

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FT. MYERS DIVISION**

MARCO HERNANDEZ PACHECO,
Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 2:26-cv-679-KCD-DNF

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,¹
Respondents.

FEDERAL RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO HABEAS PETITION

Petitioner Marco Hernandez Pacheco challenges his ongoing detention by immigration authorities. He alleges that Immigration and Customs Enforcement's ("ICE") revocation of his order of release on supervision ("OSUP") was improper under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"), ECF No. 1, at 7. The Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims. But that aside, Petitioner's OSUP was properly revoked for the purpose of executing a valid removal order. The Court is statutorily prohibited from reviewing ICE's decision to revoke his OSUP and furthermore, the period for which Petitioner has been detained remains presumptively reasonable at this time. Because his detention is lawful, the Petition should be dismissed.

¹ Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted for his predecessor under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Background

This is an immigration habeas case. Hernandez Pacheco is a citizen and national of Cuba. *See* Notice to Appear, attached as “Exhibit A” at p. 3. He was paroled into the United States on or about January 1, 2005 but never adjusted his status. *Id.* In 2008, following his convictions for battery and false imprisonment, Hernandez Pacheco was placed in removal proceedings. *Id.*; *see also* Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, attached as “Exhibit B” at 2. Petitioner was then ordered removed from the United States in a decision dated August 14, 2008. *See* Order of the Immigration Judge, attached as “Exhibit C.” Neither party reserved appeal of that decision. *Id.*

Hernandez Pacheco was not immediately detained following the issuance of that order of removal however he was taken into custody on June 1, 2009 where he remained until his release on an OSUP on August 25, 2006. *See* EARM Detention History, attached as “Exhibit D.” Hernandez Pacheco remained in the United States under the OSUP until October 30, 2025 when ICE determined it was appropriate to revoke the OSUP. *See* Petition, pp. 4, 6; *see also* 2025 Revocation of OSUP Documentation, attached as “Exhibit E” at p. 1. Notice of revocation issued that same day and was served on Petitioner on December 13, 2025. *Id.* at pp. 1-2. An informal interview was completed on December 13, 2025 as well. *Id.* at p. 7.

On March 3, 2026, this matter commenced with the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Florida. ECF No. 1. The United States

Attorney's Office in that district alerted the Court to the issue of improper venue as Petitioner was being detained at the Florida Soft Side South facility. ECF No. 3. The case was then transferred to this district and an order to show cause was issued on March 10, 2026. ECF Nos. 4-6, 8.

On March 27, 2026, ICE executed a new notice regarding revocation of Petitioner's OSUP and provided Petitioner with a second informal interview. *See* 2026 Revocation of OSUP Documentation, attached as "Exhibit F" at pp. 1-3. As the 2026 Revocation documents indicate, Petitioner's OSUP was revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) based on changed circumstances, namely that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Exhibit F at pp. 1-2. The government now timely responds to the Petition.

Certified Habeas Return

The Court has power to grant writs of habeas corpus where (among other instances) a petitioner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner bears the burden of proof in establishing that his detention violates federal law. *Whitfield v. U.S. Sec'y of State*, 853 F. App'x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021).

Hernandez Pacheco was denied relief from removal and ordered removed from the United States on August 14, 2008. He is currently detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) pending ICE's execution of that removal order.

Discussion

Hernandez Pacheco challenges his detention as a violation of the Fifth

Amendment due process clause but this claim fails because the Court has no jurisdiction. Even if it did, detention has not extended to a length creating constitutional questions nor has ICE violated any law or regulation in revoking his OSUP and proceeding with removal.

A. Lack of Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” *Id.* (citations omitted). In the context of immigration habeas cases related to removal—like here—the INA divests this Court’s jurisdiction where Petitioner challenges ICE’s revocation of his OSUP and detention to execute a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

There is no jurisdiction to review “any” claim “arising from the decision or action” to “execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This provision bars habeas review in federal courts when the claim arises from a decision or action to “execute” a final order of removal. *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC)*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Courts consistently hold that § 1252(g) eliminates subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges—including constitutional claims—to an arrest or detention for the purpose of executing a final removal order. *E.g., Camarena v. ICE*, 988 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to consider ‘any’ cause or claim brought by an alien arising from the government’s decision to execute a removal order.”); *Johnson v. U.S. Attorney General*, 847 F. App’x 801, 802 (11th Cir.

