

1 Naira Zohrabyan, Esq. [SBN 337925]
2 ZOHRABYAN LAW, APC
3 100 W. Broadway, Suite 540
4 Glendale, CA 91210
5 Tel: 818-270-5150
6 Fax: (747) 327-4059
7 Email: naira@zohrabyanlaw.com

DETAINED

8 Attorneys for Petitioner **Karain Nkengin Tatsopteu**

11
12
13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
14 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15
16 **In the matter of:**

) **Case Number: '26CV2646 AGS VET**

17)
18)
19 **KARAIN NKENGIN TATSOPTU**



20)
21 **v.**

) **PETITION FOR WRIT OF**
) **HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER**
) **TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN**
) **THREE DAYS; COMPLAINT**
) **FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF**

22 **CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE,**
23 **WARDEN OF OTAY MESA**
24 **DETENTION CENTER**

) **Challenge to Unlawful Incarceration;**
) **Request for Declaratory and**
) **Injunctive Relief**

25 _____)
26)
27)
28)



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon, who entered the United States on or about March 21, 2025, and remained in custody as of today, for thirteen (13) months now.
2. On April 10, 2026, an Immigration Judge Obrien, Leah denied Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner timely appealed that decision on April 16, 2026. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has not yet set a briefing schedule and case is pending. **See Exhibit A, which includes the Immigration Judge’s order.**
3. As a result, Petitioner has now been detained for thirteen (13) months.
4. During her prolonged detention, Petitioner has suffered significant physical and mental health deterioration. Her continued confinement has caused and continues to cause serious harm.
5. Petitioner's continued detention is arbitrary and unlawful, and she requests that this Court order her immediate release from ICE custody.

JURISDICTION

6. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).
8. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651



1 9. Federal District courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens
2 challenging the lawfulness of their detention. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 687.

3 10. Federal courts also have federal question jurisdiction, through the
4 Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), to deem unlawful and to set aside
5 agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
6 inconsistent with law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). APA claims are cognizable on
7 habeas. 5 U.S.C. §703, which provides that judicial review of agency action
8 under the APA may be proceeded by any applicable form of legal action,
9 including but not limited to habeas corpus. The APA affords a right of review
10 to a person who is adversely affected or harmed by agency action.

11
12 **VENUE**

13 11. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
14 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because Petitioner is detained within this
15 district at Otay Mesa Detention Center. Furthermore, a substantial part of the
16 events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred and continue to occur at
17 ICE's Washington Field Office in Chantilly, Virginia, within this division. No
18 real property is involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. §1391(e).

19
20 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

21 **ICE'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF PETITIONER, WITHOUT**
22 **REVIEWING HER CUSTODY UNDER ICE POLICY VIOLATES THE**
23 **ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DUE PROCESS.**

24 12. ICE's long-standing policy is to release non-citizens immediately following a
25 grant of asylum, relief absent exceptional circumstances.

26 13. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, which originated in the context of an immigration
27 case and has been developed through subsequent immigration caselaw,
28 agencies are bound to follow their own rules that affect the fundamental rights



1 of individuals, even self-imposed policies and processes that limit otherwise
2 discretionary decisions. See *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. at 226 (holding
3 that BIA must follow its own regulations in its exercise of discretion); *Morton*
4 *v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are
5 affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even
6 where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would
7 be required.").

8 14. The requirement that an agency follow its own policies is not "limited to rules
9 attaining the status of formal regulations." *Montilla v. INS*, 926 F.2d 162, 167
10 (2d Cir. 1991). Even an unpublished policy binds the agency if "an examination
11 of the provision's language, its context, and any available extrinsic evidence"
12 supports the conclusion that it is "mandatory rather than merely precatory."
13 *Doe v. Hampton*, 566 2d 265, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also *Morton*, 415 U.S.
14 at 235-36 (applying *Accardi* to violation of internal agency manual); *U.S. v.*
15 *Heffner*, 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Nor does it matter that these IRS
16 instructions to Special Agents were not promulgated in something formally
17 labeled a 'Regulation' . . .").

