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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANOUK BAGHDASARYAN,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General, et al.

Respondents.

CIVIL CASE NO.: 26-cv-1576-JES

Amended[1] Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

[1] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A) permits a party to "amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than 21 days after serving it." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1)(A) (punctuation altered). It is less than 21 days since service. Ms. Mardian therefore files this amended petition as of right.

INTRODUCTION

Manouk Baghdasaryan was ordered removed to Armenia in 2004. ICE kept him in detention for over a year but could not remove him, so he was released. He performed perfectly on supervision, committing no crimes and checking in as ordered.

Nevertheless, ICE detained him on February 22, 2026. He received no paperwork or written explanation of why he was being re-detained. An ICE officer just told him verbally—and falsely—that he was being arrested because he was a criminal. No one gave him an opportunity to contest his re-detention. And no one identified any changed circumstances that made his removal to Armenia any more likely than it had been in 2004. Worse yet, if ICE gives up on removing him to Armenia and tries to remove him to a third country, ICE policy allows them to do so with no notice, six hours' notice, or 24 hours' notice, depending on the circumstances.

Mr. Baghdasaryan must be released. ICE gave him no adequate notice or opportunity to contest re-detention, violating their own regulations. "[T]here is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," meaning that Mr. Baghdasaryan's detention is not statutorily authorized. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And if ICE is able to remove him to a third country, ICE threatens to do so in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This Court should grant this petition on all three grounds.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. ICE re-detained Mr. Baghdasaryan after 22 years on release, even though he cannot be removed to Armenia.

Mr. Baghdasaryan came to the United States in April 2004. Exh. A at ¶ 1. A judge ordered his removal on August 24, 2004. *Id.* Mr. Baghdasaryan appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on February 14, 2005. Automated Case Information, EOIR, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation.

Even with a final removal order in hand, ICE proved unable to remove Mr. Baghdasaryan to Armenia. Mr. Baghdasaryan had submitted his original passport to the court under removal proceedings. *Id.* at ¶ 2. But for whatever reason, Armenia could not find Mr. Baghdasaryan in their system. *Id.* When Armenia would not take him, ICE finally released him. *Id.* All told, Mr. Baghdasaryan spent a year and two months in detention. *Id.*

Mr. Baghdasaryan stayed on supervision for over two decades. He did not commit any crimes but got only traffic tickets. *Id.* He always checked in with ICE as ordered, and he followed all of his release conditions. *Id.*

Yet ICE re-detained him at a military base on February 22, 2026, after he dropped off some drunk soldiers. *Id.* at ¶ 4. The arresting ICE officer said—falsely—that he had a criminal record and they were collecting all the criminals. *Id.* at ¶ 5. But ICE gave Mr. Baghdasaryan no paperwork about his re-detention and no chance to contest it. *Id.* Nor did ICE speak with Mr. Baghdasaryan in Armenian, even though he does not speak English very well. *Id.*

Since then, ICE officers have come into Mr. Baghdasaryan's pod from time to time to answer detainees' questions. *Id.* at ¶ 6. When Mr. Baghdasaryan asked about his case, the ICE officer just said to wait for his lawyer. *Id.* That made no sense. He has no lawyer except the one appointed by the court for this habeas case. *Id.* ICE has said nothing to him about removal to Armenia. *Id.* No one has identified changed circumstances that make his removal more likely than it was in 2004. *Id.*

II. The government is carrying out deportations to third countries without providing sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.

Where, as here, ICE cannot remove someone to their country of origin, they have the option of removing them to a third country. The Trump administration reportedly has negotiated with at least 58 countries to accept deportees from other nations. Edward Wong et al, *Inside the Global Deal-Making Behind Trump's*

Mass Deportations, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2025. On June 25, 2025, the New York Times reported that seven countries—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo, Mexico, Panama, and Rwanda—had agreed to accept deportees who are not their own citizens. *Id.* Since then, ICE has carried out highly publicized third country deportations to South Sudan and Eswatini.

The Administration has reportedly negotiated with countries to have many of these deportees imprisoned in prisons, camps, or other facilities. The government paid El Salvador about $5 million to imprison more than 200 deported Venezuelans in a maximum-security prison notorious for gross human rights abuses, known as CECOT. *See id.* In February, Panama and Costa Rica took in hundreds of deportees from countries in Africa and Central Asia and imprisoned them in hotels, a jungle camp, and a detention center. *Id.*; Vanessa Buschschluter, *Costa Rican court orders release of migrants deported from U.S.*, BBC (Jun. 25, 2025). On July 4, 2025, ICE deported eight men, including one pre-1995 Vietnamese refugee, to South Sudan. *See* Wong, *supra*. On July 15, ICE deported five men to the tiny African nation of Eswatini, including one man from Vietnam, where they are reportedly being held in solitary confinement. Gerald Imray, *3 Deported by US held in African Prison Despite Completing Sentences, Lawyers Say*, PBS (Sept. 2, 2025). Many of these countries are known for human rights abuses or instability. For instance, conditions in South Sudan are so extreme that the U.S. State Department website warns Americans not to travel there, and if they do, to prepare their will, make funeral arrangements, and appoint a hostage-taker negotiator first. *See* Wong, *supra*.

