

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT COURT OF ARIZONA
U.S. Courthouse, suite 130
401 West Washington Street, SPC10
Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2119

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CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
BY _____	DEPUTY

LEIDY YAJAIRA SOL RAMIREZ

A# 

Petitioner,

CV26-02765-PHX-DJH--JFM

V.

Pam Bondi,
US ATTORNEY GENERAL;
Kristi Noem,
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY;
John E. Cantu,
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR THE
PHOENIX FIELD OFFICE;
Warden Eloy detention center
Respondents,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS UNDER
28 U.S.C. 2241

Petitioner, LEIDY YAJAIRA SOL RAMIREZ brings this habeas petition seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 on the ground that her continued detention in post-removal-order custody is unlawful since there is not significant likelihood of removal in the reasonable foreseeable future and it has exceeded the presumptively reasonable period established under the due process standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001).

CUSTODY

1. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Petitioner is detained at the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona. ICE has contracted with Eloy detention center to house immigration detainees such as Petitioner. Petitioner is under the direct control of Respondents and their agents. Petitioner was detained on September 7, 2025. Petitioner was transferred to Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona on September 10, 2025.

JURISDICTION

2. This action arises under the constitution of the United States, and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 1570, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.

3. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241: art. I 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution ("Suspension Clause"); and 28 U.S.C. 1331, as Petitioner is presently in custody under color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United State. This court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, 5 U.S.C. 702, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651.

4. Petitioner has exhausted any and all administrative remedies to the extend require by law.

VENUE

5. Pursuant to Braden V. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct., 410 u.s. 484, 495-96, 93 S. Ct. 1123,35 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1973); Roman V. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 318-20 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, because the petition indicates that Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Eloy Detention Center, the proper venue for this action is the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the judicial district in which Petitioner resides.

PARTIES

6. Petitioner is a native and citizen of El Salvador. Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on September 7, 2025, and has remained in ICE custody continuously since that date.

7. Respondent Pam Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA). As such, Mrs. Bondi has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner.

8. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the administration of ICE and the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA). As such, Mrs. Noem is the legal custodian of Petitioner.

9. Respondent **John E. Cantu** is one of the ICE Field Director of the Phoenix Field Office of ICE and is Petitioner's immediate custodian who has signed Petitioner's continued Detention Letters. **See Vasquez v. Reno 233 F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 43 (2001).**

10. Respondent Warden of Eloy detention Center, where Petitioner is currently detained under the authority of ICE, alternatively, may be considered to be Petitioner's immediate custodian.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Petitioner, **LEIDY YAJAIRA SOL RAMIREZ** is a native and citizen of El Salvador. Petitioner has been in ICE custody since **September 7, 2025**.

12. An Immigration Judge ordered petitioner removed on **December 17, 2023**, under INA § 208(a)(2)(A) based on the Asylum Cooperative Agreement (“ACA”) between the United States and Honduras. *See Attached Judge order*

13. Petitioner and the DHS waived their right to appeal the IJ decision and the IJ order of removal became administrative final on **December 17, 2025**.

14. Honduras is not longer accepting Asylum applicant and DHS will not be able to execute the removal order.

15. Petitioner has no criminal record.

16. ICE has not tried to obtain respondent's travel documents from a third country and there are not travel plans to remove petitioner in the reasonably foreseeable future.

LEGAL FRAME OF WORK FOR RELIEF SOUGHT

17. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), noncitizens subject to final orders of removal “shall” be detained during the first 90 days—the “removal period”—and they “shall” be removed during that period under § 1231(a)(1). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the government “may” continue detention beyond the 90-day removal period if a noncitizen falls within certain broad categories of removability or is determined “to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).

18. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to authorize detention only where it is significantly likely that removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, in order to avoid the serious due process concerns that would be presented by permitting detention for an indefinite period of time. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at CITE. After a noncitizen meets his or her initial burden to show that no such likelihood of removal exists, the burden shifts to the Government to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut [the alien’s] showing.” *Id.* at 701.

