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Attorney for Carlos Augusto Tineo Hernandez

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

'26CV2898 CAB GC

**CARLOS AUGUSTO TINEO
HERNANDEZ,**

Petitioner,

v.

**CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at
Otay Mesa Detention Center, KRISTI
NOEM, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, PAMELA JO
BONDI, Attorney General, TODD M.
LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, GREGORY J
ARCHAMBEAULT, Field Office
Director, San Diego Field Office, US
ICE, US DHS,**

Respondents.

CIVIL CASE NO.: 25-CV-

**Petition
for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus**

1 INTRODUCTION

2 This petition arises from a sudden change in the way that the Board of
3 Immigration Appeals interprets 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. “For decades, and across
4 administrations, DHS has acknowledged that § 1226(a) applies to individuals who
5 entered the United States unlawfully, but who were later apprehended within the
6 borders of the United States long after their entry.” *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F.
7 Supp. 3d 1239, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Petitioner’s brief and noting that
8 Respondents had not contested that claim). But in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I.
9 & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) accepted
10 the government’s new position that inadmissible immigrants are not eligible for
11 bond under § 1226(a), even if they have been living in the United States for years
12 or decades. Instead, the BIA held that all inadmissible immigrants are subject to the
13 mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

14 Courts do not agree. The government has lost this argument in districts across
15 the United States, *see, e.g., Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1260; *Romero v. Hyde*,
16 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2084238
17 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y.
18 Aug. 13, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24,
19 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Lopez-*
20 *Campos v. Raycroft*, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Carmona-*
21 *Lorenzo v. Trump*, No. 4:25CV3172, 2025 WL 2531521, at *5 (D. Neb. Sept. 3,
22 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
23 2025); *Hernandez Nieves v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2533110 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025);
24 *Rosado v. Figueroa*, 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), including this
25 one, *see Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025)
26 (Sabraw, J.). This Court should reject that argument, too, and order Petitioner’s
27 immediate release on the bond imposed by the immigration judge (“IJ”)

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Carlos Augusto Tineo Hernandez (Mr. Tineo) is a Venezuelan citizen who came to the United States in March 2024 with his wife Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle Ordaz-Espinoza (Mrs. Ordaz-Espinoza). Exh. A, Notice to Appear *and* Exh. B, Application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and Protection Under the Convention Against Torture. Mr. Tineo and Mrs. Ordaz Espinoza entered the United States together without inspection on March 5th, 2024. Exh. A, Notice to Appear *and* Exh. B, Application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and Protection Under the Convention Against Torture. Mr. Tineo and his wife Mrs. Ordaz-Espinoza were placed in removal proceedings upon entering the United States. *Id.* They were apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) after turning themselves in. Exh. C, Declaration from Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle Ordaz-Espinoza. Ms. Ordaz, who was a minor then, was pregnant at the time. Despite Ms. Ordaz being married to Mr. Tineo and having her parents’ written consent to travel with him, the DHS separated their family at the border, processing Ms. Ordaz as an unaccompanied minor. Exh. E, Marriage Certificate of Carlos Augusto Tineo Hernandez and Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle Ordaz Espinoza, Exh. F, Letter of Consent from Xioraidys Roxe del Valle Ordaz Espinoza’s parents to travel with spouse, Exh. G, Evidence of Xioraidys Roxe del Valle Ordaz Espinoza’s Unaccompanied Minor Classification upon entering the United States.

Both were placed in removal proceedings separately. Mr. Tineo Hernandez was released on his own recognizance Exh. H, Order of Release on Own Recognizance. Eventually, their cases were consolidated. On May 24, 2024, Mr. Tineo and Mrs. Ordaz-Espinoza’s son, Kaleth Amir Tineo Ordaz was born in San Diego, California. Exh. D, Birth certificate for USC child Kaleth Amir Tineo Ordaz. Mr. Tineo and Mrs. Ordaz-Espinoza have been attending all their immigration hearings since they were placed in removal proceedings. On June 12, 2025, after one of their court hearings, ICE tried to detain Mr. Tineo in the hallway.

