* ECF No. 3-10. Because the record evidence shows that Mr. James is a U.S. citizen, his detention by immigration officials is unlawful and the Court should order his release.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE WHETHER RESPONDENT'S DETENTION OF MR. JAMES IS UNLAWFUL.

This Court retains subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to decide whether Respondent is actively detaining a U.S. citizen without authorization from "an Act of Congress." Congress has authorized civil immigration detention only for noncitizens. Title 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, and 1231, the three main immigration detention statutes, govern the detention of noncitizens. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) ("[T]he alien shall be detained . . . ."); *id.* § 1225(b)(2)(A) ("[T]he alien shall be detained . . . ."); *id.* § 1226(a) ("On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained . . . ."); *id.* § 1231(a)(2)(A) ("During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien."). A determination of alienage is therefore antecedent and essential to a determination of whether the government has properly exercised its detention authority. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).

Respondent contends, however, that this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to decide the propriety of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")'s detention of Mr. James because such a determination would interfere with federal courts of appeals' exclusive jurisdiction to review removal orders. *See* Resp't's Return at 3–4 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5)). He suggests that Sections 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) combine to "mean that any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any removal-related activity can be reviewed only through the [petition-

for-review] process." *Id.* (quoting *J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016)) (alteration in original). Respondent's invocation of Section 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) is deficient for at least two reasons: Mr. James is not an "alien," but rather a U.S. citizen born in Florida; and the dispute over his citizenship did not first arise in removal proceedings. Habeas, rather than a petition for review, is the proper vehicle for judicial review of his unlawful detention.

A. Alienage is a Jurisdictional Predicate for the Section 1252 Bars to Apply

Like 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, and 1231, governing detention, the statutory limits on judicial review of removal orders depend on the fact of alienage. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1229a. The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") only authorizes the removal of noncitizens, not U.S. citizens. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (deeming certain "aliens" inadmissible); *id.* § 1227 (deeming certain "aliens" deportable). Orders of removal may therefore only be issued to noncitizens. *See id.* § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (indicating that immigration judges "shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States"). Section 1252(b)(9)'s channeling effect spells this out. It indicates that "questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien" shall be channeled to the courts of appeals. That Mr. James is not a noncitizen thus renders the channeling provisions and jurisdictional bars at Section 1252 irrelevant. At a minimum, this Court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, which here turns on whether Mr. James is a U.S. citizen. *See Steel Co.*, 523 U.S. at 94; *Riley v. Bondi*, 606 U.S. 259, 273 (2025); Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30–35 (raising claims under the Non-Detention Act and INA, both of which turn on the jurisdictional fact that Mr. James is not an "alien" and, accordingly, that Respondent cannot hold him in civil immigration detention). As one court in this Circuit has explained, the "statutory scheme" at section 1252 "does not address this Court's jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition relating to the . . . placement of a United States citizen in removal

proceedings. Without such clear and convincing evidence, it would be inappropriate to apply a jurisdictional prohibition against a person who does not fall within its express scope." *Ayesh v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't*, No. 08 C 542, 2008 WL 4442633, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2008).[1]

Furthermore, and contrary to Respondent's argument, Resp't's Return at 5, nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), bars Mr. James's habeas petition. Justice Alito's plurality opinion in *Jennings* did not announce a rule that section 1252(b)(9) bars habeas actions by noncitizens in custody as a result of DHS's placement of them into removal proceedings. Instead, his opinion detailed the absurd results that could lead from such a rule, such as barring from judicial review (except through the petition for review process) noncitizens' claims based on inhumane conditions of confinement or state-law tort claims. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 293 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion in *Jennings* specifically declined to address the ultimate scope of section 1252(b)(9), determining only that, based on the specific facts of the case before it, the Court had jurisdiction to consider the noncitizen respondents' habeas claims:

> The parties in this case have not addressed the scope of § 1252(b)(9), and it is not necessary for us to attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation. For present purposes, it is enough to note that respondents are not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined.