18 15. When agencies fail to adhere to their own policies as required by *Accardi*,
19 courts typically frame the violation as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law
20 under the APA, see *Damus v. Nielson*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (D.D.C.
21 2018) ("It is clear, moreover, that [*Accardi*] claims may arise under the APA"),
22 or as a due process violation, see *Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force*,
23 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) ("An agency's failure to follow its own
24 regulations tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and
25 consequently may result in a violation of an individual's constitutional right to
26 due process.") (internal quotations omitted).
27
28



1 16. Prejudice is generally presumed when an agency violates its own policy. See
2 Montilla, 926 F.2d at 167 ("We hold that an alien claiming the INS has failed
3 to adhere to its own regulations . . . is not required to make a showing of
4 prejudice before he is entitled to relief. All that need be shown is that the subject
5 regulations were for the alien's benefit and that the INS failed to adhere to
6 them."); Heffner, 420 F.2d at 813 ("The Accardi doctrine furthermore requires
7 reversal irrespective of whether a new trial will produce the same verdict.").

8 17. To remedy an Accardi violation, a court may direct the agency to properly
9 apply its policy, see Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 343 ("[T]his Court is simply
10 ordering that Defendants do what they already admit is required."), or a court
11 may apply the policy itself and order relief consistent with the policy. See
12 Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 657 (D. Mass. 2018) (scheduling bail
13 hearing to review petitioners' custody under ICE's standards because "it would
14 be particularly unfair to require that petitioners remain detained . . . while ICE
15 attempts to remedy its failure").

16 18. Here, Petitioner falls into this category where ICE has failed to act as required
17 by their procedures and require intervention.

18 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

19 **GROUND ONE**

20 **VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE**
21 **PROCESS**

22 **Petitioner has the right to challenge the legality of her detention**

23 19. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

24 20. Petitioner has due process rights to challenge their detention. Zadvydas v. Davis,
25 533 U.S. 678, 693, 695 (2001) (while noncitizens outside the United States'
26 "geographic borders" lack constitutional protections, all "persons" within them
27 are protected by the Due Process Clause, regardless of immigration status);
28



1 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2022) (though
2 constitutional rights of citizens and noncitizens “are not coextensive,”
3 noncitizens are entitled to due process, including to challenge detention pending
4 proceedings).

5 21.As the Ninth Circuit held, the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens
6 regardless of whether they are “seeking admission” or are “admitted” under
7 immigration law. Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004),
8 abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); see also
9 Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D.
10 Wash. 2023). The Due Process Clause allows Petitioner to challenge her
11 detention.

12 22.Respondent fundamentally misapprehends Petitioner’s due process claims.
13 Petitioner challenges her deprivation of liberty and prolonged detention, not the
14 adequacy of the procedures the immigration laws afford her “with respect to
15 admission. Petitioner solely challenging her ongoing detention, and she is not
16 bringing a constitutional claim with respect to the procedures governing her
17 legal admission into the United States.

18 23.To the extent Respondent takes the extraordinary position that Petitioner has no
19 due process rights at all, that is unsupported by law and would have gruesome
20 practical consequences: “If excludable [noncitizens] were not protected by even
21 the substantive component of constitutional due process, ... we do not see why
22 the United States government could not torture or summarily execute them. ...
23 [W]e conclude that government treatment of excludable [noncitizens] must
24 implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”. Rosales-Garcia v.
25 Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 412 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Jean v. Nelson,
26 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle that
27
28



1 unadmitted [noncitizens] have no constitutionally protected rights defies
2 rationality. Under this view, the Attorney General, for example, could invoke
3 legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained
4 [noncitizens] Surely, we would not condone mass starvation.”). Thus, there
5 is no question that Petitioner has the right to challenge the constitutionality of
6 her prolonged detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
7 of the Constitution.

