

1 **Kara Hartzler**
2 Cal. Bar No. 293751
3 **Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.**
4 225 Broadway, Suite 900
5 San Diego, California 92101-5030
6 Telephone: (619) 234-8467
7 Facsimile: (619) 687-2666
8 Kara_hartzler@fd.org

9 Counsel for Mr. Chang
10 

11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
12 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 WEN XUE CHANG,¹

14 Petitioner,

15 v.

16 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of
17 the Department of Homeland Security,
18 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney
19 General, TODD M. LYONS, Acting
20 Director, Immigration and Customs
21 Enforcement, JESUS ROCHA, Acting
22 Field Office Director, San Diego Field
23 Office, JEREMY CASEY, Warden at
24 Imperial Regional Detention Center,

25 Respondents.

CIVIL CASE NO.: '26CV2218 JLS SBC

**Petition for Writ
of
Habeas Corpus**

**[Civil Immigration Habeas,
28 U.S.C. § 2241]**

26
27
28 ¹ Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., is filing the instant petition with
provisional appointment under Chief Judge Order No. 134.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

II. Statement of Facts 2

III. Legal Analysis..... 3

 A. Claim One: ICE failed to comply with its own regulations when it re-detained Mr. Chang, violating his rights under applicable regulations and due process. 3

 B. Claim Two: Mr. Chang’s detention violates *Zadvydas* and 8 U.S.C. § 1231..... 6

IV. This Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on any disputed facts..... 10

V. Prayer for relief 10

1 **I. Introduction**

2 Mr. Chang is a native and citizen of China who was ordered removed in
3 2008 and subsequently released on an order of supervision. In May 2025,
4 Mr. Chang was driving from Los Angeles to Arizona and was arrested at a
5 checkpoint. Since then, he has been detained for nearly one year and is frequently
6 transferred between various detention centers in Arizona and southern California.

7 Mr. Chang's detention violates his statutory and regulatory rights,
8 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and the Fifth Amendment. Courts in this
9 district have agreed in similar circumstances as to both of Mr. Chang's claims.
10 Specifically:

11 (1) *Regulatory and due process violations*: Mr. Chang must be released
12 because ICE's failure to follow its own regulations about notice and an
13 opportunity to be heard violate due process. *See, e.g., Constantinovici v. Bondi*,
14 __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2898985, No. 25-cv-2405-RBM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
15 2025); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-cv-2053-RSH, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal.
16 Sept. 15, 2025); *Chang v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2898977, No. 25-cv-2422-RBM-MSB,
17 *3-*5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Sun v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2800037, No. 25-cv-
18 2433-CAB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025); *Van Chang v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2770623,
19 No. 25-cv-2334-JES, *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025); *Truong v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-
20 02597-JES, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Khambounheuang v. Noem*,
21 No. 25-cv-02575-JO-SBC, ECF No. 12 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) *Sphabmixay v.*
22 *Noem*, 25-cv-2648-LL-VET (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); *Sayvongsa v. Noem*, 25-cv-
23 2867-AGS-DEB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025); *Thammavongsa v. Noem*, 25-cv-2836-
24 JO-AHG (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); *Phakeokoth v. Noem*, 25-cv-2817-RBM-SBC
25 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); *Soryadvongsa v. Noem*, 25-cv-2663-AGS-DDL (S.D.
26 Cal. Nov. 8, 2025) (all either granting temporary restraining orders releasing
27 noncitizens, or granting habeas petitions outright, due to ICE regulatory violations
28 during recent re-detentions of released noncitizens previously ordered removed).

1 (2) *Zadvydas* violations: Mr. Chang must also be released under *Zadvydas*
2 because—having proved unable to remove him for the last 18 years—the
3 government cannot show that there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the
4 reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* at 701. *See, e.g., Conchas-Valdez*, 2025 WL
5 2884822, No. 25-cv-2469-DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025); *Rebenok v. Noem*, No.
6 25-cv-2171-TWR, ECF No. 13 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2025) (granting habeas
7 petitions releasing noncitizens due to *Zadvydas* violations).

