

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

C.D.E.C.	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	No. 1:26-cv-06321
v.	)	
	)	
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of Homeland	)	
Security;	)	
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., Secretary of	)	
Health and Human Services;	)	
ANGIE SALAZAR, Acting Director of the Office	)	
Of Refugee Resettlement;	)	
DAVID SINSKI, Chief Executive and Vision	)	
Officer of Heartland Human Care Services,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

COMES NOW C.D.E.C., the Petitioner, represented by his undersigned Pro Bono attorneys, and very respectfully requests that this Honorable Court issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ordering his immediate release.

Introduction

1. C.D.E.C., the Petitioner, is a 16-year-old immigrant child whom Respondents have detained for over four months since he entered the United States in January of this year. Respondents have separated C.D.E.C. from his paternal uncle, who resides in this country, is a U.S. citizen and can sponsor him. C.D.E.C.'s uncle successfully completed his sponsor application in February, yet ORR has failed to release C.D.E.C. to his uncle, who wants to relieve C.D.E.C.

from his isolation. The Petitioner seeks release from government detention into the custody of his uncle.

2. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) mandates that the government “promptly” release the children in its custody to the “least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2). C.D.E.C.’s uncle can provide that setting. By retaining custody of C.D.E.C. and separating him from his uncle, who can safely provide for him, Respondents are violating the TVPRA and C.D.E.C.’s Fifth Amendment right to due process.

3. The TVPRA requires that Respondents act on sponsors’ applications from close relatives such as an uncle—within 10 days. 45 C.F.R. § 410.1205(b); 45 C.F.R. § 410.1001. Despite his uncle’s suitability, Respondents have unjustifiably kept C.D.E.C. in their custody and away from his uncle for over **4 months**, to the detriment of Petitioners’ mental and emotional health.

4. Respondents have delayed release based on a newly created policy promulgated without notice and comment that requires sponsors to furnish proof of a social security number or individual taxpayer identification number (“ITIN”), which C.D.E.C.’s alternate caregiver (“ACG”) did not have. C.D.E.C.’s ACG has a pending application to obtain an ITIN as of April 1, 2026.

5. The delay in C.D.E.C.’s release and the new policy, requiring an ITIN, is unlawful. The delay contravenes the time limit provisions of the TVPRA. The delay and new policy also violate C.D.E.C.’s Fifth Amendment rights: they unnecessarily impede familial association, prolong groundless institutional custody, are not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and are procedurally flawed. Lastly, the new policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as it was promulgated without notice and comment, it is arbitrary and capricious, and the government failed to consider the impact of the policy on unaccompanied minors or their reliance on the previous policy.

6. Therefore, pursuant to § 2241, C.D.E.C. respectfully requests that he be released into the custody of his sponsor forthwith.

I. Parties

7. The Petitioner C.D.E.C., is a minor immigrant child from Guatemala who entered the United States on or about January 14, 2026, and was unaccompanied by an adult when he was detained. C.D.E.C. has been detained by Respondents for over four months.

8. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and as such, has authority over the detention of C.D.E.C. as a custodian. He is sued in his official capacity.

9. Respondent Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). He has authority over the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), a division of the HHS that directly oversees, controls, and manages the detention of unaccompanied immigrant children (“UIC”), including C.D.E.C., and as such is a legal custodian. He is sued in his official capacity.

10. Respondent Angie Salazar is the Acting Director of the ORR, and as such, directly oversees, controls, and manages the detention of UIC, including C.D.E.C. She is a custodian of the Petitioner. She is sued in her official capacity.

11. Respondent David Sinski is the Chief Executive and Vision Officer of Heartland Human Care Services in Illinois, the immediate custodian of C.D.E.C. He is sued in his official capacity.

II. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Exhaustion

12. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution

(Suspension Clause). Federal questions in this case arise under the TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232, and its implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 410.1200-1210, and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 *et seq.*

13. The Petitioner has standing to sue based on his separation from his uncle and his detention in institutional custody. *See, e.g., J.E.C.M. v. Lloyd*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 559, 579 (E.D. Va. 2018) (finding standing to challenge ORR policies based on the ongoing invasion of due process rights, including separation from family, that resulted from the policies); *Jacinto-Castamon de Nolasco v. ICE*, 319 F. Supp. 3d 491, 502 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding indefinite separation of families not a compelling government interest therefore giving the plaintiff standing to sue). Further, the Petitioner remains detained due to new proof of SSN/ITIN requirements. Thus, he is injured by that requirement. *See FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. 367, 384-85 (2024) (finding injury to an individual through regulation of third-party individuals or businesses when there is “a predictable chain of events leading from the government action to the asserted injury”).

14. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et. seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et. seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

15. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 1391(b)(2) because the Petitioner is in Respondents’ custody in this district. *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493–500 (1973) (venue lies in the judicial district where petitioners are held). Venue is also proper in this district because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Petitioner’s claims occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 1391(e).

16. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. First, under the TVPRA, Congress has not mandated that Petitioner exhaust any administrative remedies. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (holding unless Congress has mandated exhaustion, it is not required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Second, a requirement that Petitioner exhaust an administrative challenge to detention would be futile. *See Carr v. Saul*, 593 U.S. 83, 93 (2021) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required if effort is futile); *Honig v. Doe*, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988) (same). Respondents have not supplied any reason for Petitioner to believe that an administrative challenge will lead to his prompt release. Third, the interests of Petitioner in his immediate release, permitting him to reunify with his uncle, and the delay that further exhaustion would necessitate, outweigh any discretionary judicial interest in exhaustion.

III. Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2243

17. The Court must grant a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or issue an order to show cause (“OSC”) to the Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted “forthwith,” unless it appears from the application that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If a writ or an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* at 14. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Ruby v. United States*, 341 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir.1965).