19. Courts have rejected conclusory claims by ICE agents which claim, without submitting concrete factual information about scheduled flights or

repatriation agreements, that removal is imminent. “[A] theoretical possibility of eventually being removed does not satisfy the government’s burden once the removal period has expired and the petitioner establishes good reason to believe his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Balza v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-00866, 2020 WL 6143643, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]f [ICE] has no idea of when it might reasonably expect [Petitioner] to be repatriated, [a] Court certainly cannot conclude that [a] removal is likely to occur—or even that it might occur—in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also, *Gomez Barco v. Witte*, No. 6:20-CV-00497, 2020 WL 7393786 (W.D. La. Dec. 16, 2020) (ordering release of a petitioner who was detained longer than six months because ICE had not been able to secure necessary travel documents, noting that the ICE officer “clearly has no factual basis for his ‘belief that there is no foreseeable impediment to Petitioner’s removal or that her removal is imminent,” and that there was no foundation for the “expectation” that the COVID-19 related travel restrictions in place would soon be lifted); *Balza v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-00866, 2020 WL 6064881 (W.D. La. Oct. 14, 2020) (same).¹ In granting Ms. Balza’s release, the court considered and rejected a conclusory declaration by a local ICE Assistant Field Officer that removal was imminent. *Id.* at *5. In *Alexis v. Smith*, the petitioner, Mr. Alexis, had been in detention for almost a year and subject to a removal order for over a year. An ICE official testified to an informal agreement that permitted removals but acknowledged that there were far fewer removals to

Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 hurricane. The Haitian government had an issue with identity documents and it was unknown when that would be resolved. The magistrate did not credit ICE's vague statements that it was "endeavoring to rectify the issue" and concluded there was no end in sight for detention, and recommended release. The District Court Judge agreed and ordered release. ICE then released Mr. Alexis on an Order of Supervised release and moved to get the judgment vacated on mootness, which it was. However, this does not invalidate the reasoning and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge and District Court Judge on this subject, and this case is still informative and persuasive to the body of law on this subject. *Alexis v. Smith*, No. CIV.A. 11-0309, 2011 WL 3924247 (W.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 11-0309, 2011 WL 3954945 (W.D. La. Sept. 6, 2011), vacated, No. CV 11-0309, 2011 WL 13386020 (W.D. La. Sept. 15, 2011).

¹*Other district courts in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere have similarly granted habeas relief when the noncitizen has shown that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See, e.g., *Carreno v. Gillis*, No. 5:20-cv-44-KS-MTP, 2020 WL 8366735 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2020) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for approximately sixteen months due to a lack of diplomatic relations with Venezuela); *Ali v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 451 F. Supp. 3d 703 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (granting habeas relief to petitioner initially detained for three years, released and detained again for four months when petitioner could not be removed due to travel restrictions to Pakistan); *Sharifi v. Gillis*, No. 5:20-cv-5-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 7379211 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2020) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for seventeen months after Iranian officials failed to respond to a travel document request for more than seven months).

20. Courts in this District have—pursuant to *Zadvydas*—released individuals who have been detained for over six months. See, e.g., *Gomez Barco*, 2020 WL 7393786 (ordering release of an immigrant detainee who was a native and citizen of Venezuela who was detained longer than six months because ICE had not been able to secure necessary travel documents); *Balza*, 2020 WL 6143643, at *5 (ordering release of petitioner and noting that “[a]fter more than a year of detention, Petitioner’s removal need not necessarily be imminent, but it cannot be speculative”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

21. Under *Zadvydas*, courts have found that there is no significant likelihood of removal and granted relief where:

- No country will accept the petitioner. See, e.g., *Jabir v. Ashcroft*, No. 03-2480, 2004 WL 60318 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2004) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for more than fourteen months after numerous countries refused to repatriate the petitioner).²
- The petitioner’s country of origin refuses to issue a travel document. See, e.g., *Alexis v. Smith*, No. 11-0309, 2011 WL 3924247 (W.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for approximately one year due to the Haitian government rejecting the quality of identity documents provided); *Fermine v. Dir. of Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, No. 2:06-cv-1578, 2007 WL 2284606 (W.D. La. May 23, 2007) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for fifteen months due to Trinidad’s refusal to issue

