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DETAINED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In the matter of: **WEIPING LIU** **v.** **CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, WARDEN OF OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER**	**Case Number:** '26CV1546 JO MMP [redacted] **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN THREE DAYS; COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF** Challenge to Unlawful Incarceration; Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Petitioner is a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China who entered the United States at or near the San Luis, Arizona Port of Entry on or about April 27, 2023. On the same day, she was served with a Notice to Appear and was released on an order of recognizance. **See Exhibit "A" -Order of Release on Recognizance & Notice to Appear (NTA).**
2. Petitioner fled the People's Republic of China to escape persecution by Chinese government authorities on account of her political opinion. As a result of this persecution, Petitioner submitted her Application for Asylum (Form I-589).
3. Petitioner has been residing in the United States after her release since April 27, 2023.
4. On August 10, 2025, at approximately 7:00 a.m., she was arrested near State Route 94 (Tecate Road) in San Diego, California by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondent has revoked Petitioner's release on recognizance without proper notice.
5. Petitioner is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in Otay Mesa, CA.
6. Petitioner has already had six Master Hearings, and her upcoming merits hearing is currently set on May 30, 2026.
7. The petitioner has had legal authorization to work in the U.S. and a U.S. Social Security Number since September 2024.
8. The petitioner has a minor daughter residing in the United States, who is currently attending High School in New York. She has no relatives in the United States other than her mother.

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9. Petitioner is experiencing serious medical conditions. She suffers from lumbar nerve compression causing difficulty walking. She has also been diagnosed with bilateral parietal lobe lacunar infarcts (small vessel ischemic changes). Delayed and prolonged detention exacerbated Petitioner's preexisting condition. Continued detention causes more severe problems.
10. During her detention, petitioner has been repeatedly bullied by other detainees.
11. If released, Petitioner will reunite with her daughter Hongkun Li, who is a minor and has no other relatives in the U.S. Prior to her detention, Petitioner attended all required immigration appointments and consistently complied with every requirement imposed by ICE.
12. Petitioner has remained in immigration detention already seven (7) months to date.
13. During her prolonged detention, Petitioner has suffered significant physical and mental health deterioration. Her continued confinement has caused and continues to cause serious harm.
14. Respondents now seek to keep Petitioner detained without a meaningful opportunity to seek a bond hearing. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Respondents do so based not on Petitioner's personal circumstances or individualized facts.
15. But Respondents cannot evade due process requirements so easily. The U.S. Constitution requires the Respondents provide at least the rights available to her when she filed her application.
16. The Constitution protects Petitioner, and every other person present in this country- from arbitrary deprivations of her liberty and guarantees her due process of law. The government's power over immigration is broad, but as the Supreme Court has declared, it "is subject to important constitutional limitations" *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). "Freedom from bodily restraint

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always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action" *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).

17. Petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to compel her immediate release from the immigration jail where she has been held by DHS since being unlawfully detained on August 10, 2025, without first being provided a due process hearing to determine whether her incarceration is justified.

18. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. Government's revocation of Petitioner's release on recognizance without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights.

19. Absent review in this Court, no other neutral adjudicator will examine Petitioner's rights: Respondents will continue-unchecked-to detain her unlawfully under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1), INA § 235 (b)(1), without due process.

20. Petitioner respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of habeas corpus to release Petitioner from detention within 10 days unless Respondents schedule a hearing before an IJ where: (1) to continue detention, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger, even after consideration of alternatives to detention that could mitigate any risk that Petitioner's release would present; and (2) if the government cannot meet its burden, the IJ shall order Petitioner's release on appropriate conditions of supervision, taking into account Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.

21. Petitioner's continued detention is arbitrary and unlawful, and she requests that this Court order her immediate release from ICE custody.

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JURISDICTION

22. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause).

24. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651

25. Federal District courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens challenging the lawfulness of their detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.

26. Federal courts also have federal question jurisdiction, through the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), to deem unlawful and to set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise inconsistent with law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). APA claims are cognizable on habeas. 5 U.S.C. §703, which provides that judicial review of agency action under the APA may be proceeded by any applicable form of legal action, including but not limited to habeas corpus. The APA affords a right of review to a person who is adversely affected or harmed by agency action.

