

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

ERNESTO BENJAMIN MENCHU-
VASQUEZ, *a.k.a.* ERNESTO
BENJAMIN MENCHO-VASQUEZ

Petitioner,

v.

TONY NORMAND, WARDEN OF THE
FOLKSTON DETENTION CENTER,

PAMELA BONDI,
U.S. Attorney General,

KRISTI NOEM (or her successor),
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, and

TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity
as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement,

Respondents.

* * * * *

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Counsel submits this amended petition to correct the spelling of Petitioner's name, which was listed as Ernesto Benjamin Mencho-Vasquez is the original Petition. Petitioner's true name is Ernesto Benjamin Menchu-Vasquez, but Immigration and Customs Enforcement has wrongly identified him as Ernesto Benjamin Mencho-Vasquez in his immigration documents. The Amended Petition identifies the Petitioner by his true name and lists ICE's identifier in the alternative.

Petitioner Ernesto Benjamin Menchu-Vasquez, by and through his undersigned counsel, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, respectfully files this Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

DETENTION LOCATION

1. Petitioner presently is being detained by Respondents and their agents at Folkston Detention Center, 3026 Hwy 252 East, Folkston, GA 31537. He was detained in Baltimore, Maryland on February 27, 2026.

INTRODUCTION

2. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to challenge his continued custodial detention by the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), through its component arm, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

3. Petitioner challenges the Respondents’ mistaken assertion that he is subject to their mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)(A). That assertion stems from the Respondents’ July 2025 reinterpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) detention provisions, including § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *12 (D. Mass. Jul. 24, 2025) (“Indeed, mandatory detention for all applicants has only been the official policy of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) . . . since July 8, 2025, when Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd M. Lyons, issued an internal memorandum explaining that the agency had revisited its legal position”).

4. Under Respondents’ reinterpretation of this provision, any foreign national who is present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled is subject to mandatory detention.

5. Respondents’ misguided reinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is contrary to law.

6. Petitioner’s continued detention by Respondents without any mechanism to challenge his confinement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 though the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. Petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2201, in the form of an Order: a) requiring his immediate release because he is not lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A); or, in the alternative, b) requiring that the Respondents provide him with a bond hearing before a neutral and impartial adjudicator.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. Petitioner is detained in at the Folkston Detention Center in Folkston, Georgia, which is within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“habeas corpus”), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (“All Writs Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“Federal Question”), the INA, and U.S. CONST. amend. V (the “Due Process Clause”).

9. This Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate habeas corpus claims brought by foreign nationals who challenge the legality of their detention by U.S. immigration officials. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 307 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Rodriguez v. Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911, 915 (E.D. Va. 2024) (“The federal habeas corpus statute gives a district court jurisdiction to review immigration-related detention cases”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).

10. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Georgia because it is the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973).

11. Venue also properly lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees and officers of the United States acting in their official capacities

and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Southern District of Georgia, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B).

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

12. The Court “shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the [Respondents] to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the [Petitioner] is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Court should require respondents to file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

THE PARTIES

13. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala and is now detained by Respondents at the Folkston Detention Center in Folkston, Georgia. He is in the custody and under the direct control of Respondents and their agents.

14. Respondent The Warden of Folkston Detention Center is sued in his official capacity as the Warden of the facility where Petitioner is detained.

15. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is sued in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and supervises and oversees Respondent Liggins.

16. Respondent Kristi Noem (or her successor) is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Respondent Noem (or her successor) is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, the component agency directly responsible for Petitioner’s detention. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Respondent Noem (or her successor) is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

17. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General oversees the Executive Office for Immigration

Review and, within the Executive Branch, is the arbiter of all questions of law pertaining to the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), 1103(g).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

18. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He hails from Huehuetenango, Huehuetenango, Guatemala. He entered the United States on or about March 26, 2019 without being admitted or paroled. He was detained by immigration officials and given a notice to appear for removal proceedings. However, his Notice to Appear was not filed with EOIR. He fears being persecuted in Guatemala and intends to file an application for asylum.