² See also *Hassoun v. Sessions*, No. 18-CV-586-FPG, 2019 WL 78984, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019) (ordering release of petitioner detained fourteen months after petitioner showed “that the countries with which he has any affiliation will not accept him”); *Yusupov v. Love*, No. 4:CV-06-1804, 2007 WL 5063231 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2007); *Abel-Muhti v. Ashcroft*, 314 F. Supp. 2d 418 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (ordering release of petitioner detained approximately two years after refusal of several countries to accept petitioner).

travel documents); *Lijadu v. Gonzales*, No. 06-1208, 2006 WL 3933850 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2006) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained nineteen months because Nigeria refused to issue travel documents due to petitioner's HIV status).³

- There is no removal agreement between the United States and a country. In these scenarios, courts have found that the lack of a formal agreement regarding repatriation, lack of diplomatic relationship, and lack of a functioning government support a finding that there is no significant likelihood of removal. See, e.g., *Negusse v. Gonzales*, No. 06-1382, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for approximately one year because the United States did not have a repatriation agreement with Ethiopia and Ethiopia would not issue travel documents because one of petitioner's parents was not Ethiopian).⁴
- There is either no response from a country designated for removal or a significant delay in receiving a response. See, e.g., *Gonzalez-Rondon v. Gillis*, 5:19-cv-109-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 3428983 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2020) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained thirteen months where there was no response from Venezuelan officials).⁵

³ See also *Ka v. Bureau of Immigr. & Customs Enf't*, No. B-07-197, 2008 WL 11462867, at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) (ordering release of petitioner detained twelve months after Senegal "refused to issue Ka a travel document because he d[id] not have proper identity documentation"); *Moreira v. Gonzales*, No. CIVA CV05-588 A, 2006 WL 3861972 (W.D. La. Nov. 2, 2006) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for three years because Cape Verde advised that it would not accept the petitioner for repatriation); *Khan v. Gonzales*, 481 F. Supp. 2d 638 (W.D. Tex. 2006).

⁴ See also *Gomez Barco*, 2020 WL 7393786; *Islam v. Kane*, No. CV-11-515-PHX-PGR (LOA), 2011 WL 4374226, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2011) (ordering release of petitioner detained ten months where petitioner presented evidence that Bangladesh "is one of fifteen countries identified by ICE as least likely to issue travel documents"); *Carreno*, 2020 WL 8366735; *Simoza Rangel v. Gillis*, No. 5:19-cv-118-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 7223258 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 2, 2020) (granting habeas relief to petitioner detained for sixteen months due to a lack of diplomatic relations with Venezuela); *Abduelle v. Gonzales*, 422 F. Supp. 2d 774 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding that the petitioner met the burden to show removal was not reasonably foreseeable after being detained for more than one year when an injunction restricted the government's ability to remove the petitioner to Somalia).

- ICE fails to take action to secure travel documents for a prolonged period. See, e.g., *Senor*, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 430–31 (granting habeas relief after ICE initially requested travel documents but where “there [wa]s no indication from the record that anyone ha[d] taken any further action in the eight months since that time . . . to facilitate *Senor*’s receipt of the necessary travel documents”),⁶

22. As the length of detention grows, the period of time that would be considered the “reasonably foreseeable future” shrinks. See, e.g., *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701 (stating that as the length of time in detention grows “what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink”); *Senor*, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 430 (“[T]he passage of time combined with’ the ‘government [being] no closer to . . . repatriating [a detainee] than they were once they first took him into custody’ [is] sufficient to meet that ‘initial burden.’”); *Lawrikow*, 2009 WL 2905549, at *12.

