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**LEONEL ANTONIO ROMERO GARCIA,**

Petitioner,

v.

**JASON STREEVAL**, Warden of Stewart  
Detention Center;

**GEORGE STERLING**, Field Office Director  
of Enforcement and Removal Operations,  
Atlanta Field Office (ERO Atlanta);

**TODD M. LYONS**, Senior Official Performing  
the Duties of Director, Immigration and  
Customs Enforcement;

**DAREN K. MARGOLIN**, Director, Executive  
Office For Immigration Review (EOIR);

**KRISTI NOEM**, Secretary, U.S. Department  
of Homeland Security(DHS); and

**PAMELA BONDI**, U.S. Attorney General; in  
their official capacities,

Respondents.

**Case No. 4:26-CV-00362**

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS**

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## INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Mr. Leonel Antonio Romero Garcia is a national from Venezuela who entered the United States without inspection (EWI) about 3 years ago. Mr. Leonel Antonio Romero Garcia was apprehended by immigration authorities in May 2023. The Respondents keep Mr. Romero Garcia detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia.

2. Mr. Romero Garcia is a member of a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing based on the government's allegation that they entered the United States without admission or inspection (colloquially referred to as "entered without inspection" or "EWI").

3. On November 25, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted declaratory relief to the entire class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.), <sup>1</sup> (See, **Exhibit. 1**) holding that the government is unlawfully subjecting them to mandatory (meaning no-bond) detention and that class members are eligible for release on bond under the immigration laws. Under the Court's order, class members should be able to request a bond hearing in immigration court before an immigration

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<sup>1</sup> On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs holding that the government's policy is inconsistent with the plain language of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* ("INA"), and that petitioners are properly subject to § 1226(a); and on November 25, 2025, , the Court certified a nationwide class and expressly "extend[ed] the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole." *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*9, 11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at \*9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*11.

1 judge (IJ) who must consider whether they are suitable for release on bond while their removal  
2 proceedings are pending.

3 4. Because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office  
4 for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on  
5 behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, Mr. Romero Garcia is likely to  
6 face many additional months in detention. Mr. Romero Garcia has no other option but to bring  
7 this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to enforce her rights as a member of the Bond Eligible  
8 Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, id.*

9 5. Mr. Romero Garcia also seeks relief from this Court, as a detainee under INA §  
10 1226(a), independent of any claim to class membership, because her continued, lengthy  
11 immigration related detention is anyhow unconstitutional due to the violation of her  
12 constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the violation of the  
13 *Administrative Procedure Act* (APA) unlawful denial of bond, and the violation of statutory  
14 rights under the INA for unlawful denial of bond hearings

15 6. Accordingly, to vindicate Mr. Romero Garcia's rights, as a member of the Bond  
16 Eligible Class in *Maldonado Bautista*, as well as under the Constitution of the United States, and  
17 her statutory rights under INA, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas  
18 corpus.

19 7. Therefore, the Court should order Petitioner's release unless Respondents provide  
20 a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

**JURISDICTION**

8. This action arises under the Constitution and the *Immigration and Nationality Act*, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq*

9. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the general grant of habeas authority to the district court); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause) as Mr. Leonel Antonio Romero Garcia is presently in custody at the Stewart Detention Center under or by color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the U.S. Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

10. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

11. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by non-citizens challenging the lawfulness of their detention. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

12. Federal courts also have federal question jurisdiction, through the *Administrative Procedure Act* (APA), to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).

**VENUE**

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 228 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 1391(e) because the Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an agency within the Department of Homeland

1 Security Petitioner. Mr. Romero Garcia is detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin,  
2 Georgia and is under the direct control of Respondents and their agents.

3 15. Furthermore, Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United  
4 States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims  
5 occurred and continue to occur at the Atlanta Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal  
6 Operations division (ERO Atlanta) within the Middle District of Georgia's District and Division.

**REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

7 16. The federal habeas corpus statute provides that "[a] court, justice or judge  
8 entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the  
9 respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the  
1 application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

0 17. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting  
1 individuals from unlawful detention. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known  
1 to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of  
1 illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The  
1 application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who  
2 entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application."  
1 *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

3 18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, Petitioner respectfully requests, and this Court  
1 should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus "forthwith," as the legal issues have already  
4 been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*.

1 19. However, if pursuant to Section 2243, this Court issues an order to show cause  
2 (OSC), it must direct the respondents to file a return showing why the petition for a writ of  
3 habeas corpus filed by Mr. Romero Garcia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should not be granted.

4 20. As provided by Section 2243, the writ or order to show cause must be returned by  
5 the respondents "within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty  
6 days, is allowed." **28 U.S.C. § 2243** (emphasis added).

7 21. Nonetheless, giving the Respondents additional time to respond is inappropriate  
8 in this case because Mr. Romero Garcia faces unjustified detention for an extended period of  
9 time without being able to challenge her detention at a bond hearing in immigration court while  
10 the immigration proceedings are pending. It is important to note, that should Mr. Romero Garcia  
11 continue to fight her case, Respondents will not offer the opportunity for pre-removal release.

1 22. Thus, Mr. Romero Garcia's period of detention is uncertain and can also increase  
2 because of the backlog in the immigration courts. Mr. Romero Garcia's ongoing, and prolonged  
3 detention carries the separation from her 2 minor United States citizen sons and other close  
4 family members. Additionally, the harshness of detention could not only affect her physical  
5 health or expose her to psychological trauma, but it could also be used to pressure her to accept  
6 abandonment of any claims of immigration relief and accept deportation.