VENUE

27. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1) because Petitioner is detained within this district in the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Furthermore, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred and continue to occur

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at ICE's Washington Field Office in Chantilly, Virginia, within this division. No real property is involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. §1391(e).

CUSTODY AND REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243

28. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the Respondents "forthwith" unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file return "within three days unless good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed." *Id.*

29. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).

30. Petitioner is "in custody" for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. section 2241 because she was arrested by Respondents and remains in their legal and physical custody at Otay Mesa Detention Center, in California. She is under Respondent's and their agents' direct control.

PARTIES

31. Petitioner is a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China who entered the United States at or near the San Luis, Arizona Port of Entry on or about April 27, 2023. On the same day, she was served with a Notice to Appear and was released on an order of recognizance.

32. Petitioner fled the People's Republic of China to escape persecution by Chinese government authorities on account of her political opinion. As a result of this persecution, Petitioner submitted her Application for Asylum (Form I-589).

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33. After her release, on August 10, 2025, at approximately 7:00 a.m., she was arrested near State Route 94 (Tecate Road) in San Diego, California by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

34. Respondent has revoked Petitioner's release on recognizance Petitioner without proper notice.

35. Petitioner's upcoming merits hearing is currently set on May 30, 2026.

36. During her prolonged detention, Petitioner has suffered significant physical and mental health deterioration. Her continued confinement has caused and continues to cause serious harm.

37. Respondent Christopher J. Larose is the senior Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center located at San Diego, CA, where Petitioner is detained.

38. Petitioner has remained in immigration detention already seven (7) months to date.

39. The petitioner has had legal authorization to work in the U.S. and a U.S. Social Security Number since September 2024.

40. The petitioner has a minor daughter residing in the United States, who is currently attending High School in New York. She has no relatives in the United States other than her mother.

41. Petitioner is experiencing serious medical conditions. She suffers from lumbar nerve compression causing difficulty walking. She has also been diagnosed with bilateral parietal lobe lacunar infarcts (small vessel ischemic changes). Delayed and prolonged detention exacerbated Petitioner's preexisting condition. Continued detention causes more severe problems.

42. During her detention, petitioner has been repeatedly bullied by other detainees.

43. Respondents seek to keep Petitioner detained without providing a meaningful opportunity to seek a bond hearing, in violation of due-process requirements. *See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.*

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44. Respondents cannot evade constitutional requirements. The U.S. Constitution guarantees Petitioner the same due-process protections available to her at the time she filed her application for relief, including freedom from arbitrary and indefinite detention.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
ICE'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF PETITIONER, WITHOUT REVIEWING HER CUSTODY UNDER ICE POLICY VIOLATES THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DUE PROCESS.

45. ICE's long-standing policy is to release non-citizens immediately following a grant of asylum, relief absent exceptional circumstances.

46. Under the Accardi doctrine, which originated in the context of an immigration case and has been developed through subsequent immigration caselaw, agencies are bound to follow their own rules that affect the fundamental rights of individuals, even self-imposed policies and processes that limit otherwise discretionary decisions. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 226 (holding that BIA must follow its own regulations in its exercise of discretion); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.").

47. The requirement that an agency follow its own policies is not "limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations." Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). Even an unpublished policy binds the agency if "an examination of the provision's language, its context, and any available extrinsic evidence" supports the conclusion that it is "mandatory rather than merely precatory." Doe v. Hampton, 566 2d 265, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Morton, 415 U.S. at

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235-36 (applying Accardi to violation of internal agency manual); U S. v. Heffner , 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Nor does it matter that these IRS instructions to Special Agents were not promulgated in something formally labeled a 'Regulation' . . .").

48. When agencies fail to adhere to their own policies as required by Accardi, courts typically frame the violation as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the APA, see Damus v. Nielson, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (D.D.C. 2018) ("It is clear, moreover, that [Accardi] claims may arise under the APA"), or as a due process violation, see Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force , 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) ("An agency's failure to follow its own regulations tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation of an individual's constitutional right to due process.") (internal quotations omitted).

