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Motion for Special Admission filed contemporaneously

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

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ELDAR MURATOV,

Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No.

RONNIE WOODALL, Warden
Florida Baker Correctional Institution;

GARRETT J. RIPA, Field Office Director
ICE ERO Miami Field Office;

TODD M. LYONS
Senior Official Performing Duties
of the Director, ICE;

MARKWAYNE MULLIN
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.

Respondents.

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VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Eldar Muratov is a civil immigration detainee currently held at Florida Baker Correctional Institution in Sanderson, Florida. He brings this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge his continued detention by Respondents without constitutionally adequate custody process.

2. Mr. Muratov is not serving a criminal sentence. He is detained solely under the civil immigration laws while his removal proceedings remain pending. The Notice to Appear charges him as removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), alleging that he remained in the United States beyond the period authorized after admission as a B-2 visitor. *See Exhibit A*. His application for asylum and withholding of removal has been received and remains pending. *See Exhibit E*.

3. Mr. Muratov has appeared through counsel and is actively pursuing relief in immigration proceedings. The Executive Office for Immigration Review has scheduled his individual hearing for May 28, 2026. *See Exhibit D*. Thus, his case is not final, his claims for protection remain unresolved, and his detention is preventive civil detention—not punishment.

4. On April 21, 2026, the Immigration Judge denied Mr. Muratov's request for custody redetermination, checking the boxes for "Danger to the community/Flight risk" and citing *Matter of Dobrotvorskii*, 29 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of W-E-R-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2020). See Exhibit C. The order did not provide a meaningful individualized explanation showing why detention remains necessary, why alternatives to detention would be insufficient, or why continued confinement is justified in light of Mr. Muratov's pending proceedings and request for immigration relief.

5. Due process requires more than a conclusory custody determination when the Government continues to imprison a noncitizen for civil immigration purposes. At a minimum,

continued detention must be justified through a meaningful, neutral, and individualized process that evaluates actual flight risk and danger, considers less restrictive alternatives, and applies a constitutionally adequate burden of proof.

6. Mr. Muratov therefore seeks habeas relief requiring his release, or, in the alternative, a prompt constitutionally adequate custody hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary because no conditions of release can reasonably address any proven risk of flight or danger.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Petitioner is "in custody" under color of federal authority and challenges the legality of that custody under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

8. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the federal habeas statute.

9. Habeas jurisdiction is proper because Petitioner is presently detained at Florida Baker Correctional Institution in Sanderson, Florida, pursuant to civil immigration detention authority. *See Exhibit B*. Petitioner does not seek review of a final order of removal. Instead, he challenges the legality and constitutionality of his current detention without constitutionally adequate custody process.

10. Venue is proper in this District because Petitioner is detained within the Middle District of Florida. *See Exhibit B*. Florida Baker Correctional Institution is located in Baker

County, Florida, and Baker County is within the Jacksonville Division of the Middle District of Florida.

11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Petitioner's immediate custodian because the Warden of Florida Baker Correctional Institution exercises day-to-day control over Petitioner's physical custody within this District. See *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35, 442–43 (2004).

12. Respondents are sued in their official capacities only. Respondent Warden Ronnie Woodall is Petitioner's immediate physical custodian. The federal immigration officials named as Respondents are responsible for Petitioner's immigration detention, custody decisions, and continued confinement under federal immigration authority. ICE's official leadership page identifies Todd M. Lyons as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

13. Because Petitioner remains physically detained in this District and seeks relief from unlawful present custody, this Court has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and to order Petitioner's release or, alternatively, a constitutionally adequate custody hearing.

PARTIES

14. Petitioner Eldar Muratov is a noncitizen currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") at Florida Baker Correctional Institution, located at 20706 US 90 W, Sanderson, Florida 32087. *See Exhibit B.* Petitioner is detained pursuant to the civil immigration laws and seeks habeas relief from unlawful continued detention without constitutionally adequate custody process.

15. Respondent Ronnie Woodall is the Warden of Florida Baker Correctional Institution, where Petitioner is physically detained. Respondent Woodall is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is sued in his official capacity only.

16. Respondent Garrett Ripa is the Field Office Director for ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO") Miami. ICE ERO Miami is the field office identified in connection with Petitioner's detention records. *See Exhibit B*. Respondent Ripa is responsible for immigration enforcement and detention operations within his area of responsibility and is sued in his official capacity only.

17. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In that official capacity, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of ICE detention policies and operations nationwide, including the detention authority exercised over Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity only. ICE's official leadership page identifies Todd M. Lyons as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of ICE.

18. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In that official capacity, he is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws, including the detention authorities carried out by ICE. He is sued in his official capacity only. DHS identifies Markwayne Mullin as the current Secretary of Homeland Security.

19. All Respondents are sued only in their official capacities. Petitioner seeks declaratory and habeas relief directed to his unlawful detention and requests release or, in the alternative, a prompt constitutionally adequate custody hearing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

20. Petitioner Eldar Muratov is a civil immigration detainee currently held at Florida Baker Correctional Institution in Sanderson, Florida. ICE's detainee locator identifies Florida Baker Correctional Institution, 20706 US 90 W, Sanderson, Florida 32087, as Petitioner's current detention facility. *See Exhibit B.*

21. Petitioner is not detained pursuant to any criminal sentence. His detention arises solely from civil immigration proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.