2021); *Gupta v. McGahey*, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013).² Here, Petitioner's OSUP was revoked and he was detained for the purpose of executing a final removal order. *See* Exhibit C; *see also* Exhibit F. This habeas action represents an effort to interfere with or halt that legal process in violation of § 1252(g)'s jurisdiction-stripping mandate.

Some courts have found jurisdiction to review compliance with OSUP revocation regulations. *E.g.*, *Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) ("In other words, while courts cannot question the discretion that is exercised, they can address the process used to exercise that discretion."). Respectfully, those decisions are mistaken. "When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged." *Camarena*, 988 F.3d at 1272 (cleaned up). Challenges to detention for noncompliance with OSUP revocation procedures fall directly within the jurisdiction-stripping provisions where—as here—the revocation was for the purpose of executing a final order of removal. *Roe v. Oddo*, No. 3:25-cv-128, 2025 WL 3030692, at *11-14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025).³ There is simply no way to get around the plain language of the statute:

² *See also Hamama v. Adducci*, 912 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2018) ("Under a plain reading of the text of the statute, the Attorney General's enforcement of long-standing removal orders falls squarely under the Attorney General's decision to execute removal orders and is not subject to judicial review."); *Tazu v. U.S. Attorney General*, 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2020) ("The plain text of § 1252(g) covers decisions about whether and when to execute a removal order."); *Rauda v. Jennings*, 55 F.4th 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2022); *E.F.L. v. Prim*, 986 F.3d 959, 964-65 (7th Cir. 2021).

³ *See also Van Phan v. Oddo*, No. 3:25-cv-348-KAP, 2026 WL 60337, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2026); *Lin v. Borgen*, No. 25-CV-05618 (MMG), 2025 WL 2158874, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2025).

In addition, the [OSUP] revocation was clearly related to the execution of [alien's] final removal order. The decision to revoke the [OSUP], in other words, “arose from” the decision to “execute the removal order.” Under both statutory text and judicial precedent, Section 1252(g) bars judicial review of ICE’s revocation decision.

Nino v. Johnson, No. 16-cv-2876, 2016 WL 6995563, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2016) (cleaned up).

Hernandez Pacheco alleges that ICE did not sufficiently notify him about revocation of his OSUP, effected for the purpose of his removal. *See* Petition, p. 6; *see also* Exhibit F. Without a doubt, that is a fact pattern “arising from the decision or action” to “execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). OSUP revocation in and of itself represents the exercise of discretion to execute a removal order. This claim is a direct attack on the propriety of that decision to execute a removal order.

Hernandez Pacheco’s claims fall squarely within the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The Court, therefore, lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss.

B. Constitutionally Lawful Detention

Even if the Court disagrees with the above, it must still deny the writ. Hernandez Pacheco cannot make a claim for unlawfully prolonged detention.

1. Petitioner May Be Detained Because He Has a Final Order of Removal.

After a final removal order, an alien must be removed within ninety days—i.e., the removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001). During the removal period, the alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683. An alien may be detained beyond that removal period, a

period known as the “post-removal” period. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), (a)(6); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683; *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021).

There is no statutory limit on how long ICE can detain an alien during the post-removal period yet indefinite detention would present obvious constitutional concerns. *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 579 (2022). So the Supreme Court has interpreted this post-removal period to allow extended detention for “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. In all, a reasonable length of detention “is presumptively six months.” *Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. at 529; *see also Akinwale v. Ashcroft*, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating six-month period is inclusive of any ninety-day removal period).

