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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

CESAR ADOLFO RODAS LORENZO,

A# 

Petitioner,

v.

**WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, et al.,**

Respondents.

Case No.: 2:26-CV-1667-JES-NF

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241

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INTRODUCTION

This Memorandum of Law is submitted in support of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Petitioner Cesar Adolfo Rodas Lorenzo, a native and citizen of Guatemala who has lived continuously in the United States for over twenty-three (23) years. Petitioner has been continuously detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") at the Glades County Detention Center since April 11, 2026, without ever being afforded an individualized bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. His detention is unlawful, and he is entitled at minimum to prompt individualized custody review.

Petitioner is the father of a United States citizen child, the long-term partner of a co-resident, the primary financial provider for a household of five children, and the loyal employee of the same landscaping company for over thirteen (13) years. He has a pending asylum application that he filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services more than a year before his detention. He holds a valid Florida driver license, a Social Security number with DHS work authorization, and a verifiable address of record with USCIS. He has no criminal history. His pending asylum application, filed in April 2025, reflects his good-faith engagement with the immigration system. The only contact he has ever had with law enforcement in over two decades of U.S. residence is a single minor traffic stop in 2026, which led directly to his current detention.

Petitioner's case is not unusual. It is, regrettably, paradigmatic of a class of cases sweeping the federal courts since 2025: long-term U.S. residents — with strong family ties, no criminal records, and pending immigration relief — who have been seized after minor traffic stops and placed in detention without any bond hearing, on the theory that they are "applicants for admission"

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) rather than persons "in" the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). That theory has now been rejected by the Eleventh Circuit.

On May 6, 2026 — only days before this Petition was filed — the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in *Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden and Cerro Perez v. AFOD*, Nos. 25-14065 & 25-14075 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026). On materially similar facts — noncitizens who entered without inspection, lived for years in Florida, were arrested following traffic stops, and were detained without bond — the Eleventh Circuit held that detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore that the petitioners were eligible for bond review under the immigration-detention framework applicable to § 1226(a). The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision is binding precedent in this District and strongly supports Petitioner's position on materially similar facts.

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court (1) order Respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within seven (7) days, with procedures consistent with due process and applicable law; or, in the alternative, (2) order his immediate release on reasonable conditions of supervision.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which authorizes federal district courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to persons held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The Supreme Court has long held that § 2241 habeas jurisdiction extends to noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their immigration detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003).

The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252, do not bar habeas review here. Petitioner does not challenge a removal order; he challenges the lawfulness and constitutionality of his physical detention. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1226(e) do not bar review of challenges to prolonged immigration detention). This Court therefore retains jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review the lawfulness of Petitioner's detention.

Venue is proper in this judicial district. Under the immediate custodian rule, a habeas petition under § 2241 must be filed in the federal district where the petitioner is physically detained. *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Petitioner is physically detained at the Glades County Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida, which lies within the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division. 28 U.S.C. § 89(b). The Warden of the Glades County Detention Center is the proper immediate custodian and a Respondent in this action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Petitioner's 23 Years of Continuous U.S. Residence

Petitioner Cesar Adolfo Rodas Lorenzo is a native and citizen of Guatemala, born on [REDACTED] in Coatepeque, Quetzaltenango. Pet. Ex. K (Guatemalan Birth Certificate); Pet. Ex. L (Guatemalan Passport). He entered the United States on January 28, 2003 — over twenty-three (23) years ago — without inspection at a place other than a designated port of entry. He has resided continuously in the United States since that time.

Petitioner's connection to the United States is not measured in months or years. It is measured in decades. He has lived nearly half of his life — and the entirety of his meaningful adult life — in Brevard County, Florida. His home, his family, his employment, his community, and his identity as a productive resident of the United States have all been built here over more than two decades.

B. Petitioner's U.S. Citizen Child and Family Ties

On June 25, 2024, Petitioner became the father of a United States citizen child, C [REDACTED] [REDACTED], born at Cape Canaveral Hospital, Cocoa Beach, Brevard County, Florida. Pet. Ex. A (Certified Florida Birth Certificate). Petitioner shares his home with his long-term partner Hasling Gisselle Perez Urbina, with whom he has been in a committed relationship for approximately five years, and a blended household of five children, including their U.S. citizen son. Pet. Ex. I (Declaration of Hasling Gisselle Perez Urbina).

