

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION**

CASE NO. 1:26cv25174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	COMPLAINT TO REVOKE
	)	NATURALIZATION
	)	
CANTAVE PREVILON,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
	)	
	)	
	)	

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The United States of America brings this civil action against Defendant Cantave Previlon (“Defendant”), to revoke his naturalized U.S. citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

Defendant illegally procured his naturalization because of his criminal conduct and his false testimony. He also illegally procured his naturalization by willfully misrepresenting and concealing material facts. During the naturalization process, Defendant represented that he had never knowingly committed any crime for which he had not been arrested. This was not true. On October 22, 2009, Defendant admitted to police that he began repeatedly having sexual intercourse with his minor biological daughter in 2007. And, on February 10, 2012, he was convicted of first-degree felony sexual battery, in violation of Florida Statutes § 794.011(8)(b), and second-degree felony sexual battery, in violation of Florida Statutes § 794.011(5).

Had Defendant been truthful during his naturalization proceedings regarding his criminal conduct, the agency would not have recommended approval of his naturalization application and would have concluded, as a matter of law, Defendant was ineligible to naturalize and denied his

naturalization application. Defendant therefore illegally procured his naturalization and, independently, procured his naturalization by willfully misrepresenting and concealing material facts during his naturalization proceedings. The Court should therefore revoke the order admitting Defendant to United States citizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization No.  under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

1. This is an action filed under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) to revoke and set aside the decision admitting Defendant to U.S. citizenship and to cancel Defendant's Certificate of Naturalization No. .

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345 for this cause of action under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

3. Venue is proper in this District under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because Defendant resides in this District.

4. Plaintiff is the United States of America, suing on behalf of itself.

5. Defendant is a native of Haiti and obtained his U.S. citizenship through naturalization.

6. Defendant's last known address of residence is in Broward County, Florida.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7. The affidavit of Claudia Velez, a Special Agent with Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI"), a component of U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), an agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, showing good cause for this action, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

A. Defendant's Naturalization Proceedings

8. On or about April 5, 2007, Defendant filed a Form N-400, Application for Naturalization with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). *See* Form I-797C Notice of Action (attached as Exhibit B).

9. On his Naturalization Application, Defendant checked "No" in response to Part 10, Question 15, which asked: "Have you **ever** committed a crime or offense for which you were **not** arrested?" *See* Form N-400 Application for Naturalization (attached as Exhibit C).

10. On his Naturalization Application, Defendant checked "No" in response to Part 10, Question 23, which asked: "Have you **ever** given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit or to prevent deportation, exclusion, or removal?"

11. On or about April 2, 2007, Defendant signed the Naturalization Application under penalty of perjury, thereby certifying that his answers to the questions therein were true and correct.

12. On March 6, 2008, Jose Luyanda, a USCIS officer, orally interviewed Defendant regarding his Naturalization Application to determine his eligibility for naturalization.

13. At the beginning of the interview, Officer Luyanda placed Defendant under oath.

14. During the interview, Officer Yulanda asked Defendant, consistent with Part 10, Question 15 of Defendant's Naturalization Application, whether he had ever committed a crime or offense for which he was not arrested.

15. Defendant verbally confirmed his written response to Part 10, Question 15 of his Naturalization Application, testifying under oath that he had never committed a crime or offense for which he was not arrested.

16. During the interview, Officer Yulanda asked Defendant, consistent with Part 10, Question 23 of Defendant's Naturalization Application, whether he had ever given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit.

17. Defendant verbally confirmed his written response to Part 10, Question 23 of his Naturalization Application, testifying under oath that he had never given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit.

18. At the end of the interview, Defendant again signed the Naturalization Application under penalty of perjury in the presence of Officer Yulanda and swore that the contents of his application, including nine numbered changes, were true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

19. Based upon the information Defendant supplied on his Naturalization Application and on the sworn answers he gave during his March 6, 2008, naturalization interview, USCIS approved the application.