If the presumptively reasonable period expires without removal then a burden-shifting framework comes into play regarding the significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future (“SLRRFF”). *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. But before that six-month period expires, any habeas challenge to the detention itself is premature. *E.g.*, *Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1051-52; *Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Attorney General*, 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013); *Gozo v. Napolitano*, 309 F. App’x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009).⁴ At bottom, “This presumptively reasonable six month period must have

⁴ Some districts disagree. *Cesar v. Achim*, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2008). Of course, *Akinwale* binds the Court. Even if it did not, *Cesar* and any progeny are incorrect. *Zadvydas* recognized the presumptive six-month period for the specific “sake of uniform administration in the federal courts.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701. That was not an invitation to make up exceptions to this ripeness doctrine—like *Cesar* did.

expired at the time of the filing of a petition.” *E.g., Jiang v. Mukasey*, No. 2:08-cv-773-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009) (Steele, J.); *Noel v. Glades Cnty. Sheriff*, No. 2:11-cv-698-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 6412425, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011) (Steele, J.).

2. *Revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP Was Legally Sound.*

Petitioner’s allegation that he was not provided notice or otherwise informed or advised about ICE’s decision to revoke his OSUP is wrong. *See* Petition, p. 6. As both Exhibits E and F demonstrate, Petitioner has been notified twice over of the basis for ICE’s revocation of his OSUP. He has also been provided with an informal interview twice—first on December 13, 2025 and again on March 27, 2026. Exhibit E at p. 7; Exhibit F at p. 3. As the documentation demonstrates, ICE has exercised its discretion to revoke OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) and complied with regulatory obligations in doing so.⁵

Section 241.13 “establishes special review procedures for those aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and are detained . . . where the alien has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal . . . in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a). If ICE determines there is no SLRRFF at a given point in time it can release an alien under an OSUP—which appears to have happened for Hernandez Pacheco following his 85-day detention in

⁵ The 2025 revocation documents reference both 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. For reasons discussed further below, § 241.13 appears to be the appropriate regulatory framework. Respondents aver, however, that their actions comply with the requirements set forth under either regulatory scheme.

2009. *Id.* § 241.13(h); *see* Exhibit D. But release on OSUP does not equate to legal status to remain in the United States forever. OSUPs must specifically “promote the ability of [ICE] to effect the alien’s removal as ordered, or removal to a third country, should circumstances change in the future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1). And the circumstances have changed here. If ICE detains an individual on this basis it must then provide the alien with an informal interview—allowing the alien to respond and submit any evidence regarding SLRRFF. *Id.* § 241.13(i)(3). This was done twice in this case. Exhibit E at p. 7; Exhibit F at p. 3. If ICE determines revocation and detention remain appropriate after that interview—as it did here—the alien may seek another request for review based on any additional evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(j).

Likewise, the procedure required by § 241.4 does not change the outcome here. That provision sets out procedures and “authority to continue an alien in custody or grant release or parole.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a). For aliens released on an OSUP, authorities have broad powers to revoke that supervision order. *Id.* § 241.4(l). Again, notice and interview procedures apply when ICE revokes release due to violations of OSUP conditions. *Id.* § 241.4(l)(1), (3). Yet one subsection—§ 241.4(l)(2)—does not include those notice, explanation, or interview requirements. *Id.* § 241.4(l)(2); *Tanha v. Warden, Balt. Detention Facility*, No. 1:25-cv-02121-JRR, 2025 WL 2062181, at *6 n.10 (D. Md. July 22, 2025). Regardless, of the notice procedure required, § 241.4(l) vests broad “discretion” if “in the opinion of the revoking official” ICE should “enforce a removal order” (among other options). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).

This “regulation permits the Government extraordinarily broad discretion to

revoke an OSUP.” *Tran v. Baker*, No. 1:25-cv-01598-JRR, 2025 WL 2085020, at *4 (D. Md. July 24, 2025). In fact,

the regulation does not compel the Government to demonstrate what facts or factors, if any, it considered in deciding to revoke; nor does the regulation (or any other authority of which the court has been made aware) require the Government to demonstrate what, if any, steps it took to effect or secure removal prior to OSUP revocation.

Id.; see also *Grigorian v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (noting differences between both subsections). Both this Court and Judge Steele have recently recognized the deference afforded to ICE when it decides the time is appropriate to revoke an OSUP and enforce a removal order. See *Valdes-Santovenia v. Ripa*, No. 2:25-cv-01063-JES-DNF, 2025 WL 3771264, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2025) (Steele, J.); see also *Tran v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South*, No. 2:25-cv-1224-KCD-NPM, 2026 WL 672969 at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2026).

