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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
12 CIVIL DIVISION

13 ABRAHAM IGNACIO PEREIRA VIDAL

14 Petitioner,

15 v.

16 Brian MCSHANE, Field Office Director of
17 Enforcement and Removal Operations,
18 Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration and
19 Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM,
20 Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
21 Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
22 HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela BONDI,
23 U.S. Attorney General; The EXECUTIVE
24 OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; and
J.L. JAMISON as Warden of the Philadelphia
Federal Detention Center

Respondents.

Case No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

1 1. This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of Abraham Ignacio
2 Pereira Vidal (A ) seeking relief to remedy his unlawful detention. Respondents
3 are currently detaining Mr. Pereira Vidal subject to immigration proceedings.

4 **INTRODUCTION**

5 2. Petitioner, Abraham Ignacio Pereira Vidal is in the physical custody of
6 Respondents at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center. He now faces unlawful detention
7 as the Respondents, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office of
8 Immigration Review (EOIR) have placed into operation procedures which meaningfully
9 deprive Petitioner of release.

10 3. Petitioner was detained by Respondents on or about March 23, 2026 by
11 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Enforcement Removal Operations (“ERO”) on his way to work in Southern Delaware. Mr. Pereira Vidal is now being held under a theory
12 of mandatory detention that directly contradicts years of immigration practice, statutory
13 interpretation, and the express intent of Congress in constructing the Immigration and
14 Nationality Act (“INA”).

15 4. This case concerns the unlawful detention of a long-term resident of the United
16 States who entered the country as a child, has no criminal history, has been authorized to work,
17 and has complied fully with all immigration requirements, yet was nonetheless arrested without
18 explanation and detained by Respondents.

19 5. Petitioner is a citizen and national of Venezuela who has been present in the United
20 States since he entered at approximately nine (9) years of age. For years, Petitioner has lived
21 openly and lawfully within the United States, maintaining employment authorization, working
22 openly and lawfully within the United States, maintaining employment authorization, working
23 openly and lawfully within the United States, maintaining employment authorization, working
24 openly and lawfully within the United States, maintaining employment authorization, working

1 at Bank of America, and supporting his family—particularly his father, who is currently
2 undergoing intensive medical treatment.

3 6. Petitioner’s immigration proceedings remain ongoing. In August 2023, the
4 Immigration Court administratively closed his case pursuant to then-governing DHS
5 enforcement priorities, recognizing that continued proceedings were not warranted and that
6 closure would serve judicial economy and the interests of justice, particularly in light of
7 Petitioner’s eligibility for other forms of lawful immigration relief.¹

8 7. Despite this posture, Respondents abruptly detained Petitioner on March 23, 2026
9 without explanation, without a warrant, and without any individualized determination that
10 detention was warranted.

11 8. Respondents seek to subject Mr. Pereira Vidal to a sweeping mandatory detention
12 framework more appropriately reserved—by statute and longstanding interpretation—for
13 individuals who are entering at the border. Petitioner’s detention is not an isolated deviation;
14 it reflects a broader enforcement posture that courts across the country have repeatedly
15 scrutinized and rebuked.

16 9. On January 20, 2025, the President issued several executive actions relating to
17 immigration, including the Executive Order entitled “Protecting the American People Against
18 Invasion,” which articulated an expansive interior enforcement agenda. That Order directed
19 the Secretary of Homeland Security “to take all appropriate action to enable” ICE, CBP, and
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21
22 ¹ See Memorandum from Kerry E. Doyle, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
23 *Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws and the Exercise of*
24 *Prosecutorial Discretion* (Apr. 3, 2022) (directing attorneys to prioritize certain categories of cases while exercising
prosecutorial discretion to administratively close or dismiss proceedings where appropriate, including where
respondents have viable avenues for lawful status and where closure serves judicial economy and the interests of
justice).

USCIS to prioritize civil immigration enforcement procedures, including through the use of mass detention.²

10. In late May 2025, Respondent Kristi Noem and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller reportedly met with ICE leadership and imposed an arrest quota of 3,000 individuals per day, threatening job consequences if officials failed to meet arrest quotas.³ Deputy Chief of Staff Miller remarked that “[u]nder President Trump’s leadership, we are looking to set a goal of a minimum of 3,000 arrests for ICE every day, and President Trump is going to keep pushing to get that number up higher each and every single day.”⁴

11. Following these directives, ICE personnel were reportedly instructed to “turn the creativity knob up to 11,” to “push the envelope,” and to pursue “collateral” arrests—stating that “[i]f it involves handcuffs on wrists, it’s probably worth pursuing.”⁵

12. When the executive branch has announced daily numerical arrest targets, encouraged aggressive collateral apprehensions, and reshaped detention classifications to maximize custody, the promise of neutral adjudication becomes illusory. Habeas corpus exists precisely to safeguard against such structural distortions of liberty.

13. The gravity of these concerns is further amplified by sworn testimony presented before Congress. On February 23, 2026, former Assistant Chief Counsel Ryan Schwank

² Exec. Order No. 14,159, Protecting the American People Against Invasion, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,447 (Jan. 20, 2025); *Protecting the American People Against Invasion*, The White House (Jan. 20, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/>.

³ Julia Ainsley, et al., A sweeping new ICE operation shows how Trump’s focus on immigration is reshaping federal law enforcement, NBC News (June 4, 2025), <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justicedepartment/ice-operation-trump-focus-immigrationreshape-federal-lawenforcement-rcna193494> (last visited Nov 26, 2025); Brittany Gibson & Stef W. Kight, Scoop: Stephen Miller, Noem tell ICE to supercharge immigration arrests, Axios (May 28, 2025), available at <https://www.axios.com/2025/05/28/immigration-ice-deportations-stephen-miller> (last visited Nov. 26. 2025).

