

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Segundo Guillermo Ruiz-Coronel,

Petitioner,

v.

Joel Brott, Sherburne County, Minnesota,
Sheriff,

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security,

Department of Homeland Security,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

Daren K. Margolin, Director for
Executive Office for Immigration Review,

Executive Office for Immigration Review,

and,

David Easterwood, Acting Field Director,
St. Paul Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.

Respondents.

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEUS
CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Respondents detained Petitioner, Mr. Segundo Guillermo Ruiz-Coronel (“Mr. Ruiz-Coronel”) in violation of law.
2. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel may have been arrested without a warrant.¹
3. Upon information and belief, while Mr. Ruiz-Coronel has a prior removal order from 2019, he does not have a criminal record.
4. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was arrested through the use of confidential information pursuant to 8 USC §1367(a)(2). More specifically, Mr. Ruiz had a pending Form I-918A, Petition for Qualifying Family Member of U-1 Recipient when he was detained at his biometrics appointment on March 16, 2026 at Application Support Center for United States and Citizenship Services (“USCIS”) located at 1105 University Avenue West, Suite 102, St. Paul, MN 55104, in front of his wife and stepchildren. Attending this appointment was in furtherance of his application for immigration relief. The information used to find Mr. Ruiz-Coronel and detain him (specifically at his required USCIS biometrics appointment), upon information and belief, was obtained by ICE through Mr. Ruiz-Coronel’s submission of affirmative humanitarian relief through

¹ Petitioner, through Counsel, is currently attempting to verify whether or not a proper warrant was provided to Respondent upon his detention.

USCIS. This relief, U-Nonimmigrant status, is intended to protect and provide immigration relief to victims of qualifying criminal activity and their qualifying relatives, including spouses. *See* Exhibit A.

5. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's spouse is the qualifying victim of the crime of domestic violence from a prior partner and fully cooperated with authorities. She has a pending Form I-918, U Nonimmigrant Status petition, for which Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is a beneficiary.
6. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's spouse is twenty-two weeks and two days pregnant with his child and is suffering from severe preeclampsia, which will require a pre-term delivery. *See* Exhibit B. Her due date is approximately  or sooner. *Id.*
7. Based on the above, the continued detention of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel, specifically while he has a pending U Non-immigrant visa application and with a pending waiver to forgive his prior deportation order², serves no legitimate purpose.
8. Pending the adjudication of his Petition, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel respectfully seeks an immediate order restraining the Respondents from removing him from the United States and from transferring him to a location where he cannot reasonably consult with counsel, such a location to be construed as any

² The issue of waiving a prior deportation in context of U Visas will be discussed further below.

location outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the day-to-day operations of U.S. Customs and Immigration's ("ICE") Fort Snelling, Minnesota of the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations in the State of Minnesota.

9. Pending the adjudication of this Petition, Petitioner also respectfully requests that Respondents be ordered to provide seventy-two (72) hour notice of any movement of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel.
10. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel requests the same opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, at a meaningful time, and thus requests 72-hours-notice prior to any removal or movement of him away from the State of Minnesota.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action), § 1651 (All Writs Act), and § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution ("Suspension Clause"); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Administrative Procedure Act); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act). This action further arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(5).
12. Custody is "separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding." 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(d).

Compare also 8 U.S.C. 1229(a), *with* 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). The Board recently confirmed this in Matter of E-Y-F-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2025).

Because Mr. Ruiz-Coronel seeks to challenge his custody as a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of federal statute, jurisdiction is proper in this court.

13. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by DHS. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839–41 (2018); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961–63 (2019); Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1209-12 (11th Cir. 2016). Despite limitations on judicial review at 8 U.S.C. § 1252, “§ 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Detention is independent of removal and can be reviewed in a habeas action.
14. Upon information and belief, Federal district courts have jurisdiction to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2). This statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1367, which in part encompasses applicants for U-Nonimmigrant status, provides in relevant part that:

a) In general Except as provided in subsection (b), **in no case** may the Attorney General, **or any other official or employee of** the Department of Justice, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, **or any other official or employee of the Department of Homeland Security or Department of State** (including any bureau or agency of either of such Departments)- [...]

(2) **permit use by or disclosure to anyone (other than a sworn officer or employee of the Department, or bureau or agency thereof, for legitimate Department, bureau, or agency purposes) of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an application for relief under paragraph (15)(T), (15)(U), or (51) of section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(T), (U), (51)] or section 240A(b)(2) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)].**

The limitation under paragraph (2) ends when the application for relief is denied and all opportunities for appeal of the denial have been exhausted.

b) Exceptions

(1) [...]

(2) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may provide in the discretion of the Secretary or the Attorney General for the disclosure of information to law enforcement officials to be used solely for a legitimate law enforcement purpose in a manner that protects the confidentiality of such information.

