

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION**

ENRIQUE DOMINGO RAFAEL
RAYMUNDO,
A# 

Petitioner,

v.

JASON STREEVAL, Warden of Stewart
Detention Center,
LADEON FRANCIS, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, Atlanta
Field Office;
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as
Acting director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; and
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General.

Respondents.

Civile Action No.:

INTRODUCTION


1. This case challenges the unlawful arrest and mandatory immigration detention of 18-year-old Enrique Domingo Rafael Raymundo (“Petitioner” or “Enrique Domingo”), who has no criminal history and who came to the United States as an unaccompanied child at the age of 16, on or about November 28, 2023.

2. After Enrique Domingo presented himself to an immigration official at the border, the government issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) dated November 28, 2023. The November 28, 2023 NTA was not filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and removal proceedings were not initiated. **(Exhibit A, 11/28/2023 NTA)**

3. Enrique Domingo was briefly detained in a government-run humanitarian shelter for children. He was eventually released into the care of It them released him to the care of his maternal aunt in Georgia, after finding that he was not dangerous or a flight risk. Now, Enrique Domingo has Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), a humanitarian immigration protection for young people who have suffered parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, created by Congress to give these children the opportunity to remain safely and permanently in the United States. It is expected that Enrique Domingo will be able to apply for adjustment of status in about three years.

4. Despite Enrique Domingo’s prior release from immigration custody and his approved SIJS petition, Respondents arrested Enrique Domingo without a warrant on or about February 22, 2026, while coming home from church. Enrique Domingo was not arrested by the police and was not in the commission of a crime. He was simply returning to his home from church. Since then, he has been detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, deprived of his liberty and separated from his family. A new NTA was issued on or about February 22, 2026, and removal proceedings against Enrique Domingo were initiated. (**Exhibit B, 11/28/2023 NTA**)

5. Enrique Domingo’s detention is unlawful for at least four reasons.

6. First, due process requires that the government show, in a pre-deprivation hearing, materially changed circumstances before re-detaining Enrique Domingo. When the government released Enrique Domingo from its custody at a humanitarian shelter years ago, it determined that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. Since then, nothing has changed to undermine that determination. On the contrary, support for that determination has only strengthened: Enrique Domingo has built deep ties to the United States, is actively enrolled at  and now has a path to lawful permanent residence. And Enrique Domingo

has never been arrested or convicted of a crime. As courts in this District have held in multiple similar cases, Enrique Domingo's detention without any pre-deprivation process violates his procedural due process rights and this alone warrants his immediate release.

7. Second, the government has no legitimate interest in detaining Enrique Domingo when he is neither a flight risk nor a danger—the only two constitutionally permissible reasons for immigration detention. Accordingly, his detention also violates his substantive due process rights, equally requiring his immediate release.

8. Third, Enrique Domingo was arrested without changed circumstances, without a warrant, and without probable cause that he was a flight risk, under unlawful enforcement procedures that multiple courts around the country have declared illegal. Since then, there has been no determination that any probable cause exists to justify Enrique Domingo's detention. This violates Enrique Domingo's Fourth Amendment rights, as well as statute and regulation, similarly mandating his release.

1. Fourth, the government's claim that Enrique Domingo is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is untenable in light of the fact that he entered the United States without inspection, was previously detained and released from detention as an unaccompanied child—under an entirely separate statutory scheme—and has since lived in the United States for over three years and been granted SIJS. Courts throughout the United States have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents' expansive interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis*, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (tallying more than 350 cases reaching the same conclusion, and only 12 going the other way); *Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz*, No. 25-cv-12664, 2025 WL 3687757 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025) (granting summary judgment and extending declaratory


relief to Massachusetts-based class of noncitizens wrongly subject to mandatory detention under the government's recent interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A)); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 25-cv-0187, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (similar, extending declaratory relief to nationwide class); In *J.A.M. v. Streeval et al*, No. 4:25-cv-342 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025), this court rejected the government's *Yajure* theory and held that § 1226(a) governs interior arrests charged into § 240, not § 1225(b)(2). The court concluded that "aliens who are found in the country unlawfully and are arrested, an immigration officer or immigration judge has the discretion, after considering all the circumstances, not to detain such aliens and instead grant them release on bond" subject to exceptions for mandatory detainees delineated in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). *Id.* at 10. The court found *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* "unpersuasive," aligned with the already large and still growing district-court consensus, and concluded the petitioner is entitled to discretionary bond under § 1226(a). This renders Enrique Domingo's current detention unlawful from its inception, in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and his due process rights.

