

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO**

Civil Action No. 26-cv-01791-PAB

GURIKMAN SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden, Aurora ICE Processing Center,
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and
TODD BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney General,

Respondents.

**RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF No. 5)**

Respondents hereby respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 5), directing them to respond to the habeas petition.

This response is timely. The Court ordered service on Respondents by e-mail and overnight mail. ECF No. 5. The Court ordered Respondents to respond within seven days of service. *Id.* Service was made upon the U.S. Attorney's Office on May 13, 2026. Thus, Respondents' response deadline is May 20, 2026.¹

¹ Service is effective as of the date it is "made upon" Respondents in the manner specified in the Court's Order—that is, the date it is received. *See, e.g.,* C. Wright *et al.*, 4B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1346 (4th ed.) ("Time for Serving and Filing") ("Federal officers and employees sued in their official capacities have sixty days from the date service is *made upon* the United States to serve their response."); *A.T. v. Baltazar*, No. 26-cv-00925-NYW, ECF No. 11 at 2 n.2 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2026) ("Service by mail of a summons and complaint is effective *upon receipt*, . . . not upon mailing." (citing *Klein v. Williams*, 144 F.R.D. 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasis added))).

The central legal issue presented in this case concerns whether a noncitizen who is present in the United States and has not been admitted is subject to mandatory detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), or whether such a noncitizen is entitled by § 1226(a) to seek a bond hearing. This issue is not materially different from an issue this Court has resolved in a prior ruling in another case. *See, e.g., Alfaro Orellana v. Noem*, 25-cv-03976-PAB (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2025). Respondents respectfully disagree with that ruling. But to conserve resources and expedite this Court's consideration of this case, while preserving legal arguments and reserving all of Respondents' rights including the right to appeal, Respondents submit this abbreviated response.

When Petitioner was detained by ICE, he was present in the United States without having been admitted. *See* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2; Ex. A, Declaration of John Mansur (May 20, 2026), ¶¶ 5-7. Respondents' position is that Petitioner is, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) under the interpretation of that provision adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. *See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir. 2026); *Avila v. Bondi*, 170 F.4th 1128, 1132–38 (8th Cir. 2026). This position is further supported by *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), where the Supreme Court explained that a noncitizen "who . . . 'is present' in this country but 'has not been admitted,' is treated as 'an applicant for admission.'" 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). The Court then explained that *all* "applicants for admission" are subject to detention under either 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2)—both of which *require* detention. *See id.* ("Section 1225(b)(2) . . . serves as a catchall provision that applies to

all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”); *id.* at 297 (“Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded”). Respondents submit that *Jennings* supports their position that all “applicants for admission”—who include noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States and have not been admitted—are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

The Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, a court in this district, and some other district courts in this circuit have agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., *Buenrostro-Mendez*, 166 F.4th at 502–08; *Avila*, 170 F.4th at 1132–38; *Singh v. Blanche*, No. 1:26-cv-00421-DDD-KAS, ECF No. 12 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 2026); *Montoya v. Holt*, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025). Many others have not, including this Court, as noted above. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled on this issue. A decision in this district rejecting Respondents’ position on this issue has been appealed to the Tenth Circuit. See *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, Civil Action No. 25-cv-02720-RMR (D. Colo.), *appeal docketed*, No. 25-1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025). Decisions in other districts within this circuit adopting Respondents’ position on this issue have also been appealed to the Tenth Circuit. See *Cisneros v. Mullin*, Civil Action No. 2:25cv1170-HCN (D. Utah), *appeal docketed*, No. 26-4015 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026); *Quiroz v. Mullin*, Civil Action No. 5:25-CV-01349-PRW (W.D. Okla.), *appeal docketed*, No. 26-6019 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026). Those appeals all remain pending.

Respondents acknowledge that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if

the Court adheres to that decision, as the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable from that case for purposes of the Court's decision on the legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Thus, while Respondents do not consent to issuance of the writ and reserve the right to appeal, to expedite disposition of this case, Respondents hereby rely upon, and incorporate by reference, the legal arguments Respondents presented on this issue in *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, Civil Action No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, ECF No. 26 at 10–19.²

The Petition contends that Petitioner should be viewed as detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b). See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 67-73. If the Court agrees and determines that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and grants the petition, the appropriate relief is for the Court to direct that a bond hearing be conducted pursuant to § 1226(a) before an immigration judge. In particular, the Court should not order further relief beyond directing that Petitioner be granted a bond hearing under § 1226(a). It should not order immediate release, as multiple decisions in this district have recognized.³

² A copy of that brief is attached as Exhibit B hereto.

³ See, e.g., *Montanez de la Cruz v. Baltazar*, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026) (“[B]ecause § 1226 authorizes detention, the Court does not find that petitioner’s immediate release is an appropriate remedy. Instead, the Court will order that a bond hearing be conducted.”); *Leyva Ramirez v. Baltazar*, No. 26-cv-00199-NYW, 2026 WL 318989, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2026) (“[A] bond hearing before an immigration judge is sufficient to vindicate the procedural protections afforded by § 1226(a).”); *Perez Zepeda v. Hagan*, No. 25-cv-3789-SKC-STV, ECF No. 18, at 17 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2026) (“[Section] 1226 does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to grant a noncitizen release on bond. . . . Additionally, the Court concludes

This Court's ruling on the § 1225(b)(2)(A) issue in this case should resolve this habeas petition. If the Court grants the petition on this ground, it should decline to address additional arguments. See, e.g., *Leyva Ramirez*, 2026 WL 318989, at *3–4 (“The Court’s analysis begins and ends with Count One, the statutory claim. . . . Having granted Mr. Leyva Ramirez relief as to Count One, the Court does not reach his other claims at this time.”); see also *INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). The Court should also not grant any other prospective injunctive relief. See *Montanez de la Cruz*, 2026 WL 439217, at *3–5. For example, the Court should not preemptively direct the immigration judge or ICE to follow particular procedures; if the Court nevertheless does so, it should specify what procedures are required and the legal basis for requiring them. If the Court wishes to receive additional briefing on any other issue, Respondents request that the Court issue an order directing Respondents to address such issues.⁴

that an immigration judge is in a better position to consider whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community.”).

⁴ For example, Petitioner contends, “[u]pon on information and belief,” that “there was no warrant for [his] arrest,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 37, claims that his arrest was, therefore, unlawful, and seeks release based on this allegedly unlawful arrest, *id.* ¶ 66. But ICE officers did, in fact, obtain an arrest warrant for Petitioner before his arrest. Ex. A, ¶ 13. And, even if his arrest were flawed, Petitioner would not be entitled to habeas relief because the question in habeas proceedings is whether detention is permissible. See *Nishimura Ekiu v. United States*, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892) (stating that the “object” of a habeas proceeding “is to ascertain whether the prisoner can lawfully be detained,” and holding that “if sufficient ground for . . . detention . . . is shown, [the prisoner] is not to be discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment” (citations omitted)); *Arias v. Rogers*, 676 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (applying the rule to an immigration arrest and observing that “detention [may] be legal although the arrest was not”).

Finally, Respondents submit that if the Court grants the petition and determines that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court should order that Respondents conduct such a bond hearing within seven days and should direct Respondents to file a status report within seven days of the bond hearing, confirming that it was held.

Dated: May 20, 2026.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 20, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all persons who have registered for such notifications.

s/ Logan P. Brown
U.S. Attorney's Office