IV. Case-Specific Facts

18. C.D.E.C. is a 16-year-old child from Guatemala. Federal officials detained C.D.E.C. on or around January 14, 2026, and deemed him a minor unaccompanied by an adult. Petitioner has been held in the custody of ORR or their delegated agents since his capture. He is currently detained in Chicago, Illinois, under a contract with Heartland Human Care Services. Since his detention began, Respondents have severely restricted Petitioner's freedom to move and otherwise engage in normal activities for children. Separated from family, his physical health and mental well-being have significantly deteriorated.

19. Petitioner's uncle, who is a U.S. citizen, has completed a Family Reunification Application ("FRA"), seeking to sponsor him. While he is a suitable sponsor, who has complied with all application requirements and has successfully completed a home study, he has no basis to expect Respondents to grant his application. This is because a new policy requires C.D.E.C.'s ACG, another uncle, to provide an ITIN. If an ACG cannot provide an ITIN, ORR policy allows for them to "apply for and later provide their ITIN" The policy states that if a sponsor "appl[ies] to receive an ITIN during the pendency of their sponsorship application" then "they must provide ORR with proof of their application and all IRS correspondence pertaining to the request **within 15 calendar days** of submitting their ARI, along with the IRS CP565 Notice letter confirming issuance of the ITIN, once received." The ACG applied for an ITIN on April 1, 2026, and the application is still pending. There has been a request submitted to ORR to waive this requirement, and this request is still pending, **almost two months later**.

20. On or around February 4, 2026, Petitioner's uncle submitted Part 1 of the sponsor application and completed a fingerprint appointment. By February 20, 2026, ORR had received the Sponsor's and ACG's signed authorizations for release of information, Sponsor's proof of address, Sponsor's fingerprint results, and ACG's identification. By the end of March Sponsor had

completed a home study and Petitioner had completed a home study interview. Given the complete sponsor application, proof of address, proof of income, providing valid identification, home study, background checks, and DNA test, ORR was able to verify his sponsors' identity, relationship to C.D.E.C., and ensure their ability to safely provide for him. C.D.E.C.'s uncle can provide the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of C.D.E.C. and his physical and mental health. Yet, based on Respondents' new policy requiring an ITIN, which bears no relation to the well-being and safety of C.D.E.C., ORR has created a new obstacle to C.D.E.C.'s reunification with his uncle. Petitioner has no reason to believe that ORR will ever approve his uncle's FRA, needlessly keeping C.D.E.C. separated from his uncle and in custody.

21. Apart from this one documentation issue—entirely unrelated to the ACG's fitness or ability to care for his nephew—C.D.E.C.'s uncle has complied with every ORR request promptly and in good faith. Nevertheless, ORR will not release C.D.E.C. to his uncle. C.D.E.C. remains isolated. Because his uncle lives five hours from Illinois, he has not been able to visit C.D.E.C. Moreover, communications with C.D.E.C. have been restricted. C.D.E.C. needs family reunification now.

22. Petitioner seeks immediate release from institutional custody. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Petitioner seeks only release into the custody of his uncle. He is a close blood relative to Petitioner's father, and a person “whose protective relationship with children our society has also traditionally respected.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1993). This court has authority to condition Petitioner's release to the sponsor until Respondents reach a new decision about sponsorship that does not violate the law.

V. Legal Framework

23. The care and custody of UIC is governed by a legal framework consisting primarily of two statutes, a settlement agreement, and federal regulations. The two statutes are the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). The settlement agreement is the 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement, which is binding on the pertinent federal agencies. The federal regulations consist of the Foundational Rule, promulgated pursuant to the TVPRA.

A. The Flores Settlement Agreement

24. The Flores Settlement Agreement arose from a lawsuit filed by a group of immigrant children challenging their detention and seeking to be released to family members and/or sponsors within the United States. *See Flores v. Sessions*, 862 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the history of the *Flores* litigation); *see also Flores v. Sessions*, Case No. CV 85-4544-DMG (C.D. Cal., July 9, 2018) (affirming the terms of the Flores Settlement Agreement). In 1997, the plaintiff children entered into a consent decree with the federal government that created a nationwide policy governing the custody and release of immigrant children by immigration authorities that applies to this case. *Flores v. Reno*, No. CV 85-4544, Settlement Agreement (“Flores Settlement Agreement”).

25. Among other things, the Flores Settlement Agreement requires: (a) release without unnecessary delay, (b) release to an adult caregiver, with parents, legal guardians, and other family members given priority, and (c) placement in the “least restrictive setting” appropriate to the minor’s needs. Flores Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 11, 14.

26. Paragraph 14 of the Flores Settlement Agreement requires in relevant part:

Where the INS [ORR] determines that the detention of the minor is not required either to secure his or her timely appearance before the INS or the immigration

court, or to ensure the minor's safety or that of others, the INS [ORR] shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay, in the following order of preference, to:

- a. a parent
- b. a legal guardian
- c. an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent)
- d. an adult individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian as capable and willing to care for the minor's well-being in a declaration signed under penalty of perjury before an immigration or consular officer

See also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1232(c)(2)(A), 1232(c)(3) (codifying the Flores Settlement Agreement).

27. At the time of the Flores Settlement Agreement, a single agency—the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)—administered the custody, detention, and deportation of immigrant children.

B. The Homeland Security Act of 2002

28. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”) abolished the INS and transferred the care of UIC, like C.D.E.C. to ORR. 6 U.S.C. §§279(a), (b)(1)(A), (g)(2). Section 462 of the HSA extended the key terms of the Flores Settlement Agreement to all UIC. This was a deliberate choice by Congress to put the care of children in the hands of a non-law enforcement agency like ORR, with a mandate to make decisions in the children's best interests. 6 U.S.C. §§ 279(a), (b)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). Congress recognized that a child's welfare should not be in the hands of a law enforcement agency. It tasked ORR with safeguarding the welfare of children, most of whom have been victims of traffickers. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2)(B).

