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DETAINED

8 Attorneys for Petitioner Ayangata Umenjoh Becky

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13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
14 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

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16 **In the matter of:**

) **Case Number: '26CV3120 BJC AHG**

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18) 
19) **AYANGATA UMENJOH BECKY**

20)
21 **v.**

) **PETITION FOR WRIT OF**
) **HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER**
) **TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN**
) **THREE DAYS; COMPLAINT**
) **FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF**

22)
23) **CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE,**
24) **WARDEN OF OTAY MESA**
25) **DETENTION CENTER**

) **Challenge to Unlawful Incarceration;**
) **Request for Declaratory and**
) **Injunctive Relief**

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon who entered the United States on or about April 10, 2025, at the San Ysidro Port of Entry and has remained in custody for thirteen (13) months as of today. **See Exhibit A is indeed the Notice to Appear (NTA).**
2. On January 28, 2026, Immigration Judge Mark Sameit granted DHS’s motion to pretermite and ordered the Petitioner removed to Uganda. The Petitioner timely appealed that decision on February 27, 2026; however, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has not yet set a briefing schedule, and the case remains pending. **See Exhibit B, which includes the Immigration Judge’s order and the filing receipt for the appeal.**
3. As a result, the Petitioner has now been detained for thirteen (13) months.
4. During her prolonged detention, Petitioner has suffered significant physical and mental health deterioration. Her continued confinement has caused and continues to cause serious harm.
5. Petitioner's continued detention is arbitrary and unlawful, and she requests that this Court order her immediate release from ICE custody.

JURISDICTION

6. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).



1 8. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
2 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All-
3 Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651

4 9. Federal District courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens
5 challenging the lawfulness of their detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.

6 10. Federal courts also have federal question jurisdiction, through the
7 Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), to deem unlawful and to set aside
8 agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
9 inconsistent with law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). APA claims are cognizable on
10 habeas. 5 U.S.C. §703, which provides that judicial review of agency action
11 under the APA may be proceeded by any applicable form of legal action,
12 including but not limited to habeas corpus. The APA affords a right of review
13 to a person who is adversely affected or harmed by agency action.
14

15 VENUE

16 11. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
17 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because Petitioner is detained within this
18 district at Otay Mesa Detention Center. Furthermore, a substantial part of the
19 events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred and continue to occur at
20 ICE's Washington Field Office in Chantilly, Virginia, within this division. No
21 real property is involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. §1391(e).
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23 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

24 ICE'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF PETITIONER, WITHOUT
25 REVIEWING HER CUSTODY UNDER ICE POLICY VIOLATES THE
26 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DUE PROCESS.

27 12. ICE's long-standing policy is to release non-citizens immediately following a
28 grant of asylum, relief absent exceptional circumstances.



1 13. Under the Accardi doctrine, which originated in the context of an immigration
2 case and has been developed through subsequent immigration caselaw,
3 agencies are bound to follow their own rules that affect the fundamental rights
4 of individuals, even self-imposed policies and processes that limit otherwise
5 discretionary decisions. See *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. at 226 (holding
6 that BIA must follow its own regulations in its exercise of discretion); *Morton*
7 *v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are
8 affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even
9 where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would
10 be required.").

11 14. The requirement that an agency follow its own policies is not "limited to rules
12 attaining the status of formal regulations." *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167
13 (2d Cir. 1991). Even an unpublished policy binds the agency if "an examination
14 of the provision's language, its context, and any available extrinsic evidence"
15 supports the conclusion that it is "mandatory rather than merely precatory."
16 *Doe v. Hampton*, 566 2d 265, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also *Morton*, 415 U.S.
17 at 235-36 (applying *Accardi* to violation of internal agency manual); *U.S. v.*
18 *Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Nor does it matter that these IRS
19 instructions to Special Agents were not promulgated in something formally
20 labeled a 'Regulation' . . .").

21
22 15. When agencies fail to adhere to their own policies as required by *Accardi*,
23 courts typically frame the violation as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law
24 under the APA, see *Damus v. Nielson*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (D.D.C.
25 2018) ("It is clear, moreover, that [*Accardi*] claims may arise under the APA"),
26 or as a due process violation, see *Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force*,
27 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) ("An agency's failure to follow its own
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regulations tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation of an individual's constitutional right to due process.") (internal quotations omitted).

