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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Awel Ziyad Hussein, Petitioner, v. Warden Jeremy Casey, et al., Respondents.	No.: 26-cv-01782-CAB-DEB **RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Petitioner requests that the Court order his release or Respondents to provide him a bond hearing. *See* ECF No. 1, at 8. This Court lacks jurisdiction because Petitioner's claims are barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Moreover, as an applicant for admission to the United States found to have a credible fear of persecution, Petitioner's detention is mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) until the conclusion of his

removal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner's request for relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ethiopia. *See* Exhibit 1 (Notice to Appear).[1] On January 8, 2025, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States. *See id.* Petitioner was not then admitted or paroled into the United States. *See id.* He was determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B). *See* Exhibit 2 (Expedited Removal Order).

Petitioner manifested a fear of return, persecution, and/or torture if returned to Ethiopia, so he was referred for a Credible Fear Interview (CFI), in which an U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Asylum Officer interviewed Petitioner and concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a credible fear of prosecution or torture. *See* Exhibit 1. On January 31, 2025, after receiving a positive credible fear determination by an asylum officer pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). *See id.* The filing of the NTA initiated removal proceedings, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, against Petitioner. Those removal proceedings remain ongoing. His initial master calendar hearing was February 13, 2025. *See id.* Petitioner already had a merits hearing on March 30, 2026, which was continued to April 14, 2026, at 1:00pm for an Oral Decision. *See* Exhibit 3 (Notice of Hearing 1); *see also* Exhibit 4 (Record of Master Calendar); *See* Exhibit 5 (Notice of Hearing 2).

Within his removal proceedings under § 1229a, Petitioner has had the opportunity to apply for relief from removal before an immigration judge (IJ), including

[1] The attached exhibits are true copies, with redactions of private information, of documents obtained from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) counsel.

asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

While his proceedings remain ongoing, Petitioner remains mandatorily detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B).[2]

III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225, applies to an "applicant for admission," defined as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted" or "who arrives in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). "[A]pplicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to arriving aliens and "certain other" aliens "initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid document." *Id.* (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). These aliens are generally subject to expedited removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if "the alien indicates an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution," immigration officers will refer the alien for a credible fear interview. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). "If the officer determines at the time of the interview that [the] alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . , the alien *shall be detained* for further consideration of the application for asylum." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). If the alien does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, does not express a fear of persecution, or is "found not to have such a fear," they "shall be detained . . . until removed" from the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(iii)(IV).

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[2] Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.

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IV. ARGUMENT

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A. Petitioner's Claim is Barred Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

3 Respondents contend that judicial review over Petitioner's claim is barred by 28 4 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which states that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause 5 or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 6 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders."

7 Here, Petitioner's claims of unlawful detention necessarily arise from the 8 Department of Homeland Security's[3] decision to commence removal proceedings 9 against him because that decision unavoidably triggers mandatory detention under 8 10 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) until the conclusion of his removal proceedings. *See, e.g*, 11 *Wang v. United States*, No. CV 10-0389 SVW (RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *6 (C.D. 12 Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) (finding section 1252(g) bars judicial review of false imprisonment 13 claim because the plaintiff's detention arose from the decision to commence removal 14 proceedings, and in turn, the "statute mandating detention during removal proceedings 15 of a person charged as an 'arriving alien.'").

16 As explained by another district court, removal proceedings are commenced 17 when, as occurred here, "the alien is issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration 18 court." *Herrera-Correra v. United States*, No. CV 08–2941 DSF (JCx), 2008 WL 19 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008); *see also* Exhibit 1. The government "may 20 arrest the alien against whom proceedings are commenced and detain that individual 21 until the conclusion of those proceedings." *Herrera-Correra*, 2008 WL 11336833, at 22 *3. "Thus, an alien's detention throughout this process arises from the [government's] 23 decision to commence proceedings" and review of claims arising from such detention 24 is barred under section 1252(g). *Id* (citing *Sissoko v. Rocha*, 509 F.3d 947, 949 (9th 25 Cir. 2007)); *see also Wang*, 2010 WL 11463156, at *6.

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27 [3] "In 2002, Congress transferred the Attorney General's immigration enforcement 28 responsibilities to the Secretary of Homeland Security." *Ibarra-Perez v. United States*, 154 F.4th 989, 995 n.2 (9th Cir. 2025).

1 Because this habeas petition brings a claim "arising from the decision or action
2 by the [government] to commence proceedings," review of Petitioner's claim is barred
3 under 8 U.S.C § 1252(g). Thus, the Court must dismiss the petition.