⁴ Hannity, Sean, “Stephen Miller says the admin wants to create the strongest immigration system in US History”, FOX NEWS (May 28, 2025), <https://www.foxnews.com/video/6373591405112> (last visited Nov. 26, 2025).

⁵ Olivares, José, “US immigration officers ordered to arrest more people even without warrants,” The Guardian (Jun 4, 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/04/immigration-officials-increased-detentions-collateral-arrests>

1 testified regarding internal ICE practices.⁶ He stated that DHS representation about officer
2 training were misleading, that graduates were rapidly deployed with minimal supervision, and
3 that internal directives authorized conduct inconsistent with constitutional protections. Mr.
4 Schwank described being instructed to review a memorandum asserting that ICE officers could
5 enter homes without a judicial warrant—conduct he characterized as “the chief evil against
6 which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” He further testified that he was
7 required to review the memorandum in secret and made to understand that disobedience could
8 jeopardize his employment, concluding that ICE was teaching cadets to violate constitutional
9 safeguards while attempting to cloak such directives in secrecy.⁷

10 14. Respondents’ enforcement authority is not unbounded. Even, as here, in the
11 immigration context, the power to arrest and detain is constrained by statute and the
12 Constitution. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorized warrantless arrests
13 only in narrowly defined circumstances, requiring reason to believe the individual is removable
14 and likely to escape before a warrant may be obtained. Absent such individualized grounds,
15 detention exceeds the limits Congress thoughtfully and rightfully imposed.

16 15. Petitioner’s continued detention must be evaluated within this broader context.
17 When executive directives emphasize mass arrests, when long-settled statutory interpretations
18 are recast to expand mandatory detention, when experienced immigration judges report
19 institutional intimidation, and when sworn testimony raises concerns about constitutional
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22 ⁶ Testimony of Ryan Schwank, Former Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Before
23 the , House Oversight Committee, 119th Cong. (Feb. 23, 2025) (statement of Ryan Schwank) (“ICE is teaching
24 cadets to violate the Constitution, and they were attempting to cloak it in secrecy by demanding that I like about it. I
am here to convey the public danger that is being created at the ICE Academy.”), video recording available at
<https://youtu.be/v6HkNJ1lwvc?si=5TS43gXbZzvMmt>.

⁷ *Supra*, fn. 9.

1 compliance within enforcement ranks, meaningful relief before the agency becomes
2 structurally compromised.

3 16. Under these circumstances, habeas review by this Court is not merely appropriate—
4 it is indispensable to ensure that executive detention tethered to statute, the Constitution, and
5 the rule of law itself.

6 **JURISDICTION**

7 17. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is presently being
8 held at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

9 18. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C.
10 § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States
11 Constitution (the Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
12 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
13 § 1651.

14 **VENUE**

15 19. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-
16 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
17 Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

18 20. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as Respondent
19 are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of
20 the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of
21 Pennsylvania.

22 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

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21. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petition is not entitled to relief.⁸ If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondent must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.”⁹

22. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law...affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.”¹⁰ Further “[t]he application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.”¹¹

PARTIES

23. Petitioner Abraham Ignacio Pereira Vidal is a citizen of Venezuela who has been in immigration detention since approximately March 23, 2026. Following the arrest of Petitioner, ICE transported Petitioner into custody in the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center pending further immigration removal proceedings.

24. Respondent, Brian McShane is the Director of the Philadelphia Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Director McShane is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

25. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality

⁸ 28 U.S.C. § 2243

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

¹¹ *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

1 Act (“INA”), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner’s detention. Secretary
2 Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

3 26. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is the federal agency
4 responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of
5 noncitizens.

6 27. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is
7 responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration
8 Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in
9 her official capacity.

10 28. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is the federal
11 agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including
12 for custody redetermination in bond hearings.

13 29. Respondent J.L. Jamison, as Warden of the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center,
14 where Petitioner is detained is named in their official capacity having immediate physical
15 custody of Petitioner. They are sued in their official capacity.

16 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

17 30. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
18 persons...against unreasonable searches and seizures.”¹²

19 31. Immigration detention is a form of civil confinement that “constitutes a significant
20 deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”¹³ Immigration officers may arrest
21 an individual without a warrant in limited circumstances.¹⁴

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23 ¹² U.S. Const. amend. IV.

¹³ *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).

24 ¹⁴ *See Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 407-08 (2012) (conferring the preference of Congress, as expressed in the INA, for immigration arrests to be based on warrants).

32. The INA permits warrantless arrest if an immigration officer has reason to believe that a noncitizen (1) is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws and (2) “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”¹⁵

33. ICE officers are bound not only by statute and due process, but also by its national policy adopted pursuant to settlement agreement in *Castanon Nava et al. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*¹⁶ Under this policy, ICE officers must consider a delineated list of factors before making an arrest, including (a) the officer’s ability to determine the individual’s identity; (b) knowledge of the individual’s prior escapes or evasions of immigration authorities; (c) the individual’s attempts to flee to avoid being discovered by immigration; and (d) the individual’s ties to the community, such as a family, home, or employment.¹⁷

34. Civil immigration detention must rest on lawful, individualized determination that detention is justified under the statutory framework as established by Congress. It cannot be imposed as the byproduct of a generalized enforcement campaign or arbitrary numerical targets.

35. Yet the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s arrest and continued detention strongly indicate that his custody is not the result of a particularized assessment, but rather flowed from a broader enforcement posture designed to maximize arrests and detention irrespective of individualized risk.¹⁸ The facts of the instant case reflect the predictable consequences of that policy environment.

¹⁵ 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i)-(ii).

¹⁶ No. 18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill.).

¹⁷ Settlement Agreement, *Castanon Nava et al. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill.), available at https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/page/documents/2025-01/Nava_Settlement_ICE_Warrantless_Arrest-Vehicle_Stop_Policy_2021.pdf.