49. Prejudice is generally presumed when an agency violates its own policy. See Montilla, 926 F.2d at 167 ("We hold that an alien claiming the INS has failed to adhere to its own regulations . . . is not required to make a showing of prejudice before she is entitled to relief. All that need be shown is that the subject regulations were for the alien's benefit and that the INS failed to adhere to them."); Heffner, 420 F.2d at 813 ("The Accardi doctrine furthermore requires reversal irrespective of whether a new trial will produce the same verdict.").

50. To remedy an Accardi violation, a court may direct the agency to properly apply its policy, see Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 343 ("[T]his Court is simply ordering that Defendants do what they already admit is required."), or a court may apply the policy itself and order relief consistent with the policy. See Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 657 (D. Mass. 2018) (scheduling bail hearing to

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review petitioners' custody under ICE's standards because "it would be particularly unfair to require that petitioners remain detained . . . while ICE attempts to remedy its failure").

51. Here, Petitioner falls into this category where ICE has failed to act as required by their procedures and require intervention.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

GROUND ONE

VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

Petitioner has the right to challenge the legality of her detention

52. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

53. Petitioner has due process rights to challenge their detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 695 (2001) (while noncitizens outside the United States' "geographic borders" lack constitutional protections, all "persons" within them are protected by the Due Process Clause, regardless of immigration status); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2022) (though constitutional rights of citizens and noncitizens "are not coextensive," noncitizens are entitled to due process, including to challenge detention pending proceedings).

54. As the Ninth Circuit held, the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens regardless of whether they are "seeking admission" or are "admitted" under immigration law. Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023). The Due Process Clause allows Petitioner to challenge her detention.

55. Petitioner challenges her deprivation of liberty and detention, not the adequacy

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of the procedures the immigration laws afford her "with respect to admission. Petitioner solely challenging her detention and revocation of release on recognizance without proper notice, and she is not bringing a constitutional claim with respect to the procedures governing her legal admission into the United States.

56. To the extent Respondent takes the extraordinary position that Petitioner has no due process rights at all, that is unsupported by law and would have gruesome practical consequences: "If excludable [noncitizens] were not protected by even the substantive component of constitutional due process, … we do not see why the United States government could not torture or summarily execute them. … [W]e conclude that government treatment of excludable [noncitizens] must implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.". Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 412 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he principle that unadmitted [noncitizens] have no constitutionally protected rights defies rationality. Under this view, the Attorney General, for example, could invoke legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained [noncitizens] …. Surely, we would not condone mass starvation."). Thus, there is no question that Petitioner has the right to challenge the constitutionality of her prolonged detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

57. The relief Petitioner is entitled to is not limited to a bond hearing; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody *See, e.g.*, *Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 ("[Petitioner's] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk or a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in

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remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria."); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 ("Petitioner is not an "arriving" noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates she is afforded the Fifth Amendment's guaranteed due process before removal."); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in her release).

58. This Court accordingly found constitutional limits to apply to immigration detention, irrespective of the underlying detention authority. See, e.g., Karakhanyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center-3:25-cv-03454-JO-MMP; Romik Parunakyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center 25-cv-3739-LL-MSB; L.S. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center; M.F. v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:25-cv-3599-CAB-MSB, Vikas Kumar v. Christopher Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center et al., 25-CV-3796 JLS (DDL); Aigul Kazybayeva v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:26-cv-00421-GPC-MMP; Dariya Karmamoldoyeva v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:26-cv-00423-GPC-MSB.

59. Likewise, in Liping Zhao V. Christopher J. Larose 26-cv-1285-JES-DDL-(**granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting release on recognizance on due process grounds**).

60. Furthermore, relief was granted in similar matter. *See Doe v. Becerra*, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2025); *Duong v. Kaiser*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2689266, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. 2025); *Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; *Gonzalez Salazar*, 2025 WL 3063629, at *6; *Abdul Kadir v. Larose*, Case No.: 25cv1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025); *Matute*

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v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2495767, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025).