8 This Court should grant this habeas petition and issue appropriate
9 injunctive relief on either ground.

10 **II. Statement of Facts²**

11 Wen Xue Chang is a native and citizen of China who came to the United
12 States in 2004. On July 28, 2008, an immigration judge ordered him removed. *See*
13 Exhibit A, EOIR Case Portal information. ICE subsequently released Mr. Chang
14 on an order of supervision. He began working in construction and regularly pays
15 taxes.

16 In May 2025, Mr. Chang was driving from Los Angeles to Arizona when
17 he went through an immigration checkpoint. Border Patrol agents at that
18 checkpoint arrested him but never told him why they were revoking his
19 supervision. They also never gave him an informal interview or a chance to
20 contest his detention.

21 In the last eleven months, Mr. Chang has been frequently moved between
22 various detention centers in Arizona and the southern district of California. On the
23 evening of April 7, 2026, he called and told his family that he was in the Imperial
24 Regional Detention Center.

25
26 ² Undersigned counsel has attempted to visit and schedule legal calls with
27 Mr. Chang for approximately two weeks; however, he has continuously been
28 moved between different detention centers in the southern district of California.
Accordingly, the information in this petition comes from Mr. Chang’s family.
Undersigned counsel will attempt to supplement it with a declaration from
Mr. Chang as soon as she is able to speak with him.

1 **III. Legal Analysis.**

2 This Court should grant this petition and order Mr. Chang’s immediate
3 release. ICE failed to follow its own regulations requiring changed circumstances
4 before re-detention, as well as a chance to promptly contest a re-detention
5 decision. And *Zadvydas v. Davis* holds that immigration statutes do not authorize
6 the government to detain immigrants like Mr. Chang, for whom there is “no
7 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 533 U.S.
8 678, 701 (2001).

9 **A. Claim One: ICE failed to comply with its own regulations when**
10 **it re-detained Mr. Chang, violating his rights under applicable**
11 **regulations and due process.**

12 Two regulations establish the process due to someone who is re-detained in
13 immigration custody following a period of release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) applies to
14 all re-detentions, generally. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) applies as an added, overlapping
15 framework to persons released upon good reason to believe that they will not be
16 removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, as Mr. Chang was. *See Nguyen v.*
17 *Noem*, 2025 WL 2898977, No. 25-CV-2422-RBM-MSB, *3–*5 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
18 10, 2025) (explaining this regulatory framework and granting a habeas petition for
19 ICE’s failure to follow these regulations for a refugee of Laos who entered the
20 United States before 1995); *Rokhfirooz*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL
21 2646165 at *2 (same as to an Iranian national).

22 These regulations permit an official to “return [the person] to custody” only
23 when the person “violate[d] any of the conditions of release,” 8 C.F.R.
24 §§ 241.13(i)(1), 241.4(l)(1), or, in the alternative, if an appropriate official
25 “determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in
26 the reasonably foreseeable future,” and makes that finding “on account of
27 changed circumstances,” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).

28 No matter the reason for re-detention, the re-detained person is entitled to
certain procedural protections. For one, “[u]pon revocation,” the noncitizen ‘will

1 be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release or parole.” *Chang*,
2 2025 WL 2898977 at *3, *4 (quoting §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i)(3)). Further, the
3 person “‘will be afforded an initial informal interview promptly after his or her
4 return’ to be given ‘an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated
5 in the notification.’” *Id.*

6 In the case of someone released under § 241.13(i), the regulations also
7 explicitly require the interviewer to allow the re-detained person to “submit any
8 evidence or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant
9 likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or
10 she has not violated the order of supervision.” § 241.13(i)(3).

11 ICE is required to follow its own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi*
12 *v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); *see Alcaraz v. INS*, 384 F.3d 1150,
13 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The legal proposition that agencies may be required to
14 abide by certain internal policies is well-established.”). A court may review a re-
15 detention decision for compliance with the regulations, and “where ICE fails to
16 follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful and the
17 petitioner’s release must be ordered.” *Rokhfirooz*, 2025 WL 2646165 at *4
18 (collecting cases); *accord Chang*, 2025 WL 2898977 at *5.

