

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA- FORT MYERS DIVISION

YOHANY HERNANDEZ HERNANDEZ ,

Petitioner,

v.

GARRET J. RIPPA, Field Office Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
[OCHOPEE] Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Markwayne Mullin,
Secretary, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. Attorney
General Todd BLANCHE; EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW;
[ALLIGATOR ALKATRAZ], Warden of
[FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH].

Respondents.

Case No. 2:26-W-1718-KCD-KRH

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner [Yohany Hernandez Hernandez] has been incarcerated since [November 3rd 2025], over [SIX] months ago. Petitioner's detention became unconstitutional six months after the removal order in his case became administratively final on [May 3rd 2026] because removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, to vindicate Petitioner's statutory and constitutional rights and to put an end to his continued arbitrary detention, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2. Petitioner is from a country with which the United States does not have relations, Petitioner is stateless, DHS has determined that it will not remove Petitioner during the pendency of her/his petition for review, on which Petitioner has a strong likelihood of prevailing]. Absent an order from this Court, Petitioner will likely remain detained for many more months, if not years.

3. Petitioner asks this Court to find that his prolonged incarceration is unreasonable and to order his immediate release.

JURISDICTION

4. Petitioner is detained in civil immigration custody at [FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH] in [OCHOPEE, FL]. He has been detained since on or about [November 3rd 2025] He has not received an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge (IJ).

5. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I § 9, cl. 2 of the United States

Constitution (Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

7. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at OCHOPEE, FLORIDA which is within the jurisdiction of this District. Court for the [MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA]

8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to her claims occurred in this district, and no real property is involved in this action.]

PARTIES

9. Petitioner is a citizen of [CUBA], was ordered removed following proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He has been detained for over [SIX] months and is currently detained at [FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH]. He is the custody, and under the direct control, of Respondents and their agents.

10. Respondent; Markwayne Mullin is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Mullins is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention. Respondent Mullin is empowered to carry out any administrative order against Petitioner and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

11. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA. DHS oversees ICE and the detention of noncitizens. DHS is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

12. Respondent Todd Blanche is sued in his official capacity as the Attorney General

of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, he has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and oversees the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA.

13. Respondent [MULLIN] is sued in his official capacity as the Director of the [OCHOPEE] Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent [MARKWAYNE] is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

14. Respondent [GARRET J. RIPPA] is the Warden of [FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH], and /he has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to a contract with ICE to detain noncitizens and is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

15. Petitioner is a [47] year-old citizen of [CUBA]. ["Petitioner's significant equities weigh strongly in favor of relief, including his close family ties in the United States—among them his 21-year-old son serving in the Armed Forces, his grandchild, and his 17-year-old son who suffers from Crohn's disease—as well as his continuous employment history, ownership and tax compliance through  and his successful incorporation into society since his release under supervision on May 2, 2018. Petitioner has consistently complied with all conditions of his Order of Supervision and has remained current on all tax obligations. In contrast, if returned to Cuba, Petitioner faces a substantial likelihood of imprisonment, torture, and severe human rights abuses due to the documented lack of fundamental human rights protections and the Cuban government's treatment of individuals in his circumstances."]

Proceedings Before the [Immigration Court and BIA / Department of Homeland Security]

16. “Petitioner has demonstrated longstanding compliance with all immigration requirements and conditions imposed upon him. After being detained at Stewart Detention Center for approximately 131 days beginning on December 22, 2017, he was released under an Order of Supervision on May 2, 2018. From that date forward, Petitioner fully complied with the terms of supervision, consistently appearing for required check-ins, maintaining continuous employment, paying taxes through his business [REDACTED] and successfully integrating into society and the well-being of his family and community. However, when Petitioner appeared for a routine supervision appointment on November 3, 2026, as he had always done without incident, he was unexpectedly detained and transferred between multiple detention facilities, including ‘Alligator Alcatraz,’ El Paso, and facilities in Louisiana, before being returned to ‘Alligator Alcatraz,’ where he remains detained to this date.”

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the Court either must grant the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause to Respondents, unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief. If the Court issues an order to show cause, Respondents must file a response “within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, *not exceeding twenty days*, is allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (emphasis added).

18. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government

custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

19. This fundamental due process protection applies to all noncitizens, including both removable and inadmissible noncitizens. *See id.* at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Both removable and inadmissible [noncitizens] are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious.”). It also protects noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United States and who face continuing detention. *Id.* at 690.

20. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) authorizes detention of noncitizens during “the removal period,” which is defined as the 90-day period beginning on “the latest” of either “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final”; “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order”; or “[i]f the [noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the [noncitizen] is released from detention or confinement.”

21. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits detention “beyond the removal period” of noncitizens who have been ordered removed and are deemed to be a risk of flight or danger, the Supreme Court has recognized limits to such continued detention. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court held that “the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits [a noncitizen’s] post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United States.” 533 U.S. at 689. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” *Id.* at 699.

22. In determining the reasonableness of detention, the Supreme Court recognized that, if a person has been detained for longer than six months following the initiation of their removal period, their detention is presumptively unreasonable unless deportation is reasonably

foreseeable; otherwise, it violates that noncitizen's due process right to liberty. 533 U.S. at 701.

In this circumstance, if the noncitizen "provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." *Id.*

23. The Court's ruling in *Zadvydas* is rooted in due process's requirement that there be "adequate procedural protections" to ensure that the government's asserted justification for a noncitizen's physical confinement "outweighs the 'individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.'" *Id.* at 690 (quoting *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court only recognizes two purposes for civil detention: preventing flight and mitigating the risks of danger to the community. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528. The government may not detain a noncitizen based on any other justification.

24. The first justification of preventing flight, however, is "by definition . . . weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Thus, where removal is not reasonably foreseeable and the flight prevention justification for detention accordingly is "no longer practically attainable, detention no longer 'bears [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.'" *Id.* (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). As for the second justification of protecting the community, "preventive detention based on dangerousness" is permitted "only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91.

25. Thus, under *Zadvydas*, "if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute." *Id.* at 699–700. If removal is reasonably foreseeable, "the habeas court should consider the risk of the

[noncitizen's] committing further crimes as a factor potentially justifying the confinement within that reasonable removal period." *Id.* at 700.

26. At a minimum, detention is unconstitutional and not authorized by statute when it exceeds six months and deportation is not reasonably foreseeable. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701 (stating that "Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months" and, therefore, requiring the opportunity for release when deportation is not reasonably foreseeable and detention exceeds six months); *see also Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

27. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein.

28. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any "person" of liberty "without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V.

29. Petitioner has been detained by Respondents for over [SIX] months. Over [6] months of this prolonged detention has taken place *after* his removal period began.

30. Petitioner's removal order became administratively final on [November 3rd 2026]. The removal period began on that day and thus elapsed on [May 3rd 2026].

31. Petitioner's prolonged detention is not likely to end in the reasonably foreseeable future. Where, as here, removal is not reasonably foreseeable, detention cannot be reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating removal and thus violates due process. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690, 699–700.

32. For these reasons, Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT TWO
Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

33. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein.

34. The Immigration and Nationality Act at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) authorizes detention "beyond the removal period" only for the purpose of effectuating removal. 8 U.S.C.

35. § 1231(a)(6); *see also Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699 ("[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute."). Because Petitioner's removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his detention does not effectuate the purpose of the statute and is accordingly not authorized by § 1231(a).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Declare that Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a);
- (3) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately;

Respectfully submitted,

Yohany Hernandez Hernandez

Dated: May 6, 2026