29. When UIC arrive at the U.S. border or are found in the U.S. without papers, they are placed in the care of ORR. 45 C.F.R. § 410.1101(a). The HSA requires ORR to provide for the children in their custody, organize their care and placement, and protect the children from those who might seek to victimize them. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A) & (b)(2)(A)(ii). In making placement determinations for UICs in their custody, 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(C), ORR must ensure that these

children “are protected from smugglers, traffickers, or others who might seek to victimize or otherwise engage them in criminal, harmful, or exploitive activity.” *Id.* § 279(b)(2)(A)(ii).

C. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008

30. The TVPRA, enacted in 2008, reaffirmed the congressional directive for HHS to “establish policies and programs to ensure that [UIC] in the United States are protected from traffickers and other persons seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(1). This law codified a portion of the *Flores* settlement, a class-action decree approved in 1997 to expedite family reunification of detained UIC. *See Flores v. Sessions*, 862 F.3d 863, 869-71 (9th Cir. 2017). In recognition of the trauma that the separation from family and isolation in detention centers causes children, the TVPRA directs ORR to **promptly** place these minors “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (Emphasis added).

31. In December 2022, the minority members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs published a report identifying concerns with ORR’s sponsor vetting process. Minority Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affs., 117th Cong., *Federal Care of Unaccompanied Children: Minors Remain Vulnerable to Trafficking and Abuse* (2022). In particular, the report noted that ORR’s completion of background checks had significantly declined despite an increase in the number of UIC entering the United States over the same period. *Id.* at 34.

32. Also in 2024, the HHS Office of Inspector General found widespread failures in ORR’s completion of case files and follow-through during the sponsor vetting process. *See generally*, Off. of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., OEI-07-21-00250, *Gaps in*

Sponsor Screening and Followup Raise Safety Concerns for Unaccompanied Children (2024) (“OIG Report”). OIG recommended developing additional safeguards. *See* OIG Report at 22.

D. The Federal Regulations

33. In 2024 ORR promulgated the Unaccompanied Children Program Foundational Rule (“Foundational Rule”), formalizing preexisting ORR procedures. 45 C.F.R. pt. 410 (2024). The Foundational Rule recognizes and incorporates the Flores Settlement Agreement, including favoring release of UIC where ORR determines that “detention of the unaccompanied child is not required either to secure the child’s timely appearance before [DHS] or the immigration court, or to ensure the child’s safety or that of others,” ORR will release the child to a suitable sponsor. *Id.* § 410.1201(a).

34. Potential sponsors must submit an application and be vetted by ORR to determine their suitability. *Id.* § 410.1202(a). The regulations direct ORR to assess whether a sponsor “is capable of providing for the unaccompanied minor’s physical and mental well-being.” 45 C.F.R. §410.1202(b). The suitability assessment must include determining the sponsor’s ability to care for the child, verifying the sponsor’s identity and relationship to the child, and assessing the suitability of the sponsor’s home. *Id.* § 410.1202(b). In addition, ORR “may require such components as ... verification of the employment, income, or other information provided by the potential sponsor as evidence of the ability to support the child, interviews with members of the household, [and] a home visit or home study.” *Id.* § 410.1202(c). Potential sponsors and any adult residents in the potential sponsor’s home may also be required to submit their fingerprints for background checks. *Id.*

35. “ORR has found that 10 to 20 days is generally sufficient to thoroughly assess

sponsor suitability and notes that the additional time may be needed for a home study or other background checks in some cases”.¹ 89 Fed. Reg. 34384, 34447. In recognition of this, 45 C.F.R. § 410.1205(b) provides that once the ORR determines that a sponsor is qualified and can provide a setting that is in the best interest of the child, ORR must “release a child from its custody without unnecessary delay.” *Id.* at §410.1201. When the sponsor is a close relative, an unnecessary delay is more than 10 days. *Id.* at §410.1205(b).

36. If ORR denies release, it must appoint a “neutral and detached decision maker” to “promptly” notify the potential sponsor. *Id.* § 410.1205(c). The decision must explain the reason for the denial, and (unless safety reasons or the law forbids it) the evidence upon which the denial is based. *Id.* The decision is subject to *de novo* review, with the opportunity for legal representation, at an administrative appellate hearing. *Id.* § 410.1206.

E. Recent Changes in ORR Document Policies

37. On February 27, 2026, without following normal rule-making procedures, or providing an explanation, ORR changed its Background Check Requirements to include proof of an SSN/ITIN. Prior to this change, proof of an SSN or ITIN was not required.

38. This change followed a series of drastic changes ORR has made to its policies. In March 2025, without following normal rule-making procedures, providing an explanation, or updating relevant agency documents, ORR drastically amended its proof of identification requirements for potential sponsors as set forth in its Policy Guide. Specifically, ORR eliminated certain forms of foreign-issued identification documents, such as passports,² birth certificates, and

¹ Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 410.1204, a home study is only required where a child is a victim of human trafficking, has a disability that requires particularized services or treatment, certain instances where the child has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse, or where the potential sponsor presents a clear risk of abuse, maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking. None of these are applicable to Petitioner.

² ORR only is accepting foreign passports that have a U.S. visa stamp. *See* Office of Refugee Resettlement, ORR Unaccompanied Alien Children Bureau Policy Guide: Section 2, <https://acf.gov/orr/policy-guidance/unaccompanied-children-program-policy-guide-section-2> (last accessed Apr. 2, 2026).

national ID cards, from its list of acceptable identification documents for prospective UIC sponsors.³

39. Additionally, ORR began requiring potential sponsors to provide specific documents to establish proof of address and began requiring all sponsors to provide evidence of their relationship with the child (even if they also complete DNA testing). ORR Policy Guide § 2.2.4. ORR added to the section that “Federal staff must exhaust all available avenues to verify the authenticity of birth certificates.” *Id.* This can cause significant delays for children from countries of origin where there is no functioning consulate in the United States.