8 24.ICE has violated Petitioner's due process rights by denying an individualized
9 custody review to which she is entitled under ICE policy.

10 25.As a remedy, this Court should conduct its own review of Petitioner's custody
11 or, at least, order ICE to review Petitioner's custody under the standard
12 articulated in ICE policy.

13 **GROUND TWO**

14 **VIOLATION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 8 U.S.C. §**
15 **1231 (A)(6)**

16 **Mandatory detention is subject to constitutional limits**

17 26.The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.


18 27.U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, authorizes
19 detention only for "a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's
20 removal from the United States." 533 U.S. at 689, 701.

21 28.Petitioner’s continued detention has become unreasonable because her
22 removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, her ongoing confinement
23 violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and she must be released. On April 10, 2026,
24 an Immigration Judge Obrien, Leah denied Petitioner’s asylum and
25 withholding of removal. Petitioner timely appealed that decision on April 16,
26 2026. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has not yet set a
27 briefing schedule and case is pending.
28

ZOHRABYAN
LAW, APC.



1 29. Petitioner is challenging her prolonged detention on constitutional grounds, not
2 statutory grounds. Notwithstanding the fact that she is being detained pursuant to
3 section 1225(b), Petitioner's detention is unequivocally subject to Constitutional
4 limits. The Supreme Court has not precluded noncitizens from bringing as-
5 applied constitutional challenges to their mandatory detention. Respondent
6 correctly states: *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) "did not explicitly
7 address constitutionality arguments." U.S. Response at 3. While in *Demore v.*
8 *Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
9 mandatory detention under § 1226(c), the Supreme Court has explicitly
10 recognized the availability of judicial review over as-applied challenges to
11 detention, including mandatory detention. See, e.g., *Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U.S.
12 392, 420 (2019); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 532-33 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
13 concurring). Courts in this district have accordingly found constitutional limits
14 to apply to immigration detention, irrespective of the underlying detention
15 authority. See, e.g., *Gebregziabher v. Marrero*, Case 3:26-cv-02004-JES-MSB;
16 *Liu v. Larose*, Case 3:26-cv-01546-JO-MMP; *Synthia Engonwei Munoh*
17 *Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center*, Case 26-CV-1773 JLS (DDL); *Fuad*
18 *Abdulielil Ahmed V. Sixto Marrero* Case 26-cv-01170-BAS-MMP; *Maksim*
19 *Lastin v. Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility* 26-cv-974-RSH-DDL;
20 *Natalia Lastina V. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility* 3:26-cv-
21 00975-TWR-VET; *Karakhanyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center*-
22 3:25-cv-03454-JO-MMP; *Romik Parunakyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention*
23 *Center* 25-cv-3739-LL-MSB; *L.S. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center*;
24 *M.F. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center* 3:25-cv-3599-CAB-MSB;
25 *Miganush Ogandzhanyan V. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention Center* 26cv0093
26 *DMS MSB*; *Ter Ogannisian Geros v. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention Center*
27
28



1 26-CV-91 JLS (AHG); Emanuel Ter-Ogannisian v. Warden Of Otay Mesa Detention
2 Center 26cv0124 DMS JLB; L.S. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center;
3 Naira Kirakosyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center 26-cv-315-JO-
4 DDL. (granting a writ of habeas corpus after Court determined that
5 Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonable and
6 violates due process).

7 30. This Court should so hold as well.

8 31. Petitioner has now been detained for thirteen (13) months and with no indication
9 of when relief might be available. This prolonged and indeterminate detention is
10 arbitrary, excessive in duration, and unconstitutional.