⁵ See also *Sharifi*, 2020 WL 7379211; *Aung v. Barr*, No. 20-CV-681-LJV, 2020 WL 4581465 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2020); *Edwards v. Barr*, No. 4:20cv350-WS-MAF, 2020 WL 6747737 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2020); *Rual v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-06215 EAW, 2020 WL 3972319 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020); *Rodriguez Del Rio v. Price*, No. EP-20-CV-00217-FM, 2020 WL 7680560 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2020); *Singh v. Whitaker*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); *Butt v. Holder*, No. CA 08–0672–CG–C, 2009 WL 1035354 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2009) (holding that petitioner met his initial burden where he was held in ICE custody for more than ten months after the issuance of his removal order with no indication from the Pakistani Embassy that travel documents would be issued); *Lawrikow v. Kollus*, No. CV–08–1403–PHX–GMS (LOA), 2009 WL 2905549 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2009); *Reid v. Crawford*, No. 06–02436 PHX JWS (MEA), 2007 WL 1063413 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2007); *Gui v. Ridge*, No. 3CV031965, 2004 WL 1920719 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2004); *Shefqet v. Ashcroft*, No. 02 C 7737, 2003 WL 1964290 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003).

⁶ See also *Chun Yat Ma v. Asher*, No. C11–1797 MJP, 2012 WL 1432229, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2012) (ordering petitioner’s release where the government failed “to provide any documentation of efforts . . . to effectuate removal . . . [for] nearly six months”).

23. Petitioner's continued detention is unlawful, and Petitioner is unlikely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. The country designated for removal by the IJ is no longer accepting asylum seekers from the United States. Therefore, Petitioner's detention violates the statute and she is entitled to immediate release.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

STATUTORY VIOLATION

24. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs through 23 above.

25. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prevents the Government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects. "Zadvydas V. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001). It is well established that protection extends to noncitizens, including in removal proceedings. Reno V. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 s. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d (1993).

Moreover, "due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests at stake... are both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money. *ce* Cooper V. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 134 L. Ed. 2d (1996).

CONCLUSION

26. In conclusion, Petitioner's indefinite detention violates the detention statute and is unconstitutional. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted "within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed," and set a hearing on this Petition within five days of the return, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from their custody.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Grant Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody;
3. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and cot under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA"), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 504 and 28 U.S.C. 2412 and on any other basis justified under law; and
4. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper. Affirm, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully submitted,


LEIDY YAJAIRA SOL RAMIREZ
A# 
Eloy Detention Center
1705 East Hanna Road
Eloy, AZ 85131

Dated: April 17, 2026




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ELOY IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:

SOL RAMIREZ, LEIDY YAJAIRA

To:



A-Number:



Riders:

In Removal Proceedings

Initiated by the Department of Homeland Security

Date:

12/17/2025

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

- ☒ This is a summary of the oral decision entered on 12/02/2025. The oral decision in this case is the official opinion, and the immigration court issued this summary for the convenience of the parties.
- ☐ Both parties waived the issuance of a formal oral decision in this proceeding.

I. Removability

The immigration court found Respondent ☐ removable ☒ inadmissible under the following Section(s) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act): 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)

The immigration court found Respondent ☐ not removable ☐ not inadmissible under the following Section(s) of the Act:

II. Applications for Relief

Respondent's application for:

A. Asylum/Withholding/Convention Against Torture

- ☒ Asylum was ☐ granted ☒ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☒ Withholding of Removal under INA § 241(b)(3) was ☐ granted ☒ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☒ Withholding of Removal under the Convention Against Torture was ☐ granted ☒ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☐ Deferral of Removal under the Convention Against Torture was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☐ Respondent knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum after notice of the consequences. *See* INA § 208(d)(6); 8 C.F.R. §1208.20

B. Cancellation of Removal

- ☐ Cancellation of Removal for Lawful Permanent Residents under INA § 240A(a) was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☐ Cancellation of Removal for Nonpermanent Residents under INA § 240A(b)(1) was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice
- ☐ Special Rule Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(b)(2) was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice

C. Waiver

- ☐ A waiver under INA § was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice

D. Adjustment of Status

- ☐ Adjustment of Status under INA § was ☐ granted ☐ denied ☐ withdrawn with prejudice ☐ withdrawn without prejudice

E. Other

The Court has granted the Department's motion to pretermite Respondent's applications for asylum and related relief as to her fear of returning to Ecuador. Respondent falls within the terms of ACA with Honduras. Respondent has not demonstrated the requisite fear of persecution or torture in Honduras to be eligible for relief or protection from removal to that country. Respondent has advised the Court that she does not want to apply for Voluntary Departure.