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294. Likewise, Mr. James does not seek review of the immigration judge's decision here, which he is pursuing before the BIA, nor the process by which his removability was determined. While he does challenge his ongoing detention, his case is distinguishable on the

[1] Relying on Section 1252(b)(9)'s channeling provision to do away with habeas review raises another problem: U.S. citizens, like Mr. James, could even be removed before obtaining judicial review in the courts of appeals, unless granted a discretionary stay from the court of appeals. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

grounds that his detention as a U.S. citizen is distinct from any review that the agency is performing in his removal proceedings, *see* I.C, *infra*, and in fact the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims under the Constitution and the Non-Detention Act, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (laying out the parameters of the BIA's appellate jurisdiction).

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized the stakes of the problem in cases like Mr. James's and stressed the importance of judicial review over claims of U.S. citizenship by individuals subject to immigration enforcement, detention, and removal. In *Ng Fung Ho*, the Court reviewed habeas claims brought by individuals who had arrived in San Francisco and who claimed to be U.S. citizens. *See* 259 U.S. at 281–82. The Court explained that because "[j]urisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien," it is "well settled that . . . a writ of habeas corpus will issue to determine the [individual's citizenship] status." *Id.* at 284. The Court further explained that a "claim of [U.S.] citizenship is . . . a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact." *Id.* The *Ng Fung Ho* Court concluded by recognizing the clear constitutional problems with restricting habeas courts from reviewing claims that the government is wrongly detaining a U.S. citizen:

> If the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor may not be tested in the courts by means of the writ of habeas corpus, when the prisoner claims citizenship and makes a showing that his claim is not frivolous, then obviously deportation of a resident may follow upon a purely executive order, whatever his race or place of birth; for, where there is jurisdiction, a finding of fact by the executive department is conclusive . . . , and courts have no power to interfere, unless there was either denial of a fair hearing . . . , or the finding was not supported by evidence . . . , or there was an application of an erroneous rule of law.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Respondent's jurisdictional arguments against Mr. James's petition conflict with the Court's clear statements in *Ng Fung Ho*. Under Respondent's view, Mr. James would be forced to litigate his U.S. citizenship claim "purely" through the "executive" process, *id.* at 284, and he

would have no adequate remedy for his months of unlawful detention as that process plays out. Respondent states that merely because DHS "charged [Mr. James] as 'an alien present in the United States'" and placed him into removal proceedings, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider his claim of citizenship. Resp't's Return at 5–6. Taken one step further, Respondent's interpretation of the INA would allow the Executive to detain any individual the Executive claims to be a noncitizen, including people born on U.S.-soil who the Executive believes have not acquired birthright citizenship. *See Trump v. Barbara*, 609 U.S. ---, 146 S. Ct. 2438, 2444–45 (2026) (describing Executive Order No. 14160, which "provide[d] that children born of persons unlawfully or temporarily present in the United States . . . do not qualify for citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment or the . . . INA"). Those individuals, under Respondent's view, would not be able to obtain judicial review of their claim to citizenship until after the completion of administrative proceedings, which sometimes take months or years to complete. *See* Trans. Recs. Access Clearinghouse, *Rising Completion Times in Immigration Court Despite Record Deportations* (Sept. 11, 2026), https://tracreports.org/reports/780/ (showing that as of July 2026, immigration courts are taking an average of 901 days to complete proceedings). It is exactly because the deprivation in the case of U.S. citizens is so severe—the possibility of stripping from one "who so claims to be a citizen" their "property and life" and "all that makes life worth living," *Ng Fung Ho*, 259 U.S. at 284—that those individuals must have the "security of judicial over administrative" proceedings, *id.* at 285.

At bottom, Mr. James raises the "essential jurisdictional fact" of his U.S. citizenship, which renders his detention by immigration authorities unlawful. Because Respondent's authority to detain Mr. James hinges on this fact, sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) do not bar this Court's jurisdiction over his habeas proceedings.

B. The Question of Mr. James's Citizenship Did Not "Arise from" His Removal Proceedings

Section 1252(b)(9) further does not bar this Court's jurisdiction for an independent reason: the issue of Mr. James's citizenship did not "aris[e] from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove" him. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia explained in *Lopez*, the plain meaning of "arising" "conveys that an issue only arises from an action when it originates with that action's occurrence." *Lopez*, 681 F. Supp. 3dat 481–82 (discussing dictionary definitions of "arise").

