

Joye Wiley (CSB #191156)
jw@wileyjobson.com
Wiley & Jobson, LLP
P.O. Box 459
Berkeley, CA 94701
Tel.: (415) 627-9161

Attorneys for Petitioner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Arana-Chavez,

Petitioner,

vs.

Warden, California City Immigration
Processing Center, et al

Respondents.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-05323

FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

1. Petitioner, Victor Adolfo Arana-Chavez., (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Chavez”) petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to remedy his unlawful detention by Respondents. Petitioner states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

2. Petitioner, by and through undersigned appointed counsel, hereby files this amended petition for writ of habeas corpus to compel his immediate release from the immigration jail where he has been held by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The amended petition also adds the following Respondents: Markwayne Mullin, Director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States; and Sergio Albarran, the San Francisco Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). It also corrects the Acting Director of ICE to David J. Venturella.
3. Mr. Arana-Chavez petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to remedy his unlawful detention by Respondents. Petitioner states as follows:
4. At the time of his arrest in June 2026, DHS took the position that any noncitizen who entered without a visa is ineligible for a bond hearing. This is contrary to law and a drastic change from decades of precedent and procedure, and now Ninth Circuit authority. Because of the government’s extreme (and unlawful) position in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the U.S. constitution, Petitioner’s detention was unlawful and immediate release is necessary.
5. In addition, Petitioner has been provided no documentation regarding the legal authority for his detention. Upon information and belief, Respondents arrested him without any warrant and without following the statutory and regulatory process required for an arrest.

- 1 6. Likewise, Petitioner has not been provided any documentation that a
2 custody determination has been made pursuant to regulatory authority.
3 Petitioner has not been provided a bond hearing or redetermination hearing.
4 He has no remedy to assert his liberty interest other than by means of this
5 habeas petition.

6 **JURISDICTION**

- 7 7. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the
8 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq and the
9 Administrative Procedures Act.
10 8. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas
11 corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), the Administrative Procedures
12 Act, and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension
13 Clause).
14 9. This court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. §
15 2241 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et. seq., the
16 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Immigration and Nationality Act,
17 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).

18 **VENUE**

- 19 10. Venue is proper because Petitioner is in Respondents' custody in an
20 immigration detention facility in California City, California, which is within
21 the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of California. Respondents are
22 employees or officers of the United States, acting in their official capacity.
23 There is no real property involved in this action. For these reasons, venue is
24 proper before this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

25 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243**

- 26 11. The court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order
27 to show cause (OSC) to the Respondents "forthwith," unless the petitioner
28 is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the court

1 must require Respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good
2 cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

3 12. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in
4 protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been
5 referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional
6 law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all
7 cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400
8 (1963).

9 13. Petitioner is “in custody” for the purpose of § 2241 because Petitioner is an
10 immigration facility detained by Respondents.

11 **PARTIES**

12 14. Petitioner is currently detained at the California City detention facility.

13 15. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the Department of
14 Homeland Security (“DHS”) and is sued in his official capacity. The
15 Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with the administration and
16 enforcement of immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

17 16. Respondent Todd Blanche is the acting Attorney General of the United
18 States and is sued in his official capacity as the head of the Department of
19 Justice. The Attorney General is responsible for the fair administration of
20 the laws of the United States.

21 17. Respondent David J. Venturella is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
22 and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and is sued in his official capacity. ICE is
23 responsible for the detention of Petitioner.

24 18. Respondent Sergio Albarran is the Field Office Director for U.S.
25 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal
26 Operations in San Francisco, California, which covers the California City
27 detention facility, and is sued in his official capacity.

19. The Warden is the Facility Administrator of the California City Detention Center where Petitioner is being held and is sued in their official capacity. The Warden oversees the day-to-day operations of the detention facility and acts at the direction of Respondents Mullin, Blanche, Venturella, and Albarran. The Warden is the custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

20. Petitioner is a 26-year old native and citizen of Guatemala who has resided in the U.S. for 4 years. Prior to his detention he resided in the state of Utah with his long-term partner and 7-year-old son.¹ He is the breadwinner of the family, and was a laborer for a concrete company prior to his arrest. His partner and child depend on him financially.

21. His partner and son are in removal proceedings and have an I-589 asylum application pending with the immigration court. If his family is approved for asylum, he will be able to receive the same asylum benefit as a derivative.²

22. Petitioner has no criminal history. On or about June 11, 2026, Petitioner was pulled over by local law enforcement, allegedly for a minor traffic violation. However, the authorities arrested him, took him into custody, and handed him over to immigration authorities.

23. On approximately June 22, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the California City facility.

24. To date Petitioner has no paperwork from Respondents in his possession. Upon information and belief, he was not presented with a warrant for his arrest, a custody determination notice and an opportunity to request a custody re-determination, or a notice to appear.