20. On July 25, 2008, Defendant signed a Form N-445, Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony (attached as Exhibit D). Defendant certified with his signature that each of the answers to questions on his Form N-445 were made by him or at his direction and were true and correct.

21. Question 3 of the Form N-445 asked, after the date he was first interviewed on his application for naturalization: "Have you knowingly committed any crime or offense, for which you have not been arrested; or have you been arrested, cited, charged, indicted, convicted, fined, or imprisoned for breaking or violating any law or ordinance, including traffic violations?"

22. Defendant answered "No" to Question 3 of his Form N-445.

23. On July 25, 2008, Defendant took the Oath of Allegiance to become a U.S. citizen and was issued Certificate of Naturalization No. . See Form N-550, Certificate of Naturalization (attached as Exhibit E).

B. Defendant's Criminal Proceedings



26. On October 22, 2009, and based on an offense date of July 20, 2007, the state of Florida arrested Defendant and charged him with one count of second-degree felony sexual battery, victim over twelve years old but less than eighteen years old, against their will, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5); third-degree felony incest, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 826.04; and simply domestic battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1A). See *State of Florida v. Previlon*, Broward County Case No. 09-019587CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.), available at <https://www.browardclerk.org/Web2>.

27. On May 9, 2011, the charges were dismissed nolle prosequi and refiled under *State of Florida v. Previlon*, Broward County Case No. 11006686CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.),

available at <https://www.browardclerk.org/Web2>. On April 18, 2011, and based on offense dates of July 20, 2007, to April 14, 2009, the state of Florida filed an Information charging Defendant with one count of first-degree sexual battery, victim over twelve years old but younger than eighteen years old, while in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 793.011(8)(b); one count of sexual battery, victim over twelve years old but less than eighteen years old, without consent, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5); and simple domestic battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1).

28. A true and complete copy of the Information is attached as Exhibit G.

29. On February 10, 2012, Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was sentenced to five years' incarceration, credit for 840 days' time served, nine years of probation, and required to register as a sex offender.

30. A true and complete copy of the Disposition is attached as Exhibit H.

IV. GOVERNING LAW

A. Congressionally Imposed Prerequisites to the Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship.

31. No individual has a right to naturalization “unless all statutory requirements are complied with.” *United States v. Ginsberg*, 243 U.S. 472, 474-75 (1917). Indeed, the Supreme Court has underscored that “[t]here must be strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.” *Fedorenko v. United States*, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981); *see also id.* (an individual “who seeks political rights as a member of the Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by Congress”) (quoting *Ginsberg*, 243 U.S. at 474)).

32. Among other requirements, Congress has mandated that an individual may not naturalize unless that person “during all periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is

a person of good moral character” *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). The required period for good moral character begins five years before the date the applicant files the application for naturalization, and it continues until the applicant takes the oath of allegiance and becomes a U.S. citizen (the “statutory period”). *Id.*; 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a).

33. Although Congress has not specifically defined what constitutes good moral character for naturalization purposes, the Immigration and Nationality Act lists certain classes of applicants who cannot be found to have the requisite good moral character. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

34. As a matter of law, an applicant necessarily lacks good moral character if he or she commits a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) during the statutory period and later either is convicted of the crime or admits his or her commission of the criminal activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(i) (providing that applicants “shall be found to lack good moral character” if, for example, they committed and were convicted of one or more crimes involving moral turpitude).

35. Congress has also explicitly precluded individuals who give false testimony for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits from being able to establish the good moral character necessary to naturalize. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6).

36. Further, Congress created a “catch-all” provision, which states, “[t]he fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (flush language).

37. Individuals who commit unlawful acts adversely reflecting upon their moral character cannot meet the good moral character requirement, unless they prove that extenuating circumstances existed. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (flush language).

38. Thus, an individual unlawfully procured naturalization if he or she committed unlawful acts during the statutory period, even if he or she was convicted of those crimes after being granted citizenship. *See United States v. Jean-Baptiste*, 395 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 546 U.S. 852 (2005).