Mr. James's case is distinct from the usual case where an individual raises a claim of citizenship as a defense in removal proceedings, as such cases generally involve claims of derivative citizenship, which are properly subject to adjudication by the immigration courts and review by the courts of appeals. *See, e.g.*, *Wedderburn v. INS*, 215 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2000); *Gomez-Diaz v. Ashcroft*, 324 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2003); *Durand v. Holder*, 343 F. App'x 141 (7th Cir. 2009); *Dale v. Barr*, 967 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2020). The question of whether Mr. James is a citizen did not arise in removal proceedings. Instead, Mr. James's affirmative representations of having been born in Jamaica—as well as having citizenship in Lebanon, Iraq, and the United Kingdom, derived from his supposed descendance from a Prime Minister of Jamaica and other major historical figures—led to the U.S. Department of State revoking Mr. James's properly issued U.S. passport. As discussed in section II, *infra*, there is no objective, dispositive record evidence that Mr. James is not a U.S. citizen, or that he was not born in Florida. All Respondent's arguments regarding Mr. James's alienage are based on his own statements and representations, which, in turn, are products of his Delusional Disorder. As a result of Mr. James's representations and unnecessary affirmative immigration filings, such as his applications for asylum and for employment authorization, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") initiated removal

proceedings. As such, "the question of whether [Mr. James] is a citizen of the United States did *not* originate with a government removal action or proceeding." *Lopez*, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 482 (emphasis in original).

C. Habeas Is the Appropriate Vehicle to Challenge Mr. James's Unlawful Detention

Finally, this Court has jurisdiction because Mr. James does not, in this action, challenge any final order of removal, but rather "his *detention* prior to the issuance of any such order." *Flores-Torres*, 548 F.3d at 711 (emphasis in original); *see also Lopez*, 681 F. Supp. 3d 488 ("[T]he detention that Mr. Lopez challenges is a harm he is *currently suffering*, before any petitions for review are ever ruled on.") (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). Even a successful outcome and a finding of U.S. citizenship before the agency or before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will not remedy the harm of Mr. James's detention by immigration officials, now at nearly nine months and counting. As such, there is "no adequate alternative to Petitioner's detention claim." *Lopez*, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 488.

In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to challenge unlawful detention. "The writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). The availability of habeas relief persists "even where the petitioner's unlawful detention claims are fundamentally intertwined with the issues before the immigration judge in the removal proceedings, as there must be an explicit direction from Congress before the courts will construe a statute as limiting federal habeas review." *Boulos*, 2025 WL 4092592, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (citing *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) and collecting cases where courts have found habeas jurisdiction to review non-frivolous claims to citizenship). As such, requiring Mr. James to raise his citizenship

claim solely before the agency and by means of a petition for review—rather than in the present challenge to his detention—"conflicts not only with the plain language of § 1252 but with the well-established principle that [courts] require 'a particularly clear statement' of intent from Congress before [they] find habeas review foreclosed." *Flores-Torres*, 548 F.3d at 712 (quoting *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 517).

For these reasons, the Court retains jurisdiction to review Mr. James's habeas petition.

II. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MEANINGFULLY CONTESTED THE SUBSTANCE OF MR. JAMES'S PROOF OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

On the merits of Mr. James's citizenship, Respondent has not meaningfully challenged any of Mr. James's evidence showing that he is a U.S. citizen by virtue of his birth in Florida. Respondent asserts in the Background section of his return that Mr. James "is a native of Jamaica and citizen of Lebanon"; his return does not, however, discuss Mr. James's citizenship in the Argument section. *See* Resp't's Return at 2–3.[2]

Respondent generally relies on three sources to establish Mr. James's nationality: Mr. James's applications and statements made in connection with affirmative applications filed with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") and statements made to ICE; the U.S. Department of State's revocation of Mr. James's previous passport; and Mr. James's filing of several pro se habeas corpus petitions before this Court. *See id.* at 3; *see also* ECF No. 13-1.[3] None of these are sufficient to overcome Mr. James's evidentiary showing that he was born in

[2] Generally, such "perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived." *Rojas Pedroza v. Olsen*, No. 1:26-CV-00203-SEB-TAB, 2026 WL 531491, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 26, 2026) (quoting *M.G. Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer Agency, Inc.*, 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017)). However, the Seventh Circuit disfavors default judgments in habeas proceedings. *See id.* (citing *Bleitner v. Welborn*, 15 F.3d 652, 653 (7th Cir. 1994)).