7 23. Absent a grant of this petition for writ of habeas corpus or an issuance of an Order  
8 to show cause, the respondents will cause irreparable harm to Mr. Romero Garcia by subjecting  
9 her to an indefinite deprivation of her liberty and other fundamental rights.

**PARTIES**

24. Mr. **LEONEL ANTONIO ROMERO GARCIA** is a citizen of Venezuela that has resided in the United States since 2023. Mr. Romero Garcia was arrested at a regular check in with ICE in December 2025. He has been in immigration detention since December 2025.

25. Respondent, Mr. **GEORGE STERLING**, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, is the Director of the, Atlanta Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division (ERO Atlanta). As such, Mr. Sterling, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

26. Respondent, **TODD M. LYONS**, is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of Director of the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement, is the federal agency responsible for custody decisions relating to non-citizens charged with being removable from the United States, including the arrest, detention, and custody status of non-citizens. Mr. Lyons has responsibility for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and is a legal custodian of Mr. Nolasco Gomez. He is sued in his official capacity.

27. Respondent, **JASON STREEVAL**, is on information and belief, an employee of CoreCivic the private corporation which runs the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia. contract facility where Petitioner is detained. On information and belief, Mr. Streeval's job title is Warden of the Stewart Detention Center. He has immediate physical custody of Mr. Romero Garcia. He is sued in his official capacity.

28. Respondent, **DAREN K. MARGOLIN**, is the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), is the federal agency responsible for implementing and

1 enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond  
2 hearings.

3 29. Respondent, **KRISTI NOEM**, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  
4 Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and  
5 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms.  
6 **Noem** has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

7 30. Respondent, **PAMELA BONDI**, is the Attorney General of the United States.  
8 She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration  
9 Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her  
official capacity.

#### 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS

0 31. Mr. Romero Garcia is a 31-year-old man who was born in Venezuela.

1 32. Mr. Romero Garcia entered the United States without inspection (EWI) back in  
2023.

1 33. Mr. Romero Garcia is an construction worker and has minor traffic incidents in  
his criminal history.

2 34. Mr. Romero Garcia has family and friends in the United States who are willing  
and able to support him during the pendency of his claim.

3 35. In December 2025 Mr. Romero Garcia was wrongfully detained by ICE at a  
regular check in for his case.

4 36. Mr. Romero Garcia is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Stewart  
Detention Center in Lumpkin Georgia.

5 37. Mr. Romero Garcia is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

- a. **Does not have lawful status in the United States** and is currently detained at the Stewart Detention Center.
- b. Mr. Romero Garcia is purported to have **entered the United States without inspection** over 20 years ago and **was not apprehended upon arrival**, *cf. id.*; and
- c. **is not subject nor detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.**

38. After apprehending Petitioner in November 2025, the DHS placed her in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS has charged Petitioner as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

39. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Mr. Romero Garcia to unlawful detention despite her clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

40. Mr. Romero Garcia is scheduled to have a Master Hearing, which is merely the commencement of the removal proceedings, on March 26, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. It is important to note that the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

41. With this in mind, it is of extreme urgency that this Court issue a decision as early as practicable. This will allow the undersigned attorney to effectively argue for Mr. Romero Garcia’s release and ensure that the Immigration Judge affords Mr. Romero Garcia a bond

1 hearing as ordered in the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* and in accordance with her due  
2 process right. Therefore, the Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

### 3 4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

#### 5 A. HABEAS CORPUS

6 42. “Habeas relief is available when a person is ‘in custody in violation of the  
7 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-  
8 12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).

9 43. The right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is intended to, at a  
10 minimum, provide “a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention.” *Rasul v. Bush*,  
1 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).

0 44. In the context of immigration, there are two main sources of authority for habeas  
1 corpus petition. The first, is the civil habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It provides that:

1 (a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,  
1 the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order  
1 of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district  
1 wherein the restraint complained of is had.

2 (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—

1 (1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States  
1 or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

2 ...

3 (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of  
1 the United States . . . . 28 U.S. Code § 2241 - Power to grant writ.

1 45. The second basis of jurisdiction, is the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution,  
4 also known as the Great Writ. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of  
1

Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).

**B. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, US CONSTITUTION**

46. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V § 2.

47. In the immigration context, the Supreme Court extended these constitutional protections to all noncitizens within the United States, including those who entered unlawfully, declaring that “[noncitizens] who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” *See, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); *see also Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.); *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that unlawfully present aliens were entitled to both due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).

48. The Court reasoned that noncitizens physically present in the United States, regardless of their legal status, are recognized as persons guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. *Plyler*, 457 U.S. at 210 (citing *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 212; *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). Thus, the Court determined, [e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. *Mathews*, 426 U.S. at 77; *see also Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining that the Due Process Clause applies to

1 all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,  
2 unlawful, temporary, or permanent). “The Due Process Clause extends to all ‘persons’ regardless  
3 of status, including non-citizens (whether here lawfully, unlawfully, temporarily, or  
4 permanently).” *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*9 (citing *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S.  
5 678, 690 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S.  
6 292, 306 (1993)).