40. On March 17, 2025, ORR began requiring DNA testing of all children and potential sponsors who claim to be biologically related to the child they are applying to sponsor.⁴ In practice, sponsors and children have reported having to wait weeks or even months for a DNA appointment.⁵

41. On April 15, 2025, ORR once again, without following normal rule-making procedures, providing an explanation, or updating relevant agency documents, amended the Policy Guide by implementing new proof of income requirements. While before, potential sponsors could employ a variety of methods to demonstrate their financial ability to support a UIC, the amended guide now requires potential sponsors to submit either (1) the previous year’s tax return; (2) paystubs from the last 60 days; or (3) a letter from the sponsor’s employer verifying salary and employment.⁶

42. On May 28, 2025, ORR removed the sponsor application packet from public access,

³ Office of Refugee Resettlement, ORR Unaccompanied Alien Children Bureau Policy Guide: Section 2, <https://acf.gov/orr/policy-guidance/unaccompanied-children-program-policy-guide-section-2> (last accessed Apr. 2, 2026).

⁴ ORR Field Guidance #27, https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/FG-27_-_DNA_Testing_Expansion.pdf.

⁵ The Unraveling of ORR: A Quick and Calculated Undoing of a System Intended to Protect Children, National Center for Youth Law (2025), https://youthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/ncyl_the-unraveling-of-orr_sept2025_final.pdf.

⁶ Office of Refugee Resettlement, ORR Unaccompanied Alien Children Bureau Policy Guide: Section 2, <https://acf.gov/orr/policy-guidance/unaccompanied-children-program-policy-guide-section-2.2.4> (last accessed Apr. 2, 2026).

which was previously on their website. After this point, a potential sponsor can only receive the application directly from ORR.

43. On July 9, 2025, ORR began requiring potential sponsors to attend in-person appointments with ORR personnel to verify identification documents, sometimes with ICE present. This is not formally set out in ORR policies but ORR's internal email states that "federal law enforcement agencies 'may be present to meet their own mission objectives, which include interviewing sponsors.'" <https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/08/politics/exclusive-federal-law-enforcement-to-begin-interviewing-unaccompanied-migrant-children-in-government-custody>.

44. Taken together, these new requirements ("ORR New Document Policies") represent an insurmountable obstacle for sponsors and a bar to child reunification with qualified sponsors. The ORR New Document Policies create hurdles that are not required by federal regulations, which do not list proof of SSN or ITIN as necessary to determine a sponsor's suitability. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 410.1202.

45. ORR's own child welfare experts have long stated that best practice is to release UIC to their families within 30 days of admission. *See, e.g.,* Exhibit 21 Part 2, *J.E.C.M. v. Hayes*, 18-cv-903 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 242-13. In fiscal years 2021 through 2024, the average length of time a child remained in ORR custody ranged from 27 to 33 days. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of Refugee Resettlement, *Unaccompanied Alien Children Average Monthly Data: Average Length of Care*, <https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data> (last updated August 18, 2025).

46. In 2025, the average length of time a child remained in ORR custody was 117 days or 4 months. *See* <https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data>. Though this number is alarmingly

high when compared to fiscal years 2021 through 2024, it still includes the months prior to the implementation of the ORR New Document Policies. Since the implementation of the proof of SSN/ITIN requirements, the average length of time a child remained in ORR custody has ballooned to 209 days in March and 215 days in April. *Unaccompanied Alien Children: Average Monthly Data*, Office of Refugee Resettlement, <https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data> (last accessed May 28, 2026).

F. Restrictions Upon UIC in ORR Custody

47. Children in ORR detention have their freedoms significantly restricted. Children in ORR custody waiting to be released to a sponsor do not attend local schools. Instead, children are provided with “educational hours” in the detention center itself.

48. Children in ORR custody are not able to freely have phone calls or visits with their family members, as many, like C.D.E.C., are held in districts located away from where their family members live.

49. Children in ORR custody are granted only 1-hour per day of “large muscle activity” and 1-hour per day of “structured leisure time activities” which are increased to three hours on non-school days. ORR Rule 3.3.

50. Research has shown that separation from a caregiver for even a short period of time can be traumatic for a child.”⁷ “Children often suffer from ‘detention fatigue’, particularly during long stays in ORR custody, with symptoms of increased stress, anxiety, behavior issues, and self-

⁷ Punishing Trauma, Incident Reporting and Immigrant Children in Government Custody, Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights and National Immigrant Justice Center (September 2022), <https://www.theyoungcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/20220921FINALIRREPORT-HYPERLINKED-1.pdf> (citing S.A. MacLean et al., “Characterization of the mental health of immigrant children separated from their mothers at the U.S.–Mexico border,” *Psychiatry Research*, April 2020, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31522891/>).

harm or suicidal ideation.”⁸ “Children in [longer stays] may experience psychological distress, stemming from a sense of helplessness, limited agency, and lack of trauma-informed care.”⁹

51. Children in ORR custody “are restricted in their autonomy and agency, they have little knowledge or control over requirements or processes for release, they feel helpless in their circumstances. . . .”¹⁰ and “quite universally want to be released to family. . . and are being held against their will in restrictive settings” in which even the “least restrictive” setting in ORR custody still feels quite restrictive to children. *Id.*

52. Mental health clinicians document that a child’s mental health often deteriorates as the length of stay in ORR custody increases. *Id.* at 12. Research and reports tell us that “children’s experiences in immigration custody are associated with increases in psychological distress and functional impairment” including “increases in depression, anxiety, traumatic stress symptoms, and behavioral difficulties—sometimes leading to thoughts, urges, and acts of self-harm and suicidality—associated with children’s experiences of immigration detention.” *Id.* at 16.

53. C.D.E.C. has suffered such detention fatigue and has exhibited symptoms of increased stress and anxiety, as he is having a hard time understanding why other children are released and he remains detained. Petitioner’s uncle cannot visit C.D.E.C. because C.D.E.C. is in government custody in Illinois, and Petitioner’s uncle lives in Michigan, over five hours away.