B. The Denaturalization Statute

39. Recognizing that there are situations where an individual has naturalized despite failing to comply with all congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship or by concealing or misrepresenting facts that are material to the decision on whether to grant his or her naturalization application, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1451.

40. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), this Court must revoke an order of naturalization and cancel the individual's Certificate of Naturalization if his or her naturalization was *either*:

- i. illegally procured, *or*
- ii. procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.

41. Failure to comply with any of the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship renders the citizenship “illegally procured.” *Fedorenko*, 449 U.S. at 506.

42. Naturalization was procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, where: (1) the naturalized citizen misrepresented or concealed some fact during the naturalization process; (2) the misrepresentation or concealment was willful; (3) the fact was material; and (4) the naturalized citizen procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment. *See Kungys v. United States*, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988).

43. Where the government establishes that the defendant's citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation or concealment of material facts, "district courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization." *Fedorenko*, 449 U.S. at 517.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF NATURALIZATION (Lack of Good Moral Character – Crime Involving Moral Turpitude)

44. To be eligible for naturalization, Defendant was required to establish that he was a person of good moral character during the statutory period, here, from April 5, 2002 (five years before he filed his Form N-400) until July 25, 2008 (when he naturalized). 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a).

45. Defendant was statutorily precluded from establishing the good moral character necessary to naturalize because he committed a CIMT during the statutory period. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(i).

46. As set forth above at paragraphs 26-30, based on an offense date of July 20, 2007, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony sexual battery of an individual 12 or older but less than 18 by a person in familial/custodial authority, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(8)(b).

47. As set forth above at paragraphs 26-30, Defendant committed this crime during the statutory period.

48. A CIMT requires a culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct. *Zarate v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 26 F.4th 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2022).

49. Fla. Stat. § 794.011(8)(b) requires knowing and willful conduct. *State v. Griffin*, 268 So.3d 929, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). It also required, at the time of Defendant's

offense, a finding that Defendant sexually penetrated a minor victim over which he was in a position of familial or custodial control to the victim. *See* Fl. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 11.6 (2012).

50. “Willful” is a sufficiently culpable mental state, *see Cano v. U.S. Att’y Gen.*, 709 F.3d 1052, 1054 (11th Cir. 2013), and sexually penetrating a minor individual over which the perpetrator has a special relationship of familial or custodial control is reprehensible, *see Morales-Garcia v. Holder*, 567 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Otherwise non-morally turpitudinous conduct targeted at a victim with whom the defendant has a special relationship may transform a crime into one involving moral turpitude”).

51. As set forth above at paragraphs 26-30, based on an offense date of July 20, 2007, Defendant was also convicted of second-degree sexual battery, victim over twelve years old but less than eighteen years old, without consent, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5).

52. As set forth above at paragraphs 26-30, Defendant committed this crime during the statutory period.

53. Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5) is a general intent statute and requires knowing and willful conduct. *Statler v. State*, 349 So.3d 873, 879-85 (Fla. 2022). It also required, at the time of Defendant’s offense, Defendant sexually penetrated a minor 12 or older but less than 18 without consent.

54. “Willful” is a sufficiently culpable mental state, *see Cano*, 709 F.3d at 1054, and sexually penetrating a minor 12 or older but less than 18 without consent is reprehensible, *see United States v. Contreras*, 739 F.3d 592, 595 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5) is a crime of violence); *Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland*, 96 F.4th 670, 681 (4th Cir. 2024) (“The BIA, too, has long considered nonconsensual sexual conduct to be morally reprehensible”).

55. Because Defendant committed a CIMT during the statutory period, to which he later admitted and for which he was convicted, Defendant was barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) from showing that he had the good moral character necessary to become a naturalized U.S. citizen.

56. Because Defendant was not a person of good moral character, he was ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).

