



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

**GABRIEL ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ
FERNANDEZ,**

Petitioner,

v.

**KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security;
TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity as
Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS,
PHOENIX FIELD OFFICE,
in his official capacity;
FACILITY ADMINISTRATOR (WARDEN)
FLORENCE SERVICE PROCESSING
CENTER,**

Respondents.

Civil Action No.

CV26-01612-PHX-SHD--ASB

Immigration No. 

**PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL
VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PRO SE
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez respectfully petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his current civil immigration detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").
2. Petitioner is currently detained in ICE custody at the Florence Service Processing Center located in Florence, Arizona, within the jurisdiction of this Court. See Ex. A.

3. Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and the current EOIR automated case information reflected in the record confirms the pendency of his immigration proceedings. See Ex. B.
4. Petitioner has sought humanitarian protection under United States immigration law, including filing an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589), which remains part of the immigration record. See Ex. I.
5. Petitioner has also been granted Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") for Venezuelan nationals during the designated period, which provides protection from removal while the designation remains in effect. See Ex. H. Petitioner's authorization to work lawfully in the United States is further reflected through his Employment Authorization Document issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Ex. K.
6. Petitioner is also a class member in ongoing federal litigation concerning the administration and protection of Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelan nationals, including National TPS Alliance, et al. v. Noem, which remains pending in federal court. As a TPS beneficiary and class member in that litigation, Petitioner remains protected from removal during the pendency of those protections. See Ex. H.
7. The present Petition arises within a broader legal landscape in which immigration courts have relied on recent Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") precedent, including Matter of Q. Li and Matter of Yajure Hurtado, in evaluating bond determinations and custody decisions. See Ex. D. However, numerous federal courts have reaffirmed that prolonged civil immigration detention without constitutionally adequate procedures violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains available to remedy unlawful detention. See Ex. G.

8. Despite these constitutional protections, Petitioner remains detained without constitutionally adequate process sufficient to justify continued civil confinement. Civil immigration detention may not be maintained indefinitely without meaningful individualized procedures demonstrating that such detention remains necessary and lawful.
9. Petitioner therefore respectfully petitions this Court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and seeks injunctive relief directing Respondents to release him, or alternatively to provide a constitutionally adequate individualized custody hearing without delay, to restore Petitioner's constitutional and statutory rights and to prevent continued unlawful detention.
10. Petitioner seeks immediate release, or in the alternative, a constitutionally adequate bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof consistent with the requirements of due process under the Fifth Amendment.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
12. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Petitioner Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez is in federal immigration custody and challenges the legality of that custody under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This action also invokes the Court's authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
13. Venue is proper in the District of Arizona because Petitioner is physically detained at the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona, and his immediate custodian is located within this District.

14. Jurisdiction and venue are proper under *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35 (2004), because this Petition names Petitioner’s immediate custodian and is filed in the district of confinement.

15. This Court retains jurisdiction to remedy ongoing unlawful detention notwithstanding Respondents’ characterization of custody as discretionary, because Petitioner challenges the statutory and constitutional basis for detention itself.

16. Federal district courts retain habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2241 to review the legality of immigration detention notwithstanding the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, because this Petition challenges the fact and legality of custody rather than a discretionary immigration decision.

III. PARTIES

17. Petitioner, Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez, A#  is a citizen and national of Venezuela. See Ex. C. Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240), as reflected in the EOIR automated case information contained in the record. See Ex. B.

18. Facility Administrator (Warden) of the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona

19. Respondent, KRISTI NOEM, is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and is responsible for the administration and enforcement of federal immigration laws, including the detention of noncitizens under DHS authority. She is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent, TODD M. LYONS, is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for the civil immigration detention of noncitizens, including Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.
21. Respondent, Field Office Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, Phoenix Field Office, is the DHS official responsible for overseeing immigration detention operations within the geographic region that includes the State of Arizona and the facility where Petitioner is currently detained. This Respondent is sued in his official capacity.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

22. Petitioner, Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez, A# [REDACTED], is a citizen and national of Venezuela. See Ex. C.
23. Petitioner was paroled into the United States on September 4, 2019 through Eagle Pass, Texas. See Ex. J.
24. Petitioner is a beneficiary of Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") for Venezuelan nationals, which provides protection from removal for the designated period. Petitioner is also a class member in ongoing federal litigation concerning the administration and protection of TPS for Venezuelan nationals, including National TPS Alliance, et al. v. Noem, which remains pending in federal court. See Ex. H.
25. Petitioner has sought humanitarian protection under United States immigration law, including filing an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589), which remains part of the immigration record. See Ex. I.