4 **B. Petitioner is Lawfully Detained Under the INA and the Constitution.**

5 Even if the Court assumed jurisdiction to review Petitioner's claim, the Court
6 must deny his habeas petition because Petitioner's detention is statutorily mandated
7 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) and has not been unconstitutionally prolonged.[4]

8 **1. Petitioner is mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).**

9 Petitioner's claim fails because he is subject to mandatory detention under 8
10 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), an "applicant for admission" is
11 defined as an "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
12 arrives in the United States." As explained above, applicants for admission "fall into
13 one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by §
14 1225(b)(2)." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1225(b)(1) – the provision relevant
15 here – applies because Petitioner was found in the United States without proper
16 documents authorizing his presence. And that statute mandates detention when an
17 immigration officer determines that the alien has a credible fear of persecution. *See* 8
18 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) ("If the officer determines at the time of the interview that
19 [the] alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . , the alien *shall be detained* for further
20 consideration of the application for asylum.") (emphasis added); *see also Matter of M-*
21 *S*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 519 (AG 2019) ("all aliens transferred from expedited to full
22 [removal] proceedings after establishing a credible fear are ineligible for bond").
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26 [4] As Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1, he is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Accordingly, an analysis under
27 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), is inapplicable to
28 Petitioner's habeas petition. To the extent the Court disagrees, *see* ECF No. 3, Respondents respectfully request an opportunity to supplement this response.

Petitioner requests that the Court order him released from ICE custody. But the Supreme Court has rejected such contention, explaining: "Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. . . . Nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond hearings." *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. Except for temporary parole granted at the discretion of the Attorney General "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit" under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), "there are no *other* circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released." *Id.* at 300 (emphasis in original).

As Petitioner's removal proceedings are pending, and he has not been granted temporary parole, section 1225(b)(1)(B) mandates his detention until the proceedings have concluded. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297 ("Once those proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must end as well."). Because Petitioner is lawfully detained under section 1225(b)(1)(B) and the statute does not entitle him to release at this time, his petition must be denied. *See, e.g.*, *Zelaya-Gonzalez v. Matuszewski*, No. 23-CV-151 JLS-KSC, 2023 WL 3103811, at *3 (S.D. Cal. April 25, 2023) (applying *Jennings* to find that the petitioner had no right to release or a bond hearing).

2. Petitioner's detention is not unconstitutionally prolonged.

In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court evaluated the proper interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The Supreme Court stated that, "[r]ead most naturally, [8 U.S.C.] §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . . mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded." *Id.* at 297. In other words, neither 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) "impose[] any limit on the length of detention" and "neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) say[] anything whatsoever about bond hearings." *Id* The Supreme Court added that the sole means of release for noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) prior to removal from the United States is temporary parole at the discretion of the Attorney General under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Id.* at 300

1 ("That express exception to detention implies that there are no *other* circumstances
2 under which aliens detained under [8 U.S.C.] § 1225(b) may be released.") (emphasis
3 in original). "In sum, [8 U.S.C.] §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens
4 throughout the completion of applicable proceedings[.]" *Id.* at 302.
5 In *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 207–09 (1953), a
6 noncitizen in exclusion proceedings filed a habeas petition claiming that his prolonged
7 detention without a hearing violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
8 rejected the petition, concluding that the noncitizen's continued detention did not
9 deprive him of any due process rights, stating: "[A]n alien on the threshold of initial
10 entry stands on a different footing: 'Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress
11 is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.'" *Id.* at 212 (citation
12 omitted).
13 In *Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 138–40
14 (2020), the Supreme Court once again addressed the due process rights of inadmissible
15 arriving noncitizens seeking initial entry into the United States. The Supreme Court
16 stated that such individuals have no due process rights "other than those afforded by
17 statute." *Id.* at 107; *see also id* at 140 ("[A]n alien in respondent's position has only
18 those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute."). The
19 Supreme Court noted that its determination was supported by "more than a century of
20 precedent." *Id.* at 138 (citing *Nishimura Ekiu v United States*, 142 U.S. 651, 660
21 (1892); *U.S. ex rel. Knauff v Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); *Mezei*, 345 U.S.
22 at 212; *Landon v Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)). Because the only process due
23 Petitioner is that afforded under section 1225(b), the Court must reject his claim that
24 his detention violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and deny his
25 requested relief. *See Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 138–40; *Mendoza-Linares v Garland*,
26 51 F.4th 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) ("*Thuraissigiam* reaffirmed that 'an alien seeking
27 initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and *has no constitutional*
28 *rights regarding his application*,' meaning that such an alien 'has only those rights

1 regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.'") (emphases in original);
2 *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) ("The recognized
3 liberty interests of U.S. citizens and aliens are not coextensive: the Supreme Court has
4 'firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to
5 aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.'") (quoting *Demore v. Kim*,
6 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003)); *Zelaya-Gonzalez*, 2023 WL 3103811, at *4 ("Binding Ninth
7 Circuit and Supreme Court precedents are clear that Petitioner lacks any rights beyond
8 those conferred by statute, and no statute entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing.").