9. For these reasons, Enrique Domingo respectfully asks this Court to hold his arrest and detention unlawful, order restoration of the status quo prior to his detention, *i.e.* release without restraints on his liberty, and enjoin Respondents from re-detaining him without meaningful pre-detention process.

10. Enrique Domingo also respectfully asks that this Court enjoin Respondents from transferring him outside of this District for the duration of this proceeding.

PARTIES

11. Petitioner Enrique Domingo is an 18-year-old Guatemalan national who entered the United States as an unaccompanied child and has been residing here since the age of 16. Prior

to his arrest and detention, Enrique Domingo was living with his maternal aunt in Canton, Georgia and attending  as a full-time student. Enrique Domingo has an approved SIJS petition.

12. Respondent JASON STREEVAL is employed by The GEO Group, Inc. as Warden of the Stewart Detention Center, where Petitioner is detained. Respondent JASON STREEVAL has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. Respondent JASON STREEVAL is sued in his official capacity.

13. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Director of the Atlanta Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Ladeon Francis is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

14. Respondent Ladeon Francis is sued in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Atlanta Field Office, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), which oversees ICE's operations in Georgia. Respondent Ladeon Francis is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

15. Respondent Todd Lyons is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE. As the Acting Director of ICE, Respondent Lyons is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

16. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security. As the head of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the agency tasked with enforcing immigration laws, Secretary Noem is Petitioner's ultimate legal custodian.

17. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States. As Attorney General, Respondent Bondi oversees the immigration court system, including the immigration judges who conduct removal proceedings and bond hearings as her

designees, and is responsible for the administration of immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g). She is legally responsible for administering Petitioner's removal and bond proceedings, and as such, she is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18. This Court has jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require.”).

19. The Court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act); and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus).

20. This Court has additional remedial authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (the Declaratory Judgment Act), to grant injunctive and declaratory relief.

21. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred in this District. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) because Enrique Domingo is detained at a facility within this District.

22. Administrative exhaustion is unnecessary because it would be futile: it is Respondents' position that noncitizens in Enrique Domingo's situation are subject to mandatory detention without access to a bond hearing, so he has no meaningful administrative remedies to exhaust.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. The TVPRA Governs the Detention and Release of Unaccompanied Children

23. Because noncitizen youth who come to the United States without a parent are especially vulnerable, Congress granted them special protections through the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1232. An unaccompanied child is a child who (A) lacks lawful immigration status in the United States; (B) is under the age of 18; and (C) has no parent or legal guardian in the United States, or no such parent or legal guardian is available to provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).

24. Through the TVPRA, Congress amended the INA to guarantee unaccompanied children access to removal proceedings before an immigration judge, protecting them from expedited removal by an immigration officer without a hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D). Therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a is the only process for determining whether an unaccompanied child can stay in the United States or be removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).

25. The TVPRA requires the Department of Health and Human Services, through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), to manage the care and custody of unaccompanied children. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2). The statute requires ORR to place unaccompanied children “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). Before releasing an unaccompanied child from its custody, the government must “consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight.” *Id.*; *see also* 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(2)(A). ORR may release the unaccompanied child to a “sponsor” who already lives in the United States, so long as these and other criteria are satisfied. *Id.*; *see also* 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201.

