

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
WAYCROSS DIVISION

Calixto-Ruiz, Israel  
Petitioner,

v.

Michael BRECKON, *in his*  
*official capacity as Warden of Folkston ICE*  
*Processing Center, D. Ray James*  
*Correctional Facility and Todd LYONS,*  
*in his official capacity as Acting*  
*Director of Immigration and Customs*  
*Enforcement, and Ladeon*  
FRANCIS, *Field Office Director ICE*  
*Atlanta Field Office, and Kristi NOEM,*  
*Secretary of Homeland Security, Pamela*  
BONDI, *in her official capacity as Attorney*  
*General, United States Department of*  
*Justice*

Respondents.

Case No. \_\_\_\_\_

**PETITION FOR  
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Alien File No. 

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Petitioner, Mr. Calixto-Ruiz, is a 29-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who arrived in the United States in 2014 and has resided in the country for the past 12 years.
2. Respondent was detained on or about February 20, 2026, by the Department of Homeland Security.
3. Petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing the Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing to determine if he may be released on bond under § 1226(a)(2) and the applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1 & 1236.1.

## **II. VENUE AND JURISDICTION**

4. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the Constitution (Suspension Clause).
5. Venue lies in this Division because Petitioner is detained at Folkston ICE Processing Center, within the Waycross Division, and Respondent Breckon is his immediate custodian. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(d), 1391(e).

## **III. PARTIES**

6. Petitioner Mr. Calixto-Ruiz is a 29-year-old Mexican national who resides in Summerville, SC. He is currently detained at the Folkston ICE Processing Center.
7. Respondent Michael Breckon is the Warden of Folkston ICE Processing Center. As such, Respondent Breckon is responsible for the operation of the Detention Center where Petitioner is detained. Because ICE contracts with private prisons such as Folkston Processing ICE Center to house immigration detainees such as Mr. Calixto-Ruiz. Respondent Breckon has immediate physical custody of the Petitioner.
8. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter “ICE”). As such, Respondent Lyons is being sued in his official capacity.
9. Respondent Ladeon Francis is the Atlanta Field Office Director for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter “FOD”). As such, Respondent Francis is responsible for the oversight of ICE operations at the Folkston ICE Processing Center. Respondent Francis is being sued in his official capacity.
10. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter “DHS”).

As Secretary of DHS, Secretary Noem is responsible for the general administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Respondent Noem is being sued in her official capacity.

11. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

#### **IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES**

12. Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law, and his only remedy is by way of this judicial action.

#### **V. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

13. Petitioner, Mr. Calixto-Ruiz, is a 29-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in 2014 and has resided in the country for the past 12 years. See **Exhibit 1**, *Copy of Petitioner's Passport*.
14. On or about February 20, 2026, Petitioner was stopped by officers of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and taken into custody. At the time of the stop, Petitioner's minor children were present in the vehicle. After detaining Petitioner, ICE officers left the minor children unattended in the vehicle. Witnesses observed the incident. Petitioner further reports that ICE officers yelled at the children during the encounter.
15. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") issued a decision which proposes that, "[b]ased on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to

hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.” See *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

16. As of February 20, 2026, Petitioner has been detained for 20 days and denied the opportunity to request bond before an Immigration Judge.

17. Petitioner’s continued detention is causing irreparable harm, as he has been separated from his family and continues to suffer trauma as a result of this unlawful restraint on his liberty.

## **VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

18. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for most noncitizens in removal proceedings.

19. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. This provision applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as those “present in the United States who has not been admitted.” § 1225(a)(1). Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention until their removal proceedings are concluded, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

20. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals “seeking admission” referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

21. Third, the INA provides for detention of noncitizens who have received a final order of removal from the United States, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)-(b).

22. This case concerns the detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2).

## VII. CAUSES OF ACTION

### COUNT I

#### **Violation of 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond**

23. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations and facts set forth in paragraphs 1-17.

24. At the time of his arrest, Petitioner was a noncitizen present in the United States who had not been admitted, and thus he falls within the broad definition of “applicant for admission,” which is distinct from an “alien seeking admission,” and his detention is therefore governed by § 1226(a)(2).

25. The BIA has wrongfully construed § 1225(b)(2) as applying to all noncitizens who are found in the United States unlawfully, such as the Petitioner. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

26. The BIA’s decision in *Yajure Hurtado* erroneously synonymizes the terms “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission” in order to apply mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) to an entire class of noncitizens for whom it was never intended by Congress.

27. The unlawful application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention without a discretionary bond hearing and violates the INA.

### COUNT II

#### **Violation of the Bond Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1 and 1003.19 Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond**

28. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations and facts set forth in paragraphs 1-17.

29. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the headings of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) *will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.*” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before Immigration Judges under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and its implementing regulations.
30. Nonetheless, the BIA has asserted that, instead, § 1225(b)(2) should apply to those noncitizens “present without having been admitted or paroled.”
31. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

**COUNT III**  
**Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause**

32. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations and facts set forth in paragraphs 1-17.
33. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
34. “Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

35. Moreover, “[t]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Id.* at 693.

36. Respondents’ mandatory detention of Petitioner without consideration for release on bond or access to a bond hearing violates his due process rights.

### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 2) Grant Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing to determine if he may be released on bond under § 1226(a)(2) and the applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1.
- 3) Order Respondents to refrain from transferring Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of this court during the pendency of these proceedings and while the Petitioner remains in Respondents’ custody;
- 4) Order Respondents to file a response within 3 days of the filing of this petition;
- 5) Award attorneys’ fees to Petitioner; and
- 6) Grant any other and further relief which this Court deems just and proper.

I affirm, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully submitted this March 12, 2026.

/s/ Jessica Calmes  
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**Verification**

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

/s/ Jessica Calmes

Date: March 12, 2026