

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

TEMURMALIK NOSIROV

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN RIFE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-1534

**RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

DAVID METCALF
United States Attorney

GREGORY B. DAVID
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

ANTHONY ST. JOSEPH
Assistant United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
anthony.stjoseph@usdoj.gov

Dated: March 16, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the authority of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain him under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). **Petitioner in this case is subject to mandatory detention under the Laken Riley Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), given his arrest on February 9, 2026, by the Logan Township Police Department for the theft offense of Receiving Stolen Property in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-7a.** As discussed below, because Petitioner's detention comports with the INA and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Court should deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

This petition is distinguishable from the numerous petitions recently considered by this Court in the wake of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision in *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which is not implicated here. See e.g., *Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025 WL 3171639, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); *Anirudh v. McShane, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6458 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Bartle, J.); *Juarez Velazquez v. O'Neill, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6191 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025) (Henry, J.). The cases cited above involved **aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)** because they are removable and present in the United States without inspection and admission or parole.

Petitioner here is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). In the alternative, if the Court finds that Petitioner's arrest for a theft offense does not require mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E), the Petitioner is nevertheless

subject to mandatory detention because he was processed under the expedited removal provision. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

However, after Petitioner claimed a fear of return to his home country, DHS placed him into standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and paroled him into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) to facilitate this process. *See* ECF 1-2, Ex. A – Notice to Appear (dated March 5, 2026). This parole has since terminated. Petitioner has now returned to his detention status at the time of his parole—*i.e.*, mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)—during the remainder of his removal proceedings under § 1229a. Thus, Petitioner’s detention comports with the INA, the bond regulations, and the Constitution, and the Court should accordingly deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.¹

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan, entered the United States without authorization on December 12, 2021. *See* Ex. 1 – Form I-213, Notice Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (dated March 5, 2026). Petitioner was placed in expedited removal proceedings and was found to have a credible fear of return to Uzbekistan. ECF 1-2, Ex A. ICE issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear and released him on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Id.*, ECF 1, ¶ 3.

¹ Multiple district courts in this jurisdiction (including this Court) have rejected this argument. *See e.g. Talabadze v. Rose, et al.*, No. 26-cv-360 (E.D. Pa Jan. 30, 2026) (Perez, J.); *Seminario-Marcos v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-cv-421 (E.D. Pa Feb. 6, 2026) (Kearney, J.); *Vazquez-Diaz v. Rose, et al*, No. 26-cv-342 (E.D. Pa Feb. 10, 2026) (Gallagher, J.); *Vargas- Quajada v. Jamison, et al*, 26-cv-914 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026) (McHugh, J.); *Nawab Ali v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-cv-729 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2026) (Quinones-Alejandro, J.); *Zavala Ulloa v. Jamison, et al*, No. 26-cv-823 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2026) (Marston, J.); *Green v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-0773 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26 2026) (Scott, J.).

On February 9, 2026, Logan Township, New Jersey Police arrested Petitioner for Receiving Stolen Property in violation of N.J.S.A § 2C:20-7a. *See* Ex. 1. Following his arrest, on March 9, 2026, ICE arrested and detained Petitioner in a targeted operation. *Id.*²

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy.” *Shinn v. Ramirez*, 596 U.S. 366, 377 (2022). The petitioner bears the burden of showing his confinement is unlawful. *Hawk v. Olson*, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945); *accord Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (habeas petitioner “carries the burden of proof”); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Judicial review of immigration matters, including detention issues, is limited. *INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre*, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC)*, 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999); *Miller v. Albright*, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998); *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); *Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong*, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”). The Supreme Court has “underscore[d] the limited scope of inquiry into immigration legislation,” and “has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission

² The Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien is a presumptively reliable government document that memorializes, among other information, the facts and circumstances surrounding an alien’s encounter with DHS or other law enforcement agencies. *See e.g., Matter of Barcenas*, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988) (finding that a Form I-213 is an inherently trustworthy document and admissible as evidence to prove alienage and deportability in removal proceedings); *Matter of J-C-H-F-*, 27 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 2018) (“Generally, there is a presumption of reliability of Government documents.”).

of aliens.” *Fiallo*, 430 U.S. at 792 (internal quotation omitted); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 79–82 (1976); *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

The plenary power of Congress and the Executive Branch over immigration necessarily encompasses immigration detention, because the authority to detain is elemental to the authority to deport and because public safety is at stake. *See Shaughnessy v. United States*, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018) (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings. Detention during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the alien’s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made.”).