16. Prejudice is generally presumed when an agency violates its own policy. See *Montilla*, 926 F.2d at 167 ("We hold that an alien claiming the INS has failed to adhere to its own regulations . . . is not required to make a showing of prejudice before he is entitled to relief. All that need be shown is that the subject regulations were for the alien's benefit and that the INS failed to adhere to them."); *Heffner*, 420 F.2d at 813 ("The Accardi doctrine furthermore requires reversal irrespective of whether a new trial will produce the same verdict.").

17. To remedy an Accardi violation, a court may direct the agency to properly apply its policy, see *Damus*, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 343 ("[T]his Court is simply ordering that Defendants do what they already admit is required."), or a court may apply the policy itself and order relief consistent with the policy. See *Jimenez v. Cronen*, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 657 (D. Mass. 2018) (scheduling bail hearing to review petitioners' custody under ICE's standards because "it would be particularly unfair to require that petitioners remain detained . . . while ICE attempts to remedy its failure").

18. Here, Petitioner falls into this category where ICE has failed to act as required by their procedures and require intervention.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

GROUND ONE

**VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS**

Petitioner has the right to challenge the legality of her detention

19. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

20. Petitioner has due process rights to challenge their detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*,



1 533 U.S. 678, 693, 695 (2001) (while noncitizens outside the United States’
2 “geographic borders” lack constitutional protections, all “persons” within them
3 are protected by the Due Process Clause, regardless of immigration status);
4 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2022) (though
5 constitutional rights of citizens and noncitizens “are not coextensive,”
6 noncitizens are entitled to due process, including to challenge detention pending
7 proceedings).

8 21.As the Ninth Circuit held, the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens
9 regardless of whether they are “seeking admission” or are “admitted” under
10 immigration law. Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004),
11 abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); see also
12 Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D.
13 Wash. 2023). The Due Process Clause allows Petitioner to challenge her
14 detention.

15 22.Respondent fundamentally misapprehends Petitioner’s due process claims.
16 Petitioner challenges her deprivation of liberty and prolonged detention, not the
17 adequacy of the procedures the immigration laws afford her “with respect to
18 admission. Petitioner solely challenging her ongoing detention, and she is not
19 bringing a constitutional claim with respect to the procedures governing her
20 legal admission into the United States.
21

22 23.To the extent Respondent takes the extraordinary position that Petitioner has no
23 due process rights at all, that is unsupported by law and would have gruesome
24 practical consequences: “If excludable [noncitizens] were not protected by even
25 the substantive component of constitutional due process, ... we do not see why
26 the United States government could not torture or summarily execute them. ...
27 [W]e conclude that government treatment of excludable [noncitizens] must
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1 implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”. Rosales-Garcia v.
2 Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 412 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Jean v. Nelson,
3 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle that
4 unadmitted [noncitizens] have no constitutionally protected rights defies
5 rationality. Under this view, the Attorney General, for example, could invoke
6 legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained
7 [noncitizens] Surely, we would not condone mass starvation.”). Thus, there
8 is no question that Petitioner has the right to challenge the constitutionality of
9 her prolonged detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
10 of the Constitution.

11 24. ICE has violated Petitioner's due process rights by denying an individualized
12 custody review to which she is entitled under ICE policy.

13 25. As a remedy, this Court should conduct its own review of Petitioner's custody
14 or, at least, order ICE to review Petitioner's custody under the standard
15 articulated in ICE policy.

16
17 **GROUND TWO**

18 **VIOLETION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 8 U.S.C. §**
19 **1231 (A)(6)**

20 **Mandatory detention is subject to constitutional limits**

21 26. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

22 27. U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, authorizes
23 detention only for "a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's
24 removal from the United States." 533 U.S. at 689, 701.

25 28. Petitioner's continued detention has become unreasonable because her removal
26 is not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, her ongoing confinement violates 8
27 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and she must be released. On January 28, 2026, Immigration
28 Judge Mark Sameit granted DHS's motion to pretermite and ordered the Petitioner



1 removed to Uganda. The Petitioner timely appealed that decision on February 27,
2 2026; however, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has not yet set a
3 briefing schedule, and the case remains pending.