¹⁸ Elizabeth Findell, et al., The White House Marching Orders That Sparked the L.A. Migrant Crackdown, *The Wall Street Journal* (June 9, 2025), <https://www.wsj.com/us-news/protests-losangeles-immigrants-trump-f5089877>; Julia Ainsley, et al., A sweeping new ICE operation shows how Trump’s focus on immigration is reshaping federal law enforcement, *NBC News* (June 4, 2025), <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justicedepartment/ice-operation-trump->

1 36. The facts of Petitioner’s case fall far outside those narrow statutory bounds. On or
2 about March 23, 2026, Petitioner—who entered the United States as a child at approximately
3 nine years old and has resided here ever since—was stopped while driving to work at his job
4 at Bank of America in southern Delaware on or about March 23, 2026. He was detained by
5 ICE officers, transported to the Dover Field Office, and ultimately transferred to the
6 Philadelphia Federal Detention Center.

7 37. At no point was Petitioner presented with a warrant. Nor was he informed of any
8 basis for his arrest. Despite possessing documentation demonstrating his lawful employment
9 authorization, Temporary Protected Status, and ongoing immigration proceedings, Petitioner
10 was taken into custody without explanation.

11 38. There is no indication that officers made any attempt to obtain a warrant, not that
12 they conducted any individualized assessment of whether Petitioner posed a risk of flight or
13 danger to the community. The record reflects precisely the opposite.

14 39. Petitioner has no criminal history and no history of noncompliance with any legal
15 obligation. He has remained gainfully employed after coming of age, has maintained
16 employment authorization, and has consistently complied with the requirements of his
17 immigration case.

18 40. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s initial apprehension was lawful, his
19 continued detention must still comport with the framework Congress enacted in the INA. That
20 framework requires individualized custody determination and carefully distinguishes between
21 discretionary and mandatory detention.
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focusimmigration-reshape-federal-lawenforcement-rcna193494; Brittany Gibson & Stef W. Kight, Scoop: Stephen Miller, Noem tell ICE to supercharge immigration arrests, Axios (May 28, 2025), available at <https://www.axios.com/2025/05/28/immigration-ice-deportations-stephen-miller>.

1 41. Rather than adhere to those statutory limits, Respondents have attempted to
2 reclassify broad categories of long-term residents within the country as “applicants for
3 admission,” thereby subjecting them to mandatory detention and stripping immigration judges
4 of their traditional custody authority.

5 42. Understanding the structure of the INA’s detention provisions is therefore essential,
6 as it demonstrates that Petitioner’s ongoing confinement is not only constitutionally suspect,
7 but also contrary to the plain text, history, and settled application of the governing statute.

8 43. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
9 noncitizens in removal proceedings.

10 44. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
11 proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a)
12 detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R.
13 §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or
14 convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention.¹⁹

15 45. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
16 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
17 referred to under § 1225(b)(2). This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and
18 1225(b)(2).

19 46. Lastly, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been
20 previously ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings.²⁰

24 ¹⁹ *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

²⁰ *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)-(b).

1 47. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
2 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996.²¹

3 48. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining
4 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered
5 detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a).²²

6 49. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection
7 and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearing, unless their criminal
8 history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior
9 practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody
10 hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer.²³

11 50. For the first time since the enactment of IIRIRA, Respondents now take the position
12 through a series of precedential decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that
13 non-citizens presently residing within the interior of the United States are not entitled to a
14 custody redetermination (or bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.

15 51. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that
16 rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of
17 practice.

18 52. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
19 Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without
20 inspection shall now be deemed “applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and
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22 ²¹ Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

23 ²² See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

24 ²³ See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

1 therefore are subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy
2 applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the
3 United States for months, years, or in the instant Petitioner’s case, even decades.

4 53. On September 5, 2025, ICE, the BIA adopted this same position in a published
5 decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. The Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United
6 States without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and holding
7 them ineligible to seek bond in immigration court.²⁴

8 54. The BIA transformed the government’s contested enforcement position into a
9 categorical jurisdictional bar, foreclosing individualized custody determinations for a broad
10 class of noncitizens historically deemed bond-eligible under § 1226(a).

11 55. Federal district courts have rejected this sweeping reclassification. In *Maldonado*
12 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, the Central District of California certified a nationwide “Bond Eligible
13 Class” and granted declaratory relief, holding that DHS’s interpretation “runs counter to the
14 plain language of the INA, foundational principles of statutory interpretation, and the INA’s
15 statutory scheme,” and that class members are entitled, at minimum, to individualized bond
16 hearings.²⁵

17 56. The Respondents’ disregard for continued rulings of courts throughout the country
18 resoundingly rebuffing their interpretation of the statute has extended far beyond the initial
19 refusal to permit custody redetermination hearings for bond-eligible noncitizens.
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23 ²⁴ See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

24 ²⁵ *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).

1 57. Under Respondents' current posture, even when a petitioner succeeds in obtaining
2 a bond hearing and prevails before an Immigration Judge—often by establishing eligibility for
3 discretionary detention under § 1226(a)—Respondents reflexively file an appeal to the BIA.²⁶

4 58. The filing of a Notice of Intent to Appeal (EOIR-43) and subsequent appeal
5 automatically stays the Immigration Judge's bond order, guaranteeing that the petitioner
6 remains detained throughout the pendency of the appeal. In practice, this detention routinely
7 lasts for months.

8 59. This strategy does not reflect case-specific judgment as the statute clearly
9 contemplates, but rather, it presents a blanket policy by the Respondents to appeal bond grants
10 in all cases where it has been ordered, circumventing the INA's authority and nullifying the
11 effect of federal court relief recognizing bond eligibility. The Respondents have transformed
12 discretionary appellate review into a mechanism of categorical detention—achieving through
13 procedure what it cannot lawfully obtain through statute.