9 Since the Supreme Court's decision in *Thuraissigiam*, numerous courts have
10 acknowledged *Thuraissigiam*'s impact on the precise Fifth Amendment Due Process
11 Clause that Petitioner might have raised in this petition: Does an alien detained under
12 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) have a due process right to release or a bond hearing after being
13 detained for a certain period of time?

14 The answer is no. *See Gevorg v. Warden of Golden State Annex Detention*
15 *Facility*, 1:25-cv-00992-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3496436, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025)
16 ("To find Petitioner—an arriving asylum seeker who had not yet been admitted to the
17 United States and has an asylum application pending—is entitled to a bond hearing
18 solely based on the length of his detention would render § 1225(b)(1) meaningless and
19 disregard statutorily and constitutionally significant differences among the categories
20 of aliens seeking habeas relief."); *Doe v. Bondi*, 1:25-cv-02712, 2025 WL 3516292, at
21 *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2025) ("[P]rocedural due process does not afford inadmissible
22 arriving aliens subject to prolonged detention a right to release or bond hearing prior
23 to the conclusion of removal proceedings."); *Romero v. Bondi*, 1:25-cv-993, 2025 WL
24 2490659, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2025); *Mendoza-Linares v. Garland*, No. 21-cv-1169-
25 BEN (AHG), 2024 WL 3316306, *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2024) ("[T]he Court finds that
26 Petitioner has no Fifth Amendment right to a bond hearing pending his removal
27 proceedings."); *Zelaya-Gonzalez*, 2023 WL 3103811, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2023)
28 (same); *Rodriguez Figueroa v. Garland*, 535 F. Supp. 3d 122, 126–27 (W.D.N.Y.

1 2021); *Gonzales Garcia v. Rosen*, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 336 (W.D.N.Y. 2021); *St.*
2 *Charles v. Barr*, 514 F. Supp. 3d 570, 579 (W.D.N.Y. 2021); *Petgrave v. Aleman*, 529
3 F. Supp. 3d 665, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2021); *Poonjani v. Shanahan*, 319 F. Supp. 3d 664,
4 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same).[5]

5 Indeed, in *Jennings*, the Supreme Court plainly held that, "[i]n sum, §§
6 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) *mandate* detention of aliens throughout the completion of
7 applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those proceedings begin[,]" 583
8 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added), stressing that the language of Sections 1225(b)(1) and
9 (b)(2) "is *quite clear*." *Id.* at 846 (emphases added).

10 Even if the Court infers a constitutional right against prolonged mandatory
11 detention, Petitioner's claim still fails. Petitioner's detention falls significantly short
12 of the length courts have found to raise due process concerns. *See, e g* , *Durand v.*
13 *Allen*, No. 3:23-cv-00279-RBM-BGS, 2024 WL 711607, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
14 2024) (detained over two-and-a-half years); *Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski*,
15 No. 22-cv-1357-MMA (JLB), 2023 WL 139801, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (three
16 years); *Yagao v. Figueroa*, No. 17-cv-2224-AJB-MDD, 2019 WL 1429582, at
17 *2 (S.D. Cal. March 29, 2019) (two years).

18 In similar cases, courts in this district have applied the test in *Lopez v. Garland*,
19 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). *See, e.g.*, *Sanchez-Rivera*, 2023 WL 139801,
20 at *5 ("[W]hile the *Mathews* [*v Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] factors may be well-
21 suited to determining whether due process requires a second bond hearing, they are not
22 particularly dispositive of whether prolonged mandatory detention has become
23 unreasonable in a particular case."); *D D. v. LaRose, et al* , Case No. 25-cv-02581-BJC-
24 JLB, ECF No. 10 at 7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (considering a similar claim and finding
25 "the three-factor balancing test from *Lopez* . . . provides an appropriate assessment of
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28 [5] *But see Babaveisi v. LaRose*, 25-cv-3746-GPC-SBC, 2026 WL 76565, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (noting "two different approaches" adopted by district courts).

1 the possible constitutional implications of Petitioner's ongoing detention without
2 process.").