B. SIJS Provides a Pathway to Permanent Status for Other Vulnerable Young People

26. Separate and apart from unaccompanied children, in 1990, Congress created SIJS to protect another category of vulnerable immigrant children and provide them a pathway to citizenship. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)

(amending various sections of the INA). SIJS “alleviates hardships experienced by some dependents of United States juvenile courts by providing qualified [noncitizens] with the opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, with [the] possibility of becoming citizens of the United States in the future.” Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 43844 (Aug. 12, 1993). Since 1990, Congress has amended the INA multiple times to expand the protections of SIJS, most recently in 2008, through the TVPRA, Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).

27. To be granted SIJS, youths must first “satisf[y] a set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria.” *Osorio-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.*, 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 2018). Specifically, to be eligible for SIJS, a noncitizen youth must be present in the United States and obtain judicial determinations in a state juvenile court order that they are dependent on the juvenile court or placed by the court under the custody of a state agency or an individual; cannot be reunified with one or both parents because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other similar basis; and that it is not in their best interest to return to their country of origin. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c).

28. The application process for SIJS includes submitting a Form I-360 SIJS Petition to USCIS, along with the state juvenile court order and other evidence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b). USCIS then considers whether to exercise its statutory “consent function” to approve the petition. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii). By doing so, the agency recognizes the state juvenile court’s determinations, including that the child’s return to their country of origin would be contrary to their best interests. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).

29. The main benefit of SIJS—and indeed, its core purpose—is that it confers on vulnerable young people the right to seek lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status, while

remaining in the United States, through a process called adjustment of status. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). To facilitate this process, Congress has removed numerous barriers to adjustment of status for SIJS beneficiaries. Typically, a noncitizen seeking to adjust to LPR status in the United States must show they are admissible under immigration law and have entered the country with inspection or parole by an immigration officer. But Congress exempted SIJS youth from many inadmissibility grounds, made them eligible for adjustment regardless of their actual manner of entry into the United States, and created a generous waiver of other non-exempted inadmissibility grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). Congress also explicitly provided that certain grounds for removal “shall not apply” to SIJS beneficiaries. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(c). Accordingly, the SIJS statute “show[s] a congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused children to remain safely in the country with a means to apply for LPR status.” *Garcia v. Holder*, 659 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other grounds).

30. Although SIJS renders youth eligible to apply for adjustment to LPR status, they can only do so when a visa is immediately available to them. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). However, there is an annual limit on visas available to SIJS beneficiaries. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4). And since 2016, the number of SIJS beneficiaries has surpassed the supply of available visas for most countries, leaving what has been estimated to be more than 100,000 young people in a SIJS backlog, waiting to apply for a green card.¹

31. Nonetheless, the government takes the position that SIJS youth in the visa backlog remain subject to removal for their purported lack of lawful immigration status in the United States while they wait for the ability to apply for LPR status. So, in March 2022, to address the harms being caused by the SIJS visa backlog, USCIS announced that all young people granted SIJS

¹ *See* R. Davidson et al., *False Hopes: Over 100,000 Immigrant Youth Trapped in the SIJS Backlog* (2023), <https://perma.cc/J75S-4DRR>.

would also be considered for a discretionary grant of deferred action, meaning that they would be protected from deportation and eligible for work authorization while waiting for a visa to become available. In enacting this policy, USCIS acknowledged that “Congress likely did not envision that SIJ petitioners would have to wait years before a visa became available. . . .”²

32. In the case of SIJS recipients awaiting visas, USCIS grants deferred action for a renewable period of four years. 2022 USCIS Policy Alert at 2. Individuals granted deferred action are also eligible to apply for employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). *Id.*³

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Enrique Domingo is detained and released because he is not dangerous or a flight risk

33. Enrique Domingo is a Guatemalan youth who came to the United States for safety when he was 16 years old, on or about November 28, 2023, after he was forced to drop out of school at age 14 and work odd jobs to supplement the family income. Enrique Domingo’s father was abusive toward Enrique Domingo’s mother before absconding in 2007. Enrique Domingo does not know his father well and was abandoned by him. Enrique Domingo’s mother neglected Enrique Domingo by failing to provide adequate food, medical care, schooling, and financial support.