As described above, ICE revoked OSUP here based on its discretionary determinations under either § 241.4(l) or § 241.13(i) and Hernandez Pacheco cannot establish a violation under either regulation, particularly where notice and an informal interview have been provided. Respondents aver that Hernandez Pacheco was initially placed on OSUP in 2009 based on lack of SLRRFF to Cuba, meaning that revocation of OSUP would properly fall under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). And ICE’s reference to both 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13 in the 2025 OSUP revocation do not doom their defense. *Tran*, 2026 WL 672969 at *9 (use of the wrong regulatory label is irrelevant where the core rationale has not changed and the reasoning articulated is sound under the correct label).

Crucially, the decision to revoke an OSUP is entirely discretionary and beyond the Court's review—any judicial review is arguably limited to the process by which revocation occurred.⁶ *Navarro v. Bondi*, No. 8:25-cv-3213-KKM-NHA, 2025 WL 3275944, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (“In the present context, courts differentiate between the decision to revoke an OSUP and a failure to follow procedures in doing so.” (cleaned up)); *Ceesay*, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 154. Put bluntly: courts “will not further scrutinize ICE’s discretionary decision” in that regard. *Oddo*, 2025 WL 1892445, at *8; *Yi Mei Zhen v. ICE*, No. 3:25-cv-01507-PAB, 2025 WL 2258586, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025).

For these reasons, Petitioner has not met his burden to demonstrate that his detention is unlawful based upon perceived regulatory deficiencies in the revocation of his OSUP.

3. *Even With a Regulatory Violation Outright Release is Improper*

Even were further notice and an interview required, the proper relief would be ordering additional process, not outright release. *See Tran*, 2026 WL 672969 at *9 (“The writ of habeas corpus is a profound remedy, not a penalty for bureaucratic typos.”); *see also Yi Mei*, 2025 WL 2258586, at *10 n.19 (noting “even if these procedures have not yet been completed, courts have found that such procedures may take place after the detention has occurred”). The remedy sought—release from custody—is “an overreach and not the appropriate cure.” *Tanha*, 2025 WL 2062181,

⁶ Again, the revocation of an OSUP is clearly a “decision or action” to “execute removal orders” stripped from the Court’s jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

at *6; *see also* *Tran*, 2025 WL 2085020, at *6-7 (holding errors in notice procedure “do not entitle [petitioner] to release from detention”). The proper remedy to any procedural deficiency would be—at most—ordering ICE to provide Hernandez Pacheco with whatever additional process the Court deems appropriate. *See, e.g., I.V.I. v. Baker*, No. JKB-25-1572, 2025 WL 1811273, at *3 (D. Md. July 1, 2025) (“And while habeas is a proper vehicle to challenge detention that is without statutory authority or violative of the Constitution, it is not a proper vehicle for vindicating every procedural error the Government may have committed along the way.”).

True, some courts have ordered release when they believed ICE should have provided more robust notice and hearing. *E.g., Grigorian*, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *8-10. Respectfully, many of these decisions appear driven by policy disagreement with the current immigration enforcement environment rather than grounding in the law. The regulations mandate notice and—in some instances—an opportunity to be heard via an informal interview. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1); 241.13(i)(3). And if that does not result in release, the alien can request a more thorough review. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(3); 241.13(j).

4. Petitioner's Detention Remains Within the Presumptively Reasonable Period.

Not only was revocation of Hernandez Pacheco's OSUP proper, the period for which he has been detained remains presumptively reasonable. Petitioner has been in detention since October 30, 2025 bringing the total number of days in custody to 151, below the 180-day threshold for what is considered to be presumptively reasonable. *See Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1051-52. And though district courts disagree on whether prior

periods of post-final order detention should aggregate into this presumptively reasonable period, Respondents aver that aggregating under the circumstances present here would not be consistent with *Zadvydas*.

