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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAVJOT SINGH

Petitioner,

v.

JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the Imperial
Regional Detention Center; TODD LYONS,
Acting Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Acting
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of
the United States

Respondents.

Civil Action No. '26CV1543 TWR MSB

VERIFIED PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Singh is unlawfully detained after the Government abruptly revoked liberty that an Immigration Judge granted nearly a decade ago. Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States on December 28, 2016, without inspection. Shortly after his entry, immigration authorities detained Petitioner, but an Immigration Judge ordered his release on bond in the amount of \$14,000. Petitioner posted the bond and was released pursuant to the Immigration Judge's order.

2. Since his release, Petitioner has remained at liberty in the United States for years without

1 incident. He complied fully with all conditions of his bond order and has never been accused of
2 violating any bond requirement. Petitioner has no criminal history and has never been arrested, charged,
3 or convicted of any offense.

4 3. On April 29, 2024, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging
5 him solely under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present in the United States without admission
6 or parole. Petitioner has remained in ongoing removal proceedings before the Immigration Court and
7 has continued to comply with all immigration requirements.

9 4. Petitioner built a stable life during his many years in the United States. He obtained
10 lawful employment as a commercial truck driver, maintained stable residence and employment, and
11 remained in full compliance with immigration authorities.

13 5. Despite Petitioner’s longstanding compliance with his bond order and nearly a decade
14 of lawful presence without criminal conduct, Respondents abruptly detained him on February 28, 2026.
15 At the time, Petitioner had safely parked his commercial truck at a designated rest area and was sleeping
16 inside the vehicle during a scheduled rest period required for commercial drivers. Officers approached
17 the truck, knocked on the window, and asked Petitioner to step outside. When Petitioner presented his
18 commercial driver’s license and valid employment authorization document, officers nevertheless
19 detained him without identifying any violation, traffic offense, or legal cause.

21 6. Respondents have attempted to justify Petitioner’s detention by asserting that he is
22 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) based on DHS’s July 8, 2025 Interim
23 Guidance and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decisions in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of*
24 *Q. Li*. But Petitioner had already been released on bond by an Immigration Judge, and his detention
25 authority—if any—arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and
26 eligibility for bond.
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PARTIES

13. Respondent Jeremy Casey is sued in his official capacity as Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Center. Respondent Casey is the physical custodian of Petitioner.

14. Respondent Todd Lyons is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Lyons is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release him.

15. Respondent Markwayne Mullin is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention and custody. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

16. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

17. Petitioner Singh is a native and citizen of India.

18. Petitioner entered the United States on December 28, 2016, without inspection.

19. Shortly after his entry, immigration authorities detained Petitioner. An Immigration Judge subsequently granted Petitioner release on bond in the amount of \$14,000, which Petitioner posted. Petitioner was released from custody pursuant to the Immigration Judge's bond order.

20. Petitioner fully complied with the conditions of the bond order. He appeared as required for immigration proceedings and complied with all directives issued by immigration authorities.

1 21. Since his release, Petitioner has remained at liberty in the United States for many years
2 without incident. At no time has the Government alleged that Petitioner violated any bond condition or
3 failed to comply with immigration requirements.

4 22. Petitioner has no criminal history. He has never been arrested, charged, or convicted of
5 any offense. Immigration authorities have never alleged that he poses a danger to the community or a
6 flight risk.

7
8 23. On April 29, 2024, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging
9 removability solely under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

10 24. Petitioner has remained in pre-final order removal proceedings before the Immigration
11 Court and has continued to comply with all immigration requirements.

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13 25. During his many years in the United States, Petitioner established stable employment
14 and worked as a commercial truck driver.

15 26. On February 28, 2026, Petitioner was resting in his commercial truck at a designated
16 rest area after safely parking his vehicle during a work route. Commercial drivers are required to take
17 rest breaks, and Petitioner was sleeping in the truck at the time.

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19 27. Officers approached the truck, knocked on the window, and asked Petitioner to step
20 outside.