On June 23 and July 3, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a stay of a national class-wide preliminary injunction issued in *D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1142968, at *1, 3 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2025), which required ICE to follow statutory and constitutional requirements before removing an individual to a third country. *U.S. Dep't of*

Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D., 145 S. Ct. 2153 (2025) (mem.); *id.*, No. 24A1153, 2025 WL 1832186 (U.S. July 3, 2025).[2] On July 9, 2025, ICE rescinded previous guidance meant to give immigrants a "'meaningful opportunity' to assert claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) before initiating removal to a third country" like the ones just described. Exh. B.

Under the new guidance, ICE may remove any immigrant to a third country "without the need for further procedures," as long as—in the view of the State Department—the United States has received "credible" "assurances" from that country that deportees will not be persecuted or tortured. *Id.* at 1. If a country fails to credibly promise not to persecute or torture releasees, ICE may still remove immigrants there with minimal notice. *Id.* Ordinarily, ICE must provide 24 hours' notice. But "[i]n exigent circumstances," a removal may take place in as little as six hours, "as long as the alien is provided reasonably means and opportunity to speak with an attorney prior to the removal." *Id.*

Upon serving notice, ICE "will not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of being removed to the country of removal." *Id.* (emphasis original). If the noncitizen "does not affirmatively state a fear of persecution or torture if removed to the country of removal listed on the Notice of Removal within 24 hours, [ICE] may proceed with removal to the country identified on the notice." *Id.* at 2. If the noncitizen "does affirmatively state a fear if removed to the country of removal"

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[2] Though the Supreme Court's order was unreasoned, the dissent noted that the government had sought a stay based on procedural arguments applicable only to class actions. *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. D.V.D.*, 145 S. Ct. 2153, 2160 (2025) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus, "even if the Government [was] correct that classwide relief was impermissible" in *D.V.D.*, Respondents still "remain[] obligated to comply with orders enjoining [their] conduct with respect to individual plaintiffs" like Mr. Baghdasaryan. *Id.* Thus, the Supreme Court's decision does not override courts' authority to grant individual injunctive relief. *See Nguyen v. Scott*, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *20–23 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025).

then ICE will refer the case to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") for a screening for eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). *Id.* at 2. "USCIS will generally screen within 24 hours." *Id.* If USCIS determines that the noncitizen does not meet the standard, the individual will be removed. *Id.* If USCIS determines that the noncitizen has met the standard, then the policy directs ICE to either move to reopen removal proceedings "for the sole purpose of determining eligibility for [withholding of removal protection] and CAT" or designate another country for removal. *Id.*

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

This Court should grant this petition and order Mr. Baghdasaryan's immediate release. *Zadvydas v. Davis* holds that immigration statutes do not authorize the government to detain immigrants like Mr. Baghdasaryan, for whom there is "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). ICE's own regulations require changed circumstances before re-detention, as well as notice and a chance to contest a re-detention decision. And due process requires ICE to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before any removal to a third country.

I. Count 1: ICE failed to comply with its own regulations before re-detaining Mr. Baghdasaryan, violating his rights under the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act.

The Department of Homeland Security has enacted a series of regulations to protect the due process rights of someone who, like Mr. Baghdasaryan, is re-detained following a period of release. Title 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(*l*) applies to re-detention generally, while 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) applies to persons released after providing good reason to believe that they will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, *see Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025), as Mr. Baghdasaryan was.

ICE is required to follow its own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); *see Alcaraz v. INS*, 384 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The legal proposition that agencies may be required to abide by certain internal policies is well-established."). A court may review a re-detention decision for compliance with the regulations. *See Phan v. Beccerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01757, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Nguyen v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11470-MJJ, 2025 WL 1725791, at *3 (D. Mass. June 20, 2025) (citing *Kong v. United States*, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023)). Many judges in this district have granted habeas petitions or temporary restraining orders when ICE failed to follow 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i). *See, e.g.*, *Constantinovici v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2898985, No. 25-cv-2405-RBM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, No. 25-cv-2053-RSH, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025); *Phan v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2898977, No. 25-cv-2422-RBM-MSB, *3–*5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Sun v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2800037, No. 25-cv-2433-CAB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025); *Van Tran v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2770623, No. 25-cv-2334-JES, *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025); *Truong v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02597-JES, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); *Khambounheuang v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02575-JO-SBC, ECF No. 12 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025).[3]

Here, ICE violated §§ 241.4(*l*), 241.13(i) in at least three respects.