1 They instead agreed to put an ankle monitor on him. Exh. C, Declaration from
2 Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle Ordaz-Espinoza. They are currently scheduled for a
3 merits hearing in exactly a week from his arbitrary detention on May 14, 2026,
4 before the non-detained court in San Diego. Exh. I, Notice of Hearing Date for In
5 Person Merits Hearing.

6 On Wednesday, May 06, 2026, Mr. Tineo received a call from ICE asking
7 him to report the following day, Thursday May 07, 2026. When, they arrived, they
8 were separated and Mr. Tineo **was detained** after a roughhousing both Ms. Ordaz-
9 Espinoza and their child. Exh. C, Declaration from Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle
10 Ordaz-Espinoza.

11 Detention will cause serious hardship for Mr. Tineo, Mrs. Ordaz-Espinoza
12 and their United States citizen child. Exh. C, Declaration from Xioraidys Roxe Del
13 Valle Ordaz-Espinoza. Mr. Tineo is the primary breadwinner for his family and
14 their consolidated asylum case is **schedule in exactly one week**. Exh. C,
15 Declaration from Xioraidys Roxe Del Valle Ordaz-Espinoza.

16 17 **LEGAL BACKGROUND**

18 **I. In *Yajure Hurtado*, the BIA stripped most noncitizens who enter**
19 **without inspection of the right to seek bond.**

20 This habeas petition turns on the BIA's recent decision in *Yajure Hurtado*.
21 The issue in *Yajure Hurtado* revolves around two statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and
22 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

23 "Section 1226(a) provides for the arrest and detention of noncitizens
24 'pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.'" *Hernandez Nieves*, 2025 WL 2533110, at *3. It instructs that the Attorney General
25 "may continue to detain" arrestees or "may release [them] on bond of at least \$1,500
26 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
27 General." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (punctuation altered). "Federal regulations"
28

1 implementing this statute “provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive
2 bond hearings at the outset of detention.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 306
3 (2018) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)).

4 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an
5 applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
6 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
7 the alien shall be detained for” certain immigration proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
8 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Federal regulations do not prescribe bond hearings for people
9 detained under that section. Instead, “DHS has the sole discretion to temporarily
10 release on parole ‘any alien applying for admission to the United States’ on a ‘case-
11 by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’”
12 *Hernandez Nieves*, 2025 WL 2533110, at *3 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

13 By their terms, these statutes apply to different groups of immigrants.
14 “Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule,” which governs unless some other, more
15 specific detention provision overrides it. *Rodriguez* 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1246
16 (cleaned up). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is more specific, but it applies only to an
17 “applicant for admission” who is also an “alien seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C.
18 § 1225(b)(2)(A).

19 *Yajure Hurtado* considered which of these provisions—the default rule in
20 § 1226(a) or the mandatory detention provision in § 1225(b)(2)(A)—applies to
21 immigrants who enter the United States without inspection but live for years in the
22 country’s interior. 29 I.&N. Dec. at 216. The respondent in *Yajure Hurtado* had
23 entered without inspection in November 2022, before obtaining Temporary
24 Protected Status (“TPS”). *Id.* at 216–17. He was arrested after his TPS expired in
25 April 2025. *Id.* An immigration judge (“IJ”) ruled that he was subject to mandatory
26 detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Id.* at 217.

27 On appeal to the BIA, the respondent conceded that he was an “applicant for
28 admission” in the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A), *id.* at 221, because he had not been

1 legally “admitted”—that is, he had not effected a “lawful entry . . . into the United
2 States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1101(a)(13)(A). But he argued that he did not fall within § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s ambit
4 because he was not actively “seeking admission” at the border. 29 I&N Dec. at 221.
5 He had crossed the border and proceeded to the country’s interior years ago. *Id.*

6 The BIA disagreed, holding that only noncitizens who were legally admitted
7 retain bond eligibility. *Id.* at 218, 223. The BIA gave three reasons to support that
8 conclusion.

