

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

SANDRO RODRIGUEZ BRITO,

Petitioner,

Case No. 2:26-cv-739-SPC-DNF

v.

KRISTI NOEM et al.,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Sandro Rodriguez Brito challenges his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, arguing he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. While reserving all rights, including the right to appeal, Respondents submit this abbreviated brief in lieu of an exhaustive memorandum to preserve the Respondents' arguments and to conserve judicial resources. Should the Court prefer a more exhaustive discussion, Respondents request leave to submit additional briefing.

FACTS

Rodriguez Brito is a national and citizen of Cuba who last entered the United States without inspection on an unknown date. (Composite Exhibit, Ex. 1 at 1.) He was encountered by U.S. Border Patrol on May 13, 2022, and released on parole due to detention capacity. *Id.* at 2.

Rodriguez Brito was again placed in immigration custody on January 11, 2026. *Id.* at 1. He was served with a Notice to Appear on or about March 20, 2026. *Id.* at 4.

On February 3, 2026, Rodriguez Brito filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging his custody violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Doc. 1.)

He is currently detained at Mesa Verde Detention Center.

CERTIFIED HABEAS RETURN

ICE is detaining Rodriguez Brito under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.”). Rodriguez Brito bears the burden to prove his custody violates federal law. *Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y of State*, 853 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021).

ARGUMENT

I. Rodriguez Brito is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

In *In re Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025) the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) examined the plain language of Section 1225, the INA’s statutory scheme, Supreme Court and BIA precedent, the legislative history of the INA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

(“IIRIRA”), Pub L. No. 104-208, and DHS’s prior practices. After doing so, the BIA held that “under a plain language reading of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like the petitioner, who are present in the United States without admission.” 29 I&N Dec. at 225.¹ This Court should rule the same.

Respondents acknowledge that questions of law in this case, and the challenges to the government’s policy and practice, substantially overlap with *Garcia v. Noem, et al.*, No. 2:25-cv-879-SPC-NPM, 2025 WL 3041895 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2025). It should be noted, however, that courts have recently ruled against petitioners in similar cases. *See, E.g., Lopez v. Dir. of Enft & Removal Operations*, No. 3:25-CV-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); *Iraheta Morales v. Noem*, No. 25-62598-CIV-SINGHAL, 2026 WL 236307, at *3-9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2026). Some decisions have started recognizing that there is no jurisdiction over this question to begin with. *Munoz Nataren v. Raycraft*, No. 4:26-cv-212, 2026 WL 214368, at *2 (N.D.

¹ On February 18, 2026, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order stating the court “hereby VACATES *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* as contrary to law under the APA.” *See Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D. Cal.). Respondents submit *Yajure Hurtado* remains persuasive authority in this Court regarding the proper interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court does not need to decide the issue of *Bautista*’s preclusive effect. *See Avendano v. Warden, Fla. Soft Side S.*, No. 2:25-CV-01221-SPC-NPM, 2026 WL 145499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026) (declining to rule on *Bautista*’s preclusive effect). Respondents nevertheless note that on March 6, 2026, the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the *Bautista* district court’s February 18, 2026, order vacating *Yajure Hurtado*. *Bautista v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security*, 26-1044, Dkt Entry 5.1 ¶ 2 (9th Cir.).

Ohio Jan. 28, 2026); *Amaya-Velis v. Raycraft*, No. 4:26-cv-73, 2026 WL 100596, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026).

Significantly, the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that aliens who have not been admitted to the United States are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) regardless of whether the alien is already present in the United States. *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). Other circuits—including the Eleventh—have active appeals on the matter. *See e.g.*, *Pizzaro Reyes v. ERO*, No. 25-1982 (6th Cir.); *Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden*, No. 25-14065 (11th Cir.).

Respondents respectfully disagree with the Court's decision in *Garcia v. Noem*. That said, in the interest of judicial economy and to expedite the Court's consideration of this matter, Respondents make the following arguments:

1. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars review of Rodriguez Brito's claims. *Garcia v. Noem, et al.*, No. 2:25-cv-00879-SPC-NPM, Doc. 14 at 4-5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2025).²
2. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars review of Rodriguez Brito's claims. *Id.* at 6-7.
3. Rodriguez Brito failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. *Id.* at 7-8.

² Respondents acknowledge Local Rule 3.01(h) prohibits incorporation by reference of any other motion, legal memorandum, or brief. To achieve the purpose of efficiency, Respondents respectfully request the Court to suspend application of the rule in this instance. *See* Local Rule 1.01(a) and 1.01(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

4. Rodriguez Brito is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. *Id.* at 9-14.

Finally, Respondents contend that should this Court determine that Petitioner's detention is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, outright release is inappropriate. To the extent the Court orders a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge for the purpose of determining whether Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community—*see, e.g., Garcia v. Noem*, No. 2:25-CV-00879-SPC-NPM, 2025 WL 3041895, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2025)—Respondents aver that such bond hearings are not conducted or managed by ICE, rather by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which is not a proper party to this suit. *See Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434-36 (2004) (noting that for habeas petitions challenging detention, “the default rule is that the proper Respondents is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official”).

II. Rodriguez Brito's continued detention does not violate the U.S. Constitution.

Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, “a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). For confinement to constitute “punishment,” a petitioner must show either “an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials,” or an implied intent to punish through a condition or restriction that a “is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless[.]” *Id.* at 538-39. “Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” *Id.* at 539.

Rodriguez Brito fails to show that detention is not proportionately related to the government’s non-punitive responsibilities and administrative purposes. While civil detainees retain greater liberty protections than individuals convicted of crimes, *see, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982), continued immigration detention pending removal cannot be described as punitive or excessive in relation to the legitimate government purpose of protecting the public and ensuring their removal. *See, e.g., Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”). “[I]t is a fallacy to think that Respondents do not have a legitimate government purpose in ‘preventing detained aliens from absconding and ensuring that they appear for removal.’” *Matos v. Lopez Vega*, No. 20-CIV-60784-RAR, 2020 WL 2298775, at *10 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020).

III. Rodriguez Brito’s Administrative Procedure Act claim is not properly before the Court.

Because habeas corpus actions and non-habeas corpus actions have different filing fee requirements, different pleading standards, and different substantive standards, it is generally inappropriate to bring a hybrid action asserting both habeas and non-habeas claims in one case. *Burnam v. Marberry*, 313 F. App’x 455, 456 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court should not have considered habeas claims and

claims under the Privacy Act and Administrative Procedure Act in a single case); accord *Malcom v. Starr*, No. 20-cv-2503 (MJD/LIB), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45387, 2021 WL 931213, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2021) (“As many other cases from this District have noted, habeas petitions and civil complaints have different and incompatible rules regarding service of process, discovery, and even filing fees.”).

For example, Rodriguez Brito did not pay the required filing fee for any non-habeas claims. The statute governing filing fees in district court states, “The clerk of each district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of \$350, except that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be \$5.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). “The payment of the \$5 habeas filing fee relegates this action to habeas relief only. One cannot pay the minimal habeas fee and pursue non-habeas relief.” *Ndudzi v. Castro*, No. SA-20-CV-0492-JKP, 2020 WL 3317107, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 18, 2020); *King v. Carlton*, No. 21-cv-21634, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83778, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2021) (Bloom, J.) (finding that petitioner could not circumvent filing fee requirements by filing a “joint or hybrid” habeas action).

CONCLUSION

Rodriguez Brito’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

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DATED this 24th day of March, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

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