19. On February 27, 2026, immigration officers detained Petitioner at his scheduled ICE check-in, which he duly attended in Baltimore, Maryland. He was detained that same day in the Baltimore Hold Room. He was subsequently transferred to Folkston Detention Center.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a),

20. Petitioner incorporates and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 19 above, as if fully set forth herein.

21. Respondents' theory that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) rests on their mistaken recent reinterpretation of the INA's detention provisions at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a). Respondents' interpretation is incorrect and is in conflict with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), which provides that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) "applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States ('applicants for admission' in the language of the statute)." Id. at 297. The Court in Jennings noted that Section 1226, on the other hand, "applies to aliens already present in the United States." Id. at 303. "Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens [already present

in the United States] by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings.” Id. “Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond . . .” Id.

22. Petitioner has been in the United States for approximately seven years. By any measure, he is “already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under these circumstances, Jennings instructs that the Government’s authority to detain Petitioner does not stem from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)(A). The Respondents’ reinterpretation of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) conflicts with Jennings and must therefore be rejected.

23. Third, the Respondents’ reinterpretation of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) “conflict[s] with the statute’s broader structure.” Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069, at *15 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025).

24. It is settled that a “statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . .” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (internal quotations omitted)). The Respondents’ “theory of § 1225(b) — that the provision applies to all persons who have not been admitted into the United States — would render multiple provisions of § 1226 superfluous.” Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069, at *16. “For instance, § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), and (E) already require mandatory detention of certain categories of inadmissible noncitizens. Indeed, Congress added § 1226(c)(1)(E)—which requires detention for certain inadmissible noncitizens charged with crimes including burglary, theft, and larceny—just this year through the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).” Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069, at *16. “If § 1225(b) already required mandatory detention of all noncitizens who have not been admitted, these provisions would be meaningless.” Id.

25. Furthermore, the Respondents' reinterpretation of the detention provisions "would upend decades of practice. Indeed, mandatory detention for all applicants has only been the official policy of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") . . . since July 8, 2025, when Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd M. Lyons, issued an internal memorandum explaining that the agency had revisited its legal position" Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *12 (D. Mass. Jul. 24, 2025) (internal quotation omitted).

26. That Respondents' theory on immigration detention has been upended is underscored by the conflicting pronouncements of the theory by Respondents themselves. In an August 4, 2025 Order, Respondent Bondi determined that foreign nationals arrested in the interior of the United States (other than at a port of entry) are entitled to bond hearings and are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. She did this by designating as precedent "in all proceedings involving the same or similar issues" the Board's decision in Matter of Akhmedov, 29 I. & N. Dec. 166 n.1 (BIA 2025).

27. In Akhmedov, the Board considered DHS's appeal of an Immigration Judge's grant of bond to a foreign national arrested in the interior of the United States. See 29 I. & N. Dec. at 166, 168. The Board's decision - as adopted by the Attorney General - could hardly be clearer: "The respondent's custody determination is governed by the provisions of section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018)." Id. at 166.

28. Just like the foreign national in Akhmedov, Petitioner was arrested by immigration officers in the interior of the United States. Just like the foreign national in Akhmedov, Petitioner is, at a minimum, entitled to a bond hearing.

29. Under pertinent regulation, "[t]he Board shall be governed by the provisions and limitations prescribed by applicable law, regulations, and procedures, and by decisions of the

Attorney General (through review of a decision of the Board, by written order, or by determination and ruling pursuant to section 103 of the Act).” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i).

30. By statute, the Attorney General’s determinations and rulings on all questions of law pertaining to the INA bind the Executive Branch. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).

31. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In that case, the Board determined that a foreign national who has not been admitted to the United States is not entitled to a bond hearing and is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See id. at 220. Yajure Hurtado cannot be reconciled with the Attorney General’s decision in Akhmedov (decided a month earlier) where the Attorney General determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs foreign nationals who enter the United States unlawfully and who are later encountered by immigration officers. See Akhmedov, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 166.