22. On or about April 9, 2026, DHS issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B). The Notice to Appear alleges that Petitioner was admitted to the United States at Miami, Florida, as a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure/tourism and remained in the United States beyond the period authorized. *See Exhibit A.*

23. The Notice to Appear does not charge Petitioner with any criminal ground of removability. Rather, the charged ground is an overstay allegation under INA § 237(a)(1)(B). *See Exhibit A.*

24. The Notice to Appear ordered Petitioner to appear before an Immigration Judge at the immigration court located at Baker Correctional Institution, 20706 FL-10, Sanderson, Florida 32087. *See Exhibit A.*

25. Petitioner has a pending application for asylum and withholding of removal. USCIS issued a receipt notice stating that Petitioner's Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, was received and remains pending as of December 19, 2024. *See Exhibit E.*

26. Because Petitioner's application for protection remains pending, his immigration proceedings have not concluded. Petitioner continues to pursue relief from removal through the immigration process.

27. On April 15, 2026, the Executive Office for Immigration Review issued a Notice of Internet-Based Hearing scheduling Petitioner's individual hearing for May 28, 2026, at 10:30 a.m. Eastern Time before the Orlando Immigration Court. *See Exhibit D.*

28. The hearing notice confirms that Petitioner's case remains pending and that his merits hearing has been scheduled, but not yet completed. *See Exhibit D.*

29. On April 21, 2026, the Orlando Immigration Court issued an order in custody redetermination proceedings. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner's request for a change in custody status. *See Exhibit C.*

30. The bond order states that custody redetermination was denied because of "Danger to the community/Flight risk." *See Exhibit C.*

31. The order cites *Matter of Dobrotvorskii*, 29 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 2025), and *Matter of W-E-R-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2020).

32. The bond order does not provide a detailed individualized explanation of the factual basis for finding Petitioner to be a danger to the community or a flight risk.

33. The order also does not explain why less restrictive alternatives to detention would be insufficient to address any alleged risk of flight or danger.

34. The order further does not identify what conditions of release, if any, were considered before continued detention was ordered.

35. DHS waived appeal from the custody order, while Petitioner reserved appeal. The order states that any appeal was due on May 21, 2026.

36. Petitioner remains detained at Florida Baker Correctional Institution despite having a pending application for asylum and withholding of removal and a scheduled individual hearing in immigration court.

37. Petitioner brings this habeas petition because his continued civil detention, without a constitutionally adequate individualized custody determination supported by a meaningful explanation and consideration of alternatives to detention, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

38. The writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental safeguard against unlawful executive detention. *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969).

39. Federal courts may grant habeas relief to a person who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

40. Section 2241 remains the traditional and proper vehicle for challenging the legality of immigration detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001).

41. Petitioner is presently in federal immigration custody at Florida Baker Correctional Institution in Sanderson, Florida. He does not seek review of a final order of removal. Rather, he challenges his present civil detention and the constitutionally inadequate custody process that resulted in his continued confinement.

42. Habeas corpus is, at its core, a remedy for unlawful physical restraint. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that freedom from bodily restraint lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).

43. Immigration detention, although civil in nature, is still a severe deprivation of liberty and remains subject to constitutional limitations. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 523.

44. Because immigration detention is civil rather than punitive, it must bear a sufficient relation to its nonpunitive purposes and may not be imposed or continued in a manner inconsistent with due process. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

45. The Government's asserted purposes in civil immigration detention are generally to ensure appearance at immigration proceedings and, where supported by evidence, to protect the community. Detention that is continued without a meaningful individualized assessment of those purposes risks becoming arbitrary confinement rather than permissible civil detention.

46. Due process requires meaningful procedural protection when the Government restrains an individual's physical liberty. At a minimum, the Constitution requires a fair opportunity to challenge the factual and legal basis for detention before a neutral decisionmaker. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1972).

47. The adequacy of custody procedures is evaluated under the familiar balancing framework of *Mathews v. Eldridge*, which considers: (1) the private interest affected by the Government's action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the administrative burdens of additional procedures. 424 U.S. at 335.

48. In the immigration-detention context, the private interest is exceptionally weighty because detention deprives the individual of physical liberty. That liberty interest is especially important where, as here, the noncitizen is not serving a criminal sentence, has a pending application for protection, and remains in ongoing removal proceedings.

49. The risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial when a custody order denies release through conclusory findings of "danger" or "flight risk" without a meaningful explanation of the

factual basis for detention, without meaningful consideration of less restrictive alternatives, and without requiring the Government to justify continued confinement through constitutionally adequate procedures.

50. Although the Government has an interest in ensuring appearance at immigration proceedings and protecting the community where actual danger is proven, that interest does not eliminate the Constitution's requirement of meaningful custody process. Civil detention must remain reasonably related to its lawful purposes and must be supported by individualized findings rather than conclusory labels.

51. In the habeas context, federal courts are not limited to asking only whether the Executive has physically confined the petitioner. They may determine whether that custody is lawful and, if it is not, order release or other appropriate relief. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); *St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. at 301–05.