Petitioner is the primary financial provider for the household. He pays the rent, the utilities, the children's needs, and the family's living expenses. Since his detention, his family has suffered serious financial and emotional hardship. His U.S. citizen infant son — under two years old — has been separated from his father for over a month.

C. Petitioner's Long-Term Employment and Community

For over thirteen (13) years, Petitioner has been continuously employed in the landscaping industry. For the past three years, he has worked full-time for [REDACTED] in Cocoa, Florida, owned by Mr. Christian Martinez. Pet. Ex. B (Notarized Employment Verification and Character Affidavit). Mr. Martinez has known Petitioner for thirteen years total, having previously worked alongside him before establishing his own business.

Mr. Martinez's sworn affidavit confirms that Petitioner has been compensated at approximately \$3,000 per month, has worked an average of forty (40) hours per week, and has consistently demonstrated himself to be "hardworking, dependable, and trustworthy." Pet. Ex. B. Most importantly, Mr. Martinez has confirmed in writing that he is ready and willing to immediately rehire Petitioner on a full-time basis upon his release. Id.

Petitioner's community ties are extensive and long-standing. Mr. Carlos Humberto Escobar Vasquez of Rockledge, Florida has known Petitioner for over twenty (20) years through church and community ties. Pet. Ex. C. Mr. Walter Jose Juarez has known Petitioner for approximately ten years through their shared church community. Pet. Ex. D. Ms. Blanca de León of Cocoa, Florida has provided a sworn declaration attesting to Petitioner's peaceful, law-abiding character. Pet. Ex. E.

D. Petitioner's Pending Asylum Application

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On April 18, 2025 — more than a year before his detention — Petitioner filed an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Pet. Ex. F-2 (USCIS Annual Asylum Fee Notice, Receipt Number [REDACTED]). His asylum application has been continuously pending since that date.

On September 23, 2025, USCIS received Petitioner's Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) under category C08 — the category for asylum applicants — and issued a Notice of Action (Form I-797C), Receipt Number [REDACTED] Pet. Ex. F-1. The Notice confirms Petitioner's status as a *Rosario v. USCIS* class member and his eligibility for work authorization based on his pending asylum application.

Petitioner is in active removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review. His next master calendar hearing is scheduled for May 28, 2026, at 9:00 AM before the Honorable Stuart A. Siegel, conducted via internet-based hearing (WebEx).

Petitioner has cooperated with the immigration system at every stage. He has filed asylum, paid filing fees, maintained a verifiable address with USCIS, holds a valid Florida driver license — which requires lawful-presence documentation under Florida law — and has a Social Security number with DHS work authorization. Pet. Ex. M (Social Security Card); Pet. Ex. N (Florida Driver License).

E. Petitioner's Detention Without a Bond Hearing

On a date in early 2026, Petitioner was stopped by local law enforcement in Florida for an alleged minor traffic violation. To Petitioner's knowledge, he has no other criminal history of any kind. He has never been arrested for any offense involving violence, drugs, weapons, or property crime. He has never been convicted of any crime.

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On April 11, 2026, ICE took Petitioner into federal custody. He was transferred to the Glades County Detention Center, where he has remained continuously detained. As of the date of this filing, Petitioner has been detained for approximately one month (over 30 days), and counting.

During his entire period of detention, Petitioner has not been afforded any individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge or any other neutral decisionmaker. No hearing has been held. No hearing has been scheduled. No mechanism for bond review has been made available to him. Petitioner has been informed that no bond hearing will be provided absent an order of this Court.

Petitioner's continued detention causes ongoing and irreparable harm. He has lost over a month of wages essential to his family's survival. His U.S. citizen son is being deprived of his father. His family is suffering severe financial and emotional hardship. His ability to prepare for his asylum case — the very legal claim that demonstrates his good-faith engagement with the immigration system — is severely impaired by detention.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 invokes the most fundamental writ in Anglo-American law. "*The writ of habeas corpus was preserved in the Constitution — the only common-law writ to be explicitly mentioned.*" *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). Habeas is "a remedy for unlawful executive detention" and is the principal vehicle by which federal courts review challenges to the legality of detention by federal officials. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).