14 60. Compounding this issue, Respondents appeal these bond grants to the very
15 adjudicatory body that has already aligned itself with their contested interpretation of the
16 detention statutes. The BIA has issued precedential decisions adopting Respondents' position
17 and depriving judges of jurisdiction over custody redeterminations for individuals who entered
18 without inspection. As a result, the appeals process offers no meaningful opportunity for relief,
19 rather, it serves as a foregone conclusion that prolongs detention while preserving the
20 appearance of administrative process.²⁷

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²⁶ Redacted Example of Notice of Intent to Appeal (Form EOIR-43) (attached as Ex. 2).

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²⁷ Redacted Example of BIA Decision Applying *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* on DHS Appeal of Bond Grant (attached as Ex. 2)

61. The cumulative effect of this regime acts to trap petitioners in a procedural morass that could only be described as death by a thousand cuts. This closed circuit—self-reinforcing and outcome-determinative—functions as a form of administrative ouroboros, consuming the very relief federal courts have declared petitioners are entitled to receive. Petitioners are left to run a short and futile race toward administrative relief while standing on a plank that has been deliberately shortened by agency design.

62. Habeas corpus exists precisely to address this type of structural deprivation of liberty. Where the government’s coordinated use of stays, appeals, and BIA precedent ensures continued detention regardless of individualized findings or federal court declarations, administrative remedies are not merely inadequate—they are illusory.

63. Continued detention under these circumstances is not authorized by statute, is inconsistent with the separation of powers, and violates fundamental principles of due process. Accordingly, this Court’s intervention is necessary to enforce the rule of law and to prevent Respondents from nullifying federal judicial relief through procedural gamesmanship.

EXHAUSTION AND FUTILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

64. Exhaustion is not required where the agency’s controlling precedent forecloses relief as a matter of law.²⁸

65. Taken together, Respondent EOIR’s directive that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for individuals like Petitioner, Respondent DHS’ systematic practice of staying and appealing any bond grants, and the BIA’s continued adherence to *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado* establish that administrative processes administered by

²⁸ See *El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. EOIR*, 959 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1991).

1 Respondents are incapable of providing Petitioner with timely or effective relief from
2 detention.

3 66. That jurisdictional foreclosure is dispositive. Where the Immigration Judge is
4 instructed that they cannot exercise custody authority, and where Respondent DHS
5 systematically appeals or stays any grant of bond, there remains no meaningful administrative
6 path forward.

7 67. Exhaustion does not require pursuit of remedies that are foreclosed in advance or
8 structurally incapable of providing relief. Under these circumstances, administrative review is
9 not simply unlikely to succeed; it is functionally unavailable.

10 68. Under these circumstances, further administrative pursuit of relief is not merely
11 inadequate—it is futile.

12 69. Accordingly, this Court should expeditiously grant this petition, and order
13 Petitioner's release from detention.

14 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

15 70. Petitioner, Abraham Ignacio Pereira Vidal is a citizen and national of Venezuela
16 who has been present in the United States for approximately ten (10) years since entering as a
17 child.

18 71. Since his arrival, Petitioner has build his life in the United States. He resides with
19 his family and plays a central role in supporting his family. In particular, Petitioner provides
20 critical assistance to his father, who is currently undergoing intensive dialysis treatment while
21 he awaits a transplant procedure.

22 72. Petitioner has no criminal history and has had no adverse contact with law
23 enforcement.
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1 73. Petitioner has been consistently employed and is currently employed at Bank of
2 America. He has been authorized to work in the United States and has complied with all
3 requirements associated with that authorization.

4 74. Petitioner was formerly the beneficiary of Temporary Protected Status, including a
5 grant extending his lawful status through September of 2025, and has a subsequent application
6 that remains pending.

7 75. Petitioner likewise has removal proceedings before the Philadelphia Immigration
8 Court that remain pending before the Court. In August of 2023, the presiding Immigration
9 Judge administratively closed Petitioner's case, recognizing that continued adjudication was
10 not warranted at that time and that closure would serve the interests of judicial economy and
11 fairness, particularly given Petitioner's eligibility for alternative forms of lawful immigration
12 relief.

13 76. On or about March 23, 2026, Petitioner was driving to work at his job when he was
14 stopped by ICE officers. Petitioner was detained during that encounter and transported to the
15 Dover Field Office.

16 77. While at the Dover Office, Petitioner was permitted to briefly speak with his father.
17 During that call, Petitioner expressed that he did not understand why he was being detained
18 and that he had attempted to explain to the officers that he has a valid and ongoing immigration
19 case and had remained in compliance with all legal requirements.

20 78. Despite providing this information, Petitioner was not given any explanation for his
21 detention. Petitioner was not presented with a warrant, nor was he informed of any basis for
22 his arrest.
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79. At no point were Petitioner's individual circumstances meaningfully considered, including his long-term residence in the United States, lack of criminal history, lawful employment or ongoing immigration proceedings.

80. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), including INA § 236(c) or INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1231.

81. Petitioner's continued detention is not based on any statutory mandate, any criminal history, or any individualized finding of danger or flight risk, but solely on the government's present political posture.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution Unreasonable Seizure

1. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
2. Except at the border and its functional equivalents, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Respondents from conducting a detained stop to question a person without reasonable suspicion that a person is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment prohibits Respondents from making an arrest without probable cause to believe that a person is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States.
3. Petitioner was detained by Respondents despite lack of probable cause to believe that Petitioner was a flight risk.