52. The Supreme Court has emphasized that habeas is intended to provide a prompt and effective judicial check on unlawful detention. *Price v. Johnston*, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948), overruled in part on other grounds by *McCleskey v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400–01 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds by *Wainwright v. Sykes*, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

53. Accordingly, where a noncitizen is held in immigration custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, this Court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to grant habeas relief, including release or such other relief as law and justice require. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

54. Petitioner therefore properly invokes this Court's habeas jurisdiction to challenge his continued civil detention and to seek release or, in the alternative, a prompt constitutionally adequate custody hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

ARGUMENT

55. Petitioner's continued civil immigration detention violates the Fifth Amendment because the Government has continued to restrain his physical liberty through constitutionally inadequate custody procedures. Petitioner is not serving a criminal sentence. He is detained solely under the civil immigration laws while his removal proceedings and protection application remain pending. The Constitution does not permit the Government to continue civil confinement based on conclusory labels of "danger" or "flight risk" without a meaningful individualized determination, a constitutionally adequate burden of proof, consideration of less restrictive alternatives, and a reasoned explanation showing why detention is actually necessary.

56. Petitioner does not ask this Court to reweigh the evidence presented in immigration bond proceedings or to substitute its own discretionary judgment for that of the Immigration Judge. Rather, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the process by which his continued detention was authorized. That distinction is critical. A federal habeas court may not sit as an ordinary bond appellate tribunal, but it may determine whether the procedures used to continue physical custody comply with the Constitution and federal law. See *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018).

I. PETITIONER'S DETENTION IS GOVERNED BY 8 U.S.C. § 1226(A), THE DISCRETIONARY PRE-REMOVAL-ORDER DETENTION STATUTE.

57. Petitioner is detained while removal proceedings are pending and before any final order of removal. His detention is therefore governed, if at all, by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes the arrest and detention of a noncitizen "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

58. Section 1226(a) is discretionary. It does not require detention in every case. To the contrary, Congress expressly authorized release on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a)(1)–(2). The statutory structure therefore confirms that detention is not automatic, and that continued custody must be justified by an individualized assessment of whether detention is actually necessary.

59. Neither 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) nor 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs this case. Section 1225(b) governs certain applicants for admission and arriving aliens at the threshold of admission. Section 1231(a) governs detention after a final order of removal. Petitioner is in ongoing removal proceedings and has not reached the post-final-order removal period. Because he is being held during pending removal proceedings, § 1226(a) supplies the relevant detention framework.

60. Federal regulations likewise recognize that a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) may seek custody redetermination before an Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a)–(b), 1236.1(d)(1). The custody proceeding is separate from the removal proceeding, and the Immigration Judge's custody determination must be entered on the appropriate form with the parties informed orally or in writing of the reasons for the decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d), (f).

61. Because § 1226(a) permits release, the Government may not treat Petitioner's detention as effectively mandatory. Civil detention under § 1226(a) must remain tied to legitimate regulatory purposes—ensuring appearance and protecting the community where actual danger is proven—and it must be supported by procedures sufficient to prevent erroneous deprivation of liberty.

II. THIS COURT MAY REVIEW PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION CLAIM NOTWITHSTANDING 8 U.S.C. § 1226(E).

62. Respondents may argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) bars review because Petitioner received a custody redetermination. That argument fails because Petitioner is not asking this Court to review a discretionary bond decision as if this Court were the Board of Immigration Appeals. He challenges the constitutional adequacy of the process used to authorize continued detention.

63. Section 1226(e) bars review of certain discretionary judgments regarding detention or release, but it does not bar constitutional or legal challenges to the detention framework or procedures. In *Demore*, the Supreme Court held that § 1226(e) did not bar habeas jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to detention. 538 U.S. at 516–17. In *Jennings*, the Court likewise recognized that § 1226(e) does not bar challenges to the legal framework governing detention, as distinct from review of discretionary bond determinations. 583 U.S. at 295.

64. Petitioner therefore does not ask this Court to decide whether the Immigration Judge should have weighed the evidence differently. He asks whether due process permits the Government to continue civil confinement based on an unexplained custody order that does not meaningfully identify the evidence relied upon, does not apply a constitutionally adequate burden of proof, and does not meaningfully consider less restrictive alternatives to detention.

65. Nor do 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) or 1252(g) bar this action. Petitioner does not seek review of a removal order, the merits of his protection application, or the Government's decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate a case, or execute a removal order. He challenges present physical custody. Section 1252(g) is narrow and applies only to the discrete decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482–87 (1999). Section 1252(b)(9) likewise does not bar claims that are independent of the process for reviewing a removal order. See *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020).

66. This Court also retains authority to grant individualized relief. Section 1252(f)(1) restricts certain classwide or systemic injunctive relief, but it expressly preserves relief "with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); see also

Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 550 (2022). Petitioner seeks only individualized habeas relief from his own unlawful detention.

III. ANY EXHAUSTION OBJECTION SHOULD BE REJECTED OR EXCUSED.

67. To the extent Respondents argue that Petitioner must further exhaust administrative remedies, that objection should be rejected or excused. Section 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, and in the Eleventh Circuit exhaustion in § 2241 proceedings is not jurisdictional. *Santiago-Lugo v. Warden*, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015).

68. At most, exhaustion in this context is a nonjurisdictional, judge-made prerequisite that may be excused where administrative review is inadequate, futile, incapable of granting the requested relief, or unable to prevent irreparable injury. See *Santiago-Lugo*, 785 F.3d at 475; *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 146–49 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).