Petitioner must make a strong showing to demonstrate that his continued detention violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. *See United States v. Five Gambling Devices*, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (“This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to Acts of Congress. This is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power”).

IV. ARGUMENT

The Court should deny the petition because: (1) Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); (2) Petitioner’s detention is separately lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1); and (iii) Petitioner’s detention under either statutory provision comports with constitutional due process.

A. Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

ICE’s current detention of Petitioner is authorized and, indeed, mandated by statute. An alien loses his eligibility for release on bond if he commits one of the statutorily enumerated criminal offenses set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E) (explaining that the Attorney General “*shall* take into custody any alien” who falls into one of the enumerated categories) (emphasis added). The Attorney General “may release” these categories of aliens in only one narrow instance: if the Attorney General decides that doing so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight risk. *Id.* § 1226(c)(4). Absent this narrow exception, aliens detained under § 1226(c) are ineligible for release on bond or, alternatively, parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). *Id.*

On January 29, 2025, the President signed into law the Laken Riley Act. *See* Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Among other things, the Act amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to provide that the Attorney General:

[S]hall take into custody any alien who . . . (i) is inadmissible under paragraph 6(A), 6(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title; and (ii) **is charged with, is arrested for,** is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, **theft**, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) (emphasis added). Under the plain text of the statute, an arrest or charge for a qualifying crime, even if that charge did not result in a conviction, is sufficient to trigger mandatory detention during the pendency of removal proceedings. *Id.* (listing the qualifying conduct disjunctively with separation by the word “or”). For purposes of detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), “the terms ‘burglary,’ ‘theft,’ ‘larceny,’ ‘shoplifting,’ ‘assault of a law enforcement officer,’ and ‘serious bodily injury’ have the meanings given to such terms in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” *Id.* § 1226(c)(2).

Petitioner falls within the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). Petitioner is charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) following his unlawful entry into the United States. ECF 2-1, Ex. A. Furthermore, he was arrested for and later charged with Receiving Stolen Property in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-7a. See Ex. 2 – NJ courts Public Access Charge/Disposition Case number: 26000602. This provision is found in Chapter 20 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, which is the Chapter pertaining to “Theft and Related Offenses.” See N.J.S.A. § 2C-20. Moreover, Receiving Stolen Property is defined under New Jersey law as a theft offense: “A person is guilty of *theft* if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property, other than a motor vehicle, of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a (emphasis added). Accordingly, by the plain language of the statute under which Petitioner was arrested and charged, he was arrested for a theft offense, thus triggering mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).

Here, Congress amended § 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act to specifically include a broader range of criminal dispositions, including those not

resulting in convictions, related to a broader range of criminal activity, including any offense falling within the ambit of a “theft offense.” The specific facts of Petitioner’s arrest further demonstrate that his offense qualifies as a theft offense, as he was arrested while pulling a trailer he purchased that was stolen. ECF 1, ¶ 32. Thus, Petitioner’s criminal conduct, which culminated in an arrest and criminal charges, and all of which occurred after the passage of the Laken Riley Act, subjects him to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).

B. Petitioner’s Detention is Authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)

Petitioner’s argument that his detention violates the INA and accompanying regulations is without merit because ICE’s current detention of Petitioner is authorized and, indeed, mandated by statute. Petitioner attempted to enter the United States without inspection in 2023 and was intercepted but not inspected, admitted, or paroled by an immigration officer at the time of that entry. *See* ECF 1, Petition ¶ 27, ECF 1-1, Ex. A. Petitioner was therefore an “applicant for admission” and was accordingly processed for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). *Id.*

i. Petitioner was properly processed for expedited removal

The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) set forth a procedure that must be followed before removing an alien under the expedited removal process. Petitioner was not removed under expedited removal processing, however, because he expressed a fear of return to Uzbekistan? during his interview. *See* ECF 1, Petition ¶ 1. The fact that Petitioner is no longer in expedited removal proceedings does not preclude continued detention under § 1225(b)(1). To the contrary, when Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to Uzbekistan, he triggered the § 1225(b)(1)(B) process, which includes a referral to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a

credible fear interview and further (full removal) proceedings to consider Petitioner's application for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B); Ex A – Notice to Appear. Until his removal proceedings under § 1229a are complete, which includes adjudication of his application for asylum application, or until he withdraws his application for admission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4), Petitioner remains in this process.

ii. Petitioner's release on parole does not preclude detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)

Importantly, ICE's release of Petitioner on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) does not preclude detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Petitioner may try to argue that he is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) because he has been paroled into the United States. *See* § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (applying the expedited removal provisions to certain other aliens "who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States"). However, the Court should reject this argument because the DHS Secretary's 2004 Expedited Removal Designation makes clear that this language applies only to certain categories of aliens who were admitted or paroled into the United States *following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry*. *See* Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004) (emphasis added); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (allowing the DHS Secretary to designate certain aliens for expedited removal and clarifying that this designation "shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion" of the DHS Secretary).