26. Petitioner has been authorized to work in the United States, as reflected in his Employment Authorization Document issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Ex. K.
27. Petitioner is currently in ICE custody, as reflected in the official detention information identifying Petitioner as detained at Florida Soft Side South Detention Facility in the State of Florida. See Ex. A.
28. Shortly before the filing of this Petition, ICE transferred Petitioner to the Florence Service Processing Center located in Florence, Arizona. The transfer occurred without advance notice and further complicated Petitioner's ability to access legal materials and pursue his legal claims. Petitioner remains detained at that facility at the time of filing.
29. Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, as reflected in the EOIR automated case information included in the record. See Ex. B.
30. The record reflects that Petitioner has established residence and substantial community ties within the United States, including documentation reflecting his place of residence and community connections. See Ex. P.
31. Petitioner's economic integration and lawful participation in the United States workforce is reflected through federal tax filings submitted with this Petition. See Ex. O.
32. The record also includes multiple letters of support from members of Petitioner's community, describing his character, responsibility, family role, and community ties. See Ex. Q-S.
33. Additional documentation submitted with this Petition reflects family support and personal circumstances relevant to the hardship imposed by continued detention, including supporting declarations and documentation submitted by Petitioner's spouse and related medical documentation. See Ex. M; Ex. N.

34. The record also includes documentation demonstrating that Petitioner does not have a criminal record in his country of origin, as reflected in the Venezuelan background check included with the exhibits. See Ex. L.
35. Petitioner was arrested in connection with a pending state criminal case in Osceola County, Florida. The state court conducted a pretrial detention hearing and determined that release conditions were appropriate, setting bond and imposing conditions of supervision. See Ex. L.
36. The exhibits further include legal authorities and supporting materials concerning immigration custody determinations, including recent Board of Immigration Appeals precedent regarding bond adjudications, as well as supporting bond decisions and related authorities. See Ex. D; Ex. E.
37. The record also includes sample immigration judge custody redetermination orders denying bond based on generalized "flight risk" findings, which illustrate a broader pattern in immigration custody adjudications relevant to the habeas issues raised in this Petition. See Ex. F; Ex. G.
38. The record further includes recent immigration judge custody redetermination orders issued in January 2026, demonstrating instances in which immigration judges acknowledge federal habeas jurisdiction while nevertheless denying release based primarily on generalized flight-risk determinations without individualized evidentiary findings. See Ex. T.
39. In light of the record evidence, including Petitioner's lawful work authorization, community ties, family support, and tax filings, continued civil immigration detention without constitutionally adequate procedures imposes severe and ongoing hardship.

40. Petitioner respectfully submits that the record evidence demonstrates substantial equities supporting release and shows that continued detention requires individualized justification.

V. LEGAL STANDARD

41. Immigration detention is governed primarily by two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"): Section 235(b) [8 U.S.C. §1225(b)] and Section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. §1226(a)]. Whereas Section 236(a) authorizes discretionary custody and permits release on bond or conditional parole pending removal proceedings, Section 235(b) applies to certain categories of "arriving aliens" and mandates detention during expedited removal or threshold screening processes.
42. Section 236(a) is the default detention framework for noncitizens placed in regular removal proceedings under INA §240. The statutory text expressly provides for release on bond (or conditional release), subject only to conditions reasonably necessary to ensure appearance at proceedings and protect the community.
43. The Supreme Court has confirmed the distinction between these statutory detention schemes. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018) (explaining the differences between mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and discretionary custody under § 1226(a)). The Board of Immigration Appeals has likewise recognized for decades that individuals in § 240 proceedings are generally eligible for custody redeterminations under § 1226(a). *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). See Ex. E.
44. Federal courts have long recognized that immigration detention is subject to constitutional limits and that habeas relief is available where custody violates statutory or constitutional law. Civil immigration detention must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, and federal courts retain jurisdiction to remedy unlawful detention through habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that civil immigration detention is subject to constitutional limits and cannot be indefinite. See *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