First, ICE did not comply with § 241.13(i)'s informal interview requirement.

[3] Courts in other districts have done the same. *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); *You v. Nielsen*, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *Rombot v. Souza*, 296 F. Supp. 3fd 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017); *Zhu v. Genalo*, No. 1:25-CV-06523 (JLR), 2025 WL 2452352, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025); *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); *Escalante v. Noem*, No. 9:25-CV-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2491782, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2025); *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *2; *M.Q. v. United States*, 2025 WL 965810, at *3, *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).

No matter the reason for re-detention, the re-detained person is entitled to "an initial informal interview promptly," during which they "will be notified of the reasons for revocation." *Id.* §§ 241.4(*l*)(1), 241.13(i)(3). The interviewer must "afford[] the [person] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation," allowing them to "submit any evidence or information" relevant to re-detention and evaluating "any contested facts." *Id.* But Mr. Baghdasaryan has yet to receive the interview required by regulation. Exh. A at ¶ 5. In fact, ICE did not talk to Mr. Baghdasaryan in Armenian at all, and any attempt to conduct an interview in English—which Mr. Baghdasaryan speaks only poorly—would not satisfy Due Process. Finally, any interview conducted now would not be prompt. *See, e.g.*, *M.S.L. v. Bostock*, Civ. No. 6:25-cv-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (27-day delay not prompt); *Yang v. Kaiser*, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (two-month delay not prompt); *Soryadvongsa v. Noem*, 24-cv-2663-AGS-DDL, 2025 WL 3126821, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2025) (29-day delay not prompt). That alone is enough to grant the petition.

Second, ICE did not comply with §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i)'s requirement that, "upon revocation," the re-detained person be "notified of the reasons for revocation." As Judge Moskowitz recently explained, the regulation's text and due process require that the notice be written. *Tran v. Noem*, 25-cv-2391-BTM, Dkt. 16, at 5–6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). Here, ICE has not given Mr. Baghdasaryan any written explanation for his re-detention. Exh. A at ¶ 5. (Mr. Baghdasaryan cannot read English anyway, so any attempt to give him an English-language explanation would not have satisfied due process. *Id.*) And the only oral explanation—that he was a criminal—is false, as Mr. Baghdasaryan does not have a criminal record. *Id.* That makes the failure to provide an interview even more egregious, as Mr. Baghdasaryan had no chance to correct the record.

Third, ICE did not revoke Mr. Baghdasaryan's release for a permissible reason. He was not returned to custody because of a conditions violation. Exh. A at ¶ 4. And there are no changed circumstances that justify re-detaining him. Mr. Baghdasaryan was ordered removed to Armenia over two decades ago. *Id.* at ¶ 1. In all that time, ICE never proved able to remove him. Absent any evidence for "why obtaining a travel document is more likely this time around[,] Respondents' intent to eventually complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not constitute a changed circumstance." *Hoac v. Becerra*, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (citing *Liu v. Carter*, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at *2 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025)). Indeed, there is no indication that ICE even made a pre-arrest determination that changed circumstances made Mr. Baghdasaryan's removal likely. If the government is unable to produce "any documented determination, made prior to Petitioner's arrest," that any of the prerequisites to re-detention were met, then Mr. Baghdasaryan must be released on those grounds, too. *Rokhfirooz v. Larose*, 2025 WL 2646165, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025).

"[B]ecause officials did not properly revoke petitioner's release pursuant to the applicable regulations, that revocation has no effect, and [Mr. Baghdasaryan] is entitled to his release (subject to the same Order of Supervision that governed his most recent release)." *Liu*, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3.

II. Count 2: Mr. Baghdasaryan's detention violates *Zadvydas* and 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

A. Legal background

Mr. Baghdasaryan's indefinite detention also violates the statute authorizing detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court considered a problem affecting people like Mr. Baghdasaryan. Federal law requires ICE to detain an immigrant during the "removal period," which typically spans the first 90 days after the immigrant is

ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). After that 90-day removal period expires, detention becomes discretionary—ICE may detain the migrant while continuing to try to remove them. *Id.* § 1231(a)(6). Ordinarily, this scheme would not lead to excessive detention, as removal happens within days or weeks. But some detainees cannot be removed quickly. Perhaps their removal "simply require[s] more time for processing," or they are "ordered removed to countries with whom the United States does not have a repatriation agreement," or their countries "refuse to take them," or they are "effectively 'stateless' because of their race and/or place of birth." *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*, 257 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001). In these and other circumstances, detained immigrants can find themselves trapped in detention for months, years, decades, or even the rest of their lives.