57. Because he was ineligible to naturalize, Defendant illegally procured his citizenship, and this Court must revoke his citizenship, as provided for by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

COUNT II

ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF NATURALIZATION (Lack of Good Moral Character – Unlawful Acts)

58. To be eligible for naturalization, Defendant was required to establish that he was a person of good moral character during the statutory period, here, from April 5, 2002 (five years before he filed his Form N-400) until July 25, 2008 (when he naturalized). 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a).

59. Defendant could not establish the requisite good moral character for naturalization because he committed unlawful acts during the statutory period that reflected adversely on his moral character, and there were no extenuating circumstances that would lessen his guilt. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii).

60. Specifically, as set forth above in paragraph 25, Defendant signed a written rights waiver form and gave a sworn statement to the Sunrise Police Department admitting that 



 through October 16, 2009.

61. As set forth above at paragraphs 26-30, for this conduct, and based on an offense date of July 20, 2007, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony sexual battery of an individual 12 or older but less than 18 by a person in familial/custodial authority, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(8)(b), and felony sexual battery, victim over twelve years old but less than eighteen years old, without consent, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(5).

62. Defendant committed these crimes during the statutory period, as set forth above in paragraphs 46-47 and 51-52.

63. Defendant's sexual battery of a minor 12 or older but less than 18, while in a familial/custodial position over that minor, and the underlying conduct, adversely reflected upon Defendant's moral character.

64. Defendant's sexual battery of a minor victim over twelve years old but less than eighteen years old, without consent, and the underlying conduct, adversely reflected upon Defendant's moral character.

65. Defendant cannot establish extenuating circumstances with regard to the acts underlying his convictions under Fla. Stats. §§ 794.011(8)(b) and 794.011(5) that would render his conduct less reprehensible or tend to mitigate his guilt. He therefore cannot avoid the regulatory bar on establishing good moral character found in 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii).

66. The regulatory "unlawful acts" bar on establishing good moral character found in 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) applies to Defendant regardless of whether the statutory CIMT bar (set forth in Count I) also applies.

67. Defendant's unlawful conduct precluded him under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) and 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) from showing that he had the good moral character necessary to become a naturalized U.S. citizen.

68. Because Defendant was not a person of good moral character, he was ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).

69. Because Defendant was ineligible to naturalize, he illegally procured his naturalization, and this Court must revoke his citizenship, as provided for by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

COUNT III

ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF NATURALIZATION (Lack of Good Moral Character – False Testimony)

70. To be eligible for naturalization, Defendant was required to establish that he was a person of good moral character during the statutory period, here, from April 5, 2002 (five years before he filed his Form N-400) until July 25, 2008 (when he naturalized). 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a).

71. Defendant was statutorily precluded from showing that he was a person of good moral character because he gave false testimony, under oath, during the statutory period, for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, specifically naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(vi).

72. During the statutory period, Defendant provided false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit when he swore, under oath, during his March 6, 2008 naturalization interview, that he had never committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested, as set for above in paragraphs 13-17.

73. Defendant's testimony was false because he subsequently provided a sworn statement to police admitting that he 

 in July 2007, conduct for which he was later convicted under Fla. Stat. §§ 794.011(8)(b) and 794.011(5) as alleged in paragraphs 25-30.

74. During the statutory period, Defendant provided false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit when he swore, under oath, during his March 6, 2008 naturalization interview, that he had never given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit, as set forth above in paragraphs 13-17.

75. Defendant's testimony was false because, as alleged in paragraphs 14-17, and paragraphs 72-73, he falsely stated he had never committed a crime for which he had not been convicted.

76. Defendant's testimony on each of the foregoing issues was knowingly false and for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, namely naturalization.

77. Because Defendant provided false testimony under oath for the purpose of obtaining his naturalization, he was barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) from showing that he had the good moral character necessary to become a naturalized U.S. citizen.

78. Because Defendant was not a person of good moral character, he was ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).

79. Because he was ineligible to naturalize, Defendant illegally procured his citizenship, and this Court must revoke his citizenship, as provided for by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

COUNT IV

PROCUREMENT OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP BY CONCEALMENT OF A MATERIAL FACT OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION

80. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), this Court must revoke Defendant's citizenship and cancel his Certificate of Naturalization because he procured his naturalization by concealment of a material fact and by willful misrepresentation.