COUNT II

Violation of the INA:

Violation of the INA 8 U.S.C. § 1226

1. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
2. Where Respondents have seized and detained a noncitizen whom Respondents have previously released from an initial period of detention pursuant to INA § 1226, Respondents are required by § 1226 to make an individualized determination as to the noncitizen's risk of flight and danger to the community.
3. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended in the interior. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226, unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.
4. Respondents' failure to make individualized determinations regarding Petitioner's possible risk of flight, and possible danger to the community violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

COUNT III
Violation of Due Process

1. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
2. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,

detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

3. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.
4. The government’s detention of Petitioner without meaningful access to bond redetermination to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Issue an immediate order barring the respondents from removing petitioner from the jurisdiction, without notice to the court and approval by the court;
- c. Issue an order to show cause why this petition should not be granted within three (3) days;
- d. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;
- e. Award Petitioner attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 23rd of March, 2026.

//s/ Antonio A. Maturano, III
ANTONIO A. MATURANO
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I, Antonio A. Maturano, III, submit this verification on behalf of the Petitioner as an attorney for Petitioner. I, or immigration counsel, have discussed with Petitioner's family the events described here-in. Based on those discussions, I hereby verify that the statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: March 23, 2026

//s// Antonio A. Maturano, III

Antonio A. Maturano, III
Maturano & Associates
616 Dekalb St., Ste. 1
Norristown, PA 19401
Office: (610) 313-3120
amaturano@maturanolaw.com

JS 44 (Rev. 03/24)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

ABRAHAM IGNACIO PEREIRA VIDAL

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff PHILADELPHIA
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Maturano & Associates
616 Dekalb St., Ste. 1, Norristown, PA 19401 Ph:
6103133120

DEFENDANTSBRIAN MCSHANE, KRISTI NOEM, PAMELA BONDI, US
DHS, EOIR, J.L. JAMISON

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant _____
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

U.S. Attorney for Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff ☐ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☒ 2 U.S. Government Defendant ☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- | | PTF | DEF | | PTF | DEF |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Citizen of This State | ☐ 1 | ☐ 1 | Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State | ☐ 4 | ☐ 4 |
| Citizen of Another State | ☐ 2 | ☐ 2 | Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State | ☐ 5 | ☐ 5 |
| Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country | ☐ 3 | ☐ 3 | Foreign Nation | ☐ 6 | ☐ 6 |

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.](#)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES	
☐ 110 Insurance ☐ 120 Marine ☐ 130 Miller Act ☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument ☐ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment ☐ 151 Medicare Act ☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) ☐ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits ☐ 160 Stockholders' Suits ☐ 190 Other Contract ☐ 195 Contract Product Liability ☐ 196 Franchise	PERSONAL INJURY ☐ 310 Airplane ☐ 315 Airplane Product Liability ☐ 320 Assault, Libel & Slander ☐ 330 Federal Employers' Liability ☐ 340 Marine ☐ 345 Marine Product Liability ☐ 350 Motor Vehicle ☐ 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability ☐ 360 Other Personal Injury ☐ 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice	☐ 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability ☐ 367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability ☐ 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ☐ 370 Other Fraud ☐ 371 Truth in Lending ☐ 380 Other Personal Property Damage ☐ 385 Property Damage Product Liability	☐ 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 ☐ 690 Other LABOR ☐ 710 Fair Labor Standards Act ☐ 720 Labor/Management Relations ☐ 740 Railway Labor Act ☐ 751 Family and Medical Leave Act ☐ 790 Other Labor Litigation ☐ 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act IMMIGRATION ☐ 462 Naturalization Application ☐ 465 Other Immigration Actions	☐ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ☐ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ☐ 820 Copyrights ☐ 830 Patent ☐ 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application ☐ 840 Trademark ☐ 880 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 SOCIAL SECURITY ☐ 861 HIA (1395ff) ☐ 862 Black Lung (923) ☐ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ☐ 864 SSID Title XVI ☐ 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS ☐ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) ☐ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	☐ 375 False Claims Act ☐ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) ☐ 400 State Reapportionment ☐ 410 Antitrust ☐ 430 Banks and Banking ☐ 450 Commerce ☐ 460 Deportation ☐ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ☐ 480 Consumer Credit (15 USC 1681 or 1692) ☐ 485 Telephone Consumer Protection Act ☐ 490 Cable/Sat TV ☐ 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange ☐ 890 Other Statutory Actions ☐ 891 Agricultural Acts ☐ 893 Environmental Matters ☐ 895 Freedom of Information Act ☐ 896 Arbitration ☐ 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision ☐ 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
REAL PROPERTY ☐ 210 Land Condemnation ☐ 220 Foreclosure ☐ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ☐ 240 Torts to Land ☐ 245 Tort Product Liability ☐ 290 All Other Real Property	CIVIL RIGHTS ☐ 440 Other Civil Rights ☐ 441 Voting ☐ 442 Employment ☐ 443 Housing/Accommodations ☐ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment ☐ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other ☐ 448 Education	PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: ☒ 463 Alien Detainee ☐ 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence ☐ 530 General ☐ 535 Death Penalty Other: ☐ 540 Mandamus & Other ☐ 550 Civil Rights ☐ 555 Prison Condition ☐ 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement			

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding ☐ 2 Removed from State Court ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify) ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
28 USC 2241

Brief description of cause:

Alien detained by respondents without due process of law.

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND \$

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: ☐ Yes ☐ No**VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY**

(See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE

03/23/2026

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

/s/ ANTONIO A. MATURANO, III

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

10/2024

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

DESIGNATION FORM

Place of Accident, Incident, or Transaction: PHILADELPHIA, PA

RELATED CASE IF ANY: Case Number: _____ Judge: _____

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Does this case involve property included in an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 2. Does this case involve a transaction or occurrence which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus petition, social security appeal, or pro se case filed by the same individual? | Yes ☐ |
| 5. Is this case related to an earlier numbered suit even though none of the above categories apply?
If yes, attach an explanation. | Yes ☐ |

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the within case ☐ is / ☒ is not related to any pending or previously terminated action in this court.