[3] Not all the exhibits cited in Respondent's return support that Mr. James is a "citizen of Lebanon." For instance, this Court previously found, based on the representations of the parties when Mr. James was litigating a prior habeas petition pro se, that Mr. James is a citizen of Jamaica. ECF No. 13-1 at 50.

Florida as Phillip Michael James. Notably, Respondent never addresses Ms. Wynn's declaration, Dr. Tannenbaum's Competency Evaluation Report, or Dr. Brauman's Confidential Psychological Report, all of which establish that Mr. James suffers from longstanding mental and behavioral challenges and explain why Mr. James has asserted himself to be a foreign national in the past. Instead, the applications and statements Mr. James filed with USCIS, for example, support his consistent, albeit deluded, representation that he is the son of Edward Seaga and descended from a prominent Lebanese family or tribe via Mr. Seaga. *See* Exhibit A, DHS Submission, at 11; Exhibit B, Asylum Interview Notes, at 4–5, 7–10.[4]

Respondent's assertions are insufficient to rebut Mr. James's mother's declaration and his Florida birth certificate, which establish his U.S. citizenship. While the issue of whether the immigration judge erred in finding that DHS had established Mr. James's alienage is distinct from the issues before this Court, the evidence Respondent has submitted falls short of establishing alienage by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." *Woodby*, 385 U.S. at 285. Notably, Respondent has not introduced "evidence of foreign birth," *Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch*, 808 F.3d 413, 419 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), beyond Mr. James's own statements. *See also Murphy v. INS*, 54 F.3d 605, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1995) (DHS must first submit evidence of foreign birth, such as a birth certificate, to establish the presumption of foreign birth,

[4] Mr. James seeks leave to file Exhibits A, B, and C under seal, and to file Exhibit D with redactions. Respondent has consented to this request. Exhibit A lists the names and identifying information about Mr. James's purported parents, as well as listing information about his application for a humanitarian visa subject to confidentiality provisions by statute. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1367. Exhibit B includes the contents of Mr. James's asylum interview, which are subject to confidentiality provisions by regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6. Exhibit C lists information including a date of birth, address, tax registration number, and email address, and Mr. James seeks leave to file this document under seal for the same reasons included in his Motion to Seal, ECF No. 2. Finally, Mr. James seeks to file a redacted version of Exhibit D on the public docket, redacting certain identification numbers and dates of birth included in the document.

before the burden shifts to the respondent in removal proceedings to demonstrate that they are not inadmissible or not removable).

Respondent's reliance on Mr. James's past statements to USCIS and his previous habeas corpus petitions before this Court do not establish Mr. James's alienage because all are based on Mr. James's beliefs about his identity and are unsupported by any objective documents extrinsic to Mr. James's delusional narrative. *Compare* Exhibit A at 11 (listing his father as Edward Seaga) and Exhibit B (Mr. James's narrative about his family history to the USCIS Asylum Office) *with* ECF No. 3-2 (describing a change in Mr. James after his return from a visit to Jamaica and belief that his mother was not his mother); 3-9 (describing Mr. James's beliefs about his parentage and descent from a Lebanese Muslim tribe); 3-10 (describing Mr. James's entrenched, "implausible narratives about his paternal lineage"). Mr. James's statements about his family, birth, and citizenship are unreliable because, as his mother's declaration and medical evaluations support, Mr. James's mental health challenges caused him to disassociate from his Phillip James identity and believe that he is not a U.S. citizen. Even so, Mr. James confirmed in his USCIS interview that he was affiliated with the name, "Philip James," despite ultimately claiming that it was not his biological name. ECF No. 13-1 at 38. Furthermore, USCIS's asylum interview records indicate that USCIS asked Mr. James to submit additional documentary evidence, including his birth registration documents issued by the Jamaican government, and Mr. James had to request extensions at least twice given his inability to procure those documents. *See* Exhibit B at 16–19.