3 Under *Lopez*, to determine whether continued mandatory detention has become
4 unreasonable, "the Court will look to [1] the total length of detention to date, [2] the
5 likely duration of future detention, and [3] the delays in the removal proceedings caused
6 by the petitioner and the government." 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879.

7 **Duration of Detention**. Here, Petitioner has been detained for a about 14
8 months. Courts in this district have found detention for much longer periods to be
9 unreasonably prolonged. *See Durand v. Allen*, No. 3:23-cv-00279-RBM-BGS, 2024
10 WL 711607 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (32 months); *Sibomana*, 2023 WL
11 3028093, at *4 (19 months); *Sanchez-Rivera*, 2023 WL 139801 at *6 (three years);
12 *Kydyrali v. Wolf*, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 773 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (20 months); *Yagao*, 2019
13 WL 1429582, at *1 (two years since last bond hearing). The length of detention "is the
14 most important factor." *Sanchez-Rivera*, 2023 WL 139801, at *6 (citation omitted).

15 Notably, Petitioner's current detention does not fall within the range these courts
16 have found to be unreasonable. Moreover, the length of Petitioner's detention, *by itself*,
17 does not favor granting habeas relief. *See Sadeqi v. LaRose*, No. 25-cv-2587-RSH-
18 BJW, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) ("The Court agrees with
19 Respondents that the length of Petitioner's detention to date—almost 12 months—does
20 not by itself, without more, establish prolonged detention in violation of due process.").

21 A recent case within this district, *Markov v. Larose*, is instructive. 25-CV-3811
22 JLS (SBC), 2026 WL 92069 (S.D. Cal. January 13, 2026). There, the Petitioner had
23 been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 for "almost exactly one-year" without a bond
24 hearing. *Id.* at *2. Although he alleged that his final merits hearing had been postponed
25 "five times due to the government," and there was "no merits hearing scheduled," the
26 court nonetheless denied the petition. *Id.* at *2. In doing so, it reasoned that the mere
27 "length of detention, *without more*, does not render his detention unreasonable." *Id.*
28 (emphasis added).

1 Indeed, courts have denied petitions from individuals detained under § 2 1225(b)(1) without an individualized bond hearing—for a period *longer* than 3 Petitioner's duration of detention. *See, e.g., Doe v. Andrews*, 1:25-cv-00333-JLT-HBK 4 (HC), 2025 WL 3280777, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (pending report and 5 recommendation collecting cases); *D.A.F. v. Warden, Stewart Detention Center*, 4:20- 6 cv-79-CDL-MSH, 2020 WL 9460467, at *10-11 (M.D. Ga. May 28, 2020) (finding 15 7 months of detention "failed to rise to the level of unreasonably prolonged detention"); 8 *Traore v Decker*, No. 19-cv-4612 (ALC), 2019 WL 3890227, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. August 9 19, 2019) (denying petition for petitioner detained under 1225(b)(2) for around 20 10 months); *Yacouba v Decke*, No. 18-13879 (JLL), 2019 WL 1569823, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 11 10, 2019) (finding detention for just over 15 months insufficient to trigger due process 12 detention limitations); *Fatule-Roque v. Lowe*, No. 3:17-cv-1981, 2018 WL 3584696, at 13 *5 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (finding fifteen-month detention not unreasonable in light 14 of the petitioner's filing of multiple motions to continue immigration hearings and to 15 correct an error in an I-360 application); *but see Gonzalez v. Bonnar*, No. 18-cv-05321- 16 JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) ("In general, as detention 17 continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting continued custody 18 absent a bond hearing.").

19 The same result should follow here. Petitioner does not allege any facts or 20 advance any argument to distinguish his situation from any other applicant for 21 admission with a pending asylum case. Not only does the length of Petitioner's 22 detention fall comparatively short of the length courts in this district have found to 23 warrant habeas relief, but the other *Lopez* factors do not favor habeas relief either.

24 **<u>Likely Duration of Future Detention</u>**. Petitioner already had a merits hearing, 25 and is simply awaiting an oral decision, scheduled for April 14, 2026, at 1pm. *See* 26 Exhibit 4; *see also* Exhibit 5. The fact that Petitioner's removal proceedings are close 27 to being completed do not favor granting bond or release. *See Markov*, 2026 WL 92069 28 at *2 (denying petition even though the Petitioner, who had been detained for one year,

complained no merits hearing was scheduled). Critically, "unlike aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 whose detention could be 'indefinite' and 'potentially permanent,' aliens detained under § 1225(b) face a definite termination point." *See Gevorg*, 2025 WL 3496436, at *7.