34. DHS determined that Enrique Domingo was an unaccompanied child under 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). It then transferred him to ORR custody, as mandated by the TVPRA. ORR subsequently determined that Enrique Domingo should be released to his maternal aunt under a sponsor care agreement, finding that he did not present a flight risk or a danger to the community.

² USCIS Policy Alert, PA-2022-10, “Special Immigrant Juvenile Classification and Deferred Action” (March 7, 2022), <https://perma.cc/8CTL-QAQY> (“2022 USCIS Policy Alert”).

³ In November 2025, a federal court stayed the government’s decision to rescind the SIJS deferred action policy, thus restoring the 2022 policy during the litigation’s pendency. *A.C.R. v. Noem*, No. 25-CV-3962, 2025 WL 3228840 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025). The government’s unlawful attempt to rescind the program had no impact on SIJS beneficiaries, like NAME, who had already received deferred action.

Enrique Domingo obtains SIJS and his removal proceedings are terminated

35. On November 28, 2023, DHS also issued Enrique Domingo a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), the charging document that initiates removal proceedings, which charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present without being admitted or paroled. However, DHS never filed the November 28, 2023 NTA with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and removal proceedings were not initiated. **(Exhibit A, 11/28/2023 NTA)**

36. Enrique Domingo applied for SIJS. First, on May 27, 2025, the Probate Court of Dekalb County, Alabama issued a Special Findings Order finding that Enrique Domingo had been abandoned by his father and neglected by his mother, and that it was in his best interests to remain in the United States. The court also appointed Enrique Domingo maternal aunt as his legal guardian. Enrique Domingo then submitted a SIJS petition to USCIS on July 23, 2025, supported by his Special Findings Order from the Probate Court of Dekalb County.

37. USCIS approved Enrique Domingo’s SIJS petition on March 4, 2026. **(Exhibit C, I-360 Approval Notice).**

38. According to the USCIS March 2026 Visa Bulletin, there are currently sufficient visas available for people who filed for SIJS on or before July 15, 2021 to immediately apply for LPR status.⁴ Enrique Domingo’s I-360 filing date (also called a priority date) is July 23, 2025 **(Exhibit C, I-360 Approval Notice)**. According to the April 2026 Visa Bulletin, individuals with I-360 priority dates of July 15, 2022 will be eligible to adjust status.⁵ At this rate, Petitioner will be eligible to adjust to LPR status in the foreseeable future.

⁴ Department of State, Visa Bulletin for March 2026, [<https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2026/visa-bulletin-for-march-2026.html>] (SIJS is included under the employment-based visa category, 4th).

⁵ Department of State, Visa Bulletin for April 2026, [<https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2026/visa-bulletin-for-march-2026.html>] (SIJS is included under the employment-based visa category, 4th).

Enrique Domingo is arrested without changed circumstances and purportedly held in mandatory detention

39. Enrique Domingo is a high school senior attending [REDACTED] He lives at his maternal aunt's house with his cousins and regularly goes to church. He has no criminal history and is a well-regarded member of his community.

40. On February 22, 2026, Respondents arrested Enrique Domingo without any notice or warning while Enrique Domingo was returning from church. Upon information and belief, the immigration officers had no warrant for Enrique Domingo's arrest. Enrique Domingo was not accused of violating any vehicle and traffic law. He had no prior arrests. He had a stable address, was a full-time high school student, and a path to permanent status. He did not run or try to evade the officers. Nonetheless, they arrested him without a warrant and transferred him to the Stewart Detention Center.

41. On February 22, 2026, DHS initiated new removal proceedings by filing a charging document with the Stewart Immigration Court. Enrique Domingo has now been detained for nearly a month and is being held hundreds of miles from his family.

42. Enrique Domingo's detention has been very difficult for both him and his extended family. His cousins miss him, his aunt is worried about him, and his peers are scared that immigration is abducting individuals off the streets.

CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CLAIM

**Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Substantive Due Process**

43. Enrique Domingo repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

44. The Supreme Court has long recognized that noncitizens physically present in the United States are entitled to due process protections, regardless of their immigration status. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). And “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

45. Because “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception,” the government may imprison people as a preventive measure only within strict limits. *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).

46. Immigration detention is civil detention and must “bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed” so that it remains “nonpunitive in purpose and effect.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified); *see also Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 264-69 (1984) (finding detention must be a proportional—not excessive—response to a legitimate state objective).

47. Courts have identified only two legitimate purposes for immigration detention: mitigating flight risk pending removal and preventing danger to the community. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690-91.

48. To satisfy substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, a noncitizen’s detention must be tied to flight risk or a danger to the community. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

49. Neither purpose is served by Enrique Domingo's detention. Respondents have not made any claim that Enrique Domingo presents a flight risk or a danger to the community, nor could they. When Enrique Domingo was previously released from ORR custody in 2023, the government came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Then, it decided that Enrique Domingo did not even need to be in removal proceedings at all. Enrique Domingo's November 28, 2023 NTA was never filed with EOIR—yet another indication that it did not believe him to present any risk of flight or danger.

50. Since then, Enrique Domingo's ties to this country have only grown stronger. He has not only built his entire life here, but he has been granted SIJS, which gives him a path to citizenship and safe and meaningful future. *See Osorio*, 893 F. 3d at 173-75. And he remains without any criminal record.

51. Because the government is not detaining Enrique Domingo to serve legitimate interests in protecting against danger or flight risk, his detention violates substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, and this Court should order his immediate release.

SECOND CLAIM

Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US. Constitution Procedural Due Process

52. Enrique Domingo repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

53. Even “[w]hen government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.” *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 746.

54. Courts use the three-factor *Mathews v. Eldridge* test to determine what process is due to noncitizens challenging detention. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The

Mathews factors assess: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” *Id.* at 335.

55. The first *Mathews* factor weighs heavily in Enrique Domingo favor. Enrique Domingo has a strong liberty interest in light of (1) his prior release as an unaccompanied child and (2) his valid grant of SIJS. First, because he was previously released from custody as an unaccompanied child and not even subject to government monitoring, Enrique Domingo possessed a weighty interest in his continued liberty. Second, to be approved for SIJS, Enrique Domingo had to meet stringent eligibility criteria and he was promised that, in return, he would be given a meaningful path to LPR status in this country. That came with the expectation that he could build a life here without risking arbitrary arrest, detention, and removal that would strip him of the very permanency Congress created SIJS to provide vulnerable youth like him. *See Rodriguez v. Perry*, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911 (E.D. Va. 2024); *Sarmiento v. Perry*, No. 25-CV-01644, 2025 WL 3091140, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2025); *Campos-Flores v. Bondi*, No. 25-cv-797, 2025 WL 3461551, at *6 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2025). And this is precisely what Enrique Domingo did, building a home with his maternal aunt, with whom a juvenile court found it to be in his best interests to remain; attending school and church; contributing to her/his/their community; and making plans for the future.

56. The second *Mathews* factor also weighs in Enrique Domingo favor. Enrique Domingo was previously released from detention after being found that he is neither a danger nor a flight risk, and his re-detention, without prior notice, a showing of changed circumstances, or a

meaningful opportunity to respond, make the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty not just high, but certain. His detention is the direct result of insufficient safeguards and lack of procedure. Under these circumstances, the risk of erroneous deprivation of his liberty is high and the second factor weighs heavily in Enrique Domingo's favor.

57. The third factor favors Enrique Domingo, as well. Enrique Domingo's erroneous detention imposes high fiscal and administrative burdens on Respondents. Releasing Enrique Domingo and requiring the government to provide a pre-deprivation hearing before re-detaining him stands to save the government money and effort wasted on erroneous detention. And unlawful detention and violation of noncitizens' constitutional rights disserve the public interest.

58. Respondents violated procedural due process by re-detaining Enrique Domingo without adequate procedural protections before or after deprivation of his liberty. Therefore, this Court should order Enrique Domingo's release without any restraints on his liberty and prohibit any re-detention absent pre-deprivation process.