¹ The undersigned attorney obtained the personal facts that are relayed in this Petition from the Petitioner. Ex. 1, Declaration of Joye Wiley.

² Although not yet legally married, the couple intends to do so.

25. This Court is the only neutral arbiter for Petitioner. The Trump administration is rebuilding the EOIR into a political body for implementation of his political goals of mass deportations. There have been mass firings of immigration judges based on their viewpoints.³ The administration has reportedly instructed immigration judges who remain on the bench to ignore district court decision.⁴ Ad campaigns by the Respondents have referred to EOIR judges as “deportation judges” in a recruitment push to hire more officials to carry out the administration’s deportation campaign.⁵ Indeed, a *New York Times* investigative piece reports that the pressure on IJs to deny bond is “overt” and that judges are required to inform a supervisor every time a bond is granted.⁶

26. Petitioner cannot receive relief from a neutral arbiter without intervention of this Court. He brings this action for judicial intervention to compel his release from unlawful detention.

///
///
///

³ Ana Ley, *Trump Administration Fires 8 Immigration Judges in New York*, N.Y. TIMES, December 1, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/01/nyregion/immigration-judges-fired-trump.html>

⁴ Practice Advisory, ACLU, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, USC GOULD, December 3, 2025, [2025.12.03 - Draft Bautista Practice Advisory_final.pdf](https://www.uscgo.org/2025/12/03/draft-bautista-practice-advisory-final.pdf)

⁵ “*Trump administration is hiring ‘deportation judges,’ Noem Says*,” USA TODAY, November 21, 2025, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2025/11/21/kristi-noem-deportation-judges/87392684007/>

⁶ Nicholas Nehamas, Allison McCann, Steven Rich, Jasmine Ulloa, Hamed Aleaziz, “How Trump Purged Immigration Judges to Speed Up Deportations,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 9, 2026. (“Teresa Riley, the chief immigration judge, has received daily reports about bond rulings, according to a Justice Department official. Her office has sometimes emailed judges asking for an explanation about their decisions to grant bond, three people said. Ms. Riley declined to comment... One current judge said the “pressure to deny bond is overt.” The judge said that there was a requirement to inform a supervisor every time bond was granted, underscoring how closely the administration was monitoring decisions.”) <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/09/us/politics/trump-miller-immigration-judges-purge.html>

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

**RESPONDENTS' DETENTION OF PETITIONER IS UNLAWFUL
UNDER THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS**

27. As Courts in this district have held, and as the Ninth Circuit recently confirmed, § 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens who, like Petitioner, have resided in the U.S. for several years. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, No. 25-6842, Slip Op. at 25 (July 30, 2026). *See also, Luna Cruz v. Warden of the Golden State Annex*, No. 1:26-CV-04584 (VC), 2026 WL 1898916, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2026) (“Courts throughout this Circuit, including this Court, have found that . . . § 1225(b)(2)” does not apply “to individuals—like Petitioner—who have lived in the country for many years”).

28. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” Petitioner’s removal hearings are presumably held under § 1229a, which “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

29. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months or years.

30. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec 216 (BIA 2025). There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without

admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

31. Upon information and belief, Petitioner was arrested under this flawed reasoning, although this position has been rebuked in thousands of cases nationwide and now the Ninth Circuit.

32. Because Petitioner was apparently arrested under this flawed interpretation of the statute and without consideration of his individual circumstances, his arrest was unlawful, and he must be released.

PETITIONER'S WARRANTLESS ARREST VIOLATES THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS

33. Even though he has been provided no documentation stating the authority for his arrest and detention, Petitioner assumes, *arguendo*, that he is being detained under § 1226(a). If that is the case, Petitioner has not received the process that § 1226(a) requires.

34. Section 1226(a) “authorizes detention only ‘[o]n a warrant issued’ by the Attorney General leading to the alien’s arrest.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 302 (2018). “[T]he warrant must be issued *before* the alien is arrested and taken into custody.” *Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons*, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1023 (C.D. Cal.2025). In short, “a warrant is a necessary condition to justify discretionary detention under section 1226(a),” and unless an exception applies,⁷ “a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a)” without one. *Sergio P. v. Bondi*, 2026 WL 497290, at *2(D. Minn. Feb. 23, 2026) (cleaned up); *see Urias v. Semaia*, 2026 WL

⁷ There is a limited exception pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) allowing arrest “only where the alien ‘is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.’” *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012). To invoke this exception, the immigration officer must have “probable cause” to believe that the noncitizen is likely to escape. *Urias v. Semaia et al.*, 2026 WL 1710375, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2026). No such argument would be remotely plausible here given that Petitioner was in state custody when he was detained.

1 1710375, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2026); *Djiwaje v. Bondi*, 2026 WL
2 926753, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2026). Respondents have produced no such
3 pre-arrest warrant.