Civil Litigation Categories

A. Federal Question Cases:

- ☐ 1. Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts)
- ☐ 2. FELA
- ☐ 3. Jones Act-Personal Injury
- ☐ 4. Antitrust
- ☐ 5. Wage and Hour Class Action/Collective Action
- ☐ 6. Patent
- ☐ 7. Copyright/Trademark
- ☐ 8. Employment
- ☐ 9. Labor-Management Relations
- ☒ 10. Civil Rights
- ☐ 11. Habeas Corpus
- ☐ 12. Securities Cases
- ☐ 13. Social Security Review Cases
- ☐ 14. Qui Tam Cases
- ☐ 15. Cases Seeking Systemic Relief *see certification below*
- ☐ 16. All Other Federal Question Cases. (Please specify): _____

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:

- ☐ 1. Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
- ☐ 2. Airplane Personal Injury
- ☐ 3. Assault, Defamation
- ☐ 4. Marine Personal Injury
- ☐ 5. Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
- ☐ 6. Other Personal Injury (Please specify): _____
- ☐ 7. Products Liability
- ☐ 8. All Other Diversity Cases: (Please specify) _____

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the remedy sought in this case ☐ does / ☒ does not have implications beyond the parties before the court and ☐ does / ☒ does not seek to bar or mandate statewide or nationwide enforcement of a state or federal law including a rule, regulation, policy, or order of the executive branch or a state or federal agency, whether by declaratory judgment and/or any form of injunctive relief.

ARBITRATION CERTIFICATION (CHECK ONLY ONE BOX BELOW)

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

☒ Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2(3), this case is not eligible for arbitration either because (1) it seeks relief other than money damages; (2) the money damages sought are in excess of \$150,000 exclusive of interest and costs; (3) it is a social security case, includes a prisoner as a party, or alleges a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, or (4) jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

☐ None of the restrictions in Local Civil Rule 53.2 apply and this case is eligible for arbitration.

NOTE: A trial de novo will be by jury only if there has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT
1	Examples of Redacted Form EOIR-43, Notice of Intent to Appeal Filed following Favorable Bond Order
2	Redacted BIA Decision Overturning Favorable Bond Finding by the Immigration Judge
3	Affidavit of Former Immigration Judge Burman

Uploaded on: 01/12/2026 at 05:02:01 PM (Eastern Standard Time) Base City: ELZ

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

**Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination**

Date: 1/12/2026

Alien Number: [REDACTED]

Alien Name: [REDACTED]

1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has:

☒ a. Held the respondent without bond.

☐ b. Set the respondent's bond at \$ _____.

2. The Immigration Judge on _____ (Date)

☐ a. Authorized the respondent's release.

☒ b. Redetermined the ICE bond to \$ 5,000.00.

3. Filing this form on 1/12/2026 (Date) automatically stays the Immigration Judge's custody redetermination decision. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(i)(2).

4. The stay shall lapse if ICE does not file a notice of appeal along with appropriate certification within ten business days of the issuance of the order of the Immigration Judge, or upon ICE's withdrawal of this notice, or as set forth in 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(4) and (5).
See 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(1).

[REDACTED]
ICE Counsel

I, [REDACTED], served the Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination on _____ (Name)

Alexis Price- VIA ECAS, on 1/12/26
(Respondent or Respondent's Representative) (Date)

[REDACTED]
Signature



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ELIZABETH IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:

[REDACTED]

A-Number:

[REDACTED]

To:

Price, Alexis M
616 Dekalb St.
Suite 1
Norristown, PA 19401

Riders:

In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:

01/12/2026

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☐ Denied, because


☒ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:

☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.

☒ released from custody under bond of \$ 5,000.00

☐ other:

☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: MULLICAN, LEILA 01/12/2026

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☐ waived ☒ reserved
Respondent: ☒ waived ☐ reserved
Appeal Due: 02/11/2026

Certificate of Service

This document was served:

Via: [M] Mail | [P] Personal Service | [E] Electronic Service | [U] Address Unavailable

To: [] Alien | [] Alien c/o custodial officer | [E] Alien atty/rep. | [E] DHS

Respondent Name : NUNEZ-AQUINO, JOSE | A-Number : 221-487-800

Riders:

Date: 01/13/2026 By: VITALI, PATRICIA, Court Staff

Uploaded on: 01/12/2026 at 04:58:00 PM (Eastern Standard Time) Base City: ELZ

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

**Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination**

Date: 1/12/2026

Alien Number: [REDACTED]

Alien Name: [REDACTED]

1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has:

☒ a. Held the respondent without bond.

☐ b. Set the respondent's bond at \$ _____.

2. The Immigration Judge on _____ (Date)

☐ a. Authorized the respondent's release.

☒ b. Redetermined the ICE bond to \$ 3,000.00.

3. Filing this form on 1/12/2026 (Date) automatically stays the
Immigration Judge's custody redetermination decision. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(i)(2).

4. The stay shall lapse if ICE does not file a notice of appeal along with appropriate certification within ten business days of the issuance of the order of the Immigration Judge, or upon ICE's withdrawal of this notice, or as set forth in 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(4) and (5).
See 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(1).

[REDACTED]
ICE Counsel

I, [REDACTED], served the Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination on
(Name)

Alexis PRICE- VIA ECAS, on 1/12/26
(Respondent or Respondent's Representative) (Date)

[REDACTED]
Signature



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ELIZABETH IMMIGRATION COURT**

Respondent Name:

[REDACTED]

To:

Price, Alexis M
616 Dekalb St.
Suite 1
Norristown, PA 19401

A-Number:

[REDACTED]

Riders:

In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:

01/12/2026

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☐ Denied, because

☒ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:

☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.