III. Voluntary Departure

- ☐ Respondent's application for ☐ pre-conclusion voluntary departure under INA § 240B(a) ☐ post-conclusion voluntary departure under INA § 240B(b) was ☐ denied.
- ☐ Respondent's application for ☐ pre-conclusion voluntary departure under INA § 240B(a) ☐ post-conclusion voluntary departure under INA § 240B(b) was ☐ granted, and Respondent is ordered to depart by . The respondent must post a \$ bond with DHS within five business days of this order. Failure to post the bond as required or to depart by the required date will result in an alternate order of removal to taking effect immediately.
- ☐ The respondent is subject to the following conditions to ensure his or her timely departure from the United States:

- ☐ Further information regarding voluntary departure has been added to the record.
- ☐ Respondent was advised of the limitation on discretionary relief, the consequences for failure to depart as ordered, the bond posting requirements, and the consequences of filing a post-order motion to reopen or reconsider:

If Respondent fails to voluntarily depart within the time specified or any extensions granted by the DHS, Respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty as provided by relevant statute, regulation, and policy. *See* INA § 240B(d)(1). The immigration court has set

- ☐ the presumptive civil monetary penalty amount of \$3,000.00 USD
- ☐ \$ USD instead of the presumptive amount.

If Respondent fails to voluntarily depart within the time specified, the alternate order of removal shall automatically take effect, and Respondent shall be ineligible, for a period of 10 years, for voluntary departure or for relief under sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the Act, to include cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, registry, or change of nonimmigrant status. *Id.* If Respondent files a motion to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period set forth above, the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated; the period allowed for voluntary departure is not stayed, tolled, or extended. If the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated upon the filing of such a motion, the penalties for failure to depart under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply.

If Respondent appeals this decision, Respondent must provide to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), within 30 days of filing an appeal, sufficient proof of having posted the voluntary departure bond. The Board will not reinstate the voluntary departure period in its final order if Respondent does not submit timely proof to the Board that the voluntary departure bond has been posted.

In the case of conversion to a removal order where the alternate order of removal immediately takes effect, where Respondent willfully fails or refuses (1) to depart from the United States pursuant to the immigration court's order, (2) to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to depart the United States, (3) to present themselves at the time and place required for removal by the DHS, or (4) conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper their departure pursuant to the order of removal, Respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty for each day Respondent is in violation, pursuant to INA § 274D and 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14). If Respondent is removable pursuant to INA § 237(a), then Respondent shall be further fined and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years. See INA § 243(a)(1). Further, any Respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

IV. Removal

- ☒ Respondent was ordered removed to HONDURAS
- ☐ In the alternative, Respondent was ordered removed to
- ☐ Respondent was advised of the penalties for failure to depart pursuant to the removal order:

If Respondent is subject to a final order of removal and willfully fails or refuses (1) to depart from the United States pursuant to the immigration court's order, (2) to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to depart the United States, (3) to present themselves at the time and place required for removal by the DHS, or (4) conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper their departure pursuant to the order of removal, Respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty for each day Respondent is in violation, pursuant to INA § 274D and 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14). If Respondent is removable pursuant to INA § 237(a), then Respondent shall be further fined and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years. See INA § 243(a)(1). Further, any Respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

V. Other

- ☐ Proceedings were ☐ dismissed ☐ terminated with prejudice
☐ terminated without prejudice ☐ administratively closed.
- ☐ Respondent's status was rescinded under INA § 246.
- ☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: DeAngelis, Kathryn 12/17/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☒ waived ☐ reserved
Respondent: ☐ waived ☒ reserved

Appeal Due: 01/17/2026

Certificate of Service

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Respondent Name : SOL RAMIREZ, LEIDY YAJAIRA | A-Number : 

Riders:

Date: 12/17/2025 By: Ordonez, Caroline, Court Staff