9 First, the BIA rejected the distinction between immigrants who are
10 “applicants for admission” and those who are “seeking admission.” In the BIA’s
11 view, that distinction would leave people like Mr. Yajure Hurtado without any
12 “legal status” and would create a line-drawing problem. *Id.* at 221.

13 Second, the BIA rejected the argument that interpreting § 1225(b)(2) to cover
14 noncitizens like Mr. Yajure Hurtado renders superfluous much of § 1226(c).
15 Instead, it asserted without explanation that limiting the reach of § 1225(b)(2)
16 would render that provision superfluous. *Id.* at 221–22.

17 Third, the BIA claimed that the legislative history supported its construction
18 of § 1225, because in enacting IIRIRA, Congress sought to remedy the inequity of
19 the prior statutory scheme, which provided greater procedural and substantive
20 rights to noncitizens who entered without inspection (and were placed in
21 deportation proceedings) than those who presented themselves to authorities for
22 inspection (and were placed in exclusion proceedings). *Id.* at 223–25. But the BIA
23 did not cite any legislative history specifically addressing detention statutes or
24 custody determinations that would support its interpretation. *Id.*

25 For these reasons, the BIA concluded that noncitizens who enter without
26 inspection have no right to seek bond from an IJ, regardless of how long they have
27 been residing in the country and irrespective of whether they were apprehended by
28 immigration authorities. *Id.* at 228.

1 **II. Courts disagree with the BIA’s reasoning.**

2 Since *Yajure Hurtado* was decided, many immigrants who otherwise would
3 have received bond hearings under § 1226(a) have challenged that decision in the
4 federal courts. Courts broadly agree that the BIA’s novel constructions of
5 § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226(a) are not correct.

6 On the one hand, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is best read to apply to immigrants who
7 are at or near the border or other ports of entry, for at least three reasons.

8 *First*, § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s statutory context strongly suggests that it applies
9 only to persons apprehended at or near the border. As the Supreme Court
10 recognized in *Jennings*, § 1225(b) is concerned “primarily [with those] seeking
11 entry,” and is generally imposed “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where
12 the Government must determine whether [a noncitizen] seeking to enter the country
13 is admissible.” 583 U.S. at 297, 287. Throughout its text, the statute refers to
14 “inspections”—a term not defined in the INA but which typically connotes an
15 examination upon or soon after physical entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Inspection by
16 immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving [noncitizens];
17 referral for hearing”); *id.* § 1225(b)(1)–(2) (referring to “inspections” in their titles);
18 *id.* § 1225(d)(1) (authorizing immigration officials to search certain conveyances
19 in order to conduct “inspections” where noncitizens “are being brought into the
20 United States”). Many statutory provisions, various regulations, and BIA precedent
21 discuss “inspection” in the context of admission processes at ports of entry, further
22 supporting the conclusion that § 1225 has a limited temporal and geographic scope.
23 8 U.S.C. § 1187(h)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1225a; 8 U.S.C. § 1752a; 8 C.F.R. § 235.1;
24 *Matter of Quilantan*, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010). Petitioner’s interpretation
25 accords

26 *Second*, consistent with the statute’s overall focus on the moment of physical
27 entry, § 1225(b)(2)’s plain language limits the statute’s reach to persons actively
28 attempting to enter the United States. The statute applies only to those who are *both*

1 “applicants for admission” *and* in the process of “seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C.
2 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because the statute’s first clause already limits the provision to
3 “applicants for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” must have a different
4 meaning. Any other reading would constitute “an obvious violation of the rule
5 against surplusage.” *Romero*, 2025 WL 2403827, at *10.

6 On its face, the phrase “seeking admission” suggests an active attempt to
7 enter the country. Congress’s use of the present and present progressive tenses
8 “necessarily requires some sort of present-tense action,” excluding noncitizens in
9 the interior who are no longer in the process of seeking admission to the U.S.
10 *Romero*, 2025 WL 2403827, at *9 (cleaned up); *accord Rosado*, 2025 WL
11 2337099, at *11 (similar); *Lopez Benitez*, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (noting the
12 statute’s “present-tense active language”). “Realistically speaking,” it is hard to
13 accept that the statute’s plain language could mean anything else: “[I]f Congress’s
14 intention” to detain everyone who entered without inspection “was so clear, why
15 did it take thirty years to notice?” *Romero*, 2025 WL 2403827, at *12.