4 29. Petitioner is challenging her prolonged detention on constitutional grounds, not
5 statutory grounds. Notwithstanding the fact that she is being detained pursuant to
6 section 1225(b), Petitioner’s detention is unequivocally subject to Constitutional
7 limits. The Supreme Court has not precluded noncitizens from bringing as-
8 applied constitutional challenges to their mandatory detention. Respondent
9 correctly states: *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) “did not explicitly
10 address constitutionality arguments.” U.S. Response at 3. While in *Demore v.*
11 *Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
12 mandatory detention under § 1226(c), the Supreme Court has explicitly
13 recognized the availability of judicial review over as-applied challenges to
14 detention, including mandatory detention. See, e.g., *Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U.S.
15 392, 420 (2019); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 532-33 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
16 concurring). Courts in this district have accordingly found constitutional limits
17 to apply to immigration detention, irrespective of the underlying detention
18 authority. See, e.g., *Gebregziabher v. Marrero*, Case 3:26-cv-02004-JES-MSB;
19 *Liu v. Larose*, Case 3:26-cv-01546-JO-MMP; *Synthia Engonwei Munoh*
20 *Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center*, Case 26-CV-1773 JLS (DDL); *Fuad*
21 *Abdulielil Ahmed V. Sixto Marrero* Case 26-cv-01170-BAS-MMP; *Maksim*
22 *Lastin v. Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility* 26-cv-974-RSH-DDL;
23 *Natalia Lastina V. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility* 3:26-cv-
24 00975-TWR-VET; *Karakhanyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center*-
25 3:25-cv-03454-JO-MMP; *Romik Parunakyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention*
26 *Center* 25-cv-3739-LL-MSB; *L.S. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center*;



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M.F. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:25-cv-3599-CAB-MSB;
Miganush Ogandzhanyan V. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention Center 26cv0093
DMS MSB; Ter Ogannisian Geros v. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention Center
26-CV-91 JLS (AHG); Emanuel Ter-Ogannisian v. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention
Center 26cv0124 DMS JLB; L.S. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center;
Naira Kirakosyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center 26-cv-315-JO-
DDL. (granting a writ of habeas corpus after Court determined that
Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonable and
violates due process).

30. This Court should so hold as well.

31. Petitioner has now been detained for thirteen (13) months and with no indication
of when relief might be available. This prolonged and indeterminate detention is
arbitrary, excessive in duration, and unconstitutional.

GROUND THREE
**ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

**Petitioner’s ongoing and unreviewed detention violates her constitutional due
process rights and cannot continue without a bond hearing**

32. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.
Courts must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

33. The Mathews test is the appropriate test for this Court to use to evaluate the
constitutionality of Petitioner’s prolonged detention. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test is routinely applied by district courts across
the Ninth Circuit, including this Court, to determine whether due process



1 requires neutral review of a noncitizen’s custody. *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*,
2 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that *Mathews* is a “flexible test”
3 broad enough to account for government interests when evaluating due process
4 claims in the immigration detention context); see, e.g., *Abduraimov*, 2025 WL
5 2912307 and *Maksim*, 2025 WL 2879328. Respondents offer “no valid
6 alternative to the *Mathews* framework nor [do they] demonstrate[e] that
7 *Mathews* is inapplicable here.” *Jensen v. Garland*, No. 5:21-c-v- 01195-CAS
8 (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023).

9 34. The *Mathews* test for procedural due process claims balances: (1) the private
10 interest threatened by governmental action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
11 of such interest and the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the
12 government interest. 424 U.S. at 335. Each *Mathews* factor weighs in
13 Petitioner’s favor. Petitioner’s detention of 13 months and counting without any
14 neutral review is a violation of her procedural due process rights and requires
15 this court to order a hearing before a neutral adjudicator to evaluate whether the
16 government can justify her ongoing detention.

17 35. Petitioner has a profound liberty interest. Petitioner has a weighty interest in her
18 own liberty, the core privacy interest at stake here. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690
19 (“Freedom from imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process
20 Clause] protects.”). Petitioner’s 13 months of detention limits of the brief
21 detention contemplated in *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 530-31. See also *Lopez v.*
22 *Garland*, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 880 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“As detention continues
23 past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting continued custody
24 absent a bond hearing.”) (internal citation omitted).

25 36. The second prong of the *Mathews* test, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
26 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional
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1 procedural safeguards, also weighs heavily in Petitioner’s favor. 424 U.S. at 335.
2 “[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing
3 before a neutral decisionmaker is substantial.” *Diouf v. Napolitano* (*Diouf II*),
4 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011). When a petitioner “does not have a
5 statutory right to a bond hearing or the right to seek additional bond hearings. . .
6 the risk of erroneous deprivation as Petitioner’s time in detention lengthens is
7 not insignificant,” and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is
8 exceedingly high. *Eliazar G.C.*, No. 1:24-CV-01032-EPG-HC, 2025 WL
9 711190, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025); *Tonoyan v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 3013684
10 at *4 (“Given that Petitioner has been held without a bond hearing for almost a
11 year, and it is not clear when detention will end, the risk of erroneous deprivation
12 weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing.”). In this case, Petitioner has been
13 deprived of her liberty in civil detention for 13 months. Because she is subject
14 to mandatory detention pursuant to section 1225(b), she does not have the
15 statutory right to request a bond hearing and therefore lacks access to an
16 appropriate procedural safeguard that would protect against the risk of erroneous
17 deprivation, absent intervention from this Court.