69. Exhaustion should be excused here because Petitioner raises constitutional claims concerning the legality of his present detention and the adequacy of the process used to continue that detention. The Board of Immigration Appeals cannot grant habeas relief, cannot order this Court's requested habeas remedy, and cannot declare the governing detention process unconstitutional. See *Matter of C-*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (B.I.A. 1992) ("[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations.").

70. Requiring additional administrative review would also fail to remedy the ongoing injury. Every additional day of unconstitutional detention is a continuing deprivation of physical liberty. Habeas corpus exists precisely to provide a prompt judicial check against unlawful

executive detention. See *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969); *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).

71. Moreover, Petitioner's claim is not that the Immigration Judge simply made a wrong discretionary call. The claim is that the custody process itself was constitutionally deficient. Administrative appeal cannot substitute for habeas review where the present injury is ongoing physical confinement imposed through procedures that fail to satisfy due process.

IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A MEANINGFUL INDIVIDUALIZED CUSTODY DETERMINATION BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT MAY CONTINUE CIVIL IMMIGRATION DETENTION.

72. The Fifth Amendment protects "persons," not only citizens. A noncitizen physically present in the United States is entitled to due process before the Government deprives him of liberty. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); *Yamataya v. Fisher*, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).

73. Freedom from bodily restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). Civil immigration detention is therefore not an ordinary administrative measure. It is physical incarceration, and it must satisfy constitutional limits.

74. Immigration detention is civil, not punitive. Because it is civil, it must bear a reasonable relation to legitimate nonpunitive purposes and may not be imposed or continued in a manner inconsistent with due process. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The Government's legitimate purposes are generally to ensure appearance at immigration proceedings and to protect the community where actual danger is proven. Detention that is not meaningfully tied to those purposes becomes arbitrary civil confinement.

75. Due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). In the custody context, that requires more than a formal proceeding. It requires a fair opportunity to contest the factual and legal basis for detention before a neutral decisionmaker. See *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1972).

76. A custody hearing is not meaningful if the Government may continue detention through conclusory allegations or labels. Due process requires a reliable procedure that identifies the actual basis for detention, applies a constitutionally adequate burden of proof, considers alternatives to detention, and results in findings sufficient to permit meaningful review.

77. The Supreme Court's civil detention cases confirm this principle. In *Addington v. Texas*, the Court held that civil commitment requires clear and convincing evidence because physical liberty is too important to be lost under a weak evidentiary standard. 441 U.S. 418, 425–33 (1979). In *Foucha*, the Court held that continued civil confinement violates due process when the State cannot justify detention under constitutionally adequate standards. 504 U.S. at 77–83. In *United States v. Salerno*, the Court upheld pretrial detention only in light of robust procedural safeguards, including a prompt hearing, representation by counsel, the right to present evidence, findings, and the Government's burden to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. 481 U.S. 739, 750–52 (1987).

78. Those principles apply here. If the Government seeks to continue imprisoning Petitioner for civil immigration purposes, the Government must justify that imprisonment through a meaningful, individualized, and reliable process. It is not enough to recite "danger" or "flight risk." The Constitution requires a reasoned determination, supported by evidence, showing why

detention remains necessary and why release conditions cannot reasonably address any proven concern.

V. THE CUSTODY PROCESS HERE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT AUTHORIZED CONTINUED DETENTION THROUGH CONCLUSORY FINDINGS RATHER THAN A REASONED NECESSITY DETERMINATION.

79. The custody process used here failed to satisfy due process. Petitioner's continued detention was authorized through conclusory findings of danger and flight risk, without a meaningful explanation of the evidence relied upon, without constitutionally adequate allocation of the burden of proof, and without meaningful consideration of alternatives to detention.

80. Conclusory findings are not enough. The purpose of custody redetermination is to decide whether detention is actually necessary. A decision that merely labels a person dangerous or a flight risk does not show necessity. It does not explain what evidence was credited, what evidence was rejected, why release conditions would be insufficient, or why continued confinement remains reasonably related to a legitimate civil purpose.

81. The Board's own bond precedents confirm that custody determinations must be individualized. In ordinary bond proceedings, an Immigration Judge may consider factors such as fixed address, length of residence, family ties, employment history, criminal history, immigration history, attempts to flee, and manner of entry. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006). Those factors require actual analysis; they do not permit detention based on unexplained labels.

82. The same is true of *Matter of Dobrotvorskii*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 2025). *Dobrotvorskii* confirms that sponsor evidence may be relevant to flight risk because it bears on fixed address, community ties, and the likelihood of appearance. Id. at 214. That authority supports Petitioner's position: where flight risk is alleged, the decisionmaker must meaningfully evaluate

individualized evidence bearing on appearance, sponsorship, address, community ties, incentives to appear, and potential release conditions.

83. A custody order that invokes *Dobrotvorskii* but does not meaningfully analyze those individualized flight-risk considerations does not provide meaningful process. The issue is not whether the Immigration Judge had authority to consider flight risk. The issue is whether the decision explains, based on actual facts, why Petitioner presents a real risk of nonappearance and why reasonable conditions of release would not address that risk.

