

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION**

Jose Luis RIVERA CHAVEZ,)
(Agency No. ))

Petitioner,)

vs.)

) **CIVIL ACTION FILE**

Jason STREEVAL, Warden, Stewart)
Detention Center;)

Ladeon FRANCIS, Field Office)
Director of Atlanta for The U.S.)

) **Case No.:** _____

Immigration and Customs Enforcement;)

Todd M. LYONS, Acting Director of)
U.S. Immigration and Customs)

Enforcement;)

Markwayne MULLIN, Secretary of)
the Department of Homeland Security;)

) **Habeas Corpus**

in their official capacities,)

) **28 U.S.C. §2241**

Respondents.)

_____)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Petitioner Jose Luis Rivera Chavez, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of habeas corpus to seek enforcement of their rights pursuant to *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV- 342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025) and *P.R.S. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-330-CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025). Mr. Rivera Chavez alleges

as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Stewart Detention Center (SDC) in Lumpkin, Georgia. He now faces unlawful detention because Respondents did not set bond and insist that IJs remain bound to follow the agency's prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) continue to detain him in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights.

2. The Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency, the Immigration Court, together with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have unlawfully continued Petitioner's detention by denying him a meaningful opportunity for release on bond, notwithstanding his statutory and constitutional rights.

3. Petitioner Jose Luis Rivera Chavez is eligible for bond, as he does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Stewart Detention Center (SDC) in Lumpkin, Georgia. He was apprehended by immigration authorities on January 28, 2026; entered the United States without inspection over 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival; and is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),

§ 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

4. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

5. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

6. In any event, this Honorable Court already ruled on many occasions that aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and are entitled to consideration for release on bond by immigration officers and, if not released, a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge.

7. At the time of his arrest, Petitioner was an alien in the United States who had not been lawfully admitted, and thus he falls within the broad definition of “applicant for admission,” but based on the present record, he was not attempting to

be lawfully admitted. Therefore, he does not qualify as an “alien seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), which requires both presence and seeking admission.

8. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day, Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

9. In addition, pursuant to *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV- 342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025) and *P.R.S. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV- 330-CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025) which are controlling in this case, the Court should order Petitioner’s release unless Respondents provide another bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Stewart Detention Center (SDC) in Lumpkin, Georgia.

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

12. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (Columbus Division), the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Middle District of Georgia (Columbus Division).

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

15. The Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus “forthwith,” as the legal issues have already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*.

16. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

PARTIES

17. Petitioner, Jose Luis Rivera Chavez, is a citizen of Mexico who has been in immigration detention since January 28, 2026. He entered the United States over 20 years ago, without inspection. After Petitioner was arrested, ICE did not set bond, and Petitioner cannot request a bond hearing at the Stewart Immigration Court because IJs remain bound to follow the agency's prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. Petitioner has resided in the United States for 20 years.

18. Respondent Jason Streewal is the Warden of SDC, where Petitioner Jose Luis Rivera Chavez is currently detained. He is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is named in his official capacity. See *Doe*, 108 F.4th at 1194-97

19. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Field Office Director of the Atlanta Field Office of ICE with administrative jurisdiction over Mr. Rivera Chavez's case. He is Jose Luis Rivera Chavez's legal custodian and is named in his official capacity.

20. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE. is responsible for ICE's policies, practices, and procedures, including those relating to the detention of immigrants. He is a legal custodian of Petitioner and is named in his official capacity.

21. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), an agency of the United States, is responsible for the

administration of the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). He is a legal custodian of Petitioner and is named in his official capacity.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of the INA:

8 U.S.C. § 1226(A)

22. Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes the government to detain certain individuals during removal proceedings with the option to release them on bond or conditional parole.

23. After Petitioner was arrested, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not set bond. Petitioner cannot obtain release under bond as Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Therefore, Petitioner is filing this Petition for Habeas Corpus as it is the only remedy to determine that Petitioner is not an applicant for admission and should be afforded a bond hearing.

24. Petitioner has continuously in the United States for over 20 years and is the

parent of two U.S. citizen children, establishing deep familial and community ties that weigh heavily in favor of relief. Despite his longstanding ties to the United States, the denial of bond has resulted in his continued detention without a meaningful opportunity for release, raising serious statutory and constitutional concerns.

25. In *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, the court rejected the Government's assertion that a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for over 20 years without admission or parole was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Instead, the court held that because the petitioner was not apprehended at a port of entry or interdicted at sea, and had not recently entered the country, he was not an "arriving alien" or "applicant for admission" under the INA and was therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention. See *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025).

26. As in *Leal-Hernandez*, the original NTA in this case did not charge Petitioner as an "arriving alien," but rather as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled," removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioner was arrested inside the United States, not at a port of entry, and was never charged or treated as an "arriving alien" under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q). The Government cannot retroactively reclassify Petitioner as an arriving alien or

applicant for admission merely by modifying the charge sheet and therefore cannot invoke the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b) to override the immigration judge's valid exercise of bond authority under § 1226(a).

27. This Honorable Court also ruled that aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and are entitled to consideration for release on bond by immigration officers and, if not released, a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. See *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV- 342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025) and *P.R.S. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV- 330-CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025).

28. ICE's refusal or failure to release Petitioner following this lawful bond determination constitutes unauthorized detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and violates the plain language of § 1226(a).

29. Petitioner's detention is no longer tethered to any lawful purpose under the INA and therefore exceeds the statutory framework, warranting immediate release.

COUNT TWO
**Violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:**

30. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.

V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. This protection applies to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens in immigration detention.

31. Civil immigration detention violates due process if it is not reasonably related to its statutory purpose. See *id.* at 690 (citing *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention. First, the primary purpose is to mitigate the risk of flight, so that the government’s goal of removal proceedings and, ultimately, removal, may be effectuated; and a secondary purpose is to prevent danger to the community while removal proceedings and/or removal efforts are pending. *Id.*; *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).

32. Prolonged civil detention also violates due process unless it is accompanied by strong procedural protections to guard against the erroneous deprivation of liberty. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690–91; *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. at 346, 364–69 (1997); *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 81–83 (1992); *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750–52 (1987).

33. Further, procedural due process requires that a detained individual be provided with a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention. Here, Petitioner

has never been afforded the opportunity to be heard in a bond hearing and continues to be detained without sufficient justification or meaningful access to further process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Jose Luis Rivera Chavez prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;
- (3) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- (4) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- (5) Grant any other and further relief which this Honorable Court deems just and proper.

This 27th day of March, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,



By: David L. Lunel, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
GA Bar No.: 874002

1180 W Peachtree Street NW,
Suite 2040
Atlanta, GA 30309
Tel.: (404) 975-4500
Email: david@lunellaw.com