7 49. Accordingly, notwithstanding Congress’s indisputably broad power to regulate  
8 immigration, fundamental due process requirements notably constrained that power with respect  
9 to aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. *See Kwong Hai Chew*, 344 U.S.  
1 590, 596–97 (1953) (explaining that a lawful permanent resident may not be deprived of his life,  
2 liberty or property without due process of law, and thus cannot be deported without notice of the  
3 nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal).

4 50. This fundamental due process protection applies to all noncitizens, including both  
5 removable and inadmissible noncitizens. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001)  
6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth removable and inadmissible [noncitizens] are entitled to be  
7 free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious”). It also protects noncitizens who have been  
8 ordered removed from the United States and who face continuing detention, *Diouf v. Napolitano*,  
9 634 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2011), as well as those noncitizens deemed “arriving” under  
1 the INA, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S.Ct. 830, 862 (2018). (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that  
2 “arriving” noncitizens enjoy due process protections against prolonged detention because they  
3 are “are held within the territory of the United States at an immigration detention facility” (citing  
4 *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); *see also Kwai Fun Wong v. United*

1 *States*, 373 F.3d 952, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the “entry fiction” does not  
2 preclude substantive constitutional protection for noncitizens considered “arriving”).

3 51. As a matter of context, in the last two decades, the Supreme Court has addressed  
4 several challenges to the immigration detention scheme. For instance, in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533  
5 U.S. 678, 721 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that “Freedom from imprisonment—from  
6 government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the  
7 liberty” that the Due Process Clause protects. *Id.* at 690. The Supreme Court then held that the  
8 government must demonstrate that a noncitizen’s removal is reasonably likely to occur if the  
9 noncitizen remains detained for six months after the removal period specified in 8 U.S.C. §  
1 1231(a)(6). 533 U.S. at 701. In doing so, the Court recognized a presumption that detention  
2 longer than six months following a noncitizen’s removal period violates that noncitizen’s due  
3 process right to liberty. *Id.*

4 52. In *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the  
5 mandatory detention of a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on the petitioner’s  
6 concession of deportability and the Court’s understanding that detention under § 1226(c) is  
7 typically “brief.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 522 n.6, 528. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision  
8 in *Demore* did not foreclose a noncitizen’s right to challenge prolonged detention that does not  
9 provide protections that permit a noncitizen to challenge continued confinement.

1 53. To guarantee against such arbitrary detention and to guarantee the right to liberty,  
2 due process requires “adequate procedural protections” that ensure the government’s asserted  
3 justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally  
4 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (internal quotation  
5 marks omitted).

1 54. Following *Zadvydas* and *Demore*, circuit court of appeals that confronted the  
2 issue found either that the INA or due process require a bond hearing or release for noncitizens  
3 subject to unreasonably prolonged detention pending removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Sopo v.*  
4 *U.S. Attorney Gen.*, 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016), *vacated as moot*, 890 F.3d 952 (11th Cir.  
5 2018); *Reid v. Donelan*, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); *Lora v. Shanahan*, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir.  
6 2015); *Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III)*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015); *Diop v.*  
7 *ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); *Ly v. Hansen*, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).

8 55. Later, in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court held that  
9 the Ninth Circuit erred by interpreting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1225(b) to require bond hearings  
10 as a matter of statutory construction. The Supreme Court concluded that §§1225(b), 1226(a), and  
11 1226(c) do not give detained [noncitizens] the right to periodic bond hearings during the course  
12 of their detention. Because the Ninth Circuit had not decided whether the Constitution itself  
13 requires bond hearings in cases of prolonged detention, the Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit  
14 to address the issue. *Id.* at 851. The Court's majority opinion did not express any views on the  
15 constitutional question and left it to the lower courts to address the issue in the first instance.

1 56. In his dissent, Justice Breyer expressed that "to hold a [person] without bail is to  
2 deprive him of bodily "liberty..." "...where there is no bail proceeding, there has been no bail-  
3 related "process" at all." citing *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U. S. 739–751 (1987). Justice  
4 Breyer also mentioned that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the  
5 liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action."  
6 citing *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U. S. 71, 80 (1992); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U. S. 510, 532 (2003)  
7 (Kennedy, J., concurring); *Zadvydas*, 533 U. S., at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). To Justice  
8 Breyer "[t]he Due Process Clause foresees eligibility for bail as part of due process" because

1 “[b]ail is basic to our system of law.” *Jennings*, at 862, (citing *Salerno, supra*, at 748–  
2 751; *Schilb v. Kuebel*, 404 U. S. 357, 365 (1971); *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951)).

3 57. Since the Supreme Court’s *Jennings* decision, lower courts have expressed that  
4 “...any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is  
5 unconstitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the  
6 government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” *See, e.g., Rodriguez v.*  
*Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

7 58. In immigration cases, civil detention has been found to only permissible where it  
8 bears a “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” *Jackson v.*  
9 *Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). As concluded in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. at 690, due  
1 process thus requires “adequate procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted  
2 justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally  
3 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Id.* at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 59. Also, and relevant here, in the immigration context, the Supreme Court has  
5 recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention: to mitigate the risks of danger to the  
6 community and to prevent flight. *Id.*; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528. The government may not detain a  
7 noncitizen based on any other justification.