This Court reviews Petitioner's habeas claims de novo, including all issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner's claim for relief proceeds in the following order. *First*, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review the lawfulness of Petitioner's detention. *Second*, as a *statutory* matter, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and he is therefore eligible for bond review under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. *Third*, in the alternative and as an independent ground, due process requires individualized custody review on the facts of this case. *Fourth*, if the Court orders a bond hearing, Petitioner respectfully requests appropriate procedural protections. *Fifth*, administrative exhaustion is excused.

I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GRANT HABEAS RELIEF.

This Court has clear jurisdiction to grant habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Three doctrines confirm this Court's authority.

First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that habeas review under § 2241 is available to noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their immigration detention. In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, the Court entertained habeas claims by noncitizens challenging post-final-order detention and applied the Due Process Clause to limit such detention. 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). In *Demore v. Kim*, the Court reaffirmed habeas jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to mandatory pre-removal-order detention. 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003). And in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Court confirmed that statutory limits on judicial review do not divest federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to immigration detention. 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018).

Second, the immediate custodian rule is satisfied. Petitioner is physically detained at the Glades County Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida, in the Middle District of Florida. *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). The Warden of the Glades County Detention Center is the proper immediate custodian and has been named as a Respondent.

Third, no jurisdictional bar applies. Section 1252 of the INA does not strip this Court of jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to detention. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 294. Section 1226(e) of the INA does not strip jurisdiction over claims that detention itself violates the Constitution. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 517. Petitioner does not challenge a removal order; he challenges the lawfulness of his physical detention. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

II. PETITIONER IS DETAINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), NOT 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO BOND REVIEW.

The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes two distinct detention frameworks. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) authorizes mandatory detention of "applicants for admission" — that is, noncitizens encountered at the border or port of entry seeking lawful entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226(a), by contrast, authorizes discretionary detention of noncitizens already "in" the United States pending removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Detention under § 1226(a) permits release on bond and provides for individualized custody review by an Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(d).

Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a). He has lived continuously in the United States for over twenty-three years. He was not arrested at a border, port of entry, or designated checkpoint. He was arrested in the interior of the United States, after more than two decades of continuous residence in the same community in Florida. Under the plain language of the INA, the structure of

the statutory scheme, and Eleventh Circuit precedent, his detention is governed by § 1226(a) — a conclusion that supports eligibility for bond review.

A. The Eleventh Circuit Recently Held on Materially Similar Facts That Interior Arrests of Unadmitted Aliens Proceed Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

On May 6, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided this question on materially similar facts. In *Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden* and *Cerro Perez v. AFOD*, consolidated under Nos. 25-14065 & 25-14075, the Eleventh Circuit considered the appeals of two noncitizens who had entered the United States without inspection, lived for years in Florida, were arrested following traffic stops, and were detained by ICE without bond hearings on the theory that they were "applicants for admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief and held that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does *not* authorize no-bond detention of unadmitted aliens encountered in the interior of the United States who were not seeking lawful entry when detained. The court held that the no-bond detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only where an applicant for admission is actually "*seeking admission*" — that is, pursuing lawful entry after inspection. On the facts before it, the court held that detention proceeded under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), preserving access to bond review.

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Hernandez Alvarez* is binding precedent in this Court. It strongly supports Petitioner's statutory claim and, in this District, is binding precedent on the controlling detention question. The material facts of *Hernandez Alvarez* closely track the facts here:

- **EWI Entry:** Like the petitioners in *Hernandez Alvarez*, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection.

- **Long-term Florida Residence:** Like the petitioners in *Hernandez Alvarez*, Petitioner has lived for years in Florida — in fact, for twenty-three years.
- **Arrest Following Traffic Stop:** Like the petitioners in *Hernandez Alvarez*, Petitioner was arrested following a traffic stop.
- **Detention Without Bond Hearing:** Like the petitioners in *Hernandez Alvarez*, Petitioner has been detained by ICE without any bond hearing on the asserted authority of § 1225(b).