The only pieces of extrinsic evidence Respondent points to are Mr. James's Jamaican National Insurance Registration Card and the U.S. Department of State's passport revocation letter. *See* ECF No. 3-1 at 21, 27–28. Neither of these are objective or dispositive evidence of his Jamaican citizenship, much less disprove his U.S. citizenship. Jamaican National Insurance

Registration Cards are not restricted to Jamaican citizens.[5] Moreover, on information and belief, the Jamaican National Insurance Scheme issued the registration card to Mr. James based solely on his own representations to that agency that he was born in Jamaica and maintained an address in Jamaica. *See* Exhibit C, Application for National Insurance Number. In fact, email correspondence from the Jamaican Consulate to Mr. James's counsel supports that "there is no record of Jamaican citizenship" for Mr. James. Exhibit D, Email from Jamaican Consulate. Second, the U.S. Department of State's revocation letter recounts Mr. James's history of U.S. passport applications. It shows that Mr. James first submitted a Florida birth certificate to obtain a passport under the name Philip M. James. *See* ECF No. 13-1 at 27. It then explains that Mr. James changed his name and obtained new passports under different names. *See id.* at 27–28. The letter concludes by asserting that Mr. James's true identity is "Felibi Siagha Baladi Kambil Coke" and that he was born in Jamaica. *See id.* at 28. But the letter does not offer any reasons for the agency's finding, including any evidence the agency relied on to determine that Mr. James is not Mr. James. The letter was also issued without the benefit of the evidence Mr. James has submitted with this petition, including the explanation that Mr. James began believing he was not born in the United States only after suffering mental health challenges. The letter's tracing of Mr. James's transition from Philip Michael James to Felibi Siagha Baladi Kambil Coke instead reflects Mr. James's consistent but implausible and grandiose narrative about his identity. Respondent has not proffered

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[5] "All persons between the ages of 18 and 70 who are gainfully employed in insurable employment are required to be registered with the NIS." National Insurance Scheme, Ministry of Labour & Social Security, https://mlss.gov.jm/departments/national-insurance-scheme/#1516851336597-a4b57006-897a (last accessed October 5, 2026). The Court may take judicial notice of information from an official government website. articular, the Court may take judicial notice of public record information obtained from an official government website. *Ambrosetti v. Oregon Cath. Press*, 458 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1017 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2020) (citing *Betz v. Greenville Correctional Inst.*, 2014 WL 812403, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014); *Denius v. Dunlap*, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003); *Laborer's Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc.*, 298 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).

any evidence such as a Jamaican birth certificate or passport—or a birth certificate or passport from any other country—that shows Mr. James was *not* born in Florida. Rather, the evidence shows that Mr. James was born in Florida and is a U.S. citizen by birth.[6]

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Mr. James respectfully requests this Court find that it has habeas jurisdiction to decide his claim for unlawful detention under the Non-Detention Act and INA. He further requests this Court issue the writ and order Respondents release him from their custody because he is a U.S. citizen who cannot be subjected to civil immigration detention.

Respectfully Submitted,

DATED: Oct. 5, 2026
Bronx, NY

/s/ Edith Sangüeza

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[6] In the event the Court does not find on the record before it that Mr. James has established his U.S. citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court retains the authority to and should order limited jurisdictional discovery. *See N. Texas Equal Access Fund v. Thomas More Soc'y*, 728 F. Supp. 3d 887, 900–01 (N.D. Ill. 2024).

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, Edith Sangüeza, hereby certify that Petitioner's Reply Brief complies with N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(e) because it consists of 15 pages or fewer. Because Petitioner's brief does not exceed 25 pages, it does not include a table of contents or table of authorities.

DATED: Oct. 5, 2026
Bronx, NY

/s/ Edith Sangüeza
Edith Sangüeza
Counsel for Petitioner