19 ICE followed none of its regulatory prerequisites to re-detention here.

20 First, ICE did not identify a proper reason under the regulations to re-detain
21 Mr. Chang. Mr. Chang was simply driving through a checkpoint and presumably
22 had not violated his conditions of supervision. Moreover, nothing suggests that
23 ICE was suddenly able to remove him after 18 years; thus, there was not “a
24 significant likelihood that [Mr. Chang] may be removed in the reasonably
25 foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).

26 Second, Mr. Chang does not believe he received an informal interview
27 where an officer explained the purported “changed circumstances” underlying his
28 revocation. “Simply to say that circumstances had changed or there was a

1 significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not enough.” *Sarail*
2 *A. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-2144, 2025 WL 2533673, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025).
3 Rather, “Petitioner must be told *what* circumstances had changed or *why* there
4 was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond to
5 the reasons and submit evidence in opposition, as allowed under § 241.13(i)(3).”
6 *Id.* By “identif[ying] the category—‘changed circumstances’—but fail[ing] to
7 notify [Petitioner] of the reason—the circumstances that changed and created a
8 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future—[ICE]
9 failed to follow the relevant regulation.” *Id.* This failure to identify any changed
10 circumstances also means he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to
11 respond to the reasons for revocation or submit evidence rebutting his re-
12 detention.

13 Numerous courts have released re-detained immigrants after finding that
14 ICE failed to comply with applicable regulations. These have included courts in
15 this district,³ as well as courts outside this district.⁴

16
17 ³ *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 2898985, No. 25-cv-
18 2405-RBM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-cv-2053-
19 RSH, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025); *Chang v. Noem*, 2025 WL
20 2898977, No. 25-cv-2422-RBM-MSB, *3–*5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Sun v.*
21 *Noem*, 2025 WL 2800037, No. 25-cv-2433-CAB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025); *Van*
22 *Tran v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2770623, No. 25-cv-2334-JES, *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29,
23 2025); *Truong v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02597-JES, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
24 2025); *Khambounheuang v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02575-JO-SBC, ECF No. 12 (S.D.
25 Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); *Truong v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02597-JES, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 10, 2025); *Sphabmixay v. Noem*, 25-cv-2648-LL-VET (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2025); *Sayvongsa v. Noem*, 25-cv-2867-AGS-DEB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025);
Thammavongsa v. Noem, 25-cv-2836-JO-AHG (S.D. Ca. Nov. 3, 2025) (same);
Phakeokoth v. Noem, 25-cv-2817-RBM-SBC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025);
Soryadvongsa v. Noem, 25-cv-2663-AGS-DDL (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2025).

26 ⁴ *Grigorian*, 2025 WL 2604573; *Delkash v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2683988; *Ceesay v.*
27 *Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); *You v. Nielsen*, 321 F.
28 Supp. 3d 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387
(D. Mass. 2017); *Zhu v. Genalo*, No. 1:25-CV-06523 (JLR), 2025 WL 2452352,
at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA,
2025 WL 2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); *Escalante v. Noem*, No.

1 “[B]ecause officials did not properly revoke petitioner’s release pursuant to
2 the applicable regulations, that revocation has no effect, and [Mr. Chang] is
3 entitled to his release (subject to the same Order of Supervision that governed his
4 most recent release).” *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3.