84. The custody order's reliance on *Matter of W-E-R-B-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 795 (B.I.A. 2020), underscores the need for meaningful review. *W-E-R-B-* is not a general immigration-bond-danger case. It concerns whether an INTERPOL Red Notice may constitute reliable evidence in the asylum and withholding context for purposes of the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar. Id. at 795, 797–99.

85. Even in that context, *W-E-R-B-* does not authorize blind reliance on unexplained allegations. It concerns reliability. *Id.* at 797–99. Thus, if the Government or Immigration Judge relies on foreign accusations, a Red Notice, or similar material to support alleged danger, due process requires a meaningful explanation of what evidence was relied upon, why that evidence was reliable, what factual findings were made, and how those facts establish present danger sufficient to justify civil detention.

86. A bare citation to *W-E-R-B-* cannot substitute for individualized findings. If the custody decision relies on a foreign allegation or other contested evidence, due process requires more—not less—careful explanation. Without reliability findings and a reasoned connection between the evidence and present danger, continued detention rests on unexplained suspicion rather than constitutionally adequate process.

87. The failure to consider less restrictive alternatives is independently unconstitutional. Civil detention is permissible only when it remains reasonably related to its regulatory purposes. If those purposes can be served by bond, release to a sponsor, reporting requirements, electronic monitoring, travel restrictions, address-update obligations, or other conditions, continued physical incarceration is excessive. A custody determination that does not meaningfully consider such alternatives cannot show that detention is necessary.

88. This defect is especially important under § 1226(a), because Congress expressly authorized release on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). When the statute itself provides for release, the Constitution requires the decisionmaker to consider whether conditions can reasonably address any proven concern. Otherwise, discretionary detention becomes detention by default.

VI. RESPONDENTS CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S CIVIL DETENTION THROUGH UNDISCLOSED, UNTESTED, OR POLITICALLY SUSPECT INTERPOL-DERIVED INFORMATION.

89. Respondents' apparent reliance on INTERPOL-derived information underscores the constitutional defect in Petitioner's continued detention. The custody order cites *Matter of W-E-R-B-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 795 (B.I.A. 2020), immediately after checking the box for "Danger to the community/Flight risk." But *W-E-R-B-* is not a general immigration-bond case. It does not hold that an INTERPOL communication automatically proves present danger. It does not authorize detention based on unexplained foreign accusations. And it does not eliminate the Government's obligation to provide constitutionally adequate custody process before continuing civil confinement.

90. A Red Notice, Diffusion, or other INTERPOL communication is not an arrest warrant. It is not a United States judicial finding. It is not an independent determination of probable

cause by a United States court. And it is not, by itself, proof that a noncitizen is presently dangerous or likely to flee. The United States has recognized that ICE officers do not have authority to arrest based solely on the existence of an INTERPOL notice, and that a Red Notice alone is not sufficient for arrest under the Fourth Amendment. See Exhibit F.

91. ICE's own agency guidance reinforces the same principle. ICE Directive 15006.1, *INTERPOL Red Notices and Wanted Person Diffusions*, provides guidance to ICE personnel concerning Red Notices and Wanted Person Diffusions and generally prohibits ICE personnel from relying exclusively on such information to justify law-enforcement actions or during immigration proceedings. *U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, Directive* 15006.1, *INTERPOL Red Notices and Wanted Person Diffusions* (Aug. 15, 2023). The Directive reflects an agency recognition that INTERPOL-derived information must be handled carefully, verified, reviewed for possible abuse, and not treated as a substitute for independent lawful authority.

92. Those safeguards matter here. To the extent Respondents rely on an INTERPOL Red Notice, Diffusion, or other foreign-supplied INTERPOL communication to justify Petitioner's detention, due process requires more than a citation to *W-E-R-B-* and a checked box for "danger" or "flight risk." Respondents must identify the actual information relied upon, disclose the underlying documentation, show that the information remains valid and active, establish that it is not politically motivated or otherwise abusive, and provide Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to rebut it.

93. Congress has also recognized the serious risk that foreign governments may misuse INTERPOL mechanisms for political or unlawful purposes. Congress found that some INTERPOL member countries have used INTERPOL databases and processes, including Notice and Diffusion mechanisms, for activities of a political or otherwise unlawful character and in violation of

international human-rights standards, including by making requests for INTERPOL intervention related to purported charges of ordinary law crimes that are fabricated for political or other unlawful motives. 22 U.S.C. § 263b(a)(6); see also Exhibit I.

94. Congress further directed the Attorney General and Secretary of State to report on how INTERPOL member countries abuse Red Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL communications for political motives and other unlawful purposes. 22 U.S.C. § 263b(c)(1). Congress also required reporting on incidents in which United States courts or executive agencies relied on INTERPOL communications contrary to existing law or policy to seek detention or render judgments concerning immigration status, asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture claims. 22 U.S.C. § 263b(c)(2)(E). The statute further directs reporting on how the United States monitors and responds to likely INTERPOL abuse affecting persons with pending asylum, withholding, or Convention Against Torture claims. 22 U.S.C. § 263b(c)(2)(F). These provisions confirm that INTERPOL misuse is a recognized legal and policy concern, not a speculative argument.

95. Congress also prohibited extradition based solely on an INTERPOL Red Notice or Diffusion. 22 U.S.C. § 263b(d). While this case concerns civil immigration detention rather than extradition, the statute is important because it confirms that INTERPOL communications are not self-executing proof of criminality or danger. If an INTERPOL communication is insufficient by itself to support extradition, it cannot constitutionally serve as an unexplained shortcut to continued civil immigration detention without disclosure, reliability review, and individualized findings.