(3) [...]

(4) [...]

(5) [...]

(6) [...]

(7) [...]

(8) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(2), the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney General may provide in the discretion of either such Secretary or the Attorney General for the disclosure of information to national security officials to be used solely for a **national security purpose** in a manner that protects the confidentiality of such information. (emphasis added).

15. The Supreme Court has noted that prudential exhaustion is not required when to do so would be futile or “the administrative body . . . has . . . predetermined the issue before it.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992).
16. Despite knowing the existence of 8 U.S.C. § 1367, and knowing the delicate and confidential nature of U visa applications for victims of qualifying

criminal activities and their qualifying relatives, the vulnerable position that U visa applicants are placed into by giving USCIS all of their personal information including removal information, and Mr. Ruiz-Coronel not having a criminal record, it appears that Respondents nevertheless may have pre-coordinated Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's detention with the use of information he provided in pursuance of his application about his prior removal order as disclosed in his Form I-918A. USCIS then scheduled a biometrics appointment, for which Mr. Ruiz-Coronel assisted as required to pursue his application. Upon information and belief, upon his arrival, there were already masked ICE officers waiting to detain him on the spot. This renders administrative appeal a futile exercise. Therefore, there is no exhaustion impediment to the Court exercising jurisdiction.

17. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1)(B), and 2241(d) because Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was arrested and is detained within this District. Upon information and belief, he is currently detained at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A) because Respondents are operating in this district.

PARTIES

18. Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is a citizen of Ecuador and a resident of Hennepin County, Minnesota. He is not an arriving alien. He is not seeking admission. Upon information and belief, however, he does have a prior removal order from 2019.
19. Upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is currently in custody at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota.
20. Respondent Joel Brott is the Sherburne County, Minnesota, Sheriff and is responsible for the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota. He has ultimate authority over the facility where Petitioner is detained. He is Petitioner's immediate custodian responsible for his physical custody. Respondent Brott's address is 13880 Business Center Drive NW, Suite 100, Elk River, MN 55330-4668.
21. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice, which encompasses the BIA and the immigration judges through the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem, and/or interim appointee. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel.

22. Respondent Kristi Noem and/or interim appointee is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem and/or interim appointee is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to § 103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem and/or interim appointee is a legal custodian of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel.
23. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.
24. Respondent Daren K. Margolin is the Director of Executive Office for Immigration Review and has ultimate responsibility for overseeing the operation of the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, including bond hearings. He is sued in his official capacity.
25. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review is the adjudicatory body within EOIR with jurisdiction over the removal and bond cases of Petitioner. Its authority includes individuals detained in Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota through the Ft. Snelling immigration court.

26. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioner's detention.
27. Respondent Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the subagency within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for implementing and enforcing the Immigration & Nationality Act, including the detention of noncitizens.
28. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Mr. Ruiz-Coronel. The address for the Fort Snelling Field Office is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

EXHAUSTION

29. Upon reasonable belief, ICE asserts authority to detain Mr. Ruiz-Coronel pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
30. No statutory requirement of exhaustion applies to Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's challenge to the lawfulness of his detention. See, e.g., Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("There is no statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies

before challenging his immigration detention.”); Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 1193850, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2025) (citing Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“this Court ‘follows the vast majority of other cases which have waived exhaustion based on irreparable injury when an individual has been detained for months without a bond hearing, and where several additional months may pass before the BIA renders a decision on a pending appeal.’”)); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (citing Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992))).

31. Prudential exhaustion is not required when to do so would be futile or “the administrative body . . . has . . . predetermined the issue before it.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
32. Despite knowing the existence of 8 U.S.C. § 1367, Respondents may have pre-coordinated Mr. Ruiz-Coronel’s detention with the use of confidential information he provided in pursuance of his application about his prior removal order disclosed in his Form I-918A to USCIS. USCIS required him to attend a biometrics appointment to be able to pursue his application, for

which Mr. Ruiz-Coronel did as was required. Presumably with the information obtained through his disclosure to USCIS and counting on Mr. Ruiz-Coronel attending his required biometrics, Respondents seized the opportunity to arrest Mr. Ruiz-Coronel and detain him at that specific date and time. This renders administrative appeal a futile exercise. Therefore, there is no exhaustion impediment to the Court exercising jurisdiction.

33. To the extent that Respondents argue that Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's detention was for a legitimate purpose and/or in pursuance of national interests, it is important to note that, upon information and belief, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel has no criminal record, his removal order is waivable (forgivable) once and if his pending Form I-192 is granted, and Respondents waited close to seven years to enforce his removal order. To the extent a warrant was not provided upon his detention, there is no indication that there was reason to believe that Mr. Ruiz-Coronel, in filing for affirmative immigration relief, was likely to escape before a warrant for his arrest could be obtained.³

34. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), generally, a person that has a prior order for deportation shall be removed pursuant to the prior order **at any time** after the re-entry and/or upon apprehension.