⁸ *Id.* citing Acting Inspector General Joanne M. Chiedi, HHS Off. of the Inspector General, Care Provider Facilities Described Challenges Addressing Mental Health Needs of Children in HHS Custody, Sept. 2019, 12, <https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-18-00431.pdf>.

⁹ *Id.* (citing Exhibit C: Declaration of Ryan Matlow: Psychological Evaluation of Children and Conditions at Fort Bliss Emergency Intake Site 2, *Flores v. Garland*, No. 85-cv-04544-DMG-AGR, ECF No. 1161-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2021) (describing “clinically significant psychological harm” suffered by children in prolonged detention in Fort Bliss)).

¹⁰ The Unraveling of ORR: A Quick and Calculated Undoing of a System Intended to Protect Children, National Center for Youth Law (2025), 17, https://youthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/ncyl_the-unraveling-of-orr_sept2025_final.pdf.

There are also connectivity issues for phone calls in the shelter, which makes it hard for C.D.E.C. to speak to family members in his home country.

G. Prolonged Detention of Immigrant Children

54. Due process therefore requires “adequate procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention—to mitigate the risks of danger to the community and to prevent flight. *Id.*; *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003). In *Demore* the Court emphasized that, for detention under the statute to be reasonable, it must be for a brief period of time. *See, e.g.*, 538 U.S. at 528 (detention permissible because, as compared to *Zadvydas*, “the detention here is of a much shorter duration”). Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence that “[w]ere there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.” *Id.* at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

55. Following *Zadvydas* and *Demore*, federal courts have found either the immigration statutes or due process require a hearing for adult noncitizens subject to unreasonably prolonged detention pending removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Black v. Decker*, 103 F.4th 133, 147-58 (2d Cir. 2024); *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F. 4th 19, 28-35 (1st Cir. 2021).

56. The Flores Settlement Agreement, TVPRA, and the Foundational Rule all establish that the detention of immigrant children requires greater care and more restrictions upon the government than that of adult detention such as taking into account their best interest. In this

regard, the TVPRA regulations mandate that UIC be released promptly to the least restrictive setting that is in their best interest. In the case of a close relative such as an uncle, promptly is no more than two weeks.

57. C.D.E.C. has now been detained for over **four months**.

H. The Impact of the ORR New Document Policies

58. The inevitable result of the new policies is that sponsors and ACGs who are undocumented in the U.S., have only foreign-issued identification documents, or do not have U.S. work authorization, cannot satisfy the new policies, despite being otherwise qualified to sponsor family members. Since March of 2025, the Respondents have applied the ORR New Document Policies to sponsors as “regulated parties,” resulting in the continued separation of children from their families and their continued and lengthy institutional detention.

59. In truth and in fact, the ORR New Document Policies seek to transform ORR from a program to support child welfare into an immigration enforcement program that fosters the removal of undocumented sponsors and UIC. ORR’s refusal to release C.D.E.C. makes this clear.

60. Moreover, even where the sponsor is a U.S. citizen, like in this case, the new requirements hinder reunification by requiring that not only the sponsor, but also every member of the sponsor’s household, and ACGs ages 18 and older, comply with the ORR New Document Policies. This bears no relation to the ORR’s mandate under the TVPRA.

61. The ORR New Document Policies are keeping C.D.E.C. and UIC like him detained and these Policies are unlawful. Under the TVPRA, ORR’s function is to act in the best interest of the child; not to prioritize immigration enforcement. The TVPRA also directs ORR to place children in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child. The ORR New Document Policies prevent ORR from complying with its congressional mandate.

62. The new ORR policies have resulted in longer detentions for minors and less reunifications with relative-sponsors—precisely the opposite of the intent of the TVPRA. Between October 2025 and February 2026, the length of the detention for the over 2300 minors in ORR custody increased from 166 to 195 days.¹¹ ORR releases almost none of the children in its custody. Significantly, only about **5% or 119 of the 2348 minors** in detention in February 2026 were released to sponsors; **2,229** remained detained.¹² In March 2026 only **228 or about 10%** of the 2173 minors in detention were released to sponsors; **1,945 remained in custody**. *Id.* The average number of days in ORR custody for UIC released to sponsors in March 2026 was six and a half months. *Id.* UIC who remain in ORR custody have been detained an average of seven months. *Id.* ORR is blatantly violating its mandate.

63. Petitioner submits that the ORR New Document Policies have caused him to remain isolated from his family and remain in detention though he has an eligible sponsor willing to take him into his custody and care for him, which would be in C.D.E.C.'s best interest.

64. The current administration has made no secret of its wish to deport as many undocumented persons as possible, including UIC. The ORR New Document Policies are just one more tactic to achieve this goal. In practice, under the ORR New Document Policies, UIC are removed from their communities, isolated from their families, placed in facilities unequipped to ensure their welfare and effectively coerced into waiving their rights. Immigration Enforcement Agents are brought into sponsor interviews to intimidate potential sponsors and coerce them into desisting in their applications. These goals are plainly unlawful and a blatant violation of the TVPRA, which requires ORR to act in the best interest of the child; not to engage in immigration

¹¹ See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Data, available at https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data#book_content_1 (last accessed March 19, 2026).

¹² See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Data, available at https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data#book_content_9 (last accessed March 19, 2026).

enforcement. Even the appearance of coordination between ORR and immigration-enforcement personnel intimidates undocumented but qualified sponsors into not sponsoring loved ones, contrary to the TVPRA's stated and sole goal of ensuring the children's best interest and welfare.

i. The All Writs Act

65. The All Writs Act provides that “the Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). *See also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson*, 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002). Thus, pursuant to the All Writs Act, this Court has authority to order the government not to transfer Petitioners out of its jurisdiction. *See L.Z.R. v. Mullin*, Case No. 26-04371, Dkt. No. 3 (ordering the government not to remove Petitioners from the jurisdiction of the United States and not to transfer them outside of the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to the Court's authority under the All Writs Act) (citing *A.A.R.P. v. Trump*, 605 U.S. 91, 97 (2025) (per curiam); *United States v. United Mine Workers of Am.*, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947)); *Z.O. v. Mullin*, Case No. 26cv04794, Dkt. No. 8 (same).