21 28. Officers asked Petitioner about his immigration status. Petitioner presented his
22 commercial driver's license and valid employment authorization document, which reflected his
23 authorization to work and his pending immigration proceedings.

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25 29. Despite Petitioner's longstanding compliance with immigration authorities, officers
26 detained him immediately.

27 30. Officers did not allege any traffic violation, criminal conduct, or violation of bond
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1 conditions.

2 31. Petitioner was detained without prior notice, without any alleged noncompliance, and
3 without any individualized custody determination.

4 32. Respondents' detention decision reflects a categorical policy to treat certain noncitizens
5 as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) based on DHS's July 8, 2025 Interim
6 Guidance and the BIA's decisions in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and *Matter of Q. Li*.

7 33. Petitioner had already been granted liberty by an Immigration Judge through a bond
8 order, and he relied on that liberty by living and working in the United States for years while complying
9 with all immigration requirements.

10 34. Respondents revoked that liberty without providing any pre-deprivation hearing or
11 opportunity to contest the legal basis for detention.

12 35. Petitioner remains detained without access to bond or individualized review.

13 36. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief to secure immediate release or, at minimum,
14 a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

15 **STATUTORY FRAMEWORK**

16 37. The INA prescribes three primary statutory authorities that govern detention of
17 noncitizens in removal proceedings. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the detention of noncitizens
18 in standard non-expedited removal proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
19 Individuals in section 1226(a) detention are entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention,
20 *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or
21 convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

22 38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited
23 removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under
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1 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

2 39. Finally, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who are subject to final
3 orders of removal, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).
4 The detention provisions at section 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal
5 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div.
6 C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226(c) was most
7 recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”), Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3
8 (2025).
9

10 40. Following enactment of the IIRIRA, the EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that,
11 in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained under
12 section 1225 and that they were instead detained under section 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited
13 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum
14 Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). In the decades that followed, most noncitizens
15 who entered without inspection—unless they were subject to some other detention authority—received
16 bond hearings. This practice was also consistent with the practice prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA,
17 in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ
18 or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229
19 (1996) (noting that section 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at section
20 1252(a)).
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24 41. On July 8, 2025, DHS issued a memo to all employees of ICE stating that “[t]his
25 message serves as notice that DHS, in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ), has revisited
26 its legal position on detention and release authorities. DHS has determined that section 235 of the
27 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8 U.S.C. § 1225], rather than section 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226],
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1 is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission. The following interim
 2 guidance is intended to ensure immediate and consistent application of the Department's legal
 3 interpretation while additional operational guidance is developed." The memo further stated DHS' new
 4 position with regard to custody determinations as follows:

5
 6 An "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
 7 or who arrives in the United States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival. INA §
 8 235(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)]. **Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that such**
 9 **aliens are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] and may not be**
 10 **released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole.** These aliens are also ineligible
 11 for a custody redetermination hearing ("bond hearing") before an immigration judge and may
 12 not be released for the duration of their removal proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For
 13 custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have
 14 historically been treated. **The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release**
 15 **on recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during**
 16 **removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with**
 17 **deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention**
 18 **under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].**

14 Moving forward, ICE will not issue Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination, to applicants
 15 for admission because Form I-286 applies by its terms only to custody determinations under
 16 INA § 236 and part 236 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. With a limited exception
 17 for certain habeas petitioners, on which the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) will
 18 individually advise, if Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) previously conducted a
 19 custody determination for an applicant for admission still detained in ICE custody, ERO will
 20 affirmatively cancel the Form I-286.

19 *See* [https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-](https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission)
 20 [applications-for-admission](https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission) (last accessed October 18, 2025) (emphasis original).