THIRD CLAIM

Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), and 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) Unlawful Arrest

59. Enrique Domingo repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

60. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Immigration arrests and detentions are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984) (acknowledging that deportation proceedings are civil, but the Fourth Amendment still applies to the "seizure" of the person).

61. As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment requires that all arrests entail a neutral, judicial determination of probable cause. *See Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). “Probable cause requires a ‘substantial probability; based on facts related to the individual.’” *Ramirez Ovando v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-03183-RBJ, 2025 WL 3293467, at *15 (D. Colo. Nov. 25, 2025) (quoting *Storey v. Taylor*, 696 F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding probable cause for immigration arrests lacking). That determination can occur either before the arrest, in the form of a warrant, or promptly afterward, in the form of a prompt judicial probable cause determination. *See id.* It must, however, occur within 48 hours of detention, which includes weekends, unless there is a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. *See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).

62. There is a strong preference that immigration arrests be based on warrants. *See Arizona v. U.S.*, 567 U.S. 387, 407–08 (2012). The INA thus provides immigration agents with only limited authority to conduct warrantless arrests. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Specifically, an officer must have probable cause to believe the person is violating the immigration laws *and* that the person “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained,” *i.e.*, is a flight risk *Id.*; *see also Ramirez Ovando*, 2025 WL 3293467, at *2. Federal regulations track the strict limitations on warrantless arrests. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii).

63. Enrique Domingo’s warrantless arrest occurred without probable cause that he was a flight risk. “Courts have ... made the self-evident finding that the likelihood of escape is lower when the individual has resided in the country for a lengthy period of time and has strong community ties.” *Escobar Molina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. CV 25-3417 (BAH), 2025 WL 3465518, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2025) (collecting cases). At the moment of his seizure, Enrique Domingo (a) had valid SIJS and deferred action, which provided him a path to LPR status,

(b) was living at a stable home address, of which the government was fully aware, and (c) had been in the United States for 3 years and built strong ties to his community. Moreover, Enrique Domingo fully complied with the ICE officers and in no way tried to disobey or flee. Therefore, no officer could have probable cause that Enrique Domingo was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained.

64. Without a statutory basis to arrest, Respondents were required under the Fourth Amendment to secure a prompt judicial probable cause determination to continue holding Enrique Domingo. *Gerstein*, 420 U.S. at 114; *McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. at 56–57. He received no such judicial determination, yet his detention continued well beyond 48 hours, rendering it presumptively unconstitutional.

65. Regulations also provide that noncitizen arrested without a warrant must receive a custody determination within 48 hours of the arrest, unless there is “an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” that requires “an additional reasonable period of time” to make the custody determination. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). During that custody determination, the immigration officer must make findings as to whether “release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). Similarly, upon information and belief, Enrique Domingo has received no such custody determination.

66. Enrique Domingo’s re-detention after a prior release, without any new showing of probable cause, was also unconstitutional. When the government releases a person from detention, the purpose of their detention has been accomplished. *See Williams v. Dart*, 967 F.3d 625, 634 (7th Cir. 2020) (“It is axiomatic that seizures have purposes. When those purposes are spent,

further seizure is unreasonable.”). As a result, any probable cause justifying the prior arrest, if any, is extinguished.

67. Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, the government cannot re-arrest someone without changed circumstances that amount to new probable cause. *See Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 546-47 (1952) (holding that re-arrest for immigration detention required a new warrant after previous release from immigration detention on bail).

68. Respondents’ warrantless re-arrest of Enrique Domingo without changed circumstances, and their refusal to provide a prompt (or any) probable cause determination, violated the Fourth Amendment, the INA, and implementing regulations. Thus, this Court should order his release. .