96. The DOJ and State Department report submitted under 22 U.S.C. § 263b confirms why blind reliance on INTERPOL information is constitutionally dangerous. The report recognizes that repressive governments may misuse INTERPOL systems as part of transnational

repression, including by targeting dissidents, peaceful critics, political opponents, and human-rights defenders. *See Exhibit F.* The report further explains that governments attempting to misuse INTERPOL systems often do not identify their accusations as political; instead, they may present allegations as ordinary crimes such as fraud, financial crimes, terrorism, or other facially nonpolitical offenses, even where the charges are fabricated, weakly supported, or politically motivated. *See Exhibit F.*

97. That risk is not abstract here. Petitioner has objective evidence of political activity and foreign-state mistreatment. The European Court of Human Rights identified Petitioner in connection with an anti-war protest in Russia and recognized violations arising from his detention and administrative proceedings, including unlawful detention and lack of impartiality in the tribunal. *See Exhibit G.* This evidence directly undermines any assumption that foreign-state allegations or INTERPOL-derived information can be treated as reliable without careful scrutiny.

98. Petitioner's political context required heightened reliability review. If the Government's danger theory rests on foreign accusations, a Red Notice, a Diffusion, or any INTERPOL-derived communication, the decisionmaker had to ask: Who supplied the information? What is the underlying offense? Is there a valid foreign warrant? Is the information active, withdrawn, suspended, or under CCF review? Was Petitioner given the underlying documents? Is there evidence that the foreign accusation is politically motivated? Does the accusation actually show present danger in the United States? And can any legitimate concern be addressed through release conditions? The custody order answers none of those questions.

99. The pending CCF access request further demonstrates the due-process problem. Petitioner has sought access to and clarification of any INTERPOL data concerning him through the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files. *See Exhibit H.* That request reflects that

the INTERPOL information remains undisclosed, untested, and contested. A civil detainee cannot meaningfully rebut secret or unexplained foreign-supplied allegations. Continued detention based on such information, without disclosure and meaningful opportunity to contest it, creates an intolerable risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.

100. *Matter of W-E-R-B-* does not save Respondents' position. In *W-E-R-B-*, the Board addressed whether an INTERPOL Red Notice could constitute reliable evidence in the entirely different context of the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar to asylum and withholding of removal. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 795. The Board did not hold that a Red Notice proves dangerousness for immigration bond purposes. It did not hold that a Red Notice authorizes civil detention. And it did not hold that the Government may rely on an undisclosed or unexplained INTERPOL communication without reliability findings.

101. In fact, *W-E-R-B-* supports Petitioner's due-process argument. The Board emphasized that the Red Notice in that case was supported by specific record findings: the notice identified a serious offense, was tied to a valid national arrest warrant, matched the respondent's identifying information, was active, and was accompanied by additional evidence, including Form I-213 information. Id. at 798–99. Here, by contrast, the custody order provides no comparable analysis. It does not identify the specific INTERPOL information relied upon, does not state whether there is a Red Notice or a Diffusion, does not identify the underlying documents, does not make reliability findings, and does not explain how any foreign accusation establishes present danger.

102. *W-E-R-B-* also recognizes the importance of political-motivation evidence. The Board noted that, in a case where a noncitizen presents evidence of the political nature of the alleged crime, the Immigration Judge should consider evidence that the foreign country issuing

the Red Notice abuses such notices for political reasons. Id. at 800 n.5. The Board cited *Tatintsyan v. Barr*, 799 F. App'x 965, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2020), where a Russia-requested Red Notice was insufficient where the noncitizen credibly denied the allegation and presented evidence of political abuse. *W-E-R-B-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 800 n.5.

103. That principle applies with even greater force here, where Petitioner has objective evidence of anti-war political activity and documented foreign-state rights violations. *See Exhibit G*. A custody decision that cites *W-E-R-B-* but ignores Petitioner's political profile, the recognized risk of INTERPOL misuse, and the undisclosed nature of the INTERPOL information does not provide meaningful individualized process.

104. Nor can Respondents rely on INTERPOL information as a shortcut around the requirements of § 1226(a). Petitioner is detained under the discretionary pre-removal-order detention statute, which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). Because detention under § 1226(a) is discretionary, not mandatory, the Government must show why detention is actually necessary. An untested foreign accusation or INTERPOL communication cannot substitute for individualized proof of present danger or flight risk.

105. The danger finding is particularly deficient. Present danger must be based on reliable, individualized evidence. The Government cannot transform a foreign-state allegation into proof of danger merely by invoking INTERPOL. Where the alleged source of danger is an INTERPOL communication connected to a foreign government, and where Petitioner has evidence of political activity and rights violations abroad, due process requires careful scrutiny before continued civil detention may be justified.

106. The flight-risk finding is also deficient. Petitioner has strong reasons to appear: he is represented by counsel, has a pending protection application, has an upcoming individual

hearing, and has family ties, including his spouse and two children. These facts strongly undermine any claim that he is likely to abscond. Any legitimate appearance concern can be addressed through less restrictive conditions, including bond, release to family, regular ICE reporting, electronic monitoring, address-update requirements, travel restrictions, and other supervision conditions.