21 42. As a result, DHS now considers all noncitizens who have entered the United States
 22 without inspection and are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, including long-time U.S. residents,
 23 to be subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b) and ineligible for release on bond.
 24 Conversely, according to DHS "[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on
 25 recognizance, bond, or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal
 26 proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA §
 27 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. §
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1 1226(c)].” *Id.*

2 43. Shortly thereafter, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued decisions
3 reflecting the same interpretation. In *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) and *Matter of Yajure*
4 *Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board concluded that Immigration Judges lack bond
5 authority over certain noncitizens present in the United States without admission because, in the
6 Board’s view, § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention of such “applicants for admission” during removal
7 proceedings.
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9 44. Federal courts, however, have rejected DHS’s attempt to reclassify noncitizens already
10 placed in removal proceedings as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Courts have
11 recognized that such individuals remain properly detained, if at all, under § 1226(a) and therefore retain
12 the statutory right to seek release on bond. See, e.g., *Bautista–Maldonado v. DHS*, holding that DHS
13 may not retroactively convert individuals already in removal proceedings into § 1225(b) detainees in
14 order to deny them access to bond.
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16 45. Petitioner falls squarely within this framework. He entered the United States, was placed
17 in removal proceedings, and was released on his own recognizance under DHS supervision. Under the
18 statutory scheme and longstanding agency practice, his detention authority—if any—arises under §
19 1226(a).
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21 46. Respondents nevertheless rely on DHS’s July 8, 2025 guidance and the Board’s recent
22 decisions to claim that Petitioner is categorically subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and
23 therefore ineligible for a bond hearing. That interpretation conflicts with the statutory structure of the
24 INA and unlawfully deprives Petitioner of the procedural protections guaranteed under § 1226(a).
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26 47. The government’s re-detention of Petitioner conflicts not only with the statutory
27 structure of the INA, but also with fundamental due process protections governing the revocation of
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1 previously granted liberty.

2 48. Independent of the statutory violation, Petitioner's re-detention violates the Fifth
3 Amendment's Due Process Clause because the government revoked his previously granted liberty
4 without providing any pre-deprivation process.

5 49. DHS initially determined that detention was unnecessary and released Petitioner on a
6 bond order of \$14,000. Petitioner relied on that release determination and complied fully with every
7 condition imposed.

9 50. Once the government grants an individual liberty—particularly liberty granted through
10 a judicial bond determination and maintained for an extended period of time—that liberty interest
11 cannot be revoked arbitrarily or without constitutionally adequate procedures. Petitioner was released
12 from immigration detention pursuant to an Immigration Judge's bond order in the amount of \$14,000,
13 and he remained at liberty in the United States for years while fully complying with all conditions
14 imposed by the Immigration Court.

16 51. Courts have long recognized that when the government seeks to revoke previously
17 granted liberty, due process ordinarily requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral
18 decisionmaker prior to the deprivation. See *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Fuentes v.*
19 *Shevin*, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). These procedural protections are particularly critical where, as here, the
20 government seeks to withdraw liberty that has already been conferred and relied upon by the individual.

22 52. Here, DHS provided no such process. On February 28, 2026, Petitioner was resting in
23 his commercial truck at a designated rest area when officers approached the vehicle, knocked on the
24 window, and asked Petitioner to step outside. After Petitioner presented his commercial driver's license
25 and valid employment authorization document, officers immediately detained him.

27 53. DHS did not allege any violation of the Immigration Judge's bond order, any failure to
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1 comply with immigration requirements, any criminal conduct, or any changed factual circumstances
2 that would justify revocation of Petitioner's liberty.

3 **54.** Instead, Petitioner's liberty was revoked solely because DHS adopted a new legal
4 interpretation of detention authority based on its July 8, 2025 Interim Guidance and the Board's
5 decisions in Matter of Yajure Hurtado and Matter of Q. Li.

6
7 **55.** Petitioner was provided no advance notice that his bond status would be reconsidered,
8 no opportunity to contest the legal basis for detention, and no hearing before a neutral decisionmaker
9 prior to being taken into custody.