☒ released from custody under bond of \$ 3,000.00

☐ other:

☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: MULLICAN, LEILA 01/12/2026

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☐ waived ☒ reserved
Respondent: ☒ waived ☐ reserved

Appeal Due: 02/11/2026

Certificate of Service

This document was served:

Via: [M] Mail | [P] Personal Service | [E] Electronic Service | [U] Address Unavailable

To: [] Alien | [] Alien c/o custodial officer | [E] Alien atty/rep. | [E] DHS

Respondent Name : [REDACTED] | A-Number : [REDACTED]

Riders:

Date: 01/12/2026 By: VITALI, PATRICIA, Court Staff

Uploaded on: 07/31/2025 at 04:51:22 PM (Eastern Daylight Time) Base City: ELZ

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

**Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination**

Date: July 31, 2025

Alien Number: [REDACTED]

Alien Name: [REDACTED]

1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has:

☒ a. Held the respondent without bond.

☐ b. Set the respondent's bond at \$ _____.

2. The Immigration Judge on July 31, 2025

(Date)

☐ a. Authorized the respondent's release.

☒ b. Redetermined the ICE bond to \$ 5,000.

3. Filing this form on July 31, 2025

(Date)

automatically stays the

Immigration Judge's custody redetermination decision. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(i)(2).

4. The stay shall lapse if ICE does not file a notice of appeal along with appropriate certification within ten business days of the issuance of the order of the Immigration Judge, or upon ICE's withdrawal of this notice, or as set forth in 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(4) and (5).

See 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(1).

[REDACTED]
ICE Counsel

I, [REDACTED], served the Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination on
(Name)

Alexis Price, Esq., on July 31, 2025,
(Respondent or Respondent's Representative) (Date)

[REDACTED]
Signature



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ELIZABETH IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:

[REDACTED]

To:

Price, Alexis M
616 Dekalb St.
Suite 1
Norristown, PA 19401

A-Number:

[REDACTED]

Riders:

In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:

07/31/2025

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☐ Denied, because


☒ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:

☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.

☒ released from custody under bond of \$ 5,000.00

☐ other:

☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: PANOPOULOS, ADAM 07/31/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☐ waived ☒ reserved
Respondent: ☒ waived ☐ reserved
Appeal Due: 09/02/2025

Certificate of Service

This document was served:

Via: [M] Mail | [P] Personal Service | [E] Electronic Service | [U] Address Unavailable

To: [] Noncitizen | [] Noncitizen c/o custodial officer | [E] Noncitizen's atty/rep. | [E] DHS

Respondent Name : [REDACTED] A-Number : [REDACTED]

Riders:

Date: 08/01/2025 By: ARANGO, HAROLD, Court Staff

Uploaded on: 07/30/2025 at 06:44:33 PM (Eastern Daylight Time) Base City: ELZ

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination

Date: July 30, 2025

Alien Number: [REDACTED]

Alien Name: [REDACTED]

1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has:

- ☒ a. Held the respondent without bond.
☐ b. Set the respondent's bond at \$ _____.

2. The Immigration Judge on July 30, 2025
(Date)

- ☐ a. Authorized the respondent's release.
☒ b. Redetermined the ICE bond to \$ 12,000.

3. Filing this form on July 30, 2025
(Date) automatically stays the
Immigration Judge's custody redetermination decision. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(i)(2).

4. The stay shall lapse if ICE does not file a notice of appeal along with appropriate certification within ten business days of the issuance of the order of the Immigration Judge, or upon ICE's withdrawal of this notice, or as set forth in 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(4) and (5).
See 8 C.F.R. §1003.6(c)(1).

[REDACTED]
ICE Counsel

I, [REDACTED], served the Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination on
(Name)

[REDACTED], on July 30, 2025.
(Respondent or Respondent's Representative) (Date)

[REDACTED]
Signature



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
ELIZABETH IMMIGRATION COURT**

Respondent Name:

[REDACTED]

To:

Maturano, Antonio Alberto
616 Dekalb Street
Norristown, PA 19401

A-Number:

[REDACTED]

Riders:

In Custody Redetermination Proceedings

Date:

07/30/2025

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The respondent requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. After full consideration of the evidence presented, the respondent's request for a change in custody status is hereby ordered:

☐ Denied, because

☒ Granted. It is ordered that Respondent be:

- ☐ released from custody on his own recognizance.
- ☒ released from custody under bond of \$ 12,000.00
- ☐ other:

☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: BAILEY, RICHARD 07/30/2025

Appeal: Department of Homeland Security: ☐ waived ☒ reserved
Respondent: ☒ waived ☐ reserved

Appeal Due: 08/29/2025

Certificate of Service

This document was served:

Via: [M] Mail | [P] Personal Service | [E] Electronic Service | [U] Address Unavailable

To: [] Noncitizen | [] Noncitizen c/o custodial officer | [E] Noncitizen's atty/rep. | [E] DHS

Respondent Name : [REDACTED] | A-Number : [REDACTED]

Riders:

Date: 07/30/2025 By: VITALI, PATRICIA, Court Staff



U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

Office of the Clerk

5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 22041



[REDACTED]
616 Dekalb St. Suite 1
Norristown PA 19401

DHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - ELZ
625 Evans Street, Room 135
Elizabeth NJ 07201

Name: [REDACTED] A [REDACTED]-682

Date of this Notice: 10/31/2025

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Seiler".

John Seiler
Acting Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Userteam: Docket

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

MATTER OF:

[REDACTED]

Respondent

FILED

Oct 31, 2025

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Alexis M. Price, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF DHS: John D. Staples, Assistant Chief Counsel

IN BOND PROCEEDINGS

On Appeal from a Decision of the Immigration Court, Elizabeth, NJ

Before: Gemoets, Appellate Immigration Judge

GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judge

The respondent is a native and citizen of [REDACTED]. The Department of Homeland Security appeals from the Immigration Judge's July 30, 2025, bond order granting the respondent a \$12,000 bond. On August 15, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued a bond memorandum memorializing his decision. The respondent opposes the appeal. The appeal will be sustained, and the Immigration Judge's order will be vacated.