So it cannot be disputed that "Petitioner's detention [under § 1225(b)] will end once his petition for asylum is granted or denied." *See id.*; *see also Prieto-Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying habeas relief when "two of [petitioner's] three years of federal custody have passed while he has been awaiting" judicial review because, "although his removal has certainly been delayed by his pursuit of judicial review of his administratively final removal order, he is not stuck in a 'removable-but-not removable limbo,' as the petitioners in *Zadvydas* were[.]").

Here, Petitioner's detention cannot be described as "indefinite" because his detention has a definite termination point (i.e., relief or a final order of removal), unlike the Petitioners in *Zadvydas*. *See Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. at 512 (distinguishing *Zadyvdas*, because while the period of detention at issue there was "indefinite" and "potentially permanent," the detention in *Kim*, under § 1226(c) "has a definite termination point").

Delays caused by Petitioner or Government. This final factor is neutral. There is no evidence to suggest any delays by either Petitioner or by the Government.

If this court were to grant a bond hearing based solely on Petitioner's mandatory detention—without requiring more (i.e., foot-dragging or bad-faith by DHS)—this would create a precedent where every similarly situated alien simply prolongs out their immigration proceeding with continuances and appeals to only request immediate release after a year while their case remains pending.

This cannot be the rule for such an unremarkable and common scenario Petitioner is in as an applicant for admission who is mandatorily detained under 1225(b)(1). Such a rule is at odds with binding "Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent[.]" *See Zelaya-Gonzalez*, 2023 WL 3103811, at *3-4.

1 Petitioner was detained as an alien present in the United States who has not been
2 admitted or paroled. Thus, Petitioner is rightly considered an applicant for admission,
3 and his mandatory detention does not violate due process. *See Duran Romero v. LaRose*,
4 No. 25-cv-3567-AGS-VET, ECF No. 7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026); *Shahin v Noem*, No.
5 25-cv-2496-AGS-KSC, ECF No. 12 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025); *Cordova Cordova*, No.
6 25-cv-2426-BAS-DDL, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); *Mendez Ramirez v.*
7 *Decker*, 612 F. Supp. 3d 200, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); *Gonzalez Aguilar v. Wolf*, 448 F.
8 Supp. 3d 1202, 1212 (D.N.M. 2020); *de la Rosa Espinoza v. Guadian*, Case No. 20-
9 3126-JWL, 2020 WL 3452967, at *6-8 (D. Kansas June 24, 2020).

10 **C. Conditions of Confinement Allegations are Not Proper Habeas Claims**

11 To the extent Petitioner asserts claims regarding conditions of his confinement,
12 ECF No. 1 at 7 (claiming detention have been affecting him both "psychologically and
13 physically"), the Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims because they do not
14 challenge the lawfulness of his custody. An individual may seek habeas relief under 28
15 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is "in custody" under federal authority "in violation of the
16 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). But habeas
17 relief is available to challenge only the legality or duration of confinement. *Pinson v.*
18 *Carvajal*, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023); *Crawford v. Bell*, 599 F.2d 890, 891
19 (9th Cir. 1979); *Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020)
20 (The writ of habeas corpus historically "provide[s] a means of contesting the
21 lawfulness of restraint and securing release."). The Ninth Circuit squarely explained
22 how to decide whether a claim sounds in habeas jurisdiction: "[O]ur review of the
23 history and purpose of habeas leads us to conclude the relevant question is whether,
24 based on the allegations in the petition, release is *legally required* irrespective of the
25 relief requested." *Pinson*, 69 F.4th at 1072 (emphasis in original); *see also Nettles v.*
26 *Grounds*, 830 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (The key inquiry is whether success on the
27 petitioner's claim would "necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release.").
28

1 Here, Petitioner's claims regarding the conditions of his confinement do not
2 arise under § 2241. *See Nettles*, 830 F.3d at 933 ("We have long held that prisoners
3 may not challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus."); *Giron Rodas*
4 *v. Lyons*, No. 25cv1912-LL-AHG, 2025 WL 2300781, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025)
5 ("Like in *Pinson*, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's § 2241 habeas petition
6 since it cannot be fairly read as attacking 'the legality or duration of confinement.'")
7 (quoting *Pinson*, 69 F.4th at 1065); *Guselnikov v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-1971-BTM-KSC,
8 2025 WL 2300873, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (finding petitioners' claims did not
9 arise under § 2241 because they were not arguing they were unlawfully in custody and
10 receiving the requested relief would not entitle them to release). Thus, Petitioner's
11 claim does not arise under § 2241 and the petition should be dismissed.

12 **V. CONCLUSION**

13 For the reasons stated herein, Respondents respectfully request that the Court
14 dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction or deny it on the merits.

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16 Dated: April 2, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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