32. In Yajure Hurtado, the Board articulated no reasoning for its disagreement with the Attorney General other than to state its opinion that a foreign national’s presence in the United States “does not somehow eviscerate or nullify section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), or vest the Immigration Judge with authority over the respondent’s bond request.” Id. at 226. But the Attorney General’s decision controls the Board. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i).

33. The Board’s observation in Yajure Hurtado that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) was not before the Attorney General in Akhmedov does not give license to the Board to act contrary to both statutory and regulatory authority declaring that the Attorney General – and not the Board – speaks for the Executive Branch with respect to “all questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i). Nor can it vitiate the Attorney General’s determination that custody determinations of foreign nationals arrested in the United States interior are “governed

by the provisions of section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018).”

COUNT TWO

Violation of U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

34. Petitioner incorporates and realleges Paragraphs 1-33 above as if fully set forth herein.

35. It is settled that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). Petitioner is a “person” and has been in the United States for seven years.

36. The term “persons” includes foreign nationals such as Petitioner. See id.

37. It is equally well settled that freedom from confinement is a core liberty interest and violation of that liberty interest raises a colorable substantive due process claim. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (collecting cases); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (bodily freedom is the “most elemental of liberty interests”).

38. As such, Petitioner also has a right to procedural due process. Immigration proceedings are civil and they are intended to be “nonpunitive in purpose and effect.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Over a century of Supreme Court precedent instructs that the Fifth Amendment entitles foreign nationals to procedural due process. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 306 (citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, (1903). A failure to provide any process whatsoever contravenes over a century of Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause as applying to foreign nationals such as Petitioner. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

39. “To determine whether civil detention violates a detainee’s Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, courts apply the three-part test articulated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069, at * 22. “Under that test, courts must weigh (1) ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’; and (3) ‘the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’” Id. (quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335).

40. Petitioner invokes “‘the most elemental of liberty interests’; ‘[t]he interest in being free from physical detention.’” Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194069, at *17 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)) (alterations in original). To be sure, the Respondents’ refusal to provide any process whatsoever creates significant risk that Petitioner will be deprived of that interest.

41. The Government’s interest in implementing its novel reinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is minimal. This new “approach attempts to upend decades of immigration practice.” Hasan, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184734, at *24. “Indeed, mandatory detention for all applicants has only been the official policy of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) . . . since July 8, 2025, when Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd M. Lyons, issued an internal memorandum explaining that the agency had “revisited its legal position. . . .” Martinez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *12. In contrast, the resumed application of decades of agency practice will satisfy the Government’s interest in enforcement of the immigration laws.

42. In Petitioner's case, all three Matthews factors weigh heavily in favor of holding that the Respondents' refusal to provide him any process whatsoever violates his right to procedural due process. The Court should grant the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for this reason as well.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

- A. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- B. Require Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days;
- C. Find that the Respondents' detention of Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- D. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately or, alternatively, order that a neutral and impartial adjudicator conduct a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
- E. Issue an Order enjoining Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside of this district; and
- F. Order such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 16, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sarah S. Wilson
SARAH S. WILSON
COLOMBO HURD PL
301 E. Pine Street #450
Orlando, Florida 32801
(407) 478-1111
swilson@colombohurd.com

Local Counsel for the Petitioner

Pro Hac Vice Motion for Roberto Allen
forthcoming

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

Local Rules for the Southern District of Georgia prevent local counsel from filing the verification signed by Petitioner's retained counsel, Roberto N. Allen. I have been retained by Mr. Allen as local counsel in this case, and he has confirmed to me that he verified all of the facts in this petition such that it should be deemed verified consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2242. I will submit counsel's verification after he is admitted *pro hac vice* to the case.

/s/ Sarah Wilson
Sarah Wilson