Importantly, ICE's release of Petitioner on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) does not convert DHS's detention authority from § 1225(b)(1) to § 1226 because, as noted above, parole "shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien." *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A). Rather, Congress was very explicit: "when the purposes of such parole

have been served[,], the alien shall forthwith return or *be returned to the custody from which he was paroled* and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with *in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission* to the United States.” *Id.* (emphasis added). Regardless of the length of his parole, Petitioner remains “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139–40 (noting that “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years” “cannot be said to have ‘effected an entry’ and remain “on the threshold.”). Petitioner therefore remains subject to the same detention authority (§ 1225(b)(1)) until his claim for asylum is fully adjudicated and he is either granted asylum or removed. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302; *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 111; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

That Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(1) receives further support from the Attorney General’s decision in *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019). In *M-S-*, the Attorney General overruled as wrongly decided an earlier Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) case, *Matter of X-K-*, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2005), in which the BIA held that aliens transferred to full proceedings after establishing a credible fear were eligible for bond. 27 I&N Dec. at 513–14. The Attorney General explained that, by its plain language, applicants for admission transferred to full removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear remain ineligible for bond. *Id.* at 515. Instead, an individual in this category of applicants for admission “must be detained until his removal proceedings conclude, unless he is granted parole.” *Id.* at 509.

iii. No written notice is required prior to revoking parole

If Petitioner argues that ICE improperly revoked his parole without first providing notice of such revocation, the Court should reject that argument. The regulations make clear that no written notice is required prior to terminating a prior

discretionary parole decision under § 1182(d)(5)(A). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii) (explaining that parole *shall be automatically terminated without written notice . . . at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized . . . in accordance with* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2), *except that no written notice shall be required*) (emphasis added). Only when termination of parole is not automatic under § 212.5(e)(1)—in other words, when an alien has not departed the United States or the period of parole has not expired—is notice required under § 212.5(e)(2). *But see Talabadze v. Rose*, No. 26-cv-360 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2026) (Perez, J.) (finding notice required prior to terminating parole); *Vasquez Diaz v. Rose*, No. 26-cv-342 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2026) (Gallagher, J.) (same).

Furthermore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a parole revocation decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), since it is plainly a discretionary “decision or action.”

Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding DHS’s authority to “grant or revoke” parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) is a matter of agency discretion barred from review by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); *Hassan v. Chertoff*, 593 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

Moreover, to the extent Petitioner is alleging that revocation of parole requires a case-by-case analysis, the Court should reject this argument. While 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) requires that *grants* of parole be made on a case-by-case basis, it contains no parallel language with respect to terminations, and the language of § 1182(d)(5)(A) makes clear that such a determination is left entirely to the “opinion” of the DHS Secretary.

C. Petitioner’s detention comports with constitutional due process.

Petitioner’s argument that his detention violates procedural due process also lacks merit. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Further, applicants for admission like Petitioner lack any constitutional due process rights with respect to admission aside from the rights provided by statute: “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” *Shaughnessy v. ex. rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), and, “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review [that] determination.” *United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). *See also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam* 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[T]he Due Process Clause provides nothing more.”).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed “[its] century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry” in *Thuraissigiam*, explaining that an individual who illegally crosses the border—like Petitioner—is an applicant for admission and “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” 591 U.S. at 139–40. The *Thuraissigiam* Court explained that “[w]hile aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the Court held long ago that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien’s lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” *Id.* at 107.