If federal law were understood to allow for "indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention," it would pose "a serious constitutional threat." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 699. In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional concern by interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to incorporate implicit limits. *Id.* at 689.

As an initial matter, *Zadvydas* held that detention is "presumptively reasonable" for at least six months. *Id.* at 701. This acts as a kind of grace period for effectuating removals.

Following the six-month grace period, courts must use a burden-shifting framework to decide whether detention remains authorized. First, the petitioner must make a prima facie case for relief: He must prove that there is "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.*

If he does so, the burden shifts to "the Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." *Id.* Ultimately, then, the burden of proof rests with the government: The government must prove that there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," or the immigrant must be released. *Id.*

A. The six-month grace period has expired.

As an initial matter, the six-month grace period has long since ended. The *Zadvydas* grace period lasts for "*six months* after a final order of removal—that is, *three months* after the statutory removal period has ended." *Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft*, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Mr. Baghdasaryan received a final order of removal in February 2005. Automated Case Information, EOIR, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. Accordingly, his 90-day removal period began then. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). The *Zadvydas* grace period therefore expired three months after the removal period ended, in August 2005. Thus, the threshold requirement is met.

B. There is good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of Mr. Baghdasaryan removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Because the six-month grace period has passed, this Court must evaluate Mr. Baghdasaryan's *Zadvydas* claim using the burden-shifting framework. At the first stage of the framework, there must be "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This standard can be broken down into three parts.

"Good reason to believe." The "good reason to believe" standard is a relatively forgiving one. "A petitioner need not establish that there exists no possibility of removal." *Freeman v. Watkins*, No. CV B:09-160, 2009 WL 10714999, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). Nor does "'[g]ood reason to believe' . . . place a burden upon the detainee to demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or show that his detention is indefinite; it is something less than that." *Rual v. Barr*, No. 6:20-CV-06215 EAW, 2020 WL 3972319, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020) (quoting *Senor v. Barr*, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). In short, the standard means what it says: Petitioners need only give a "good reason"—not prove anything to a certainty.

"No significant likelihood of removal." This component focuses on whether Mr. Baghdasaryan will likely be removed: Continued detention is permissible only if it is "significant[ly] like[ly]" that ICE will be able to remove him. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This inquiry targets "not only the *existence* of untapped possibilities, but also [the] probability of *success* in such possibilities." *Elashi v. Sabol*, 714 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (second emphasis added). In other words, even if "there remains *some* possibility of removal," a petitioner can still meet its burden if there is good reason to believe that successful removal is not significantly likely. *Kacanic v. Elwood*, No. CIV.A. 02-8019, 2002 WL 31520362, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2002) (emphasis added).

"In the reasonably foreseeable future." This component of the test focuses on when Mr. Baghdasaryan will likely be removed: Continued detention is permissible only if removal is likely to happen "in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. This inquiry places a time limit on ICE's removal efforts. If the Court has "no idea of when it might reasonably expect [Petitioner] to be repatriated, this Court certainly cannot conclude that his removal is likely to occur—or even that it might occur—in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Palma v. Gillis*, No. 5:19-CV-112-DCB-MTP, 2020 WL 4880158, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2020), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2020 WL 4876859 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2020) (quoting *Singh v. Whitaker*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). Thus, even if this Court concludes that Mr. Baghdasaryan "would *eventually* receive" a travel document, he can still meet his burden by giving good reason to anticipate sufficiently lengthy delays. *Younes v. Lynch*, 2016 WL 6679830, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2016).

Mr. Baghdasaryan readily satisfies the above standards. ICE could not remove him in 2004. Exh. A at ¶ 2. And ICE still could not remove him during two decades of release. *Id.* at ¶¶ 2–4. And there is a good explanation for this failure: Even though Mr. Baghdasaryan provided his passport, Armenia was not able to

confirm his citizenship. *Id.* at ¶ 2. There is therefore very good reason to believe that ICE cannot remove him.

Mr. Baghdasaryan has met his initial burden. Thus, unless the government can prove a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," Mr. Baghdasaryan must be released. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701.

III. Count 3: ICE may not remove Mr. Baghdasaryan to a third country without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Unable to remove Mr. Baghdasaryan to Armenia, ICE may try to remove him to a third country. If so, it could do so under a policy that violates the Fifth Amendment, the Convention Against Torture, and implementing regulations.

