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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ITOE PHILEMON SAKWE,

Petitioner,

v.

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 26-CV-2159-BAS-MMP

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT

Petitioner requests this Court order his release, or a new bond hearing. However, Petitioner's bond hearing complied with the Court's order—thus the appropriate remedy for a denial of bond is an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. Therefore, this Court should deny Petitioner's motion.

I. Argument

A. Respondents Complied with the Court's Order

Petitioner claims that Respondents violated this Court's order because the bond hearing provided by Respondents was constitutionally defective. However, although Petitioner quotes from the bond hearing extensively, Petitioner has not filed a copy of the hearing transcript. Even so, as described, Petitioner's objection to the bond hearing relates to the Immigration Judge's consideration of the evidence as it related to risk of flight. There is no evidence that the IJ improperly allocated the burden of proof or otherwise failed to make an individualized bond determination.

An alien's objection to the outcome of a bond hearing (as here) does not establish that the procedures governing the proceeding at which bond was denied violated due process. *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Ching v. Mayorkas*, 725 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) ("It is process that the procedural due process right protects, not the outcome."). In asking this Court to review the immigration judge's bond denial order and grant immediate release, Petitioner "comes close to asking [the Court] to directly review the [immigration judge's] bond decision, a task Congress has expressly forbidden [federal courts] from undertaking." *Rodriguez Diaz*, 53 F.4th at 1212–13 (quoting *Borbot v. Warden*, 906 F.3d 274, 279 (3rd Cir. 2018)). Congress has determined that an immigration judge's "discretionary bond determinations [are] not reviewable in federal court." *Id.* at 1209; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) ("The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond

or parole.").

B. Administrative Remedies Should Be Exhausted

Petitioner seeks review of the immigration judge's decision at his bond hearing, but Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

"Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required." *Acevedo–Carranza v. Ashcroft*, 371 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2004). "If exhaustion is statutory, it may be a mandatory requirement that is jurisdictional." *Id.* (citing *El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review*, 959 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1991)). "If, however, exhaustion is a prudential requirement, a court has discretion to waive the requirement." *Id.* (citing *Stratman v. Watt*, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 1981)). Here, the proper avenue for Petitioner's grievance with his bond denial is to utilize the administrative scheme and appeal his bond denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

The BIA is an appellate body within the Executive Office for Immigration Review and possesses delegated authority from the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(1). The BIA is "charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)] that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it," including immigration judge custody determinations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), 236.1, 1236.1. The BIA not only resolves particular disputes before it, but is also directed to, "through precedent decisions, . . . provide clear and uniform guidance to [the Department of Homeland Security], the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its implementing regulations." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Decisions rendered by the BIA are final, except for those reviewed by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).

"District Courts are authorized by 28 U.S.C § 2241 to consider petitions for habeas corpus." *Castro–Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), *abrogated on other grounds by Hernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales*, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). "That section does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas

corpus." *Id.* That said, the Ninth Circuit "require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241." *Id.* Specifically, "courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review." *Puga v. Chertoff*, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

"When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused." *Leonardo v. Crawford*, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); *see also Alvarado v. Holder*, 759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014), *abrogated on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) ("issue exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement"); *Tijani v. Holder*, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (court "lacks jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien's administrative proceedings before the BIA"). Moreover, "a petitioner cannot obtain review of procedural errors in the administrative process that were not raised before the agency merely by alleging that every such error violates due process." *Reid v. Engen*, 765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985); *see also Sola v. Holder*, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to address a due process argument that was not raised below because it could have been addressed by the agency).

Here, requiring Petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies is warranted because agency expertise is required. "[T]he BIA is the subject-matter expert in immigration bond decisions[.]" *Aden v. Nielsen*, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019); *see also Delgado v. Sessions*, No. C17-1031-RSL-JPD, 2017 WL 4776340, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2017) (noting a denial of bond to an immigration

detainee was "a question well suited for agency expertise").

Waiving exhaustion would also encourage other detainees to bypass the BIA and directly appeal from the immigration judge to federal district court. *See Aden*, 2019 WL 5802013, at *2 ("[R]elaxation of the exhaustion requirement would likely encourage other detainees to bypass the BIA and directly appeal their no-bond determinations from the [immigration judge] to federal district court."). Individuals, like Petitioner, would have little incentive to seek relief before the BIA if this Court permits review here. And allowing a skip-the-BIA-and-go-straight-to-federal-court strategy would needlessly increase the burden on district courts. *See Bd. of Tr. of the Constr. Laborers' Pension Trust for S. Cal.. v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co.*, 37 F.3d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Judicial economy is an important purpose of exhaustion requirements.") (citation omitted); *Santos-Zacaria*, 598 U.S. at 418 (noting "exhaustion promotes efficiency"). If the immigration judge erred, this Court should allow the administrative process to correct itself.

Moreover, detention alone is not an irreparable injury. Discretion to waive exhaustion "is not unfettered." *Laing v. Ashcroft*, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). "[C]ivil detention after the denial of a bond hearing [does not] constitute[] irreparable harm such that prudential exhaustion should be waived." *Reyes v. Wolf*, No. C20-0377JLR, 2021 WL 662659, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2021), *aff'd sub nom. Diaz Reyes v. Mayorkas*, No. 21-35142, 2021 WL 3082403 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021).

Judge Bencivengo dismissed a habeas petition that, like here, challenged an immigration judge's denial of bond. *See Baker v. Gordon*, No. 25-cv-03539-CAB-SBC, ECF No. 8 at 2:1–5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) ("As the Ninth Circuit has explained, '[Petitioner] pursued habeas review of the [immigration judge's] adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. [Petitioner] should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the [immigration judge's] decision.'") (quoting

Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160). Other courts in this district agree. *See, e.g.*, *Rana v. LaRose*, No. 26-cv-00285-RSH-DDL, ECF No. 11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2026) (denying motion to enforce judgment where petitioner was denied bond on the basis of flight risk because there was no indication that administrative remedies were first exhausted) (citing *Leonardo*, 646 F.3d at 1160); *Sharma v. Archambrault*, 2026 WL 381611, at *2 (S.D. Cal. February 11, 2026) ("Exhaustion would protect administrative authority and promote judicial efficiency. Release on bond falls within the agency's discretionary power and falls within its special expertise.").

The majority of Petitioner's arguments regarding the substance of his bond hearing relate to the immigration judge's weighing of evidence of flight, and whether Petitioner's specific circumstances rendered Petitioner a flight risk. Alleged errors regarding the immigration judge's factual findings, and application of the law to the facts are appropriately litigated before the BIA, not forum-shopped to the district court. *Id.* ("The BIA has the authority to determine whether the Immigration Judge correctly applied the law to the facts in determining whether Petitioner should or should not be released."). Because Petitioner was provided a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court should deny Petitioner's motion.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the motion.

DATED: July 31, 2026

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