The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning applies with full force to Petitioner. Under *Hernandez Alvarez*, his detention is governed by § 1226(a), and he is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

The Eleventh Circuit's holding is consistent with the structure of the INA and Supreme Court precedent. In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Supreme Court described § 1225 as primarily concerning the inspection and admission process at the border, while § 1226 "generally governs" the arrest and detention of aliens already present in the country. 583 U.S. at 287–88. In *Nielsen v. Preap*, the Court addressed the scope of § 1226(c) within the broader detention framework of § 1226(a), which supports the conclusion that § 1226 governs interior arrests generally. 586 U.S. 392 (2019). And in *Sanchez v. Mayorkas*, the Court emphasized that "admission" is a technical term distinct from mere "lawful presence," reinforcing that "seeking admission" under § 1225 refers to the inspection process — not retroactively to anyone who entered without inspection at any time in the past. 593 U.S. 409, 416–17 (2021).

B. Courts in This District Have Consistently Granted Habeas Relief on Identical Facts.

Even before *Hernandez Alvarez*, the federal district courts in Florida — and across the country — had consistently rejected the Government's theory that long-term residents who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). In the Middle District of Florida, see *Rivero v. Mina*, 2026 WL 199319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026) (granting habeas

and ordering bond hearing); see also collected cases discussed in the Jacksonville Division's recent decisions concluding that "seeking admission" applies to arriving aliens and not aliens who entered without inspection and lived in the United States for years.

In the Southern District of Florida, see *Sanchez-Morales v. Field Off. Dir., Miami Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft.*, 2026 WL 496726, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2026) (granting habeas relief on similar facts).

Decisions from courts nationwide are consistent. See *Belsai D.S. v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2802947, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) ("Overwhelmingly, courts have rejected the interpretation offered by [the r]espondents that § 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are 'inadmissible' because they entered the United States without inspection."); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto*, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 410 (D.N.J. 2025); *Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025) (Seventh Circuit considered the Government's position on the scope of § 1225(b)(2) and found it unlikely to succeed on the merits).

A substantial body of district court authority has reached the same conclusion. The overwhelming weight of federal court authority — now confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit's binding decision — supports the conclusion that Petitioner's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that he is entitled to bond review.

III. PETITIONER'S DETENTION WITHOUT ANY BOND HEARING VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.

Even apart from the statutory question, Petitioner's continued detention without any individualized bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause applies to all "persons" within the United States, regardless of immigration status. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 693 (citing *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)). "Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

Civil immigration detention must bear a reasonable relation to its legitimate purposes, including ensuring appearance at proceedings and protecting the community. See *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Where detention is imposed without individualized review — and where, on the facts, it serves neither legitimate civil purpose — it violates the Due Process Clause.

On the facts of this case, the record supports the conclusion that detention is not reasonably related to the recognized civil purposes of ensuring appearance and protecting public safety. The record shows Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community:

- **Flight risk:** A person who has lived openly at the same community in Florida for twenty-three years, holds a Florida driver license issued upon lawful-presence documentation, has filed asylum applications and EAD applications on file with USCIS, holds a Social Security number with DHS work authorization, has a verifiable address of record with USCIS, has a U.S. citizen infant child, has 13 years of continuous employment with the same employer, and has actively pursued affirmative immigration relief is not going to flee. He has strong incentives to appear at every future hearing, and the record does not suggest a realistic risk of flight.

- **Danger to community:** Petitioner has no criminal history of any kind. His sole contact with the criminal justice system in twenty-three years of U.S. residence is a single alleged minor traffic stop. Multiple long-term members of his community — including persons who have known him for 20 and 10 years respectively — have submitted sworn statements attesting to his peaceful and law-abiding character. The record strongly indicates that Petitioner does not pose a danger to the community.

"Even where the Government's interest is at its zenith," the Supreme Court has held, a detainee's "loss of liberty 'lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.'" *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690). Justice

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Kennedy specifically noted in his *Demore* concurrence that detention without bond review may become unreasonable. 538 U.S. at 532–33. Where, as here, the detention is imposed without *any* individualized review, the constitutional violation is immediate and ongoing.

IV. IF THE COURT ORDERS A BOND HEARING, PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS AND CONTROLLING LAW.

If the Court orders a hearing, Petitioner respectfully requests procedures consistent with due process and controlling law. Petitioner submits the following considerations for the Court's review.

First, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court require procedures consistent with due process, including an allocation of the burden of proof that the Court finds appropriate under *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Several federal courts of appeals — though not yet the Eleventh Circuit — have held that the Government should bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence at immigration bond hearings. See *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 2020); *German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020); *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–05 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner respectfully submits this as persuasive authority for the Court's consideration.