11 **GROUND THREE**
12 **ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE**
13 **ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

14 **Petitioner’s ongoing and unreviewed detention violates her constitutional due**
15 **process rights and cannot continue without a bond hearing**

16
17 32. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.
18 Courts must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is "arbitrary,
19 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
20 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

21 33. The Mathews test is the appropriate test for this Court to use to evaluate the
22 constitutionality of Petitioner’s prolonged detention. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
23 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test is routinely applied by district courts across
24 the Ninth Circuit, including this Court, to determine whether due process
25 requires neutral review of a noncitizen’s custody. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland,
26 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that Mathews is a “flexible test”
27 broad enough to account for government interests when evaluating due process
28



1 claims in the immigration detention context); see, e.g., *Abduraimov*, 2025 WL
2 2912307 and *Maksim*, 2025 WL 2879328. Respondents offer “no valid
3 alternative to the Mathews framework nor [do they] demonstrate[e] that
4 Mathews is inapplicable here.” *Jensen v. Garland*, No. 5:21-c-v- 01195-CAS
5 (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023).

6 34. The Mathews test for procedural due process claims balances: (1) the private
7 interest threatened by governmental action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
8 of such interest and the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the
9 government interest. 424 U.S. at 335. Each Mathews factor weighs in
10 Petitioner’s favor. Petitioner’s detention of 13 months and counting without any
11 neutral review is a violation of her procedural due process rights and requires
12 this court to order a hearing before a neutral adjudicator to evaluate whether the
13 government can justify her ongoing detention.

14 35. Petitioner has a profound liberty interest. Petitioner has a weighty interest in her
15 own liberty, the core privacy interest at stake here. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690
16 (“Freedom from imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process
17 Clause] protects.”). Petitioner’s 13 months of detention with a granted asylum”
18 limit of the brief detention contemplated in *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 530-31. See
19 also *Lopez v. Garland*, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 880 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“As detention
20 continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting continued
21 custody absent a bond hearing.”) (internal citation omitted).

22 36. The second prong of the Mathews test, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
23 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional
24 procedural safeguards, also weighs heavily in Petitioner’s favor. 424 U.S. at 335.
25 “[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing
26 before a neutral decisionmaker is substantial.” *Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II)*,
27
28



1 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011). When a petitioner “does not have a
2 statutory right to a bond hearing or the right to seek additional bond hearings. . .
3 the risk of erroneous deprivation as Petitioner’s time in detention lengthens is
4 not insignificant,” and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is
5 exceedingly high. *Eliazar G.C.*, No. 1:24-CV-01032-EPG-HC, 2025 WL
6 711190, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025); *Tonoyan v. Andrews*, 2025 WL 3013684
7 at *4 (“Given that Petitioner has been held without a bond hearing for almost a
8 year, and it is not clear when detention will end, the risk of erroneous deprivation
9 weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing.”). In this case, Petitioner has been
10 deprived of her liberty in civil detention for 13 months. Because she is subject
11 to mandatory detention pursuant to section 1225(b), she does not have the
12 statutory right to request a bond hearing and therefore lacks access to an
13 appropriate procedural safeguard that would protect against the risk of erroneous
14 deprivation, absent intervention from this Court.

15
16 37. Here, a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is the only appropriate
17 procedural safeguard to protect against the risk of erroneous deprivation because
18 it provides both the noncitizen and the government with an opportunity to
19 present witness testimony or evidence and be heard before a neutral body.
20 Anything less would not comport with due process. In particular, “the
21 discretionary parole system available to § 1225(b) detainees are not sufficient to
22 overcome the constitutional concerns raised by prolonged mandatory detention
23 because the parole process is purely discretionary, and its results are
24 unreviewable by IJs and “release decisions are based on humanitarian
25 considerations and the public interest.” *Abduraimov*, 2025 WL 2912307, at *6
26 (citing *Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II)*, 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013)
27 (internal quotations omitted). The parole process “is not a constitutionally
28



1 adequate substitute for a bond hearing particularly since it does not test the
2 necessity of detention, does not afford the noncitizen an in-person adversarial
3 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present witness
4 testimony or evidence, does not require the ICE detention officer [to] make any
5 factual findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an
6 administrative appeal.” *Abduraimov*, 2025 WL 2912307, at *6 (citing *Padilla v.*
7 *U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft*, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2023).