61. ICE has violated Petitioner's due process rights by denying her an individualized custody review to which she is entitled under ICE policy.

62. As a remedy, this Court should conduct its own review of Petitioner's custody or, at least, order ICE to review Petitioner's custody under the standard articulated in ICE policy.

GROUND TWO

VIOLATION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (A)(6)

Mandatory detention is subject to constitutional limits

63. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

64. "Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of liberty [Due Process Clause] protects." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.

65. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with her community, working and continuing the process of seeking asylum. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 ("Subject to the conditions of her release on recognizance, she can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachment of normal life.")

66. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner's release on recognizance was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving an opportunity being heard. Since DHS's initial determination that Petitioner should be released because she posed no danger to the community and was not at flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changes. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal2017).

67. Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal

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trouble, had work authorization. "Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting her merely because she is subject to removal proceedings." Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1760. "Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances-namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk.." *Id.*

68. Government's interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, and a hearing is "low." *See Pinchi*, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; *Matute*, 2025 WL 2817795, at *6; *Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) ("If the government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low."). Respondents fail to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice, reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing.

69. Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her release on recognizance in violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. *See, e.g.*, *Alegria Palma v. Larose et al.*, No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of release on recognizance without a pre-deprivation hearing); *Navarro Sanchez*, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting order of release on recognizance on due process grounds).1

70. Petitioner's release on recognizance without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. Therefore, her continued detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and she must be immediately released.

71. Furthermore, Petitioner is challenging her detention on constitutional grounds, not

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statutory grounds. Notwithstanding the fact that she is being detained pursuant to section 1225(b), Petitioner's detention is unequivocally subject to Constitutional limits. The Supreme Court has not precluded noncitizens from bringing as-applied constitutional challenges to their mandatory detention. Respondent correctly states: Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) "did not explicitly address constitutionality arguments." U.S. Likewise, While in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the availability of judicial review over as-applied challenges to detention, including mandatory detention. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 420 (2019); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532-33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This Court accordingly found constitutional limits to apply to immigration detention, irrespective of the underlying detention authority. See, e.g., Vikas Kumar v. Christopher Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center et al., 25-CV-3796 JLS (DDL); Aigul Kazybayeva v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:26-cv-00421-GPC-MMP; Dariya Karmamoldoyeva v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center 3:26-cv-00423-GPC-MSB. (**granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds**).

72. This Court should so hold as well.

GROUND THREE

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

Petitioner's ongoing and unreviewed detention violates her constitutional due process rights and cannot continue without a bond hearing

73. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein. Courts must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

74. The Ninth Circuit in Singh stressed that "it is improper to ask the individual to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual—deprivation of liberty— is so significant[.]" See Singh, 638 F. 3d at 1205; Black, 103 F.4th at 157-58 (observing that where "an individual's liberty is at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently used [clear and convincing] evidentiary standard for continued detention") (internal citations omitted); id. at 159 (reiterating that the government bears the burden of meeting this standard even where an individual is detained pursuant to mandatory detention). This Court should, too, apply the heavy burden on the government to justify Petitioner's continued civil detention without a bond hearing.

75. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, the adjudicator must consider alternatives to detention and Petitioner's financial circumstances in determining whether further detention is warranted and the conditions of her release. See, e.g., Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 ("If the government is setting monetary bonds to ensure appearance at future proceedings, there is no legitimate reason for it not to consider the individual's financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release.").

76. Thus, due process and Ninth Circuit precedent require that the government bear the burden of justifying Petitioner's ongoing and prolonged detention by clear and convincing evidence.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

a) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

b) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three

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days.

c) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6);

d) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to be released.

e) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and

f) Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C.§ 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for her removal.

g) Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without first following all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures.

h) Enjoin Respondents from removing Petitioner unless they provide the following process:

a. written notice to both Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in a language Petitioner can understand.

i) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: March 11, 2026,

Respectfully submitted

Naira Zohrabyan
Attorney for Petitioner