107. The custody order does not explain why those alternatives would be insufficient. That omission is constitutionally significant. Civil immigration detention must remain reasonably related to its regulatory purposes. If the Government's goals can be achieved through supervision and release conditions, continued incarceration is excessive. A custody order that relies on INTERPOL-related allegations without assessing less restrictive alternatives fails to show that detention is necessary.

108. Due process required, at minimum, a meaningful hearing at which Respondents disclosed the INTERPOL-derived information and underlying documents, established that the information was reliable and not politically motivated, allowed Petitioner a fair opportunity to rebut it, considered Petitioner's family ties and release plan, and explained why no conditions of release could reasonably address any proven risk. The custody process did not provide those safeguards.

109. Accordingly, any reliance on INTERPOL-derived information strengthens rather than weakens Petitioner's habeas claim. It shows why a conclusory custody order is constitutionally inadequate. It shows why the Government must bear the burden of proof. It shows why the decisionmaker must make specific findings. And it shows why Petitioner is entitled to immediate release or, at minimum, a prompt constitutionally adequate custody hearing that includes disclosure, reliability review, consideration of political-motivation evidence, and meaningful consideration of alternatives to detention.

VII. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFYING CONTINUED DETENTION.

110. The Constitution does not permit the Government to imprison a person and then require that person to prove he deserves liberty. Physical liberty is the baseline. Detention is the exception. See *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 755. When the Government seeks to restrain a person's body, the Government must justify that restraint.

111. In the § 1226(a) context, placing the burden on the detainee creates a serious risk of erroneous deprivation. The Government controls the arrest decision, detention records, law-enforcement allegations, and much of the evidence used to support custody. A detained person, by contrast, faces obvious barriers to gathering documents, locating witnesses, obtaining sponsor materials, and rebutting Government allegations while incarcerated.

112. Several courts of appeals have recognized that due process requires the Government to bear the burden at constitutionally adequate immigration custody hearings. In *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, the Second Circuit held that due process required a new § 1226(a) bond hearing at which the Government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that detention was justified. 978 F.3d 842, 855–56 (2d Cir. 2020). In *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, the First Circuit held that placing the burden on a § 1226(a) detainee created an unconstitutional risk of erroneous deprivation and required the Government to justify detention. 10 F.4th 19, 39–41 (1st Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit has likewise required the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued immigration detention is justified. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–05 (9th Cir. 2011).

113. Those decisions are persuasive because they rest on the basic due-process rule that the Government bears the burden when it deprives a person of physical liberty. The same principle follows from *Addington*, *Foucha*, and *Salerno*. Civil confinement requires reliable procedures, and

reliable procedures require the Government to justify detention with evidence—not require the detained person to disprove detention.

114. At a constitutionally adequate custody hearing, the Government should bear the burden of proof. At minimum, the Government must prove danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence and flight risk by at least a preponderance of the evidence. See *Hernandez-Lara*, 10 F.4th at 39–41. Because physical liberty is at stake and because civil detention is a severe deprivation, Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should require the Government to prove both danger and flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. See *Velasco Lopez*, 978 F.3d at 855–56; *Singh*, 638 F.3d at 1203–05.

115. Requiring the Government to bear the burden does not prevent detention when detention is truly necessary. It simply ensures that detention is based on evidence and constitutional process. If the Government can prove that no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably address danger or flight risk, detention may continue. But if the Government cannot make that showing, continued confinement is not constitutionally justified.

VIII. THE MATHEWS FACTORS REQUIRE STRONGER PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS HERE.

116. The balancing test in *Mathews v. Eldridge* confirms that Petitioner's custody process was constitutionally inadequate. Under *Mathews*, courts consider: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including administrative burdens. 424 U.S. at 335.

117. The first factor strongly favors Petitioner. The private interest is physical liberty. Petitioner is not merely subject to reporting obligations or immigration supervision; he is

incarcerated. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that freedom from bodily restraint lies at the heart of due process. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690; *Foucha*, 504 U.S. at 80.

118. The second factor also strongly favors Petitioner. The risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial where continued detention may rest on conclusory findings, unexplained reliance on contested allegations, no clearly assigned Government burden, and no meaningful analysis of alternatives to detention. That risk becomes especially severe where the alleged basis for danger appears to involve foreign-supplied INTERPOL information that has not been meaningfully disclosed, verified, tested, or evaluated for political motivation. These defects create a serious risk that a person who could safely be released under appropriate conditions will instead remain jailed.

119. Additional safeguards would have substantial value. Requiring the Government to bear the burden, requiring a heightened evidentiary standard, requiring disclosure of the evidence relied upon, requiring reliability review of INTERPOL-derived information, requiring consideration of political-motivation evidence, requiring consideration of alternatives, and requiring a reasoned decision would materially reduce the risk of erroneous detention. These safeguards would force the Government to identify the actual basis for detention and would permit meaningful review of any continued confinement.

120. The third factor does not outweigh Petitioner's liberty interest. The Government has legitimate interests in ensuring appearance and protecting the community where danger is proven. But those interests are served by accurate custody procedures. The Government has no legitimate interest in continuing detention through unconstitutional process or in relying on undisclosed, untested, or politically suspect foreign-supplied information without meaningful review.