8 38. Any internal review of Petitioner’s detention or request for discretionary parole
9 by DHS cannot satisfy the requirements for due process because DHS is the very
10 authority that is detaining him. Where a custody review is conducted by the very
11 same agency that is detaining the individual, that agency reviewing its own
12 actions cannot be held to a neutral standard. As such, Petitioner must be afforded
13 a hearing before a neutral arbiter in order for her ongoing, prolonged detention
14 to comply with due process.

15 39. Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, Petitioner faces prolonged detention for an
16 indefinite period of time pending the final adjudication of her asylum claim. This
17 Court has recognized that “it is difficult to ascertain an endpoint to removal
18 proceedings, but it is clear proceedings could take a substantial amount of time,”
19 and “[i]t is unknown when the IJ will decide the application for relief.” *Idiev v.*
20 *Warden, et al.*, No. 1:25-CV-01030-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3089349, at *5 (E.D.
21 Cal. Nov. 5, 2025). Even after the IJ issues a decision, each party “has other
22 avenues available for relief including an appeal to the BIA and a petition for
23 review to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” *Id.* See, e.g., *Abduraimov*, 2025
24 WL 2912307 (where the government appealed the IJ’s grant of asylum and the
25 BIA remanded back to the IJ); *A.E.*, 2025 WL 1424382 (where the government
26 appealed the IJ’s grant of asylum, the IJ denied all relief on remand, and the
27
28




1 noncitizen appealed to the BIA).

2 40. Here, On April 10, 2026, an Immigration Judge Obrien, Leah denied
3 Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner timely appealed
4 that decision on April 16, 2026. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals
5 (“BIA”) has not yet set a briefing schedule and case is pending.

6 41. Petitioner has been in detention for **13 months**, and Petitioner’s removal is not
7 reasonably foreseeable, as it depends entirely on the outcome of her merits
8 appeal and any subsequent review that may follow. Accordingly, her continued
9 detention is arbitrary, prolonged, and constitutionally unreasonable.

10 42. Due to prolonged detention, Respondent has been experiencing physical and
11 mental issues. There is no indication as to how long the appeal will take, and/or
12 depending on outcome of the appeal, Petitioner might stay in custody longer.

13 43. Because “it is not clear when detention will end, the risk of erroneous
14 deprivation weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing.” A.E., 2025 WL
15 1424382, at *5; Doe v. Andrews, No. 1:25- CV-00506-SAB-HC, 2025 WL
16 2590392, *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting that “[a]lthough future events are
17 difficult to predict, the [c]ourt nevertheless finds that...possible remand to the
18 immigration court for further factfinding or possible judicial review by the Ninth
19 Circuit will be sufficiently lengthy such that [the delay] factor weighs in favor
20 of Petitioner”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-00506-KES-
21 SAB (HC), 2025 WL 2896218 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2025); Abduraimov, 2025
22 WL 2912307, *8 (“appeal to BIA and potential Ninth Circuit review ‘may take
23 up to two years or longer’ and ‘favors granting petitioner a bond hearing’) (citing
24 Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2019)). The risk
25 of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probably value
26 of a bond hearing is exceptionally high. Therefore, the second Mathews factor
27
28



1 also weighs in favor of granting Petitioner a bond hearing.