“When an alien arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country.” *Id.* at 139. The same “threshold” rule applies to individuals who are apprehended after trying “to enter the country illegally” since by statute, such individuals are also defined as applicants for admission. *Id.* at 139–40. And all applicants for admission, “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal,” “have no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute.” *Id.* at 107, 139. And the statute provides no more procedural protection than allowing an applicant for admission to seek relief from removal if he fears return to his home country, and to seek parole from the agency. *Id.* During that process, however, applicants for admission may be detained without a bond hearing pending admission or removal without running afoul of the Constitution. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003)

Petitioner’s recent detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) during the pendency of his removal proceedings does not violate Due Process. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (detention less than six months presumed constitutional). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that there may come a time when mandatory civil detention without a bond hearing becomes unreasonable. *See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) (analyzing detention under § 1226(c)). However, at this time, Petitioner does not challenge the reasonableness or length of his detention under *German Santos*. Therefore, the Court should find that Petitioner’s detention is constitutional and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID METCALF
United States Attorney

/s/ Susan R. Becker for GBD
GREGORY B. DAVID
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

/s/ Anthony St. Joseph
ANTHONY ST. JOSEPH
Assistant United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Anthony.stjoseph@usdoj.gov
Counsel for Respondents

Dated: March 16, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I filed the foregoing Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus via the Court's CM/ECF System, thereby making it available for viewing and download for all parties to the case.

Dated: March 16, 2026

/s/ Anthony St. Joseph
ANTHONY ST. JOSEPH
Assistant United States Attorney

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

TEMURMALIK NOSIROV

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN RIFE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-1534

Exhibit List

Exhibit 1: Form I-213, Notice Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (dated March 5, 2026)

Exhibit 2: NJ Courts Public Access Charge/Disposition Case number:





Exhibit 1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Subject ID :

Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien

Family Name (CAPS) DIA, IBRAHIM		First	Middle	Sex M	Hair BLK	Eyes BRO	Cmpbkn DRK
Country of Citizenship MALI	Passport Number and Country of Issue			Height 70	Weight 170	Occupation laborer	
U.S. Address 555 GEO DR PHILIPSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA, 16866, UNITED STATES				Scars and Marks			
Date, Place, Time, and Manner of Last Entry 02/18/2000 Unknown Time, JFK, B2-visitor For Pleasure			Passenger Boarded at	F.B.I. Number ☒ Single ☒ Divorced ☐ Married ☐ Widower ☐ Separated			
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of Permanent Residence				Method of Location/Apprehension NCA			
Date of Birth /1968	Age: 57	Date of Action 03/12/2026	Location Code PHI/PHI	At/Near See I-831		Date/Hour 03/12/2026 12:29	
City, Province (State) and Country of Birth MALI		AR ☒	Form : (Type and No.) Lifted ☐ Not Lifted ☐	By THOMAS ROMAINE			
NIV Issuing Post and NIV Number		Social Security Account Name		Status at Entry		Status When Found	
Date Visa Issued		Social Security Number		Length of Time Illegally in U.S.			
Immigration Record NEGATIVE			Criminal Record See Narrative				
Name, Address, and Nationality of Spouse (Maiden Name, if Appropriate)						Number and Nationality of Minor Children None	
Father's Name, Nationality, and Address, if Known DIA, MAMADOU NATIONALITY: MALI			Mother's Present and Maiden Names, Nationality, and Address, if Known DIAKITE, ADAM NATIONALITY: MALI				
Monies Due/Property in U.S. Not in Immediate Possession None Claimed		Fingerprinted? ☒ Yes ☐ No	Systems Checks	Charge Code Words(s) See Narrative			
Name and Address of (Last)(Current) U.S. Employer		Type of Employment Unemployed or Retired	Salary	Employed from/to Hr			
Narrative (Outline particulars under which alien was located/apprehended. Include details not shown above regarding time, place and manner of last entry, attempted entry, or any other entry, and elements which establish administrative and/or criminal violation. Indicate means and route of travel to interior.)							
FIN: 		Left Index fingerprint			Right Index fingerprint		
							
FAMILY INFORMATION Father: DIA, MAMADOU is a citizen of MALI. Mother: DIAKITE, ADAM is a citizen of MALI. Spouse: Subject is not married. Child: Subject does not have children or dependents.							
OTHER ALIASES KNOWN BY: SEYDOU, SOUMANO ... (CONTINUED ON I-831)							
Alien has been advised of communication privileges _____ (Date/Initials)				THOMAS ROMAINE Deportation Officer _____ (Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)			
Distribution:				Received: (Subject and Documents) (Report of Interview) Officer: THOMAS ROMAINE on: March 12, 2026 (time) Disposition: Other Examining Officer: DEMURGUIONDO, ASD8132			