VI. Claims for Relief

COUNT I

Violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
8 U.S.C. § 1232

(Custody must be in the “least restrictive setting” in the “child's best interest”)

66. Petitioner incorporates paragraphs 1 to 65 by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

67. Through the ORR New Document Policies, the Respondents have kept the Petitioner in custody in violation of his rights under the TVPRA.

68. Through the Respondents' policy of having immigration-enforcement authorities participate in the sponsor-vetting process, the Respondents have kept the Petitioner in custody, further violating his rights under the TVPRA.

69. The TVPRA requires that Respondents place Petitioner in the least restrictive setting that is in his "best interest." 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). This is presumptively with "a suitable family member," who can provide for his physical and mental well-being. *Id.* ORR regulations affirm "that, generally, placement with a vetted and approved family member or other vetted and approved sponsor, as opposed to placement in an ORR care provider facility, whenever feasible, is in the best interests of unaccompanied children." 89 Fed. Reg. at 34440.

70. The ORR New Document Policies unnecessarily delay Petitioner's release into the custody of his sponsor as Petitioner's ACG cannot immediately provide an ITIN. This is despite the fact that the ACG can prove he is who he purports to be—the uncle of the Petitioner—and despite the uncontested fact that Petitioner's uncle can provide the least restrictive setting that is in the Petitioner's best interest. Therefore, according to TVPRA regulations, custody of Petitioner should be transferred to his uncle. 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201. Yet the Respondents refuse to release the Petitioner to his uncle based on the ORR New Document Policies, which are completely unrelated to Petitioner's "best interest" or the mandate of the TVPRA. Insofar as the ORR New Document Policies require proof of an SSN or ITIN from C.D.E.C.'s ACG, those New Document Policies are therefore unlawful.

71. The Respondents' policy of including immigration-enforcement officials in the vetting process also violates the Petitioner's rights under the TVPRA. Their inclusion has needlessly delayed reunification of his uncle with the Petitioner.

72. The ORR New Document Policies and ORR's inclusion of immigration officials in the sponsor-vetting process contravene not only the TVPRA but also ORR's own regulations. The TVPRA's regulations explicitly provide that the government may determine identity by using non-U.S.-issued documents: "ORR may consult with the issuing agency (e.g., consulate or embassy) of the sponsor's identity documentation to verify the validity of the sponsor identity document presented." 45 C.F.R. § 410.1202(b).

73. By conditioning release of Petitioner on proof of SSN or ITIN from Petitioner's ACG, Respondents are violating the Petitioner's rights under the TVPRA, because ORR custody is not the least restrictive setting that is the "best interest" of C.D.E.C.

74. The Petitioner is thus entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT II

Violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
8 U.S.C. § 1232
(Release must occur "promptly" and "without unnecessary delay")

75. Petitioner incorporates paragraphs 1 to 65 by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

76. Under the TVPRA, the government must release immigrant children in its custody "promptly." 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2). "Prompt" means "[d]one quickly, immediately, or at the right time; performed without delay" Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

77. Likewise, under TVPRA regulations, the Respondents must release immigrant children "without unnecessary delay," 45 C.F.R. §§ 410.1200, 1201.

78. These commands are strict: "without unnecessary delay" means that ORR shall ordinarily adjudicate a sponsorship application within 10 days for a close relative, 14 days otherwise. *Id.* § 410.1205(b). ORR may deny a sponsorship only if it determines that the sponsor

cannot provide for the “well-being” of the child or that placement with the sponsor would endanger the child or the community. *Id.* § 410.1205(a).

79. These regulations obligate ORR to release the Petitioner to his uncle unless the Respondents have notified the uncle of a decision that relies upon evidence subject to appellate challenge supporting a valid reason not to release. *Id.* §§ 410.1205-1206. Respondents have not done so.

80. By taking over 10 days to release Petitioner to his uncle, and by not supplying a valid, evidence-based decision for denying release, the Respondents are violating the Petitioner’s rights under the TVPRA.

81. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Petitioner is entitled to release.

COUNT III

Violation of the Fifth Amendment (Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process—Family Separation)

82. Petitioner incorporates paragraphs 1 to 65 by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

83. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

84. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects liberty against “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). The Government may not infringe upon fundamental liberty interests unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).

85. At the apex of this substantive protection is the right of children to live with their close family members. *See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (recognizing

a fundamental right “concerning family living arrangements”). Familial association is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected by the substantive component of due process. *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); *see also Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that close family member have a constitutional right to live together without government interference); *Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform*, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (“[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought . . . in intrinsic human rights.”); *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization” establishes the “strong tradition” of protecting families and allowing parents a primary role over “the nurture and upbringing of their children”; it is “an enduring American tradition.”); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal . . . that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”); *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State.”).

86. Government action seeking to break the familial bond “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Whether the focus is on the child or the adult family member, the interest of both in familial association is fundamental: Supreme Court jurisprudence has “extended this interest in raising children to caretakers in a child’s extended family, striking down an ordinance that limited occupancy of a single-family house to members of a nuclear family on the ground that “[d]ecisions concerning child rearing . . . long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives.” *Kerry v. Din*, 576 U.S. 86, 95 (2015) (quoting *Moore v. East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 949, 505-06 (1977)). Even if a requirement of proof of an SSN/ITIN might serve a valid government purpose in some contexts, it does not disqualify a capable family member from taking custody over a child.