8 60. Thus, where the government detains a noncitizen for a prolonged period or where  
9 the noncitizen pursues a substantial defense to removal or claim to relief, due process requires an  
1 individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether such a significant  
2 deprivation of liberty is reasonably related to its purpose. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J.,  
3 concurring) (stating that an “individualized determination as to [a noncitizen’s] risk of flight and  
4 dangerousness” may be warranted “if the continued detention became unreasonable or  
5

unjustified”); *cf. Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (detention beyond the “initial commitment” requires additional safeguards); *McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst.*, 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972) (noting that “lesser safeguards may be appropriate” for “short-term confinement”); *Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978) (observing, in Eighth Amendment context, that “the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether [a] confinement meets constitutional standards”).

61. To determine if the prolonged detention of a noncitizen is reasonable, Courts have applied a reasonableness test, which involves three main factors. First, courts have evaluated whether the noncitizen has raised a “good faith” challenge to removal—that is, the challenge is “legitimately raised” and presents “real issues.” *Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison*, 783 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2015). Second, reasonableness is a “function of the length of the detention,” with detention presumptively unreasonable if it lasts six months to a year. *Id.* at 477-78; *accord Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1217-18. In assessing the length of detention, delay attributable to the government weighs against finding the detention reasonable. *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1218. Third, courts consider the likelihood that detention will continue pending future proceedings. *Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478 (finding detention unreasonable after ninth months of detention, when the parties could “have reasonably predicted that Chavez-Alvarez’s appeal would take a substantial amount of time, making his already lengthy detention considerably longer”); *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 128; *Reid*, 819 F.3d at 500.

62. Due process also requires certain minimal bond hearing procedures. First, the government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to justify continued detention. Second, the decisionmaker must consider available alternatives to detention. Finally, if

1 the government cannot meet its burden, a decisionmaker must assess a noncitizen's ability to pay  
2 a bond must when determining the appropriate conditions of release.

3 63. The requirement that the government bear the burden of proof by clear and  
4 convincing evidence is also supported by application of the three-factor balancing test from  
5 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Under the *Mathews* test, Courts consider (1)  
6 "the private interest that will be affected by the official action." (2) "the risk of an erroneous  
7 deprivation of such interest," and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved  
8 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement  
9 would entail." *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. at 335.

10 64. Due process also requires that a neutral decisionmaker consider alternatives to  
11 detention. A primary purpose of immigration detention is to ensure a noncitizen's appearance  
12 during removal proceedings. Detention is not reasonably related to this purpose if there are  
13 alternative conditions of release that could mitigate risk of flight. *See Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S.  
14 520, 538 (1979).

15 65. Courts have ruled that automatically stayed release from detention is a violation of  
16 the Fifth Amendment. *See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 886, 895 (D. Minn.  
17 2025) (finding that it "does not require any showing of dangerousness or flight risk. Nor is it  
18 subject to immediate review by an immigration judge. It operates by fiat and has the effect of  
19 prolonging detention even after a judicial officer has determined that release on bond is  
20 appropriate. That mechanism's operation here—in the absence of any individualized  
21 justification—renders the continued detention arbitrary as applied. Cf. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at  
22 699–700, 121 S.Ct. 2491.

1 66. The “recent shift to use the mandatory detention framework under Section  
2 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also fundamentally unfair. In a nation of laws vetted and  
3 implemented by Congress, we don't get to arbitrarily choose which laws we feel like following  
4 when they best suit our interests.” *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*10.

5 67. It is important to consider that detention is often lengthy and that immigration  
6 detainees face severe hardships while incarcerated. Immigration detainees are held in lock-down  
7 facilities, with limited freedom of movement and access to their families: “the circumstances of  
8 their detention are similar, so far as we can tell, to those in many prisons and jails.” *Jennings*,  
9 138 S. Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting); *accord Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478; *Ngo v. INS*,  
1 192 F.3d 390, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1999); *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1218, 1221. “And in some cases[,] the  
2 conditions of their confinement are inappropriately poor.” *Jennings*, 138 S. Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J.,  
3 dissenting) (citing Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), *DHS*  
4 *OIG Inspection Cites Concerns With Detainee Treatment and Care at ICE Detention Facilities*  
5 (2017) (reporting instances of invasive procedures, substandard care, and mistreatment, *e.g.*,  
6 indiscriminate strip searches, long waits for medical care and hygiene products, and, in the case  
7 of one detainee, a multiday lock down for sharing a cup of coffee with another detainee)).

8 68. These conditions and obstacles only further underscore the serious due process  
9 concerns that prolonged immigration detention entails for Mr. Romero Garcia. While in  
1 detention Mr. Romero Garcia is separated from her United States Citizen children, who will also  
2 endure hardship as Mr. Romero Garcia is unable to help provide for them.

3 69. Upon weighing the *Matthews* factors this Court should find that the Government's  
4 interest in fewer bond hearings (the efficient processing on noncitizens for removal) is  
5 diminished. Additionally, since Mr. Romero Garcia's detention will continue pending future

1 immigration proceedings, this Court should find that the Government's interest in denying her  
2 the opportunity for a bond hearing does not outweigh Mr. Romero Garcia's liberty interest and it  
3 will also create a high risk of erroneous deprivation to said right.