45. Notwithstanding this statutory framework, DHS and immigration courts have increasingly invoked recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) precedent, including *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), to restrict or deny immigration judges’ bond authority in cases where a detainee has been placed in § 240 removal proceedings and seeks individualized custody redetermination. See Ex. D. Recent custody redetermination orders further demonstrate that immigration judges frequently deny bond based on generalized “flight risk” findings without individualized evidentiary analysis. See Ex. T.
46. Multiple federal district courts have addressed habeas petitions raising challenges to detention classifications and the denial of individualized custody review, concluding that the clear statutory framework of INA § 236(a) permits noncitizens in circumstances like Petitioner’s—individuals in removal proceedings seeking individualized custody review—to request bond hearings before the immigration court. See Ex. G.
47. Federal courts have emphasized that habeas relief is appropriate where detention results from statutory misclassification or where custody determinations fail to provide meaningful individualized review, thereby resulting in continued unlawful detention.
48. These holdings reflect the fundamental principle that federal district courts retain jurisdiction to intervene where immigration detention rests on statutory error or results in ongoing constitutional harm. Individuals situated like Petitioner are entitled to

individualized custody consideration consistent with § 1226(a) and due process protections. See Ex. G.

49. Immigration detention is civil, not punitive, and therefore must comply with constitutional limitations. Detention must remain reasonably related to its regulatory purposes and must include adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that continued confinement is justified.

50. Habeas relief is appropriate where detention is unlawful at its inception, becomes constitutionally excessive, or lacks constitutionally adequate procedures, including meaningful individualized custody review before a neutral adjudicator.

VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count I – Violation of INA §236(a) [8 U.S.C. §1226(a)]

51. Petitioner Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

52. As federal courts have repeatedly emphasized, agency adjudication cannot override the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).

53. To the extent Respondents are treating Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention or otherwise denying Immigration Judge custody jurisdiction based on recent BIA precedent, Respondents’ refusal to provide Petitioner with an individualized custody redetermination hearing violates the INA and governing law. See Ex. D; Ex. G.

54. INA §236(a), 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” and that the Attorney General “may continue to

detain the arrested alien” or “may release the alien on—(A) bond of at least \$1,500 ...; or (B) conditional parole.”

55. By its plain text, §1226(a) applies to noncitizens arrested and detained pending removal proceedings unless mandatory detention under §1226(c) applies.
56. The record reflects that Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings under INA §240, as reflected in the EOIR automated case information contained in the record. See Ex. B. Absent a valid statutory basis for mandatory detention, custody for individuals detained pending §240 removal proceedings is governed by §1226(a).
57. By adopting and applying a policy and/or practice that deprives Petitioner of an individualized bond hearing consistent with §1226(a), Respondents have acted contrary to statutory authority requiring individualized custody consideration.
58. Recent BIA decisions—Matter of Q. Li and Matter of Yajure Hurtado—have been invoked to restrict or deny immigration judges’ bond authority for a broad class of detainees notwithstanding the INA’s text. See Ex. D.
59. Where Respondents attempt to apply §1225(b) to an individual detained pending removal proceedings to avoid custody jurisdiction, such detention rests on statutory error subject to correction through habeas. See Ex. G.
60. Even assuming arguendo that Respondents contend §1225(b) applies, prolonged civil detention without individualized review and meaningful procedural safeguards violates the Fifth Amendment.
61. Petitioner’s eligibility for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) further underscores that he possesses lawful presence during the designated TPS period and protection from removal while that designation remains in effect. See Ex. H.