³ For purposes of transparency, as mentioned previously, it is unclear at this time if Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was indeed provided with a warrant upon his arrest at his biometrics.

35. Prudential exhaustion is not required in cases where “a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his claim.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147. Pursuant to paragraph 33 above, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel may be removed at any given moment. Furthermore, every day that Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is detained causes him, his pregnant wife, and his step-children irreparable harm. Matacua v. Frank, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 2018) (explaining that “a loss of liberty” is “perhaps the best example of irreparable harm”); Hamama v. Adducci, 349 F. Supp. 3d 665, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (holding that “detention has inflicted grave” and “irreparable harm” and describing the impact of prolonged detention on individuals and their families).
36. Prudential exhaustion is additionally not required in cases where the agency “lacks the institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147–48.
37. Immigration agencies have no jurisdiction over constitutional challenges of the kind Mr. Ruiz-Coronel raises here. See, e.g., Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations.”); Matter of Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 874, 880 (BIA 2012);

Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I. & N. Dec. 343, 345 (BIA 1982); Matter of Fuentes-Campos, 21 I. & N. Dec. 905, 912 (BIA 1997); Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327 (BIA 1991). Furthermore, it is only appropriate for this Court, not the agency, to determine whether or not there was a violation of federal statute, namely 8 USC § 1367 upon detaining Mr. Ruiz-Coronel on the spot at his biometrics appointment after potentially obtaining said information pursuant to Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's humanitarian application for immigration relief.

38. Because requiring Mr. Ruiz-Coronel to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile, would cause him irreparable harm, and the immigration agencies lack jurisdiction over his constitutional claims, this Court should not require exhaustion as a prudential matter.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

39. Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is a native and citizen of Ecuador.
40. Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel entered the United States without inspection on or about May 21, 2018.
41. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was 27 years old at the time of his entry at or near Laredo, Texas.

42. Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was detained upon entry in Laredo, Texas by immigration enforcement, which resulted in his placement in removal proceedings before the Immigration Court at San Antonio, Texas.
43. Upon information and belief, due to not feeling well and due to being in Minnesota, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel requested for his removal proceedings to be moved to a new date and location. Upon information and belief, the Immigration Court denied this request, which led Mr. Ruiz-Coronel to miss his hearing before the Immigration Court.
44. As a result, on November 25, 2019, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel received an order of removal, in absentia.
45. On August 8, 2025, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's wife filed a Form I-918A on his behalf for U Nonimmigrant Status. This relief, if granted, would provide Mr. Ruiz-Coronel with lawful immigration status, with a pathway to lawful permanent residence.⁴
46. On February 28, 2026, Mr. Ruiz-Coronado received a notice of an upcoming biometrics appointment with USCIS on Monday, March 16, 2026. The notice noted that,

⁴ It is important to note that U Visa applications also allow for the discretionary waiver of a prior deportation order, amongst other immigration inadmissibilities, pursuant to Form I-192, Application for Advance Permission to Enter as a Nonimmigrant. *See also* INA 212(a)(9)(A). Those that are in the United States that have an approved Form I-192 (if required) in addition to I-918 or I-918A Forms are not required to consular process unless they depart or have departed the United States, hence the name "Form I-192, **Advanced Permission** to enter as Non-Immigrant" (emphasis added).

To process [Petitioner's] application, petition, or request, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) **must** collect [Petitioner's] biometrics [...] **IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AS SCHEDULED, USCIS WILL CONSIDER YOUR BENEFIT REQUEST ABANDONED AND IT MAY BE DENIED.** See ASC Appointment Notice, I-797C, Notice of Action (emphasis added).

47. Accordingly, and bearing in mind the enumerated consequences of failure to attend the biometrics appointment, Mr. Ruiz Coronel, along with his pregnant wife and three step-children, attended the appointment as scheduled.
48. During the biometrics appointment, and in front of his pregnant wife and step-children, Mr. Ruiz-Coronel was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
49. Respondents took Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel into custody on March 16, 2026.
50. Upon information and belief, Respondents maintain that Petitioner is not eligible to be released or to seek a bond redetermination rehearing consistent with § 1231(a)(5). Furthermore, he is subject to imminent removal from the United States.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

51. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's removal is subject 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
52. The "[d]etention and removal of aliens ordered removed", as governed under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), provides that:

If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally **after having been removed** or having departed voluntarily, **under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated** from its original date **and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed**, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien **shall be removed under the prior order at any time after reentry**. (emphasis added).

53. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii), an immigration official may only make an arrest if they have a reason to believe the person is in violation of an immigration law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for arrest. The language of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8, states, “the following standards for enforcement of activities contained in this section must be adhered to by every immigration officer involved in enforcement activities.” Whether Mr. Ruiz-Coronel is being held under § 1226(a) or § 1231, a person cannot be lawfully arrested by immigration officials without the official first making an individualized assessment of probable cause to believe the person is in violation of immigration laws and whether the person is likely to escape before a warrant (Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien) may be obtained. *Id.*

54. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2), states:

In General. Except as provided in subsection (b), in no case may the Attorney General, or any other official or employee of the Department of Justice, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or any other official or employee of the Department of Homeland Security or Department of State (including any bureau or agency of either of such Departments)-

(2) permit use by or disclosure to anyone (other than a sworn officer or employee of the Department, or bureau or agency thereof, for legitimate Department, bureau, or agency purposes) of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an application for relief under paragraph (15)(T), (15)(U), or (51) of section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(T), (U), (51)] or section 240A(b)(2) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)]. (emphasis added). *See also*, 8 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(8).

REMEDY

55. Respondents' detention of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's ongoing detention violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amend. 5.
56. Due Process requires that detention "bear [] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
57. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel seeks immediate release to the extent that Respondents arrested him without a warrant/and or by using the information provided in his U visa application to detain him at a biometrics appointment not pursuant to legitimate purposes that are in the national interests. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1367.
58. Although neither the Constitution nor the federal habeas statutes delineate the necessary content of habeas relief, I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337

(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to . . . the writ of habeas corpus”), implicit in habeas jurisdiction is the power to order release. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (“[T]he habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained.”).

59. The Supreme Court has noted that the typical remedy for unlawful detention is release from detention. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (“The typical remedy for [unlawful executive detention] is, of course, release.”); See also Wajda v. US, 64 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating the function of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “is to obtain release from the duration or fact of present custody.”).
60. That courts with habeas jurisdiction have the power to order outright release is justified by the fact that, “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995), and that as an equitable remedy, federal courts “[have] broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief [and are] authorized . . . to dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require.’” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243. An order of release falls under court’s broad discretion to fashion relief. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp.

3d 626, 636 (D. Mass. 2018) (“Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy. The court has the discretion to fashion relief that is fair in the circumstances, including to order an alien’s release.”).

61. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel respectfully requests a constitutionally adequate remedy of immediate release.

CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF

62. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

63. To the extent it is not proven that a warrant was provided during Mr. Ruiz-Coronel’s arrest, he requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) that he was detained without a warrant and without good cause.

64. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel requests a declaratory judgment that Respondents violated 8 U.S.C. § 1367 in using Respondent’s confidential U visa application information to arrest him without a legitimate interest and/or in furtherance of national security interests.

COUNT TWO: VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

65. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

66. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary detention and requires that detention be reasonably related to its purpose and accompanied by adequate procedures to ensure that detention is serving its legitimate goals.
67. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's detention appears to have been coordinated by virtue of the information contained in his pending and confidential U visa application with USCIS, culminating into a prompt and pre-coordinated detention at a required and routine biometrics appointment, through no prior knowledge of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel.

**COUNT THREE: VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT – CONTRARY TO LAW AND ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS AGENCY POLICY**

68. Mr. Ruiz-Coronel re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
69. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
70. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

71. Respondents through their recent administrative decision failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for detaining Mr. Ruiz-Coronel at his routine USCIS biometrics appointment.
72. The application of re-instatement of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel's removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 241, six years and three months after his order of removal was entered, with upon information and belief no criminal record of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel, with a waivable (forgivable) removal order through a pending Form I-192, and only after Mr. Ruiz-Coronel provided his removal information as part of his U Nonimmigrant visa application, which led to his detention when he was attending a biometrics appointment at USCIS, is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Mr. Ruiz-Coronel, asks this Court for the following relief:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter.
2. Issue an immediate order restraining Respondents from removing Mr. Ruiz-Coronel from the United States during the pendency of this Petition.
3. Issue an order restraining Respondents from attempting to move Mr. Ruiz-Coronel from the State of Minnesota during the pendency of this Petition.

4. Issue an order requiring Respondents to provide 72-hour notice of any intended movement of Mr. Ruiz-Coronel.
5. Find that Respondents' administrative decision to detain Mr. Ruiz-Coronel as he attended a Biometrics Appointment with USCIS is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, since such detention relied on the violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367.
6. Declare that Petitioner's detention without a warrant, if none was issued, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
7. Grant Mr. Ruiz-Coronel reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
8. Grant all further relief this Court deems just and proper.

**THE LAW OFFICE OF IRIS
RAMOS LLC**

Dated: March 17, 2026

By: 

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Segundo Guillermo Ruiz-Coronel, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Dated this 17th day of March 2026.

s/Iris Ramos Nieves
Iris Ramos Nieves, #MN 0392421