4 70. The government's decision that all noncitizens, like Mr. Romero Garcia, are to be  
5 mandatorily detained is arbitrary and affords to individuals like him no process, let alone due  
6 process. Therefore, it should be unconstitutional. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

7 **C. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA")**

8 71. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"), codified in Chapter 12 of  
9 Title 8 of the United States Code, governs all aspects of immigration law. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101  
10 *et seq.* Forming the basis of current immigration laws of the United States, the INA addresses  
11 issues of admission qualifications for noncitizens, naturalization and loss of nationality, refugee  
12 assistance, and removal procedures for noncitizen terrorists. *Id. See also* Margaret C. Jasper,  
13 *The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952*, Legal Almanac: The Law of Immigration (2012).

14 72. Sections 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226 of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* ("INA")  
15 govern how the executive branch evaluates inadmissible noncitizens. Logically speaking,  
16 inspection or apprehension of the noncitizen is a necessary precondition of removal. Only after  
17 a noncitizen is identified as inadmissible can removal proceedings happen.<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court  
18 has already distinguished these two provisions in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*. *See* 583 U.S. 281, 289  
19 (2018). The *Jennings* Court determined that the government may "detain certain aliens seeking

20 <sup>2</sup> *See also, Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr et al.* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, ---  
21 *F. Supp. 3d* ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). Amended Order Consolidating The  
22 Court's Orders On Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, Class Certification, And Application For  
23 Reconsideration Or Clarification.

1 admission into the country” under § 1225(b) while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain  
2 certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” *Id.*  
3 (emphasis added).

4 73. Under § 1225, an “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen “present in the United  
5 States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).  
6 “[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States  
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

7 74. Section 1225(b)(1) of INA authorizes expedited removal for certain “applicants  
8 for admission” in two categories. First, noncitizens “arriving in the United States” that are  
9 determined by an immigration officer to be inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to  
1 meet documents requirements. *Id.* at § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); *see also id.* at § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7).

2 75. Second, noncitizens that (a) are inadmissible because of misrepresentation or  
3 failure to meet documents requirements; (b) have not “been admitted or paroled into the United  
4 States”; (c) have not “affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that  
5 [they have] been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period  
6 immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (d) have been  
7 designated by the Attorney General for expedited removal. *Id.* at § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).

8 76. These two categories of noncitizens subject to § 1225(b)(1) are subject to  
9 mandatory detention “until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297.  
1 Individuals that fall into § 1225(b)(1) are “normally ordered removed ‘without further hearing or  
2 review’ pursuant to an expedited removal process” unless claiming asylum or a fear of  
3 persecution. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (first quoting § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); then citing §  
4 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)).  
5

1 77. Noncitizens who are “seeking admission” and not covered by the expedited  
2 removal provisions in § 1225(b)(1) are subject to Section 1225(b)(2). *See id.* at 287. This  
3 category would include, for example, noncitizens who are arriving in the United States, seek  
4 admission, and are inadmissible for some reason other than misrepresentation or failure to meet  
5 documents requirements. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)–(3).

6 78. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs mandatory detention of applicants for admission.  
7 Subject to limited exceptions, Section 1225(b)(2) provides that such noncitizens “shall be  
8 detained” for full removal proceedings under § 1229a “if the examining immigration officer  
9 determines” that the noncitizen “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” *Id.* at  
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).<sup>3</sup>

1 79. On the other hand, Section 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and  
2 detaining aliens who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” This Section  
3 provides for discretionary detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *See, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53  
4 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022).

1 80. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained” “[o]n a warrant  
2 issued by the Attorney General” if their removal proceedings are pending, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).<sup>4</sup>

3 <sup>3</sup> (b) Inspection of applicants for admission

1 ..  
2 (2) Inspection of other aliens  
3 (A) In general

4 Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the  
5 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a  
6 doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.  
7 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

8 <sup>4</sup> (a) Arrest, detention, and release

9 On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision  
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and  
pending such decision, the Attorney General—

1 Detention pursuant to § 1226(a) is not mandatory. If the noncitizen was not charged with,  
2 arrested for, or convicted of certain criminal offenses enumerated in § 1226(c),<sup>5</sup> the government  
3 has discretion to release them on “bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and  
4 containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or ... conditional parole.” *Id.* at §  
1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).

5 81. Beyond how noncitizens are identified as inadmissible, the one key distinction  
6 between these two Sections is that noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to receive  
7 bond hearings at the outset of detention. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1). *See also Jennings v. Rodriguez*,  
8 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018).

9 82. Not only does § 1226(a) provide several layers of review of the agency’s initial  
1 custody determination, but it also confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral  
2 decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to  
3 appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” *See, e.g.,*  
4 *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that § 1226(a) and its  
5 implementing regulations “provide extensive procedural protections that are unavailable under  
6 other detention provision”).

7 (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

8 (2) may release the alien on—

9 (A) bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, an containing conditions  
10 prescribed by, the Attorney General... 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

11 <sup>5</sup> Known as the *Laken Riley Act*, subsection (c) of § 1226, provides for mandatory detention of  
12 noncitizens found inadmissible or deportable under certain provisions and who have been “charged with,”  
13 “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit “having committed” certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  
14 “[N]oncitizens arrested and detained under § 1226 have a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e.,  
15 a bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.” *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL  
16 2496379, at \*4 (citing 8 C.F.R. 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). “The IJ evaluates whether there is a risk of  
17 nonappearance or danger to the community.” *Id.* (citing *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA  
18 2006)).

1 83. For decades the DHS had applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary release and  
2 review of detention “to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid  
3 documentation”—a practice codified by regulation. *See, e.g., Salcedo Aceros*, 2025 WL  
4 2737503, at \*3. However, last year the Government upended this long-held understanding of the  
5 law.