FOURTH CLAIM

Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Procedural Due Process

69. Enrique Domingo repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.

70. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for most noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Individuals detained under Section 1226(a) are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). However, noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

71. Second, the INA provides for brief mandatory detention of noncitizens with final orders of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

72. Third, the INA also provides for mandatory detention of two groups of noncitizens encountered “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288. The first group consists, generally, of those who are subject to expedited removal for being apprehended upon arrival near the border or for being unable to show that they have been physically present in the United States for more than two years until a determination has been made as to whether they have a credible fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Notably, unaccompanied children are not subject to expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5).

73. The second group subject to mandatory detention consists of anyone alleged to be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and whom an “examining immigration officer determines . . . is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

74. Respondents claim that Enrique Domingo is mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). But this statute does not apply to Enrique Domingo, who was previously released from custody as an unaccompanied child, has resided in this country for years, and has been granted SIJS.

75. First, a person with SIJS cannot be detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because “the INA defines a ‘special immigrant’ as ‘an immigrant who is present in the United States,’” an award of SIJS confirms that a noncitizen is not “arriving” or “seeking admission.” *Rodriguez*, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (concluding that a noncitizen who had entered the United States years earlier as an “arriving alien” but had then been granted SIJS was not detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)); *see also Sarmiento*, 2025 WL 3091140, at *3 (similar). Moreover, SIJS status “bespeak[s] a substantial legal relationship between [SIJS beneficiaries] and the United States—a relationship far more significant than’ the relationship possessed between an initial

entrant into this country.” *Del Cid Del Cid v. Bondi*, No. 3:25-CV-00304, 2025 WL 2985150, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025).

76. Second, an unaccompanied child who entered the United States and was released from government custody to a guardian years ago also cannot not be detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). An unaccompanied child’s initial detention is governed by the TVPRA, which requires unaccompanied children—even those who turn 18 and age out of ORR custody—to be placed in the “least restrictive setting available.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). This is entirely inconsistent with mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). So is the fact of a released unaccompanied child spending years building a life in the United States before being re-detained in the interior. *See, e.g., Portillo Martinez v. Hyde*, No. 25-11909, 2025 WL 3152847 at *8 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2025).

77. Third and more broadly, courts across the United States have overwhelmingly concluded that noncitizens like Enrique Domingo who entered the United States without inspection and are detained by ICE for removal proceedings while they are residing in the United States are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A)—and thus entitled to a bond hearing. *See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis*, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (tallying more than 350 cases reaching the same conclusion, and only 12 going the other way); *See, also J.A.M. v. Streeval et al*, No. 4:25-cv-342 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025).

78. Accordingly, Enrique Domingo’s current detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—without access to a bond hearing as required by § 1226(a)—violates both the INA and Enrique Domingo’s procedural due process rights. As this renders his detention unlawful from its inception, she/he should be released. *See, e.g., Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas*, No. CV 25-02943,

2025 WL 2898389, *22 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other grounds sub nom. Alvarez v. Rivas*, 2025 WL 2899092 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2025) (“The appropriate relief for an immigration detainee held in violation of their right to due process is their immediate release from custody, and to be provided with relief returning them to status quo ante, i.e., the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”); *Quintero Campos v. Deleon*, No. 25-CV-10099, 2025 WL 3514120, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025) (collecting cases ordering immediate release); [

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin the Respondents from transferring Petitioner away from the jurisdiction of this District pending these proceedings;
- c. Declare that Petitioner’s arrest and detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment; and the INA and implementing regulations;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody without restraints on his liberty beyond those that existed prior to his unlawful re-detention;
- e. Order that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before this Court where the government bears the burden of justifying re-detention by clear and convincing evidence;
- f. Grant bail pending the conclusion of the habeas review; *see, e.g., Mapp v. Reno*, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001);
- g. Award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

- h. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2026.

//Eszter Bardi//

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28 U.S.C. § 2242 VERIFICATION STATEMENT

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with Petitioner's family members and have reviewed various documents for Petitioner. On the basis of those discussions, I hereby verify that I have reviewed the foregoing Petition and that the facts and statements made in this Petition and Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge or belief pursuant to 28 USC § 2242.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2026.

//Eszter Bardi//

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