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19 37. Here, a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is the only appropriate
20 procedural safeguard to protect against the risk of erroneous deprivation because
21 it provides both the noncitizen and the government with an opportunity to
22 present witness testimony or evidence and be heard before a neutral body.
23 Anything less would not comport with due process. In particular, “the
24 discretionary parole system available to § 1225(b) detainees are not sufficient to
25 overcome the constitutional concerns raised by prolonged mandatory detention
26 because the parole process is purely discretionary, and its results are
27 unreviewable by IJs and “release decisions are based on humanitarian
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1 considerations and the public interest.” Abduraimov, 2025 WL 2912307, at *6
2 (citing Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013)
3 (internal quotations omitted). The parole process “is not a constitutionally
4 adequate substitute for a bond hearing particularly since it does not test the
5 necessity of detention, does not afford the noncitizen an in-person adversarial
6 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present witness
7 testimony or evidence, does not require the ICE detention officer [to] make any
8 factual findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an
9 administrative appeal.” Abduraimov, 2025 WL 2912307, at *6 (citing Padilla v.
10 U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2023).

11 38. Any internal review of Petitioner’s detention or request for discretionary parole
12 by DHS cannot satisfy the requirements for due process because DHS is the very
13 authority that is detaining him. Where a custody review is conducted by the very
14 same agency that is detaining the individual, that agency reviewing its own
15 actions cannot be held to a neutral standard. As such, Petitioner must be afforded
16 a hearing before a neutral arbiter in order for her ongoing, prolonged detention
17 to comply with due process.

18 39. Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, Petitioner faces prolonged detention for an
19 indefinite period of time pending the final adjudication of her asylum claim. This
20 Court has recognized that “it is difficult to ascertain an endpoint to removal
21 proceedings, but it is clear proceedings could take a substantial amount of time,”
22 and “[i]t is unknown when the IJ will decide the application for relief.” Idiev v.
23 Warden, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01030-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3089349, at *5 (E.D.
24 Cal. Nov. 5, 2025). Even after the IJ issues a decision, each party “has other
25 avenues available for relief including an appeal to the BIA and a petition for
26 review to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id. See, e.g., Abduraimov, 2025
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1 WL 2912307 (where the government appealed the IJ’s grant of asylum and the
2 BIA remanded back to the IJ); A.E., 2025 WL 1424382 (where the government
3 appealed the IJ’s grant of asylum, the IJ denied all relief on remand, and the
4 noncitizen appealed to the BIA).

5 40. Here, On January 28, 2026, Immigration Judge Mark Sameit granted DHS’s
6 motion to pretermite and ordered the Petitioner removed to Uganda. The Petitioner
7 timely appealed that decision on February 27, 2026; however, the Board of
8 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has not yet set a briefing schedule, and the case
9 remains pending.

10 41. Petitioner has been in detention **for thirteen (13) months**, and Petitioner’s
11 removal is not reasonably foreseeable, as it depends entirely on the outcome of
12 her merits appeal and any subsequent review that may follow. Accordingly, her
13 continued detention is arbitrary, prolonged, and constitutionally unreasonable.

14 42. Due to prolonged detention, Respondent has been experiencing physical and
15 mental issues. There is no indication as to how long the appeal will take, and/or
16 depending on outcome of the appeal, Petitioner might stay in custody longer.

17 43. Because “it is not clear when detention will end, the risk of erroneous
18 deprivation weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing.” A.E., 2025 WL
19 1424382, at *5; Doe v. Andrews, No. 1:25- CV-00506-SAB-HC, 2025 WL
20 2590392, *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting that “[a]lthough future events are
21 difficult to predict, the [c]ourt nevertheless finds that...possible remand to the
22 immigration court for further factfinding or possible judicial review by the Ninth
23 Circuit will be sufficiently lengthy such that [the delay] factor weighs in favor
24 of Petitioner”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-00506-KES-
25 SAB (HC), 2025 WL 2896218 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2025); Abduraimov, 2025
26 WL 2912307, *8 (“appeal to BIA and potential Ninth Circuit review ‘may take
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1 up to two years or longer’ and ‘favors granting petitioner a bond hearing’) (citing
2 *Banda v. McAleenan*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2019)). The risk
3 of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probably value
4 of a bond hearing is exceptionally high. Therefore, the second Mathews factor
5 also weighs in favor of granting Petitioner a bond hearing.