6 84. First, on July 8, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued  
7 an interim guidance memo stating that anyone who entered without inspection was ineligible for  
8 release on bond and could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court,  
9 regardless of how long an individual has lived in the United States.<sup>6</sup> As result, DHS attorneys  
10 started arguing, and some IJs started finding, that such individuals were not eligible for bond  
11 hearings in immigration court.

12 85. Then, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a  
13 precedential decision binding on all IJs, holding that an IJ had no authority to consider bond  
14 requests for any person who entered the United States without inspection. *See Matter of Yajure*  
15 *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The BIA determined that such individuals are subject  
16 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible for release on  
17 bond. In practice, DHS is not exercising this authority. As a result, thousands of people are  
18 facing months or years in detention without any individualized consideration for whether they  
19 should be detained.

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<sup>6</sup> See, AILA Doc. No. 25071607, accessible through <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission> (last accessed on Friday, January 16, 2026 at 6:27 pm.)

1 86. As discussed above, mandatory detention of applicants for admission applies after  
2 an immigration officer has determined that they will not be entitled to admission if the  
3 examining immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly  
4 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). But the Government is  
5 now contending that anyone who entered without inspection remains an “applicant for  
6 admission” who is “seeking admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention under Section  
7 1225(b)(2). *See e.g., Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, et al.* 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL  
8 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (citing *Torres v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020)).

8 87. However, it is important to note, that individuals who have not been inspected and  
9 authorized by an immigration officer lack the trait to be categorized as “applicants for  
10 admission” since statutory language of § 1225(b)(2) contemplates a determination by an  
1 “examining immigration officer” regarding a noncitizen’s admissibility. *See* § 1225(b)(2).<sup>7</sup>

0 88. In regard to this new interpretation, as of late 2025, several district courts have  
1 held that the Government’s new, and more expansive interpretation of mandatory detention  
1 under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect on the basis that this reading of the statute  
1 would render 1226(c) inoperable or moot. Several Courts have then rejected the government’s  
2 position and have held that such individuals are subject to § 1226(a) and thus eligible for a bond

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3 <sup>7</sup> “...based on a plain reading of the language and aided by these standard canons of statutory  
1 construction, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens in the United States who have not been admitted  
1 (“applicants for admission” definition) AND who are attempting to obtain lawful admission to the United  
4 States. This interpretation is also consistent with the framework of § 1225, which focuses on the  
1 admission of aliens upon their arrival to the United States or upon an attempt to obtain admission after  
4 arrival...” *See J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025)  
1 citing *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (Kennedy, J.) (“In ascertaining the  
1 plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, *as well as*  
5 *the language and design of the statute as a whole.*”) (emphasis added).

1 hearing. *See also* e.g., *Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, et al.* 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL  
2 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025); *See* e.g., *Aguilar Merino v. Ripa*, 25-23845-CIV, 2025  
3 WL 2941609 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025), and *J.Y.L.C., v. Bostock, et al.*, 3:25-cv-02083-AB, (D.  
4 Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases rejecting *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*).

5 89. One of those recent cases where the Court rejected the government's position, and  
6 relevant here, is *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp.  
7 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). On November 20, 2025, the District  
8 Court granted partial summary judgment for the four petitioners, holding that the government's  
9 policy is inconsistent with the plain language of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* ("INA"),  
10 and that petitioners are properly subject to § 1226(a). *See* e.g., *J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-  
1 342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025) and *P.R.S. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-cv-330-  
2 CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025).

3 90. Then, on November 25, 2025, the Court certified all noncitizens in the United  
4 States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without  
5 inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be  
6 subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department  
7 of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination as "the Bond Eligible Class." and  
8 expressly "extend[ed] the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible  
9 Class as a whole." *Id.*, at \*9 (emphasis added).

10 91. As expressed above, Mr. Romero Garcia is a member of the *Maldonado Bautista*  
11 Bond Eligible Class.

12 **D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

1 92. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA commands a reviewing court to “hold unlawful *and*  
2 *set aside* agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, . . .  
3 or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).

4 93. APA claims are cognizable on habeas. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (providing that judicial  
5 review of agency action under the APA may proceed by “any applicable form of legal action,  
6 including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or  
7 habeas corpus”). The APA affords a right of review to a person who is “adversely affected or  
8 aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702.

9 94. Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Romero Garcia for a prolonged or  
10 otherwise indefinite period of time without a review of her custody or a bond hearing is  
11 adversely and severely affecting her liberty and freedom.

12 **E. EXHAUSTION**

13 95. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA commands a reviewing court to “hold unlawful *and*  
14 *set aside* agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, . . .  
15 or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).

16 96. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, “a party may not  
17 seek federal judicial review of an adverse administrative determination until the party has first  
18 sought all possible relief within the agency itself.” *Howell v. INS*, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir.  
19 1995) (quoting *Guitard v. U.S. Sec’y of Navy*, 967 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1992)).

20 97. However, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies, however, when the  
21 available remedies would “provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief” or when  
22 “administrative appeal would be futile.” *Beharry v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003)  
23 (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting *Able v. United States*, 88 F.3d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1996)). *See also*

1 *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 146-49 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds as*  
2 *stated in Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (noting that traditional exceptions include where  
3 exhaustion would cause “undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action” or  
4 “irreparable harm” to the petitioner, where there is “some doubt as to whether the agency was  
5 empowered to grant effective relief,” or where it would be futile because “the administrative  
6 body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it”) (internal  
7 quotation marks omitted).