16 *Third*, the statutory history supports a limited reading of § 1225(b)’s reach.
17 When Congress amended § 1225(b)’s predecessor statute—which authorized
18 detention only of arriving noncitizens—to include individuals who had not been
19 admitted, legislators expressed concerns about recent arrivals to the United States
20 who lacked the documents to remain in the country. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1,
21 at 157–58, 228–29 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 209 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
22 There was no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to subject
23 all people present in the United States after an unlawful entry to mandatory
24 detention and thereby transform immigration detention and sweep millions of
25 noncitizens into § 1225(b).

26 The BIA’s contrary reading of the legislative history is not persuasive. True,
27 IIRIRA “altered the typology of immigration *proceedings* to ‘place[] on equal
28 footing’ ‘all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted.’” *Romero*, 2025 WL

1 2403827, at *12 (emphasis added) (quoting *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th
2 Cir. 2020)). But that “says nothing about *detention* pending the outcome of those
3 proceedings.” *Id.* (emphasis added). All these indicators suggest that
4 § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to recent arrivals at the border or ports of entry, not
5 people who have already entered the country.

6 On the other hand, § 1226(a) is best read to apply to some inadmissible
7 persons. It cannot plausibly be the case that all inadmissible persons fall under
8 § 1225(b)(2)(A) and none fall under § 1226(a).

9 *First*, § 1226(a)’s statutory structure makes clear that it reaches some
10 individuals who have not been admitted and have entered without inspection.
11 Section 1226(c) exempts specific categories of noncitizens from the default
12 eligibility to seek release on bond in § 1226(a). “Among the individuals carved out
13 and subject to mandatory detention are certain categories of ‘inadmissible’
14 noncitizens.” *Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (quoting 8 § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D),
15 (E)). The 2025 Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) added to that list. “This ‘new’ category”
16 of persons not eligible for bond “includes those noncitizens who are deemed
17 inadmissible, including for being ‘present in the United States without being
18 admitted or paroled,’ and who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of
19 certain crimes.” *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *9 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E);
20 LRA, Pub. L. No. 119-1). If § 1226(a) did not apply to inadmissible noncitizens,
21 then the longstanding carve outs that refer to inadmissibility and Congress’ most
22 recent amendments would all be surplusage. *See Garcia*, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6.
23 The better reading is the Supreme Court’s in *Jennings*: that § 1226(a) “applies to
24 aliens already present in the United States.” 583 U.S. at 303.

25 *Second*, § 1226(a)’s legislative history supports Petitioner’s reading. “After
26 passing the IIRIRA, Congress declared the new § 1226(a) ‘restates the current
27 provisions in [the predecessor statute] regarding the authority of the Attorney
28 General to arrest, detain, and release on bond’ a noncitizen ‘who is not lawfully in

1 the United States.” *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *9. Because noncitizens deemed
2 inadmissible “were entitled to discretionary detention under § 1226(a)’s
3 predecessor statute, and Congress declared the statute’s scope unchanged by
4 IIRIRA,” § 1226(a) must “allow for a discretionary release on bond for”
5 inadmissible noncitizens, too. *Id.*

6 Thus, the best reading of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226 shows that petitioner is
7 eligible for bond. And under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Loper Bright*
8 *v. Raimondo*, this Court must independently interpret the meaning and scope of
9 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a) using the traditional tools of statutory construction. 603 U.S.
10 369, 385, 401 (2024); *see also Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1251; *Kostak*, 2025
11 WL 2472136, at *2 n.29; *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL
12 1869299, at *8 n.9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). Because the BIA’s decision in *Yajure*
13 *Hurtado* is a deviation from the agency’s long-standing interpretation of §§ 1225,
14 1226; is not guidance issued contemporaneously with enactment of the relevant
15 statutes; and contradicts the statutory interpretations of dozens of federal courts,
16 this Court should give it no weight. If anything, the government’s “decades of
17 practice” providing bond hearings to those who entered without inspection is a
18 more persuasive guide to the proper outcome here. *Martinez*, 2025 WL 2084238,
19 at *4.