62. Petitioner therefore seeks habeas relief ordering that he receive an individualized custody redetermination hearing consistent with INA §236(a) without delay, or other appropriate relief consistent with the INA and the Constitution. See Ex. G.

Count II – Violation of the Fifth Amendment (Due Process)

63. Petitioner incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations.

64. Petitioner's continued civil detention without a meaningful individualized custody redetermination hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

65. The record reflects substantial equities supporting release and demonstrating that Petitioner is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk, including documented residence and community ties, tax filings, and multiple support letters. See Ex. O; Ex. P; Ex. Q; Ex. R; Ex. S.

66. Yet Petitioner remains detained without constitutionally adequate procedures providing meaningful individualized review.

67. Petitioner further alleges an emerging pattern in immigration custody proceedings following federal habeas intervention: immigration judges increasingly rely on generalized "flight risk" determinations unsupported by individualized evidence, even when custody jurisdiction is acknowledged.

68. Multiple recent immigration judge custody redetermination orders illustrate how detention may continue based on conclusory flight-risk findings without individualized evidentiary analysis. See Ex. T.

69. Such practices substantially increase the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and violate the procedural safeguards required by the Fifth Amendment.

70. A bond hearing at which DHS offers no individualized evidence beyond conclusory assertions does not constitute meaningful review and fails to satisfy due process requirements.

71. Continued detention under such circumstances becomes arbitrary, excessive, and unconstitutional.

72. Under *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the balance of interests weighs strongly in Petitioner's favor because:

- 1) the private interest in physical liberty is fundamental,
- 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial, and
- 3) the government's interest in continued detention is minimal where less restrictive alternatives exist.

73. Accordingly, due process requires a prompt individualized bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of justifying continued detention.

74. Because physical liberty is at stake, the Government must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary. See *Addington v. Texas*, 441 U.S. 418, 425–33 (1979) (clear and convincing standard required where physical liberty is at stake).

75. Petitioner therefore seeks a prompt constitutionally adequate bond hearing, or other appropriate relief including release if such hearing is not provided.

76. The following claims are pleaded in the alternative. Petitioner does not rely exclusively on any single statutory or constitutional theory for relief. To the extent the Court determines that any particular claim is not applicable or not supported by the record, Petitioner

respectfully requests that such claim be set aside without prejudice and that the Court proceed to consider the remaining grounds for relief.

Count III – Unlawful Agency Action (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706

77. Petitioner incorporates the foregoing allegations.

78. To the extent Respondents' custody practices rely on administrative interpretations that restrict immigration judges' statutory bond authority, Petitioner asserts that such action constitutes unlawful agency action resulting in ongoing deprivation of liberty.

79. For decades, immigration judges exercised bond jurisdiction under INA §236(a) consistent with statutory text and constitutional principles. See Ex. E.

80. Recent BIA decisions issued in 2025 have been invoked to restrict that longstanding practice. See Ex. D.

81. The Administrative Procedure Act requires reasoned decision-making and prohibits agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A).

82. Abrupt departures from longstanding statutory interpretation without adequate explanation are unlawful under the APA. Agencies must provide reasoned explanations when departing from prior interpretations of law. *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).

83. Respondents' reliance on *Matter of Q. Li* and *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* to deny custody jurisdiction constitutes agency action not in accordance with law and in excess of statutory authority. See Ex. D.

84. Because this unlawful agency action results in ongoing physical detention, habeas relief is appropriate.

85. Petitioner therefore seeks relief ordering that he be afforded lawful individualized custody review consistent with the INA and the Constitution.

Count IV – Violation of the Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Seizure)

86. Petitioner incorporates the foregoing allegations.

87. To the extent supported by the evidentiary record and to the extent relevant to the legality of Petitioner's current detention, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of the arrest and seizure that resulted in his ICE custody.

88. A seizure without lawful authority, warrant, or constitutionally sufficient cause violates the Fourth Amendment.

89. Where continued detention is the product of an unlawful seizure, habeas relief and appropriate injunctive relief may be warranted.