8 98. In the context of immigration, Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion.  
9 Where Congress has not explicitly spoken, requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies  
10 lies within “sound judicial discretion.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). In  
11 exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court has stated that “federal courts must balance the  
12 interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against  
13 countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” *Id.* at 146. Those institutional interests  
14 are “protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” *Id.* at 145.

15 99. The *McCarthy* Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual  
16 weighs heavily against the institutional interests. *See id.* at 146–49. Relevant here, “an  
17 administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise  
18 predetermined the issue before it.” *Id.* at 148 (citing *Gibson v. Berryhill*, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.14  
19 (1973)).

20 100. Further, constitutional challenges have been found exempt from administrative  
21 exhaustion requirements. *See Khan v. Atty. Gen. of U.S.*, 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006)  
22 (internal alterations and quotations omitted) (“[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from  
23 the exhaustion requirement because the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

1 constitutional issues.”); *United States v. Gonzalez-Roque*, 301 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2002)  
2 (“[T]he BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues . . . .” (quoting  
3 *Vargas v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization*, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1987))).

4 101. As mentioned above, on July 8, 2025, the U.S. Immigration and Customs  
5 Enforcement (“ICE”) was instructed, via an interim guidance memo, that anyone deemed to have  
6 entered without inspection (EWIs) is ineligible for release on bond. Then, on September 5, 2025,  
7 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that “[b]ased on the plain language of section  
8 235(b)(2)(A) of the [INA], Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant  
9 bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.” *See Matter of Yajure*  
*Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

1 102. In accordance with the July 8, 2025 interim guidance memo and the Board of  
2 Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, DHS’ attorneys have the  
3 practice of arguing, and Immigration Court IJs throughout the country, including those stationed  
4 at Stewart Detention Center, have started finding that individuals, such as Mr. Romero Garcia,  
5 could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court, regardless of how  
6 long an individual has lived in the United States. As result, individuals, such as Mr. Romero  
7 Garcia, are denied bond hearings in immigration court.

1 103. Since the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is an administrative body located  
2 in the DOJ, which, of course, is part of the executive branch of the government. Its members are  
3 appointed by the Attorney General, and its decisions are binding on all immigration judges,  
4 *Yajure Hurtado* thus precludes an IJ from finding jurisdiction over noncitizens like Mr. Romero  
5 Garcia, to hold a custody redetermination hearing. As such, this Court should find that the  
6 agency’s position is already set and recourse to administrative remedies is very likely futile.

1 104. Additionally, Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings  
2 that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado*  
3 *Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound  
4 to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA  
5 2025).

6 105. Since the government has already predetermined that anyone who they  
7 determined entered without inspection (EWIs) is ineligible for release on bond, established a no-  
8 bond for EWIs policy, and has resorted to an across-the-board application of § 1225(b)(2), Mr.  
9 Romero Garcia had to proceed directly to filing this petition for writ of habeas corpus based on  
10 *Maldonado Bautista* class membership and for the violation to her statutory and constitutional  
11 rights.

1 106. Requiring exhaustion, in this case, would not further the ends of judicial  
2 efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of  
3 Mr. Romero Garcia’s legal questions. It is important to consider that in detention cases, appeals  
4 to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) can take months or years. Thus, requiring habeas  
5 petitioners, such as Mr. Romero Garcia, to appeal to the BIA to prudentially exhaust is not  
6 efficient, would cause irreparable harm by continuing to deprive her of her liberty. Additionally,  
7 while in detention Mr. Romero Garcia is separated from her United States Citizen sons, who will  
8 also endure hardship as Mr. Romero Garcia is unable to help provide or care for them.

9 107. Thus, Mr. Romero Garcia’s individual interest in having prompt access to this  
10 forum outweighs any institutional interests at stake.

11 108. Therefore, the Court should consider the merits of the Petition. This Court  
12 intervention, to enjoin the Respondents from preventing Mr. Romero Garcia from having a bond

1 hearing pursuant to the holding in *Hurtado*, is necessary to enable her to avail herself of her  
2 administrative remedies.

3 **CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

4 **COUNT 1: REQUEST FOR RELIEF PURSUANT**  
5 **TO MALDONADO BAUTISTA**

6 109. Petitioner, Mr. Romero Garcia, repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference  
7 each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

8 110. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Mr. Romero Garcia is entitled to  
9 consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

1 111. The Order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that  
2 Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class  
3 members.

4 112. The Order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that  
5 “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same  
6 declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

7 113. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s  
8 declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C.  
9 § 2201(a).

1 114. By denying Mr. Romero Garcia a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and wrongly  
2 asserting that she is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Mr.  
3 Romero Garcia’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado*  
4 *Bautista*.

**COUNT 2: UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION IN  
VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT**

115. Petitioner, Mr. Romero Garcia, repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

116. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

117. Civil immigration detention is only permissible where it bears a “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Those purposes are limited: preventing flight and protecting the community. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).

118. Mr. Romero Garcia’s immigration proceedings at an early stage, and she could raise a “good faith” challenge to removal. There is no removal order. Her removal is not imminent or reasonably foreseeable.