10 **56.** Revoking liberty that was previously granted by an Immigration Judge—after years of
11 compliance and without any alleged violation—based solely on a policy reinterpretation applied
12 retroactively violates the core protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

13
14 **57.** Because DHS revoked Petitioner's liberty without constitutionally required pre-
15 deprivation procedures and continues to detain him without providing access to a bond hearing,
16 Petitioner's detention is unlawful under both the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth
17 Amendment. Habeas relief is therefore warranted.

18
19 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

20 **COUNT ONE**

21 **Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Substantive Due Process**

22 **58.** The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

23
24 **59.** Petitioner challenges DHS's unlawful custody determination that he is subject to mandatory
25 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and ineligible for release on bond. Respondents' reliance on this
26 interpretation—based on DHS's July 8, 2025 Interim Guidance and the Board of Immigration Appeals' decisions
27 in Matter of Yajure Hurtado **and** Matter of Q. Li—has resulted in Petitioner's continued detention without access
28 to a bond hearing.

1 60. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
2 without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Freedom from physical restraint lies at the core of the liberty
3 protected by the Due Process Clause. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

4 61. Petitioner entered the United States in 2016 and was subsequently granted release on bond by
5 an Immigration Judge in the amount of \$14,000, which Petitioner posted. For many years thereafter Petitioner
6 remained at liberty in the United States while complying fully with all bond conditions and immigration
7 requirements.

8 62. On February 28, 2026, Respondents abruptly re-detained Petitioner while he was resting in his
9 commercial truck at a designated rest area during the course of his employment. After officers approached the
10 vehicle and asked Petitioner about his status, Petitioner presented his commercial driver’s license and valid
11 employment authorization document. Despite his long history of compliance, officers immediately detained him.
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13 63. The re-detention was not based on any alleged violation of the Immigration Judge’s bond order,
14 any criminal conduct, or any changed factual circumstances. Instead, the detention was based solely on DHS’s
15 revised legal interpretation of detention authority.

16 64. If Petitioner is detained at all, the governing authority is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes
17 discretionary detention and provides for eligibility for release on bond. By categorically treating Petitioner as
18 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), Respondents have eliminated any individualized assessment of
19 whether detention is necessary.
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21 65. Continued detention under these circumstances—after years of liberty granted by an
22 Immigration Judge and without any individualized findings—bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate
23 governmental purpose and therefore violates substantive due process.

24 66. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court order his immediate release or, in the alternative,
25 require Respondents to provide a prompt and constitutionally adequate bond hearing.

26 67. As a remedy, the Court should order Petitioner’s immediate release. In the alternative, the Court
27 should order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at
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1 which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention.

2 **COUNT TWO**

3 **Violation of Petitioner's Procedural Due Process Rights**

4 68. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

5 69. In *Mathews v. Eldridge*, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider in
6 determining if government action deprives an individual's Fifth Amendment right to procedural due
7 process or whether the government process is constitutionally adequate. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) The
8 *Mathews* factors are as follows: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
9 [S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
10 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; Third, the Government's
11 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
12 or substitute procedural requirement would entail. *Id.* at 335.

13 70. The risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial. DHS re-detained Petitioner without any
14 individualized custody review, without alleging any violation or changed circumstance, and without
15 affording him access to a bond hearing. The probable value of additional safeguards—namely, an
16 individualized bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator—is immense.

17 71. Procedural due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before
18 the government deprives an individual of a protected liberty interest, except in extraordinary
19 circumstances not present here.

20 72. Petitioner possessed a recognized liberty interest in remaining free from physical
21 detention. That liberty interest was reinforced by DHS's prior decision to release him and permit him
22 to remain at liberty under supervision for an extended period.

23 a. Respondents revoked that liberty on February 28, 2026 without providing:

24 a. advance notice that his release would be revoked;
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1 b. any opportunity to contest the legal basis for detention;

2 c. an individualized custody determination; or

3 d. a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

4 73. The re-detention was based solely on a change in agency interpretation, not on any
5 alleged violation, changed circumstance, or individualized risk assessment.