4
5 35. Just as an arrest under § 1226(a) must be preceded by a warrant, a warrant
6 must be preceded by the issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). *See*
7 *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 407 (explaining the “federal statutory structure” under
8 which once an NTA is issued, the Attorney General may then issue a
9 warrant where appropriate, followed by lawful arrest under the warrant).
10 Respondents’ own regulations—which they are required to follow, *see Bui*
11 *v. INS*, 76 F.3d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1996); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033,
12 1046 n.22 (9th Cir. 1999)—commit them to the same sequence.

13 36. Respondents issue warrants of arrest pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236.1. That
14 regulation provides that “[a]t the time of issuance of the notice to appear,
15 or at any time thereafter...the respondent may be arrested and taken into
16 custody under the authority of Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest.” 8 C.F.R. §
17 236.1(b) (emphasis added).

18 37. Respondents presented no arrest warrant to Petitioner, and at the time of
19 this filing he has received no documentation regarding the charges against
20 him. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest was not in accordance with the law.

21 **DETENTION WITHOUT NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE**
22 **HEARD VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND THE INA**

23 38. Immigration detention is a form of civil confinement that “constitutes a
24 significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”
25 *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 4253 (1979).

26 39. He has also received no notification of the custody determination that was
27 made, nor given an opportunity to request a redetermination of that custody
28 determination.

1 40. First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in his own liberty that is
2 unquestionably undermined by Respondents' decision to detain him. The
3 amount of time he has spent in the United States—four years—underscores
4 the gravity of its loss. *See Xinhai H., v. Robbins*, No. 1:26-CV-02622-TLN-
5 CSK, 2026 WL 983176, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026) (holding so about a
6 petitioner who has been at liberty in the United States since 2024) Second,
7 the risk that Petitioner has been erroneously deprived of this liberty interest
8 is considerable. Because civil immigration detention is “nonpunitive in
9 purpose and effect,” a “special justification” must outweigh Petitioner’s
10 protected liberty interest for his detention to comport with due process.
11 *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Here, a neutral adjudicator has yet to consider
12 the question of whether Petitioner must remain detained, and he has already
13 been in custody for 6 weeks and counting.

14 41. A post-deprivation hearing provided by Respondents is not sufficient to
15 cure the violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. At this stage,
16 immediate release—not a bond hearing—is required. *See Feng v. Lyons*,
17 No. 1:26-CV-00235-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 472635, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19,
18 2026) (ordering immediate release because “[p]rovision of a bond hearing
19 after months of detention without the opportunity to seek release on bond
20 cannot be said to satisfy due process”).

21 42. Petitioner has resided in the U.S. for four years, is employed, and has a
22 partner and child who rely upon him for their wellbeing. He was provided
23 no process or opportunity to be heard prior to his detention, and there is no
24 evidence that Respondents considered any evidence regarding his flight risk
25 or danger to the community when they detained him.

26 43. Respondents also acted arbitrarily and capriciously by detaining him
27 without any evaluation of his flight risk or danger to the community. With a
28 proper evaluation, Respondents should have considered that Petitioner has

no criminal history, is the breadwinner of his family and was employed at the time of his arrest, and has a partner and child that are known to authorities and in an immigration process of which Petitioner can be a beneficiary. Upon information and belief, Respondents made no meaningful assessment of Petitioner's flight risk or danger to the community when they detained him, but rather detained him under a blanket policy of mass mandatory detention for all.

ELECTRONIC MONITORING WOULD BE ANOTHER FORM OF ILLEGAL DETENTION

44. The placement of electronic monitors, such as ankle monitors, and accompanying restrictions have been found to constitute a significant deprivation of liberty. *Palacio v. Hermosillo*, C25-1983-RSM-MLP, 2025 WL 4033287, W.D. WA (December 22, 2025) (Finding that the placement of an ankle monitor without procedural safeguards violated due process.) See also, *A.B.D., C.C.S., v. Cammilla Wamsley, et al* Civ. No. 6:25-cv-02014-AA, 2026 WL 178306, D.OR, (January 1, 2026) (Determining that supervision measures such as ankle monitors are "custody" and Petitioners may be granted habeas relief from the on-going restraints on their liberty.); *Khabazha v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement*, 25-CV-5279-JMF, 25 WL 3281514, S.D.NY (November 25, 2025) (Ordering the removal of ankle monitor and other restrictions on liberty).

45. Petitioner had no electronic monitoring devices when he was illegally detained.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS THE PROPER REMEDY.