119. Mr. Romero Garcia continued and prolonged detention does not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which it was committed until the government satisfies its burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that community protection or flight risk concerns apply to her. This can only happen in a bond hearing, which the Respondents are not affording to Mr. Romero Garcia. *See Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

120. Furthermore, the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens, such as Mr. Romero Garcia, residing in the United States who are

1 subject to the grounds of inadmissibility only because they previously entered the country  
2 without being admitted.

3 121. Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to another detention  
4 provision, such as 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

5 122. However, in accordance with the BIA decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, DHS  
6 attorneys have the practice of arguing and IJs throughout the country, including those stationed  
7 the Stewart Detention Center, have started finding that individuals, such as Mr. Romero Garcia,  
8 could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court, regardless of how  
9 long an individual has lived in the United States. As result, individuals such as, Mr. Romero  
Garcia, are denied bond hearings in immigration court.

1 123. These cumulative actions render his detention even more constitutionally suspect,  
2 as they reflect punitive conduct rather than civil processing.

3 124. Respondents lack statutory authority to detain Mr. Romero Garcia under Section  
4 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to noncitizens in her circumstances. Accordingly,  
5 Mr. Romero Garcia's continued detention constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process  
6 of law. The Court should order her release.

7  
8 **COUNT 3: VIOLATION OF INA AND ITS**  
9 **IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(A)**  
10 **UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF BOND HEARINGS**

11 125. Petitioner, Mr. Romero Garcia, herein incorporates all allegations and facts set  
12 forth in the paragraphs above.

13 126. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to  
14 noncitizens, such as Mr. Romero Garcia, residing in the United States who are only subject to the  
15 grounds of inadmissibility because they previously entered the country without being admitted.

127. It is important to note that, individuals who have not been inspected and authorized by an immigration officer lack the trait to be categorized as “applicants for admission” since statutory language of § 1225(b)(2) contemplates a determination by an “examining immigration officer” regarding a noncitizen’s admissibility. *See* § 1225(b)(2). Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention provision, such as 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

128. That Mr. Romero Garcia is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to the detention provisions proscribed in 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

129. The government’s no-bond for purported EWIs policy and the incorrect, willful, and capricious application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Romero Garcia violates the *Immigration and Nationality Act*.

**COUNT 4: UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF BOND HEARING IN VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BAIL**

130. Petitioner, Mr. Romero Garcia, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

131. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII cl. 4.2.

132. Bail is “basic to our system of law.” It not only “permits the unhampered preparation of a defense,” but also “prevent[s] the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.” *Jennings*, at 862, (Breyer, J., dissenting) citing *Salerno, supra*, at 748–751; *Schilb v. Kuebel*, 404 U. S. 357, 365 (1971); *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951).

133. The government’s categorical, incorrect, willful, and capricious application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Romero Garcia and continued detention without a bond hearing results in

1 indefinite and unconstitutional imprisonment which surmounts to a cruel and unusual  
2 punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

3 134. For these reasons, Mr. Romero Garcia's ongoing and prolonged detention without  
4 a bond hearing violates the Eighth Amendment.

5 **COUNT 5: CONTINUED DETENTION WITHOUT BOND**  
6 **HEARING IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE**  
7 **PROCEDURE ACT, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

8 135. Petitioner, Mr. Romero Garcia, herein incorporates all allegations and facts set  
9 forth in the paragraphs above.

10 136. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to  
11 noncitizens, such as Mr. Romero Garcia, residing in the United States who are only subject to the  
12 grounds of inadmissibility because they are purported to have originally entered the United  
13 States without inspection. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject  
14 to another detention provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c) or § 1231.

15 137. That Mr. Romero Garcia is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to any  
16 detention provisions proscribed in 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

17 138. Nonetheless, IJs stationed at Stewart Detention Center have a policy and practice  
18 of applying § 1225(b)(2) and denying bond hearings to detainees, such as Mr. Romero Garcia.

19 139. Respondents continue to keep Mr. Romero Garcia detained under the wrong  
20 provision of INA. Such action against Mr. Romero Garcia is arbitrary, capricious, and not in  
21 accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

22 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

1 WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Argelia Garcia Villatoro, prays that this Court grant the following  
2 relief:

- 3 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 4 b. Issue an Order prohibiting the Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the  
5 district without the court's approval;
- 6 c. Issue a declaration that Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the  
7 declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*;
- 8 d. Expedite consideration of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 because it is an  
9 action brought under chapter 153 (habeas corpus) of Title 28;
- 10 e. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release  
11 Petitioner; on her own recognizance, under parole, or on low bond or any other  
12 reasonable conditions of supervision;
- 13 f. Alternatively, issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, hold a hearing before this Court if  
14 warranted to determine if the Petitioner should be subject to mandatory detention  
15 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); require Respondents to release Petitioner unless they  
16 provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- 17 a. Issue a declaration that Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention violates the Due  
18 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.
- 19 a. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act  
20 (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under  
21 law; and
- 22 b. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

1 Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ Michael Urbina

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Michael Urbina

michael@urbina.law

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*Counsel for Petitioner*

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Dated: 9th<sup>h</sup> day of March, 2026

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 35

URBINA IMMIGRATION LAW

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Marietta, GA 30006

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VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Leonel Antonio Romero Garcia, and submit this verification on her behalf. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 9<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2026.

s/Michael Urbina  
Michael Urbina  
michael@urbina.law