81. As set forth above, during the naturalization process, Defendant willfully misrepresented and concealed that he [REDACTED] [REDACTED] acts that he later admitted to in sworn statement, and for which he was convicted under Fla. Stat. §§ 794.011(8)(b) and 794.011(5).

82. Specifically, Defendant represented during his naturalization interview that he had never knowingly committed any crime or offense for which he had not been arrested, despite knowing that such representations were false and misleading.

83. Defendant also represented during his naturalization interview that he had never given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit, despite knowing that his representation was false and misleading.

84. Defendant knew the representation that he had never knowingly committed any crime or offense for which he had not been arrested were false because, starting in July 2007, he [REDACTED] as he later admitted in a sworn statement to police, and for which he was convicted under Fla. Stat. §§ 794.011(8)(b) and 794.011(5).

85. Defendant knew the representation that he had never given false or misleading information to any U.S. Government official while applying for any immigration benefit was false because he signed Part 13 of his Form N-400, swearing his statements during his naturalization interview were true and correct, after providing his false statement that he had never committed any crime for which he had not been arrested.

86. Defendant's misrepresentations were material to his naturalization because the disclosure of his sex crimes would have had a natural tendency to influence USCIS's decision

whether to approve Defendant's Naturalization Application as they related to statutory eligibility criteria for such benefit.

87. Had Defendant disclosed the truth about his criminal conduct, USCIS would have discovered his statutory ineligibility for naturalization and could not have approved his application or administered the oath of allegiance.

88. Defendant thus procured his naturalization by willful misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, and this Court must revoke his citizenship pursuant to the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests:

1. A declaration that Defendant illegally procured his citizenship;
2. A declaration that Defendant procured his citizenship by concealment and willful misrepresentation of material facts;
3. Judgment revoking and setting aside Defendant's naturalization and canceling Certificate of Naturalization No.  effective as of the original date of the certificate, July 25, 2008;
4. Judgment forever restraining and enjoining Defendant from claiming any rights, privileges, benefits, or advantages related to U.S. citizenship that he obtained as a result of his July 25, 2008, naturalization;
5. Judgment requiring Defendant to surrender and deliver, within ten days of the entry of judgment against him, his Certificate of Naturalization and any copies thereof in his possession – and to make good faith efforts to recover and immediately surrender any copies

thereof that he knows are in the possession of others – to the Attorney General or his representative, including undersigned counsel;

6. Judgment requiring Defendant to surrender and deliver, within ten days of the entry of judgment against him, any other indicia of U.S. citizenship (including, but not limited to, U.S. passports, passport cards, and Enhanced Drivers Licenses, whether valid or expired), and any copies thereof in his possession – and to make good faith efforts to recover and then surrender any copies thereof that he knows are in the possession of others – to the Attorney General or his representative, including undersigned counsel; and

7. Judgment granting the United States such other relief as may be lawful and proper in this case.

Dated: July 31, 2026

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/s/ Matthew J. Feeley

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION**

CASE NO. 1:26-cv-25174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CANTAVE PREVILON,

Defendant.

**EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF
COMPLAINT TO REVOKE NATURALIZATION**

- A. Affidavit of Good Cause of Joseph B. Malone, Special Agent, U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (July 22, 2026)
- B. Form I-797C Notice of Action (December 18, 2007)
- C. Form N-400 Application for Naturalization (April 5, 2007)
- D. Form N-455 Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony (July 9, 2008)
- E. Certification of Naturalization (July 25, 2008)
- F. Cantave Previlon Signed Rights Waiver and Sworn Statement (October 22, 2009)
- G. Information, *State of Florida v. Previlon*, Broward County Case No. 11006686CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., April 18, 2011)
- H. Disposition, *State of Florida v. Previlon*, Broward County Case No. 11006686CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., February 10, 2010)