87. ORR did not provide a compelling state interest to justify why proof of an ITIN is necessary.

88. Respondents' refusal to grant custody of C.D.E.C. to his uncle violates Substantive Due Process as guaranteed to him by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore, C.D.E.C. is entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT IV

Violation of the Fifth Amendment (Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process—Indefinite Detention)

89. Petitioner realleges the foregoing allegations and by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

90. “[T]he interest in being free from physical detention” by the state is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). A child’s interest in being free from confinement is no narrower than that of an adult. *In re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone”); *see also Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O’Connor, J. and Souter, J., concurring), quoting *Gault*, 387 U.S. at 13 (“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently [...] rejected the assertion that ‘a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody.’”). Further, “incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends.” *O’Connor v. Donaldson*, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). Thus, as a matter of substantive due process, the Petitioner has a liberty interest in freedom from *institutional* custody, even though minors are “always in some form of custody.” *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); *see Lucas R. v. Becerra*, No. 18-5741, 2022 WL 2177454, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2022) (finding that ORR policies for placing minors in more

restrictive facilities violated due process because minors have liberty interest in freedom from institutional custody).

91. The Petitioner's interest in freedom from institutional custody is particularly pronounced as his detention lengthens. The Supreme Court has warned that institutional detention of adults for six months or longer may deprive them of the liberty interest protected by due process unless the government supplies a detainee-specific justification. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

92. The Petitioner is a child who has been detained for over four months. To a child, over four months may appear even longer than for adults. Therefore, the substantive presumption from *Zadvydas* applies at least as strongly to C.D.E.C. Here, the government has not provided any detainee-specific justification for prolonging Petitioner's detention.

93. Courts have found that family separation and prolonged detention harm children. *See, e.g., Jacinto-Castanon de Nolasco*, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 502 (determining that family "[s]eparation irreparably harms plaintiffs every minute it persists"); *Andreiu v. Ashcroft*, 253 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 2001) (*en banc*). In view of this finding, ORR is obligated under the TVPRA to determine the suitability of a close family member for sponsorship "without unnecessary delay," that is within 14 days. 45 C.F.R. §410.1201. Failure to do so violates the TVPRA regulations and C.D.E.C.'s right to be free from unjustified detention.

94. Respondents have not identified a permissible justification specific to Petitioner, such as flight risk or dangerousness that justifies his continued detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690-91. ORR's ongoing and prolonged detention of Petitioner bears no reasonable relation to any government purpose. Petitioner has not committed any crime and is not a danger to himself or others. Petitioner's sponsor has demonstrated himself as a capable, and willing sponsor to care for

Petitioner, according to the requirements of law. Moreover, Sponsor is in fact capable, proper, and fit, and Petitioner presents no flight risk.

95. Respondents' reliance on the ORR New Documents Policies, the requirements of which are unnecessarily burdensome for Petitioner's ACG, resulted in Petitioner's prolonged and indefinite detention; and therefore, violates his Fifth Amendment right to liberty and freedom from unjustified institutional custody.

96. Respondents' continued detention of Petitioner under these circumstances violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, entitling him to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT V

Violation of the Fifth Amendment (Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process—Procedural Fairness)

97. Petitioner realleges the foregoing allegations and by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

98. The right to due process also contains a procedural component that constrains the process by which the government may deprive a person of a legally protected liberty interest. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Due process requires that the government not deprive an individual of their constitutional rights without meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral arbiter to protect against the risk of erroneous deprivation. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process also requires that government action be rational and non-arbitrary. *See U.S. v. Trimble*, 487 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2007).

99. The fairness of any governmental decision-making process involves a familiar balancing test: (1) assessing the private interests, that is, Petitioner's interest in family unity and freedom from institutional detention; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest

without added procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's countervailing interest. *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

100. Based on the balancing of these three factors, the ORR New Document Policies are unconstitutional, and Petitioner should be released.

101. First, as established, Petitioner's interest in his liberty is profound and clear. It is based on his constitutional right to familial association and freedom from institutional detention. It is also rooted in the TVPRA's assignment of nondiscretionary duties to the Respondents: The Respondents must release Petitioner from institutional custody unless "a suitable family member is not available to provide care." 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). They must also "promptly place[]" each child **in the least restrictive setting** that is in the child's the "best interest." *Id.* (Emphasis added). When, as here, constitutional and statutory dictates contain "specified substantive predicates" eliminating agency discretion, the beneficiaries—like the Petitioner—have a protected liberty interest. *See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989).

102. Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that constitutionally protected interest—the disqualification of an otherwise suitable sponsor—based on the ORR New Document Policies is high. The ORR New Document Policies delays custody to the Petitioner's uncle, even though his identity, relationship to the Petitioner, and ability to care for the Petitioner is not in doubt. Rather, ACG must take the burdensome step of obtaining an ITIN in order for Petitioner's uncle to gain custody.

103. Finally, the government's interest in retaining custody of the Petitioner at this point is low. By law, ORR's duty is *not* in enforcing immigration policy against others. Its duty is to safeguard the well-being of Petitioner. The government has and can continue to comply with its duty through the verification of foreign-issued identification documents, background checks,

fingerprint checks and DNA testing. In addition, it can verify a sponsor's or ACG's ability to care for a UIC without requiring an SSN or ITIN. Thus, the government's interest in the Petitioner's well-being requires his release from institutional detention and reunification with his uncle.

104. The Respondents detention of Petitioner based on the procedural requirements imposed by the ORR New Document Policies denies him a prompt and accurate resolution of his claims for release. Detention thus violates the Petitioner's rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment. He is entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT VI

Violation of the Fifth Amendment (Deprivation of Equal Protection)

105. Petitioner realleges the foregoing allegations and by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

106. Equal protection requires that the government supply a rational basis for treating undocumented aliens differently than documented aliens. *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 248 (1982).

107. The Respondents' refusal to grant custody of the Petitioner to his suitable uncle sponsor, based on the ACG's lack of proof of an SSN or ITIN, and despite him submitting proof of an ITIN application, is irrational where they would otherwise grant custody to the sponsor and has no relation to ORR's mandate under the TVPRA.

