

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION

ORDONEZ FUNEZ, Melvin Jojarci,

Petitioner,

v.

LADEON FRANCIS, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE, IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
Secretary, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; U.S. Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW; Jason STREEVAL, Warden of
STEWART DETENTION CENTER, *in their
official capacities,*

Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, MELVIN JOJARCI ORDONEZ FUNEZ (“Petitioner”) is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Stewart Detention Center. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) will conclude that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.
2. Petitioner is charged with, *inter alia*, having entered the United States (“U.S.”) without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS will certainly deny Petitioner’s release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the U.S. without admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.
4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges (“IJ” or “IJs”), holding that an IJ has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the U.S. without admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.
5. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the U.S. Instead, such

individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the U.S. without inspection.

6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.
7. Moreover, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No.5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
8. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. The court then issued a final judgment in favor of the class on December 18, 2025.
9. Nonetheless, the EOIR and its subagency, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), and the DHS, have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that class members be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.
10. IJs have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by

“leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

11. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven (7) days.

JURISDICTION

12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Stewart Detention Center located in Lumpkin, Georgia.
13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).
14. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

15. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, the judicial district in which Petitioner is currently detained.
16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the U.S., and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Georgia.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

17. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an

order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

18. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law... affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

19. Petitioner Ordonez Funez is a citizen of Honduras who has been in immigration detention since on or about January 13, 2026. Petitioner was detained and taken into ICE custody, who did not set bond, and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
20. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Director of the Atlanta Field Office of ICE’s ERO division. As such, he is Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.
21. Respondent Secretary of DHS is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner’s detention. The Secretary of DHS has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in his official capacity.
22. Respondent DHS is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

23. The Attorney General of the U.S is responsible for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), of which the EOIR and the immigration court system is a component agency. The Attorney General of the U.S. is sued in their official capacity.
24. Respondent EOIR is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.
25. Respondent Jason Streeval is employed by CoreCivic as Warden of the Stewart Detention Center where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

26. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
27. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
28. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).
29. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)-(b).
30. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).
31. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-582 to 3009-583, 3009-585.

Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

32. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
33. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).
34. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.
35. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for

Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the U.S. without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the U.S. for months, years, and even decades.

36. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the U.S. without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

37. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA’s detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE. *See Bautista v. Santaacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (citing *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 398 (2024)) (applying *Loper Bright* to hold that courts must exercise independent judgment in statutory interpretation and must not follow agency interpretations the court concludes are incorrect); *Bethancourt Soto v. Soto*, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025) (“This Court owes no deference to an agency interpretation that conflicts with the statute’s unambiguous text”); *Laborde Casallas v. Miami Field Off. Dir.*, No. 2:26-CV-221-JES-NPM, 2026 WL 538372, at *1, n.1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2026) (“the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretations”).

38. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma,

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the U.S. without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the U.S. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

39. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH) 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not §1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

40. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner. This court has also rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation. *See, e.g., J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025); *P.R.S. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-cv-330-CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025).

41. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[][noncitizen].”

42. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are

afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7.

43. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the U.S., including those who are present without admission or parole.
44. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the U.S. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).
45. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the U.S. at the time they were apprehended.
46. Finally, as mentioned above, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-

SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

47. Despite this declaratory judgment holding that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), class members are being blatantly refused bond hearings across the country. *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

FACTS

48. Petitioner is a thirty-one year old Honduran national who entered the United States without inspection as an unaccompanied minor child on or about April 1, 2004, when he was nine-years-old.
49. In 2008, when Petitioner was fourteen-years-old, his mother sent him back to Honduras while she underwent cancer treatment in the United States.
50. Petitioner re-entered the United States in August 2012 and was detained and later released to his uncle, Daniel Leiva, a citizen the United States residing in California. Removal proceedings were initiated at this time and Petitioner was ordered to appear at the Los Angeles Immigration Court.
51. Venue was subsequently changed to the Atlanta Immigration Court. Despite providing notice of his address, Petitioner did not receive a hearing notice and was ordered removed in absentia. Once made aware of the missed hearing, he filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings. Proceedings were subsequently reopened for lack of notice and dismissed without prejudice.

52. In 2016, Petitioner married Andrea Gabriella Jean Smith, a citizen of the United States.

Soon thereafter, Petitioner was diligently working towards obtaining his Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative Application. In fact, Petitioner's Form I-130 was approved on October 17, 2018.

53. Petitioner diligently made other attempts to resolve his immigration status, including obtaining an approved Form I-131 and filing for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).

54. Due to Ms. Smith's work for the United States Navy, Mr. Ordonez Funez lived in Virginia Beach, Virginia from August 2019 to November 2022.

55. Petitioner has diligently maintained a Taxpayer Identification Number, sought and maintained employment and filed taxes.

56. In 2024, Petitioner was granted a divorce and his approved Form I-130 became invalid.

57. In October 2025, Petitioner began the processes of filing Form I-360, Petition for Special Immigrant, as the abused spouse of a United States citizen. This Form I-360 was filed on Petitioner's behalf on March 30, 2026.

58. On January 7, 2026, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Petitioner was driving a vehicle in Clayton County, Georgia, when he was stopped by law enforcement due to dim tag lights that did not meet visibility requirements under Georgia law. During the traffic stop, Petitioner provided a Virginia driver's license, which had expired in December 2023. A records check revealed that Petitioner did not have a valid driver's license. Petitioner advised the officer that he was aware he did not have a valid license and that he was unable to renew it. Petitioner was transported to the Clayton County Jail without incident and charged with driving without a valid license. He was detained in custody thereafter

and subsequently placed into immigration custody.

59. Petitioner was detained by ICE on or about January 13, 2026, and transferred to Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia.

60. DHS initiated a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on January 14, 2026, and subsequently initiated removal proceedings before the Immigration Court in Stewart, Georgia.

61. ICE has charged Petitioner with, *inter alia*, being subject to removal from the U.S. pursuant to 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)) as someone who entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner conceded to these charges.

62. Petitioner sought relief in the form of Form 42-B Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Nonpermanent Residents, which was filed in the Stewart Immigration Court on February 24, 2026.

63. Petitioner’s next immigration court date, a Master Calander hearing, is scheduled for April 7, 2026 at 2:30 p.m. with Judge Fuller at the Stewart Immigration Court.

64. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
Violation of the INA

65. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
66. The mandatory detention provision at 8. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.
67. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II
Violation of Bond Regulations

68. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in proceeding paragraphs.
69. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR, and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formally referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear

that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.

70. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

71. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

72. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

73. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

74. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

75. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Middle District of Georgia while this habeas petition is pending;

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three (3) days;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days;
- e. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- f. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- g. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: April 03, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP

By: /s/ Alex S. Drummond

Alex S. Drummond
Georgia Bar No: 231116
adrummond@seyfarth.com
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
1075 Peachtree St. NE
Suite 2500
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3962
Telephone: (404) 881-5467
Facsimile: (404) 724-1667

Attorney for Petitioner

Verification

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

/s/ Alex S. Drummond

Date: April 03, 2026