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name DIA, IBRAHIM	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 03/12/2026
SUBJECT HEALTH STATUS ----- Diabetes type 2, Hypertension, Dyslipidemia CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES ----- 03/12/2026 - 237a1Ci - NONIMMIGRANT WITH UNAUTHORIZED EMPLOYMENT ARRESTED AT/NEAR [REDACTED] PENNSYLVANIA, 19107, UNITED STATES RECORD OF DEPORTABLE/EXCLUDABLE ALIEN: ----- Ibrihim DIA is subject to President Donald Trump's Executive Order, titled "Protecting the American People Against Invasion," signed on January 20, 2025. Encounter: On March 12th, 2026, DIA, Ibrahim A# [REDACTED] a native and citizen of Mali reported to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Philadelphia Field Office for his scheduled check-in appointment. The Philadelphia Non-Detained Unit confirmed DIA 's identity, alienage, and removability and served him with a Warrant of Arrest form I-205 and Notice of Revocation of Release letter. Alienage & Removability: DIA is a citizen of Mali and a national of Mali by virtue of birth, who entered the United States illegally without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. Numerous checks using databases with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) show no pending appeals, applications, petitions or waivers. On November 15th, 2004, DIA submitted form I-687 Application for Status that was ultimately denied. Family/ Derivative Citizenship: DIA has not asserted any claim to United States citizenship, nor do any records indicate that he has obtained or derived such citizenship. Immigration History: On February 18th, 2000, INS admitted DIA into the United States at or near New York City, as a Non-immigrant as a B-2 visitor with authorization to remain in the United States until March 17, 2000. On March 8th, 2000, INS encountered DIA engaging in unauthorized employment. INS took the subject into custody and transported him to the Philadelphia District Office for processing. INS served DIA with an I-862 notice to appear charging him under section 237a1Ci (Nonimmigrant with Unauthorized Employment) of the INA. INS transferred him to the Berks County Jail. On April 10th, 2000, and Immigration Judge granted DIA Voluntary Departure, and he was ordered to depart no later than May 17th, 2000. DIA bonded out of INS custody the same day. On May 18th, 2000, DIA failed to depart the United States and his Order of Removal became final. On October 3rd, 2011, INS encountered DIA at the Philadelphia Detention Unit. INS transferred DIA to York County Jail. On February 22nd, 2012, INS released DIA from custody on an Order of Supervision pending issuance of travel documents.		
Signature THOMAS ROMAINE	Title Deportation Officer	

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name DIA, IBRAHIM	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 03/12/2026
------------------------------	---	--------------------

On January 31st, 2014, DIA was booked into the Philadelphia District Office and released that day on an Order of Supervision pending issuance of travel document.

Criminal History:
On October 1st, 2011, the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) arrested DIA and charged him with Prostitution and Related Offense. On March 22, 2012, the Philadelphia Court convicted DIA and sentenced him to 6 months' probation.
On January 23rd, 2014, the Upper Providence Township Police Department arrested DIA and charged him with Theft by Unlawful Taking. On April 28th, 2014, the Upper Providence Township court convicted DIA and sentenced him to 6 months prison.
On February 19th, 2014, the PPD arrested DIA and Charged him with Tampering with Identification and Unsworn Falsification to Authority. On April 29th, 2015, the Philadelphia Court convicted DIA and sentenced him to 2 years' probation.

Health & Humanitarian:
DIA denied any significant humanitarian concerns.
DIA made a 5-minute phone call to his wife Aissata Traore [REDACTED].
DIA declined his right to speak with the Mali Consulate. Consular notifications are not mandatory.
DIA has not claimed fear of removal to Mali.
DIA claims to have Diabetes type 2, Hypertension, and Dyslipidemia. He claims to take Metformin and Losartan.

DIA claims to be Married.
DIA claims to have four children under the care of his wife.
DIA stated that he did not serve in the United States Military.

Foreign Identity and Travel Documents:
At the time of arrest, ERO was able to obtain a copy of DIA 's foreign identity/travel document.
Mali Passport [REDACTED]

Disposition:
ICE served him with a Warrant of Arrest Form I-205 and an Order of Supervision Revocation Letter. All forms were explained to him in English. Subject's I-205 and Order of Supervision Revocation Letter were uploaded to the EARM documents tab.

OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBERS

ALIEN-[REDACTED]
State Criminal Number/State Bureau Number-[REDACTED] (UNITED STATES)
Other Biometric-[REDACTED]
..COMMENT: FINS
U.S. Social Security Number-[REDACTED]

Signature THOMAS ROMAINE	Title Deportation Officer
-----------------------------	------------------------------