Second, Petitioner respectfully requests that any bond be set in a reasonable amount and on terms that meaningfully permit release if Petitioner is otherwise found eligible.

Third, Petitioner respectfully requests that any procedures address the availability of release on conditions of supervision. Petitioner is willing to comply with reasonable conditions, including reporting requirements, GPS monitoring under the ICE Intensive Supervision Appearance Program ("ISAP"), or other alternatives to detention the Court deems appropriate.

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Federal courts have recognized that such alternatives can adequately serve the civil purposes of immigration detention. See *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 991 (9th Cir. 2017). To the extent the Court considers alternatives to detention, Petitioner respectfully submits that such conditions may appropriately be considered in light of his twenty-three years of continuous residence at a verifiable address of record with USCIS, his pending asylum application, his thirteen years of continuous employment with an employer prepared to immediately rehire him, and his strong family ties to this community.

V. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED.

Petitioner has not appealed his detention through administrative channels because no administrative bond decision has been issued. No Immigration Judge has held a bond hearing. No Board of Immigration Appeals decision exists to appeal. Petitioner is challenging the absence of administrative process — not its outcome.

Exhaustion should be excused because no meaningful administrative custody review was available, and any effort to pursue administrative relief would have been futile. The Supreme Court has long recognized that exhaustion is not required where it would be futile. *Bowen v. City of New York*, 476 U.S. 467, 482–83 (1986).

Here, no meaningful administrative remedy appears to have been available to Petitioner. The Government had taken the position that individuals in Petitioner's situation were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a reading the Eleventh Circuit has now rejected on materially similar facts. Petitioner cannot be faulted for failing to pursue an administrative remedy that the Government itself maintained did not exist.

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court expedite consideration of his Petition. Every additional day of detention causes ongoing and irreparable harm:

- Petitioner's U.S. citizen infant son — under two years old — is being deprived of his father.
- Petitioner's family is suffering severe financial hardship. He is the primary financial provider; without his income, the household — including five children — is in distress.
- Petitioner's master calendar hearing before Immigration Judge Stuart A. Siegel is scheduled for May 28, 2026 — just weeks away. Petitioner's ability to prepare for that hearing is severely impaired by the conditions of his detention.
- Petitioner's employer, Mr. Christian Martinez, has held Petitioner's position open and is ready to immediately rehire him upon his release. That employment opportunity will not remain available indefinitely.

Federal courts have shown that habeas petitions in immigration detention cases can be decided efficiently. See, e.g., decisions from courts across the country granting habeas relief within 30 days of filing. Petitioner respectfully requests similarly expedited consideration here.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Cesar Adolfo Rodas Lorenzo is a 23-year resident of the United States, the father of a U.S. citizen child, a long-term employee, a member of a stable family, and a person of demonstrated peaceful character. He has no criminal history. His pending asylum application reflects his good-faith engagement with the immigration system over the past year. He has every incentive — and every legal protection — to appear at all future hearings.

Yet he remains detained without an individualized bond hearing. None has been held and none is scheduled. His detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), as the Eleventh Circuit recently held in *Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden*. On the present record, he respectfully submits that he is entitled to prompt custody review under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and due process.

For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Issue a writ of habeas corpus and ORDER Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within seven (7) days of this Court's order, with procedures consistent with due process and applicable law;
2. In the alternative, if the Court finds Petitioner's detention unlawful, ORDER Petitioner's immediate release on reasonable conditions of supervision; and
3. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: 05/18/2026, 2026



Cesar Adolfo Rodas Lorenzo

Pro Se Petitioner

MEMORANDUM OF LAW — RODAS LORENZO v. WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY — A# 235-798-276

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Glades County Detention Center
1297 East State Road 78
Moore Haven, FL 33471

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on _____, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was served by United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:

U.S. Attorney's Office
Middle District of Florida
Civil Process Clerk
400 North Tampa Street, Suite 3200
Tampa, FL 33602

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA)
Miami Field Office

Warden, Glades County Detention Center
1297 East State Road 78
Moore Haven, FL 33471



Cesar Adolfo Rodas Lorenzo
Pro Se Petitioner

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