We review the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). We review all other issues, including issues of law, discretion, or judgment, under the de novo standard. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

In intervening precedent, we held that, pursuant to section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 225 (BIA 2025). We find no error in the Immigration Judge's finding that the respondent is present in the United States without admission (IJ Bond Mem. at 1; Exh. B2 at 1). On this record, the Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent's motion for a bond because he is an applicant for admission and therefore subject to mandatory detention.

We disagree with the respondent's argument that *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* cannot be retroactively applied to his case because it was issued after the Immigration Judge's bond order (Respondent's Br. at 7-10). The application of our interpretation of the INA's detention statutes in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* "is not subject to retroactivity concerns because an alien's eligibility (or continued eligibility) for release on bond should be considered a form of prospective relief in the context of" *Landgraf v. USI Film Products*, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). *Matter of Valdez*,

21 I&N Dec. 703, 710 (BIA 1997). The INA “does not give detained aliens any *right* to release on bond.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 575 (BIA 2003) (citing *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952)). As such, application of *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* to the respondent does not “impair rights [he] possessed when he acted, increase [his] liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” *Matter of Valdez*, 21 I&N Dec. at 709-10 (quoting *Landgraf*, 511 U.S. at 280). The respondent’s inability to seek release on bond before an Immigration Judge does not have any effect on the immigration consequences of his unlawful entry into the United States, such as whether he is removable from the United States or eligible for relief from removal. It “at most creates a practical disadvantage, not an impairment of protected rights.” *Id.* at 711.

Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s July 30, 2025, custody order is vacated, and the respondent is ordered detained without bond.

AFFIDAVIT OF LAWRENCE O. BURMAN

I, Lawrence O. Burman, swear under penalty of perjury, that the following information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief:

Experience

1. I am over 18 years of age, and a citizen of the United States.
2. I was admitted to the Maryland Bar in November 1978 and have maintained active status since that time.
3. I was employed by the United States Department of Justice from September 1988 until my retirement on December 31, 2025.
4. I served as an Immigration Judge from my appointment in April 1998 until my retirement.
5. Before that, I worked as an assistant district counsel for the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Baltimore, Maryland, from 1991 to 1998 – a role now absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security.
6. Prior to that, from 1990 to 1991, I served as assistant general counsel at INS Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
7. From 1988 to 1990, I worked as a general attorney for INS in Baltimore.

Experience as an Immigration Judge

8. During my 27 years as an Immigration Judge, I presided over both detained and non-detained dockets in Memphis TN and Northern Virginia. I also heard detained cases on detail to detention facilities in Texas, California, New Mexico, Louisiana and Pennsylvania. I was assigned to the Annandale VA detained docket most recently in December 2025 for a short period to cover judges who were on leave.
9. While presiding over the detained docket, I adjudicated requests for custody redetermination (also known as bond hearings). In making these adjudications, I considered whether the alien was a flight risk or a danger to the community.
10. I have been asked to prepare this affidavit to explain my decades of experience as an Immigration Judge regarding the application of “flight risk” when denying a bond, as well as my professional observations regarding recent adjudicatory patterns and their potential implications.
11. Over my time on the bench, I found that concerns about flight risk were usually addressed by setting an appropriate bond amount. It was rare for a bond to be denied solely based on flight risk; more often, a higher bond amount was imposed to ensure the individual’s appearance at future hearings.
12. In my experience, bond was not denied solely due to a person’s manner of entry into the United States or because they had not yet applied for relief before being encountered by immigration officials. Such factors were never the main reason for denial, and generally not considered at all.

13. It was also extremely rare to see a bond denial based on flight risk where the alien had a fixed address, a job, a proposed application for relief, or family ties to the United States.
14. In my experience, bonds in excess of \$15,000 were relatively uncommon on the dockets on which I served. This is largely because a person's ability to pay a bond should be considered when adjudicating a bond request, and because immigration delivery bonds generally require payment of the full amount to post.
15. Earlier in my tenure, judges typically maintained a regular detained docket. In the last decade, the Immigration Court in Annandale, Virginia, assigned certain judges to detained matters on a full-time basis, while others would substitute when needed.
16. Since around 2017, Immigration Judges Raphael Choi and Karen Donoso-Stevens had been assigned to the detained dockets. IJ Choi was previously the Chief Counsel of the Office of Principal Legal Advisor for Arlington, Virginia, and IJ Donoso-Stevens was a senior attorney for the detained docket for the Office of Principal Legal Advisor for Arlington, Virginia
17. I recently learned that both IJ Choi and IJ Donoso-Stevens were abruptly removed from the detained docket in January 2026, in the middle of their morning dockets, and were replaced by newly-appointed judges.

Concerns about the Immigration Court System

18. Since January 2025, I have observed a troubling trend of Immigration Judges being terminated without explanation or notice. In all my years on the bench, I have never witnessed such a high level of turnover.
19. From conversations within the immigration bench and professional organizations, including the National Association of Immigration Judges (of which I was an officer), it is clear that judges were removed for their strong commitment to due process for those appearing before them.
20. Although immigration judges are expected to act as neutral adjudicators, I have noticed increasing concern among members of the bench about institutional intimidation and the perception that decisions unfavorable to the government could negatively affect judicial tenure.
21. I am concerned that the notable rise in bond denials and adverse case outcomes undermines due process and erodes confidence in the Immigration Court system.

Signed this 14th day of February 2026 in the County of Arlington, Commonwealth of Virginia.

February 14, 2026



Lawrence O. Burman