A. Legal background

U.S. law enshrines protections against dangerous and life-threatening removal decisions. By statute, the government is prohibited from removing an immigrant to any third country where they may be persecuted or tortured, a form of protection known as withholding of removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The government "may not remove [a noncitizen] to a country if the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen's] life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the [noncitizen's] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." *Id.*; *see also* 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16. Withholding of removal is a mandatory protection.

Similarly, Congress codified protections enshrined in the CAT prohibiting the government from removing a person to a country where they would be tortured. *See* FARRA 2681-822 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note) ("It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States."); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; *id.*

§§ 208.16-208.18, 1208.16-1208.18. CAT protection is also mandatory.

To comport with the requirements of due process, the government must provide notice of the third country removal and an opportunity to respond. Due process requires "written notice of the country being designated" and "the statutory basis for the designation, i.e., the applicable subsection of § 1231(b)(2)." *Aden v. Nielsen*, 409 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2019); *accord D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025); *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).

The government must also "ask the noncitizen whether he or she fears persecution or harm upon removal to the designated country and memorialize in writing the noncitizen's response. This requirement ensures DHS will obtain the necessary information from the noncitizen to comply with section 1231(b)(3) and avoids [a dispute about what was said]." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. "Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process." *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041.

If the noncitizen claims fear, measures must be taken to ensure that the noncitizen can seek asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT before an immigration judge in reopened removal proceedings. The amount and type of notice must be "sufficient" to ensure that "given [a noncitizen's] capacities and circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his claim for withholding of deportation." *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) and *Kossov v. I.N.S.*, 132 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1998)); *cf. D.V.D.*, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (requiring the government to move to reopen the noncitizen's immigration proceedings if the individual demonstrates "reasonable fear" and to provide "a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen days, for the non-citizen to seek reopening

of their immigration proceedings" if the noncitizen is found to not have demonstrated "reasonable fear"); *Aden*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1019 (requiring notice and time for a respondent to file a motion to reopen and seek relief).

"[L]ast minute" notice of the country of removal will not suffice, *Andriasian*, 180 F.3d at 1041; *accord Najjar v. Lunch*, 630 Fed. App'x 724 (9th Cir. 2016), and for good reason: To have a meaningful opportunity to apply for fear-based protection from removal, immigrants must have time to prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence. Merely telling a person where they may be sent, without giving them a chance to look into country conditions, does not give them a meaningful chance to determine whether and why they have a credible fear.

B. The June 6, 2025 memo's removal policies violate the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the Conviction Against Torture, and Implementing Regulations.

The policies in the June 6, 2025 memo do not adhere to these requirements. First, under the policy, ICE need not give immigrants *any* notice or hearing before removing them to a country that—in the State Department's estimation—has provided "credible" "assurances" against persecution and torture. Exh. B. By depriving immigrants of any chance to challenge the State Department's view, this policy violates "[t]he essence of due process," "the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (cleaned up).

Second, even when the government has obtained no credible assurances against persecution and torture, the government can still remove the person with between 6 and 24 hours' notice, depending on the circumstances. Exh. B. Practically speaking, there is not nearly enough time for a detained person to assess their risk in the third country and martial evidence to support any credible fear—let alone a chance to file a motion to reopen with an IJ. An immigrant may know nothing about a third country, like Eswatini or South Sudan, when they are

scheduled for removal there. Yet if given the opportunity to investigate conditions, immigrants would find credible reasons to fear persecution or torture—like patterns of keeping deportees indefinitely and without charge in solitary confinement or extreme instability raising a high likelihood of death—in many of the third countries that have agreed to removal thus far. Due process requires an adequate chance to identify and raise these threats to health and life. This Court must prohibit the government from removing Mr. Baghdasaryan without these due process safeguards.

IV. This Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on any disputed facts.

Resolution of a prolonged-detention habeas petition may require an evidentiary hearing. *Owino v. Napolitano*, 575 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). Mr. Baghdasaryan hereby requests such a hearing on any material, disputed facts.

V. Prayer for relief

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody;
2. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless ICE copies with all requirements of 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13;
3. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for his removal;
4. Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner to any country other than Armenia unless they provide the following process, *see D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640, at *1 (D. Mass. May 21, 2025):
    a. written notice to both Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in a language Petitioner can understand;
    b. a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal;

c. if Petitioner is found to have demonstrated "reasonable fear" of removal to the country, Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner's immigration proceedings;

d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a "reasonable fear" of removal to the country, a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen days, for the Petitioner to seek reopening of his immigration proceedings.

5. Order all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 19, 2026

s/ Katie Hurrelbrink

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