5 **B. Claim Two: Mr. Chang’s detention violates *Zadvydas* and 8**
6 **U.S.C. § 1231.**

7 In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court considered
8 a problem affecting people like Mr. Chang: Federal law requires ICE to detain an
9 immigrant during the “removal period,” which typically spans the first 90 days
10 after the immigrant is ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). After that 90-
11 day removal period expires, detention becomes discretionary—ICE may detain
12 the migrant while continuing to try to remove them. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6). Ordinarily,
13 this scheme would not lead to excessive detention, as removal happens within
14 days or weeks. But some detainees cannot be removed quickly. Perhaps their
15 removal “simply require[s] more time for processing,” or they are “ordered
16 removed to countries with whom the United States does not have a repatriation
17 agreement,” or their countries “refuse to take them,” or they are “effectively
18 ‘stateless’ because of their race and/or place of birth.” *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*,
19 257 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001). In these and other circumstances, detained
20 immigrants can find themselves trapped in detention for months, years, decades,
21 or even the rest of their lives. If federal law were understood to allow for
22 “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” it would pose “a serious constitutional
23 threat.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court avoided the
24 constitutional concern by interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to incorporate implicit limits.
25 *Id.* at 689.

26 _____
27 9:25-CV-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2491782, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2025);
28 *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. July 16, 2025); *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *2; *M.Q. v. United States*, 2025
WL 965810, at *3, *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).

1 *Zadvydas* held that § 1231(a)(6) presumptively permits the government to
2 detain an immigrant for 180 days after his or her removal order becomes final.
3 After those 180 days have passed, the immigrant must be released unless his or
4 her removal is reasonably foreseeable. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. After six
5 months have passed, the petitioner must only make a prima facie case for relief—
6 there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal
7 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* Then the burden shifts to “the
8 Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” *Id.*

9 Further, even before the 180 days have passed, the immigrant must still be
10 released if he *rebutts* the presumption that his detention is reasonable. *See, e.g.,*
11 *Trinh v. Homan*, 466 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting cases
12 on rebutting the *Zadvydas* presumption before six months have passed); *Zavvar v.*
13 *Scott*, Civil No. 25-2104-TDC, 2025 WL 2592543, *6 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2025)
14 (finding the presumption rebutted for a person who was immediately released
15 after being ordered removed and, years later, re-detained for less than six months).

16 Mr. Chang can make all the threshold showings needed to prove his
17 *Zadvydas* claim and shift the burden to the government.

18 First, the six-month grace period has long since ended. The *Zadvydas* grace
19 period is linked to the date the final order of removal is issued. It lasts for “*six*
20 *months* after a final order of removal—that is, *three months* after the statutory
21 removal period has ended.” *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th
22 Cir. 2001); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B) (linking the statutory removal
23 period to issuance of the final order and other proceedings associated with the
24 original removal order).

25 Here, Mr. Chang’s order of removal was entered on July 28, 2008. Exh. A.
26 Accordingly, his 90-day removal period began then. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
27 The *Zadvydas* grace period thus expired in January 2009, three months after the
28

1 removal period ended. *See, e.g., Tadros v. Noem*, 2025 WL 1678501, No. 25-cv-
2 4108(EP), *2–*3.⁵

3 This Court uses a burden-shifting framework to evaluate Mr. Chang’s
4 *Zadvydas* claim. At the first stage of the framework, Mr. Chang must “provide[]
5 good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
6 reasonably foreseeable future.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This standard can be
7 broken down into three parts.

8 “**Good reason to believe.**” The “good reason to believe” standard is a
9 relatively forgiving one. “A petitioner need not establish that there exists no
10 possibility of removal.” *Freeman v. Watkins*, No. CV B:09-160, 2009 WL
11 10714999, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). Nor does “[g]ood reason to
12 believe’ . . . place a burden upon the detainee to demonstrate no reasonably
13 foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or show that his detention is
14 indefinite; it is something less than that.” *Rual v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-06215 EAW,
15 2020 WL 3972319, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020) (quoting *Senor v. Barr*, 401
16

17 ⁵ The government has sometimes argued that release and rearrest resets the six-
18 month grace period completely, taking the clock back to zero. “Courts . . . broadly
19 agree” that this is not correct. *Diaz-Ortega v. Lund*, 2019 WL 6003485, at *7 n.6
20 (W.D. La. Oct. 15, 2019), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2019 WL
21 6037220 (W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2019); *see also Sied v. Nielsen*, No. 17-CV-06785-
22 LB, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (collecting cases).