2 44. The third Mathews factor also supports Petitioner: the government interest is
3 weak here because the interest at stake “is the ability to detain Petitioner without
4 providing her a bond hearing, not whether the government may continue to
5 detain him” at all. *Lopez-Reyes v. Bonnar*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal.
6 Jan. 29, 2019) (emphasis in original). As the government has conceded in similar
7 cases, the cost of providing such a bond hearing is minimal. *Id.*; *Singh v. Barr*,
8 Case No. 18-cv-2471-GPC-MSB, 2019 WL 4168901, at *12 (“The government
9 has not offered any indication that a second bond hearing would have outside
10 effects on its coffers.”); *Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr*, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964
11 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of a §1226(a) detention, the parties did
12 not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine whether the
13 continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”). Holding a hearing at
14 which Respondents must justify Petitioner’s continued detention thus actually
15 “promotes the Government’s interest—one we believe to be paramount—in
16 minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no
17 purpose.” See *Velasco-Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F.3d 842, 854 (2d Cir. 2020)
18 (emphasis added); *id.* at n.11; *Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons*, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir.
19 2021) (“[L]imiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are
20 dangerous or a flight risk may save the government, and therefore the public,
21 from expending substantial resources on needless detention.”).

22
23 45. In sum, there is no question that all three Mathews factors favor Petitioner.
24 Contrary to Respondent’s claim, Petitioner’s prolonged detention does not pass
25 constitutional muster and requires that this Court immediately order her a bond
26 hearing.

27 46. At a bond hearing, the government must bear the burden of justifying
28



1 Petitioner’s ongoing and prolonged detention. Where a custody hearing is
2 warranted as a procedural safeguard against unreasonably prolonged detention,
3 it is well established that the government bears the burden of justifying
4 continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence. *Singh v. Holder*, 638
5 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ue process places a heightened burden of
6 proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests at
7 stake...are both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of
8 money.”). See e.g. *Lopez*, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, n.3 (specifically noting that
9 *Singh* provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for bond hearings
10 and that the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
11 noncitizen is a flight risk. or danger to the community to justify denying bond)
12 (internal quotations omitted); *Eliazar G.C.*, 2025 WL 711190, *10 (E.D. Cal.
13 Mar. 5, 2025) (stating that the Court will follow the “overwhelming majority of
14 courts” to hold that the government must justify continued mandatory detention
15 by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is a flight risk or a danger
16 to the community); *Maksim*, 2025 WL 2879328, * 6 (same); *Abduraimov*, 2025
17 WL 2912307, *11 (same); *Idiev*, 2025 WL 3089349, *7 (same); *Tonoyan*, 2025
18 WL 3013684, *5 (same).

19
20 47. The Ninth Circuit in *Singh* stressed that “it is improper to ask the individual to
21 share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
22 individual—deprivation of liberty—is so significant[.]” See *Singh*, 638 F. 3d at
23 1205; *Black*, 103 F.4th at 157-58 (observing that where “an individual’s liberty
24 is at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently used [clear and convincing]
25 evidentiary standard for continued detention”) (internal citations omitted); *id.* at
26 159 (reiterating that the government bears the burden of meeting this standard
27 even where an individual is detained pursuant to mandatory detention). This
28



1 Court should, too, apply the heavy burden on the government to justify
2 Petitioner's continued civil detention without a bond hearing.

3 48. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, the adjudicator must consider alternatives
4 to detention and Petitioner's financial circumstances in determining whether
5 further detention is warranted and the conditions of her release. See, e.g.,
6 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 ("If the government is setting monetary bonds to
7 ensure appearance at future proceedings, there is no legitimate reason for it not
8 to consider the individual's financial circumstances and alternative conditions
9 of release.").

10 49. Thus, due process and Ninth Circuit precedent require that the government bear
11 the burden of justifying Petitioner's ongoing and prolonged detention by clear
12 and convincing evidence.

13
14 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

15 Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:
16

- 17 a) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 18 b) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show
19 cause why this Petition should not be granted within three
20 days.
- 21 c) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process
22 Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6);
- 23 d) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to be
24 released;
- 25 e) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal
26 Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under
27 law; and
28



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

f) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper

DATED: April 25, 2026,

Respectfully submitted



Naira Zohrabyan

Attorney for Petitioner