108. The ORR New Document Policies are irrational because the government can and does validate foreign-issued identification documents in a wide variety of immigration-related contexts. The government would accept or even require foreign-issued identification documents from any alien—including the sponsor of Petitioner—if he sought temporary protected status, non-immigrant visas, permanent residence, asylum, or an individual taxpayer identification number. Given the universal acceptance of foreign-issued identification documents elsewhere, the refusal

to accept them here to determine the eligibility of a sponsor violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating holders of U.S. issued identification documents differently from holders of foreign-issued identification documents without rational justification.

109. Because the ORR Document Policy is irrational, it violates the Petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection, entitling him to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT VII

Substantive Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(B)
(ORR New Document Policies are Arbitrary and Capricious and
in Violation of Constitutional Rights)

110. Petitioner realleges the foregoing allegations and by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

111. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., authorizes suits by “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” *Id.* § 702. The APA requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” *Id.* § 706(2)(A)-(B).

112. The ORR New Document Policies are final agency actions because they are “the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process” and determine “rights and obligations” and create “legal consequences.” *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). Final agency action is subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (13); *id.* § 706(2)(A); *see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 17 (2020).

113. The Supreme Court has instructed that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.*

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). An agency action is arbitrary or capricious if the agency “has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” *Zero Zone, Inc. v. United States DOE*, 832 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)).

114. In enacting the ORR New Document Policies, ORR failed to consider the impact of the policies on UIC like C.D.E.C. and their reliance on the previous policies.

115. Because ORR immediately implemented the ORR New Document Policies, which revised preexisting policies as well as conflicted with representations made on its FRA, it needed to “assess whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns.” *DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 33 (2020). ORR knew that the new document requirements would significantly impact children and their sponsors who acted in reliance on the previous documentation policies as well as pursuant to the representations by ORR on its FRA. The impact was particularly damaging to C.D.E.C. who traveled to the United States with the expectation that his uncle could sponsor him based on the previous documentation requirements. And in fact, C.D.E.C.’s uncle promptly applied to sponsor C.D.E.C., and but for the proof of ITIN requirement, C.D.E.C. would have been released into his custody. ORR changed the document requirements without warning and applied them to C.D.E.C.’s proposed sponsors.

116. ORR had an obligation to consider the impact its new policies would have before changing the *status quo*. Not only did it not consider its impact on UIC and their reliance on the

status quo, but it also failed to consider other less burdensome alternatives. *Cf. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 592 U.S. 414, 417 (2021) (applying arbitrary-and-capricious review to the FCC's weighing of a policy factor even though the FCC was not statutorily required to consider that factor).

117. The reasons advanced by ORR for its new document policy are wholly unsupported by the evidence. The government failed to provide a plausible explanation for the ORR New Document Policies; therefore, it necessarily follows that the new policies are unsupported by a rational explanation. *Cf. AlphaPharma, Inc. v. Leavitt*, 460 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

118. The ORR New Document Policies are so irrational that they cannot be ascribed to agency expertise. ORR added a proof of SSN or ITIN without any explanation, without waiting to lawfully update the FRA, and without any consideration for the reliance interests of sponsors and UIC, the impact on children's length of detention, or less burdensome alternatives to verify potential sponsors. These changes are arbitrary and capricious and violate C.D.E.C.'s substantive due process rights. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

119. The ORR New Document Policies are arbitrary and capricious. They result in denials of sponsorship based on failure to provide documentation that has no rational connection to ORR's mandate under the TVPRA. This is in direct contradiction to years of ORR policy and the Foundational Rule, without any reasoned explanation. Additionally, the ORR New Document Policies are arbitrary and capricious because, in adopting the new document requirements, Respondents failed to take into account important aspects of the problem such as the impact on children's length of stay in custody in direct controversy to the child's welfare and right to expedited family reunification. ORR has failed to articulate a reasoned explanation for its decision, failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the new requirements, failed to take into account

reliance interests, and offered no reasonable explanation for their decision other than pretextual explanations that run counter to other immigration policies. *See Angelica S. v. United States HHS*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 158, 173-175 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding at the preliminary injunction stage that it was substantially likely that the ORR new sponsorship documentation requirements were arbitrary and capricious because ORR provided little to no explanation as to how it weighed findings against relevant factors).

120. The ORR New Document Policies are in fact law enforcement policies that do not align with ORR's mandate under the TVPRA. Their intent is to keep children in custody by prohibiting family members, who are otherwise qualified, from serving as sponsors. But Congress removed UIC from the custody of a law enforcement agency and placed them in the custody of ORR, with a clear mandate that it prioritize the well-being of the children—not law enforcement.

121. Additionally, the ORR New Document Policies are contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and in violation of C.D.E.C.'s rights to familial association and freedom.

122. Petitioner has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of these unlawful policies implemented by Respondents, as alleged herein. Therefore, C.D.E.C. is entitled to be released to his sponsor under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

COUNT VIII

Procedural Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(ORR New Document Policies Promulgated Without Complying with Rule-Making Procedures)

123. Petitioner realleges the foregoing allegations and by reference as if they were stated and set forth herein.

124. The APA requires courts to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action taken “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). These rulemaking

procedures are required before engaging in actions that impact substantive rights. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553.

125. HHS is an agency, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), and ORR is a division of this agency.

126. Respondents promulgated the ORR New Document Policies, drastically changing their policy to require proof of an SSN or ITIN without following proper rulemaking procedures as required by the APA. This action resulted in unnecessary delays in Petitioner's reunification with his family and his prolonged detention and is a violation of the APA's rulemaking requirements. Therefore, C.D.E.C. is entitled to be released to his sponsor under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Requests For Relief

Petitioner respectfully urges that this court:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Declare that Petitioner's current detention is unlawful;
3. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner from custody to the custody of his sponsor forthwith;
4. Issue an Order prohibiting the Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside the district without the court's approval;
5. Prohibit the Respondents from requiring proof of ITIN documents from C.D.E.C.'s ACG, and from including immigration-enforcement officials in the sponsor vetting process;
6. Award Petitioner his attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and
7. Grant any further relief this court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Charles Roth

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