20 **III. Because an appeal to the BIA would be futile and Mr. Tineo faces**
21 **irreparable harm, exhaustion is not required.**

22 Petitioners raising this argument need not exhaust remedies by appealing a
23 denial of bond to the BIA. “Here, no statute requires exhaustion.” *Romero*, 2025
24 WL 2403827, at *5. Rather, “exhaustion here is a prudential requirement.” *Garcia*,
25 2025 WL 2549431, at *4. “[A] court may waive the prudential exhaustion
26 requirement if . . . pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.”
27 *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “Here,
28 exhausting administrative remedies would be futile because all ICE employees

1 have been directed by DHS' and DOJ's new policy to consider anyone arrested in
2 the United States and charged with being inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) to
3 be an 'applicant for admission' under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore be subject to
4 mandatory detention." *Garcia*, 2025 WL 2549431, at *5 (cleaned up). This habeas
5 petition can therefore proceed.

6 **IV. Either Outright Release and No Re-Detention Absent a Pre-Detention**
7 **Bond Hearing or, in the Alternative, a Bond Hearing and/or Release if a**
8 **Bond Hearing is Not Held Within Five Days Are Proper Remedies/**

9 The Court has two options for remedies in this case. Under one option, the
10 Court should order outright release of Mr. Tineo without re-detention absent a pre-
11 detention bond hearing. *See Lepe v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO
12 (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) *and see Hernandez*
13 *Nieves v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06921-LB, 2025 WL 2533110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
14 3, 2025). Especially considering he has an upcoming merits hearing in a
15 consolidated case with his wife on May 14, 2026 before the non-detained court in
16 San Diego, California.

17 In the alternative, the Court should order a bond hearing before the IJ and/or
18 release if there is no bond hearing within a certain time frame set by the Court. *See*
19 *Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *7
20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) ("Respondents are enjoined from continuing to detain
21 petitioners unless they are provided with an individualized bond hearing before an
22 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of this
23 Order"); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at
24 *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) ("Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is
25 GRANTED. Respondents are HEREBY ORDERED to immediately release Lopez-
26 Campos, or in the alternative, provide him with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
27 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the date of this Order").

28 **CLAIMS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

1 **Detaining Petitioner Without a Bond Hearing Violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),**
2 **Associated Regulations, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Fifth**
3 **Amendment Right to Due Process.**

4 For the reasons just given, Petitioner may be detained, if at all, pursuant to 8
5 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Both the statute and its associated regulations entitle Petitioner
6 to a bond hearing. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 326.1(d), 1236.1, 1003.19(a)-(f). Accordingly,
7 the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause requires the government to provide the
8 legally required bond hearing before Petitioner is detained. *See Hernandez-Lara v.*
9 *Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021).

10 The statute and regulations implement the due process protection that attends
11 any civil detention. *See Rodriguez v. Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018)
12 (expressing “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged
13 detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our
14 democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of
15 liberty would have thought so”). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized
16 that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
17 liberty that requires due process protection,” including an individualized detention
18 hearing. *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); *see also United States v.*
19 *Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 81–83
20 (1992); *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).

21 Here, Petitioner would have been eligible for release on bond under
22 § 1226(a), but for the BIA’s recent decision in *Yajure Hurtado*.

23 Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- 24 1. Order the Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody
25 under the condition that Respondents cannot re-detain him absent a pre-
26 detention bond hearing;

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2. Order, in the alternative, a bond hearing before the IJ and release from detention immediately if a bond hearing is not held within a certain time frame set by the Court; and
3. Order all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 7, 2026

s/ Crystal Felix
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