6 44. The third Mathews factor also supports Petitioner: the government interest is
7 weak here because the interest at stake “is the ability to detain Petitioner without
8 providing her a bond hearing, not whether the government may continue to
9 detain him” at all. *Lopez-Reyes v. Bonnar*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal.
10 Jan. 29, 2019) (emphasis in original). As the government has conceded in similar
11 cases, the cost of providing such a bond hearing is minimal. *Id.*; *Singh v. Barr*,
12 Case No. 18-cv-2471-GPC-MSB, 2019 WL 4168901, at *12 (“The government
13 has not offered any indication that a second bond hearing would have outside
14 effects on its coffers.”); *Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr*, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964
15 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of a §1226(a) detention, the parties did
16 not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine whether the
17 continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”). Holding a hearing at
18 which Respondents must justify Petitioner’s continued detention thus actually
19 “promotes the Government’s interest—one we believe to be paramount—in
20 minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no
21 purpose.” See *Velasco-Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 854 (2d Cir. 2020)
22 (emphasis added); *id.* at n.11; *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir.
23 2021) (“[L]imiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are
24 dangerous or a flight risk may save the government, and therefore the public,
25 from expending substantial resources on needless detention.”).

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27 45. In sum, there is no question that all three Mathews factors favor Petitioner.
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1 Contrary to Respondent’s claim, Petitioner’s prolonged detention does not pass
2 constitutional muster and requires that this Court immediately order her a bond
3 hearing.

4 46. At a bond hearing, the government must bear the burden of justifying
5 Petitioner’s ongoing and prolonged detention. Where a custody hearing is
6 warranted as a procedural safeguard against unreasonably prolonged detention,
7 it is well established that the government bears the burden of justifying
8 continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence. *Singh v. Holder*, 638
9 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ue process places a heightened burden of
10 proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests at
11 stake...are both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of
12 money.”). See e.g. *Lopez*, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, n.3 (specifically noting that
13 *Singh* provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for bond hearings
14 and that the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
15 noncitizen is a flight risk. or danger to the community to justify denying bond)
16 (internal quotations omitted); *Eliazar G.C.*, 2025 WL 711190, *10 (E.D. Cal.
17 Mar. 5, 2025) (stating that the Court will follow the “overwhelming majority of
18 courts” to hold that the government must justify continued mandatory detention
19 by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is a flight risk or a danger
20 to the community); *Maksim*, 2025 WL 2879328, * 6 (same); *Abduraimov*, 2025
21 WL 2912307, *11 (same); *Idiev*, 2025 WL 3089349, *7 (same); *Tonoyan*, 2025
22 WL 3013684, *5 (same).

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24 47. The Ninth Circuit in *Singh* stressed that “it is improper to ask the individual to
25 share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
26 individual—deprivation of liberty— is so significant[.]” See *Singh*, 638 F. 3d at
27 1205; *Black*, 103 F.4th at 157-58 (observing that where “an individual’s liberty
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1 is at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently used [clear and convincing]
2 evidentiary standard for continued detention”) (internal citations omitted); id. at
3 159 (reiterating that the government bears the burden of meeting this standard
4 even where an individual is detained pursuant to mandatory detention). This
5 Court should, too, apply the heavy burden on the government to justify
6 Petitioner’s continued civil detention without a bond hearing.

7 48. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, the adjudicator must consider alternatives
8 to detention and Petitioner’s financial circumstances in determining whether
9 further detention is warranted and the conditions of her release. See, e.g.,
10 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 (“If the government is setting monetary bonds to
11 ensure appearance at future proceedings, there is no legitimate reason for it not
12 to consider the individual’s financial circumstances and alternative conditions
13 of release.”).

14 49. Thus, due process and Ninth Circuit precedent require that the government bear
15 the burden of justifying Petitioner’s ongoing and prolonged detention by clear
16 and convincing evidence.

17 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

18 Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:
19

- 20 a) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 21 b) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show
22 cause why this Petition should not be granted within three
23 days.
- 24 c) Declare that Petitioner’s detention violates the Due Process
25 Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6);
- 26 d) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to be
27 released;
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- e) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- f) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper

DATED: May 19, 2026,

Respectfully submitted



Naira Zohrabyan
Attorney for Petitioner