90. Petitioner therefore seeks relief declaring that the seizure and resulting detention were unlawful and ordering release or other appropriate relief consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, to the extent supported by the evidentiary record.

VII. EXHAUSTION

91. Petitioner Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez has no adequate or effective administrative remedy to address the constitutional and statutory violations described herein in a timely manner. Accordingly, exhaustion should be excused and habeas relief is appropriate. See Ex. B; Ex. D; Ex. F; Ex. G. Requiring further exhaustion would be futile because immigration courts lack authority to remedy the statutory and constitutional violations alleged herein, and because the relief sought in this Petition concerns the legality of Petitioner's ongoing physical detention under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

92. Because this Petition challenges the statutory authority for detention itself, rather than merely the discretionary outcome of a custody determination, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where such remedies are inadequate to address the legality of detention.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- A. Declare that Petitioner's continued detention is unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Constitution of the United States;
- B. Order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a prompt and constitutionally adequate individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary, consistent with INA §236(a), 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), within seven (7) days of the Court's Order.
- C. If Respondents fail to provide such hearing within the time ordered by the Court, order Petitioner's immediate release from ICE custody.
- D. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

If the Court determines that any claim asserted in this Petition is not applicable or not supported by the evidentiary record, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court set aside that claim without prejudice and proceed to adjudicate the remaining claims for relief.

IX. VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: 03/05/2026

Signature: Gabriel Fernandez

Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez

A#



Petitioner, Pro Se

X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by U.S. Mail on the United States Attorney for the district of Arizona, the Attorney General of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Facility Administrator of the facility where Petitioner is detained.

Date: 03/05/2026

Signature: Gabriel Fernandez

Gabriel Alejandro Fernandez Fernandez

A#



Petitioner, Pro Se

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

<u>Exhibit</u>	<u>Description</u>
A.	Proof of Detention Information (ICE Detention Locator)
B.	Automated Case Information
C.	Passport
D.	Recent BIA Decisions on Bond • <i>Matter of Q. Li</i>, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) • <i>Matter of Yajure Hurtado</i>, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)
E.	Group Exhibit: Pre-2025 Unpublished BIA Bond Decisions • <i>Matter of Guerra</i>, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) (establishing criteria of danger to community and flight risk as factors for immigration bond requests) • <i>In re L-E-V-H-</i>, AXXX-XXX-504 (BIA, Dec. 21, 2018) (despite noncitizen's testimony he had "turned himself in to officials at the border," held noncitizen had entered without inspection and was therefore not "arriving alien"); • <i>In re A-R-S-</i>, AXXX-XXX-161 (BIA, June 25, 2020) (remanding to develop record where noncitizen who had DACA alleged he had entered without inspection but had been misclassified as "arriving alien"); and • <i>In re M-D-M-</i>, AXXX-XXX-797 (BIA, Aug. 24, 2020) (despite recent arrest, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 20 years) • <i>In re F-P-J-</i>, AXXX-XXX-699 (BIA, Oct. 22, 2020) (where noncitizen had a pending circuit court appeal and IJ failed to consider alternatives to detention, granted bond to noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 17 years)
F.	Sample of IJ Decisions Denying Bond
G.	Appendix of Recent Habeas Decisions

- H. TPS-Alliance Membership and National TPS Alliance, et. al., v. Kristi Noem, et. al.
- I. I-589
- J. Parole and Document Entry
- K. EAD
- L. Criminal Record and Background Documentation (State criminal case documents, Venezuelan background certificate, and related records concerning petitioner.)
- M. Letter of Support Johana Montiel (wife)
- N. Medical report
- O. Taxes Gabriel Fernandez
- P. Bills (Community Ties)
- Q. Letter of Support  Catholic Church
- R. Letter of Support Oscar Calderon (ZION Music)
- S. Letter of Support
- T. Sample Immigration Judge Bond Orders Denying Release Based on "Flight Risk" Following Federal Habeas Intervention (January–February 2026)