121. The administrative burden of providing a constitutionally adequate custody hearing is minimal compared to the severe liberty deprivation caused by incarceration. Immigration courts already conduct custody proceedings. Requiring the Government to carry the burden, present reliable evidence, disclose the material relied upon, address alternatives, and obtain reasoned findings does not create an undue burden. It simply ensures that civil detention remains lawful.

122. The *Mathews* balance therefore requires a new constitutionally adequate custody hearing unless this Court orders immediate release. A hearing that merely repeats the same defective process would not cure the violation. The hearing must require the Government to justify detention, must require disclosure and reliability review of any INTERPOL-derived information, must consider alternatives to detention, and must result in specific findings.

IX. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE OR, AT MINIMUM, A PROMPT CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE CUSTODY HEARING.

123. Habeas courts have broad authority to remedy unlawful custody. Section 2243 directs courts to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. When custody is unlawful, release is the traditional habeas remedy. *Preiser*, 411 U.S. at 484; *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987).

124. Immediate release is warranted because Petitioner's continued detention has not been justified through constitutionally adequate procedures. The Government has already had an opportunity to justify detention, but the process used did not provide the safeguards required by due process. The Constitution does not require Petitioner to remain incarcerated indefinitely while the Government receives repeated opportunities to cure defective custody process.

125. At minimum, this Court should order Respondents to provide Petitioner, within seven days, a constitutionally adequate custody hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. At that hearing, the Government must bear the burden of proving that continued detention is necessary.

The decisionmaker must consider whether conditions of release can reasonably address any proven risk of flight or danger. Any continued detention must be supported by specific, reasoned findings.

126. The constitutionally adequate hearing should include, at minimum: (1) a neutral decisionmaker; (2) notice of the evidence relied upon; (3) disclosure of any INTERPOL-derived information and reasonably available underlying documentation relied upon by the Government; (4) a fair opportunity to present evidence and rebut the Government's evidence; (5) reliability review of any foreign-supplied or INTERPOL-derived information; (6) consideration of evidence of political motivation, transnational repression, and foreign-state misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms; (7) the Government's burden to justify continued detention; (8) application of a constitutionally adequate evidentiary standard; (9) meaningful consideration of alternatives to detention; and (10) a reasoned written or oral decision sufficient to permit meaningful review.

127. If Respondents cannot provide such a hearing within the deadline set by this Court, Petitioner should be released under appropriate conditions of supervision. A remedy without a firm deadline would not meaningfully protect Petitioner's liberty interest. The constitutional injury is ongoing every day Petitioner remains detained without adequate process.

X. PETITIONER PRESERVES HIS RIGHT TO SEEK COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND EXPENSES TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.

128. Petitioner also requests costs, attorney's fees, and expenses to the extent permitted by law. The Equal Access to Justice Act provides for an award of fees and other expenses to a prevailing party against the United States unless the Government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also *Comm'r, INS v. Jean*, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990).

129. Petitioner recognizes that an application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act is ordinarily made after judgment and after prevailing-party status is established. Petitioner

therefore preserves his right to seek attorney's fees, costs, and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and any other applicable authority.

130. For these reasons, the Petition should be granted. The Court should order Petitioner's immediate release or, in the alternative, order Respondents to provide a prompt constitutionally adequate custody hearing within seven days. At that hearing, the Government must bear the burden of justifying continued detention, any INTERPOL-derived information must be disclosed and subjected to reliability review, evidence of political motivation and transnational repression must be meaningfully considered, less restrictive alternatives must be meaningfully considered, and any continued detention must be supported by specific findings.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

a. Grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus;

b. Declare that Petitioner's continued civil immigration detention, without constitutionally adequate custody process, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;

c. Order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody under appropriate conditions of supervision;

d. In the alternative, order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate custody hearing within seven days, at which the Government bears the burden of justifying continued detention;

e. Order that, at any such hearing, Respondents must disclose and identify the evidence relied upon, including any INTERPOL-derived information, foreign-supplied allegation, Red Notice, Diffusion, or related material, and must establish its reliability and non-political basis before it may be used to justify detention;

f. Order that any continued detention after such hearing must be supported by specific, reasoned findings showing why detention remains necessary, why less restrictive alternatives are insufficient, and why no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably address any proven risk of danger or flight;

g. Award Petitioner costs, attorney's fees, and expenses to the extent permitted by law; and

h. Grant any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: May 1, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Vano I. Haroutunian
Vano I. Haroutunian, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I, Vano I. Haroutunian, do depose and state:

I represent Petitioner Eldar Muratov in these habeas corpus proceedings. Mr. Muratov is currently being held in detention at the Florida Baker Correctional Institution in Sanderson, Florida, and cannot appear in my office to sign this Verification. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated: May 1, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Vano I. Haroutunian
Vano I. Haroutunian, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit	Description of Exhibits
A	Notice to Appear
B	ICE Detainee Locator
C	Immigration Judge Bond Order
D	Notice of Internet-Based Individual Hearing
E	Form I-589 Receipt Notice
F	Relevant Excerpts from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State Report on INTERPOL Abuse
G	Relevant Excerpts from *Kotugin and Others v. Russia*, European Court of Human Rights Judgment
H	INTERPOL Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files Access Request Submission
I	Relevant Excerpts from 22 U.S.C. § 263b Concerning INTERPOL Communications