It goes without saying an alien must be detained (or otherwise in custody) to effect removal unless the alien leaves voluntarily. Hernandez Pacheco has not left voluntarily and ICE is now attempting to remove him. Furthermore, ICE's last attempt at executing his order took place almost 17 years ago, in 2009. *Zadvydas* stands for the principle that prolonged and indefinite detention is improper. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. 679. And statute has created the removal period for the purpose of allowing the government a reasonable opportunity to take the steps necessary to remove someone. *Diouf v. Mukasey*, 542 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2008). With these considerations in mind, it would make little sense to aggregate the current detention period with Petitioner's prior detention as it would prematurely foreclose the presumptively reasonable period. See e.g., *Meskini v. Att'y Gen. of United States*, No. 4:14-CV-42 (CDL), 2018 WL 1321576 at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018) (rejecting strict adherence to 180-day time period and urging analysis based upon removal efforts at present); *Tran*, 2026 WL 672969, at *5 (urging a balancing of the circumstances and reasoning that "absent evidence of such bad faith or a deliberate strategy of looping confinement, courts should presume that a subsequent detention is a genuine, independent effort to effectuate removal.").

There is no indicia of bad faith nor is there any continuous looping of detention here. There are two periods of detention: one in 2009 and another at present.

Furthermore, circumstances have changed such that ICE deems it appropriate to attempt removal once more, this time to an alternate third country should circumstances necessitate it. *See* Exhibit E at 3.

Put simply, this case is unripe. The burden-shifting analysis into SLRRFF has not been triggered and ICE need not show SLRRFF at this moment in time. *Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. at 529 (cleaned up); *see also Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 298-99; *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005); *Jama v. ICE*, 543 U.S. 335, 347-48 (2005). Until the Supreme Court recognizes a *Zadvydas* challenge *during* that six-month period, the Court cannot create that cause of action where none exists in derogation of *Akinwale*. *See* 287 F.3d at 1052 (“This six-month period thus must have expired . . . in order to state a claim under *Zadvydas*.”).

To require detailed justification from ICE before the *Zadvydas* period expires would be a significant infringement on separation-of-powers principles as questions related to immigration are “exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). This is not a recent development. *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018) (“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments.” (cleaned up)). That power, however, is always “subject to important constitutional limitations.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 695. “In these cases, we focus upon those limitations.” *Id.*

Other principles of judicial review come into play too. *Id.* at 700. Courts “recognize primary Executive Branch responsibility” in this field. *Id.* They must also “give expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise.” *Id.* Important here, that includes “Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters.” *Id.* These basic separation-of-powers principles “require courts to listen with care when the Government’s foreign policy judgments, including, for example, the status of repatriation negotiations, are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise.” *Id.*

The Executive branch is attempting to remove Hernandez Pacheco in line with what the law allows. Unless and until his detention raises a constitutional problem—i.e., after six months—the Executive branch must be permitted to proceed without interference.

5. *SLRRFF Has Been Established.*

Even if the Court determines that Hernandez Pacheco’s detention has exceeded the presumptively reasonable period, SLRRFF has been established. As discussed above, nearly seventeen years have passed since ICE has made its first effort at executing Petitioner’s longstanding order of removal. A lot has transpired in those seventeen years, including changes to Executive branch leadership, diplomatic relations worldwide, and shifts to U.S. immigration policy. Given these changes and given ICE’s representations on removability to an alternate third country at present—Exhibit E at 3—Hernandez Pacheco’s likelihood of removal indeed appears significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the Court should deny the Petition. To the extent that the Court grants any relief, the only proper relief would be whatever notice and hearing requirement it believes proper—not outright release.

Date: January 23, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY W. KEHOE
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Amanda Saylor
Amanda Saylor
Assistant United States Attorney
Lead Counsel for Federal Respondents
Florida Bar No. 1031480
400 North Tampa Street, Suite 3200
Tampa, Florida 33602
Telephone: (813) 274-6020
Facsimile: (813) 274-6198
Email: Amanda.Saylor@usdoj.gov

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 30, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF electronic filing system which will furnish copies of these documents to all registered counsel of record. In addition, undersigned certifies that the foregoing was served via mail at the following address:

Marco Hernandez Pacheco

A# 

Florida Soft Side South

Inmate Mail/Parcels

54575 Tamiami Trail E Na

Ochopee, FL 34141

Dated: March 30, 2026

Signed:

/s/ Amanda Saylor

Amanda Saylor

Assistant United States Attorney