46. Courts have the power and discretion under federal habeas to fashion a wide range of appropriate relief. *Garcia v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 3466312, (D.R.I, December 3, 2025) [quoting *Peyton v. Rowe*, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67(1968)] . "Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention." *Munaf v.*

1 *Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of
2 course, release.” *Id.*; see *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)
3 (based on statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law
4 history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
5 custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of
6 the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). The Ninth Circuit has
7 likewise explained that “the purpose of habeas remedies is to ‘put the
8 [petitioner] back in the position he would have been in if the [constitutional]
9 violation never occurred.’” *Lujan v. Garcia*, 734 F.3d 917, 935 (9th Cir. 2013)
10 (citation omitted). Petitioner requests that he be released immediately.

11 47. In addition, courts have found that immediate release is the proper remedy for
12 a warrantless arrest. *J.A.C.P. v. Wofford*, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
13 Oct. 27, 2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is improper because there is no
14 evidence in the record that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Since the
15 Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
16 petitioner’s immediate release is justified.” (cleaned up); *Mayen v. Warden*,
17 *California City Detention Ctr.*, 2026 WL 1158217, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
18 2026) (ordering petitioner’s immediate release as a remedy for failure to issue
19 a warrant prior to detaining petitioner, rejecting respondents’ argument that a
20 bond hearing was the proper remedy).

21 48. Courts have also found that immediate release is appropriate where a
22 petitioner was improperly detained, as here, pursuant to the Respondents
23 misapplication of § 1225(b) and where the government made no showing of
24 flight risk or danger to the community. See, e.g., *Bernal v. Albarran*, 2025
25 WL 3281422 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).

26 49. In addition, the Executive Office for Immigration Review is not able to
27 provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing due to its politicization.

28 50. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that he be released immediately.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of the INA

51. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

52. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who entered the country prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

53. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT TWO

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process

54. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

55. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process protects “all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693; accord *Flores*, 507 U.S. at 306.

1 56. Due process requires that government action be rational and non-arbitrary.
2 See *U.S. v. Trimble*, 487 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 57. Here, Respondents have chosen to detain Petitioner in an arbitrary manner
4 and not based on a rational and individualized determination of whether he
5 is a safety or flight risk, in violation of due process. Because no
6 individualized custody determination has been made and no circumstances
7 indicate that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community,
8 Respondents' detention violates his right to procedural due process.

9 **COUNT THREE**

10 **Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act – 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

11
12 58. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the
13 preceding paragraphs.

14 59. Under the APA, a court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action”
15 that is an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

16 60. The “touchstone of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review” is “reasoned decision
17 making.” *Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue*, 926
18 F.3d 1061, 1080 (9th Cir. 2019)(quoting *Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State*
19 *Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co*, 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).

20 61. To survive an APA challenge, the agency must articulate “a satisfactory
21 explanation” for its action, “including a rational connection between the
22 facts found and the choice made.” *Dep’t of Com. v. New York*, 139 S. Ct.
23 2551, 2569 (2019) (citation omitted).

24 62. Respondents' detention of Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
25 discretion, and contrary to law. There is no indication that Respondents
26 made any individualized determination in their decision to detain Petitioner.

27 63. In addition, they failed to follow even the basic procedures of notice and
28 process required by their regulations when they detained Petitioner.

COUNT FOUR

**Violation of the INA and Implementing Regulations Requiring a Warrant
for Arrest**

64. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

65. Section 1226(a) “authorizes detention only ‘[o]n a warrant issued’ by the Attorney General leading to the alien’s arrest.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 302 (2018). Respondents issue warrants of arrest pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236.1. That regulation provides that “[a]t the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time thereafter...the respondent may be arrested and taken into custody under the authority of Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b) (emphasis added). The arresting officer also makes an initial custody determination pursuant to 8 CFR. 236.1(c)(8)

66. Upon information and belief, none of these procedures were properly followed, and Petitioner’s arrest was unlawful.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner requests that this court:

- (1) Accept jurisdiction over this action;
- (2) Issue the writ of habeas corpus and order Respondents to show cause, within three days of Petitioner filing this petition, why the relief he seeks should not be granted; and set a hearing on this matter within five days of Respondents’ return on the order to show cause (see 28 U.S.C. § 2243);
- (3) Order Petitioner’s immediate release;
- (4) Order Respondents not to re-detain Petitioner without at least 7 days notice and without a hearing before a neutral arbiter;

(5) Order that Respondents return Petitioner's documents, identifications, and belongings;

(6) Order that Respondents not fit Petitioner with an ankle monitor or other electronic monitoring device as that would be a continuation of Respondents' illegal detention;

(8) Award reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), 5 U.S.C. § 504, or any other applicable law;

(9) Grant any other relief that the court may deem just and proper.

Date: August 6, 2026

Respectfully submitted,
// Joye Wiley

Joye Wiley
Wiley & Jobson
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am Petitioner's attorney. As the Petitioner's attorney, I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: August 6, 2026

/s/ Joye Wiley

Joye Wiley
Attorney for Petitioner