23 It has also sometimes argued that rearrest creates a new three-month grace
24 period. As a court explained in *Bailey v. Lynch*, that view cannot be squared with
25 the statutory definition of the removal period in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). No. CV
26 16-2600 (JLL), 2016 WL 5791407, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2016). “Pursuant to the
27 statute, the removal period, and in turn the [six-month] presumptively reasonable
28 period, begins from the latest of ‘the date the order of removal becomes
administratively final,’ the date of a reviewing court’s final order where the
removal order is judicially removed and that court orders a stay of removal, or the
alien’s release from detention or confinement where he was detained for reasons
other than immigration purposes at the time of his final order of removal.” *Id.*
None of these statutory starting points have anything to do with whether or when
an immigrant is detained. *See id.* Because the statutorily-defined removal period
has nothing to do with release and rearrest, releasing and rearresting the
immigrant cannot reset the removal period.

1 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). In short, the standard means what it says:
2 Petitioners need only give a “good reason”—not prove anything to a certainty.

3 **“Significant likelihood of removal.”** This component focuses on whether
4 Mr. Chang will likely be removed: Continued detention is permissible only if it is
5 “significant[ly] like[ly]” that ICE will be able to remove him. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S.
6 at 701. This inquiry targets “not only the *existence* of untapped possibilities, but
7 also [the] probability of *success* in such possibilities.” *Elashi v. Sabol*, 714 F.
8 Supp. 2d 502, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (second emphasis added). In other words,
9 even if “there remains *some* possibility of removal,” a petitioner can still meet its
10 burden if there is good reason to believe that successful removal is not
11 significantly likely. *Kacanic v. Elwood*, No. CIV.A. 02-8019, 2002 WL
12 31520362, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2002) (emphasis added).

13 **“In the reasonably foreseeable future.”** This component of the test
14 focuses on when Mr. Chang will likely be removed: Continued detention is
15 permissible only if removal is likely to happen “in the reasonably foreseeable
16 future.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This inquiry places a time limit on ICE’s
17 removal efforts. If the Court has “no idea of when it might reasonably expect
18 [Petitioner] to be repatriated, this Court certainly cannot conclude that his removal
19 is likely to occur—or even that it might occur—in the reasonably foreseeable
20 future.” *Palma v. Gillis*, No. 5:19-CV-112-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 4880158, at *3
21 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2020), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2020 WL
22 4876859 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2020) (quoting *Singh v. Whitaker*, 362 F. Supp. 3d
23 93, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). Thus, even if this Court concludes that Mr. Chang
24 “would *eventually* receive” a travel document, he can still meet his burden by
25 giving good reason to anticipate sufficiently lengthy delays. *Younes v. Lynch*,
26 2016 WL 6679830, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2016).

27 Mr. Chang’s own experience bears this out. ICE has now had 18 years to
28 deport him. He has cooperated with ICE’s removal efforts throughout that time.

1 Yet ICE has proved unable to remove him. Thus, Mr. Chang has met his initial
2 burden, and the burden shifts to the government. Unless the government can
3 prove a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,”
4 Mr. Chang must be released. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

5 **IV. This Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on any disputed facts.**

6 Resolution of a prolonged-detention habeas petition may require an
7 evidentiary hearing. *Owino v. Napolitano*, 575 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).

8 Mr. Chang hereby requests such a hearing on any material, disputed facts.

9 **V. Prayer for relief**

10 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- 11 1. Order and enjoin Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
12 custody;
- 13 2. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C.
14 § 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for
15 his removal;
- 16 3. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without first following
17 all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other
18 applicable statutory and regulatory procedures;
- 19 4. Order all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

20
21 Respectfully submitted,

22
23 Dated: April 8, 2026

s/ Kara Hartzler

Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.
Attorneys for Mr. Chang
Email: kara_hartzler@fd.org

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Proof of Service

I, the undersigned, will cause the attached Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be emailed to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California at USACAS.Habeas2241@usdoj.gov when I receive the court-stamped copy.

Dated: April 8, 2026

/s/ Kara Hartzler
Kara L. Hartzler