6
7 74. Because Respondents revoked Petitioner's liberty without providing a pre-deprivation
8 hearing and continue to deny him access to a meaningful custody determination, his detention violates
9 procedural due process.

10 75. Petitioner respectfully requests an order directing Respondents to provide a prompt bond
11 hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge at which the government bears the burden of justifying
12 continued detention.

13
14 **COUNT THREE**

15 **Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act**

16 76. The allegations in the above paragraphs are realleged and incorporated herein.

17
18 77. Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and released
19 pursuant to an Immigration Judge's bond order in the amount of \$14,000. Under the statutory structure
20 of the INA, detention in such proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), absent a separate
21 mandatory detention provision not applicable here.

22 78. Section 1226(a) authorizes discretionary detention and expressly permits release on
23 bond. Nothing in the statute authorizes DHS to retroactively reclassify a noncitizen already placed in §
24 1229a proceedings and previously released under § 1226(a) as subject to mandatory detention under §
25 1225(b).

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27 79. Respondents' categorical denial of bond eligibility and reliance on § 1225(b) exceed
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1 statutory authority and are contrary to law.

2 80. Because Petitioner's detention is not authorized by the INA, habeas relief under 28
3 U.S.C. § 2241 is warranted.

4 **COUNT FOUR**

5 **Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act**

6 81. The allegations above are incorporated herein.

7 82. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706 to
8 review final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.

9 83. DHS's determination that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
10 1225(b), and its re-detention of him on February 28, 2026 based solely on that interpretation, constitute
11 final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704. The custody determination is definitive,
12 determines Petitioner's rights and obligations, and has immediate legal consequences—namely, his
13 continued physical detention and categorical ineligibility for bond.

14 84. The Administrative Procedure Act directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
15 action” that is contrary to law; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; or arbitrary,
16 capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

17 85. DHS's application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner—who was arrested pursuant to an
18 Immigration Judge's bond order, and placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a—is contrary
19 to the structure and plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner is subject, if at
20 all, to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes discretionary detention and eligibility for
21 release on bond.

22 86. By reclassifying Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), DHS has
23 acted in excess of its statutory authority and effectively nullified the bond eligibility expressly provided
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1 under § 1226(a).

2 87. DHS's action is also arbitrary and capricious. The agency:

- 3 a. provided no individualized custody determination;
4 b. relied solely on a revised legal interpretation rather than any new conduct or changed
5 factual circumstance;
6 c. disregarded Petitioner's nearly decade-long compliance with the Immigration Judge's bond
7 order; and
8 d. failed to account for the reliance interests created by its prior decision to release him and
9 permit him to remain at liberty under supervision.

10 88. An agency must provide a reasoned explanation when it changes course, particularly
11 where prior action has created reliance interests. DHS offered no individualized or reasoned
12 explanation for reversing its earlier custody determination that detention was unnecessary.

13 89. Because Respondents' custody determination is contrary to law, in excess of statutory
14 authority, and arbitrary and capricious, it must be set aside pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

15 90. Petitioner respectfully requests declaratory and injunctive relief vacating the unlawful
16 custody determination and restoring his eligibility for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), including
17 access to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

18 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

19 Wherefore, Petitioner requests this Court to grant the following:

- 20 1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
21 2. Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner during the pendency of the instant action;
22 3. Declare that Petitioner's continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act,
23 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and/or the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
24 4. Order Petitioner's Immediate release from ICE custody; or
25 5. In the alternative, Order Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond
26 hearing before an Immigration Judge within 7 days, at which the government bears the
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burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence and must consider alternatives to detention.;

6. Grant Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") fees and costs; and

7. Grant any other further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully,

/s/Gurpreet Kaur

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, and I submit this verification on his behalf. Because Petitioner is detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Center and immediate relief is sought, counsel verifies this petition on his behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 11th day of March, 2026.

/s/Gurpreet Kaur

Gurpreet Kaur, Esq.