

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION**

JORGE DIAZ ESCANDON,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 2:26-cv-646-KCD-NPM

FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Jorge Diaz Escandon seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking his immediate release from immigration custody on the basis that the length of his detention is unlawful. His petition should be denied. In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, the Supreme Court held that detention following a final removal order is presumptively reasonable for six months. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Diaz Escandon had been detained for 111 days when he filed the present petition. His present detention is therefore lawful.

BACKGROUND

Diaz Escandon is a national and citizen of Cuba. Composite Exhibit, Ex. 1 at 1. An order of removal was entered against Diaz Escandon on March 4, 2010. *Id.* at 10-11. He has an extensive criminal history. Ex. 1 at 26-33. Diaz Escandon was encountered at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center in Dade County after his arrest on state charges related to cocaine and resisting arrest. *Id.* at 2. On

November 12, 2025, Diaz Escandon was placed in immigration custody. *Id.* at 1-2. On March 3, 2026, Diaz Escandon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. 1. Diaz Escandon is currently detained at Florida Soft Side South. *Id.* at 34.

ARGUMENT

Diaz Escandon’s detention does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

After a final removal order, an alien must be removed within ninety days—i.e., the removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001). During the removal period, the alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683. An alien, however, can be detained beyond that removal period. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), (a)(6); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 683. This is called a “post-removal” period. *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021).

There is no statutory limit on how long ICE can detain an alien during the post-removal period. *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 579 (2022). Due to constitutional concerns, the U.S. Supreme Court has nevertheless interpreted the post-removal period to allow extended detention for “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. In all, a reasonable length of detention “is presumptively six months.” *Guzman Chavez*, 594 U.S. at 529; *see also Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1052 (stating six-month period is inclusive of any ninety-day removal period).

If the presumptively reasonable period expires without removal, then a

burden-shifting framework comes into play regarding the “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 689. But before that six-month period expires, any habeas challenge to the detention itself is premature. *E.g.*, *Akinwale v. Ashcroft*, 287 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (11th Cir. 2002); *Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Attorney General*, 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013); *Gozo v. Napolitano*, 309 F. App’x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009). At bottom, “[U]ntil the six-month *Zadvydas* period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe.” *E.g.*, *Khalil Al Ellary*, 2:26-cv-00112-KCD-DNF, Doc. 7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2026); *Jiang v. Mukasey*, No. 2:08-cv-773-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009); *Noel v. Glades Cnty. Sheriff*, No. 2:11-cv-698-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 6412425, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011).

Diaz Escandon filed the present petition well before expiration of six months in detention. He was detained on November 12, 2025, and filed the present petition on March 3, 2026. At that point, Diaz Escandon been detained for 111 days; to date, he has been in detention for 135 days.

It is only afterward that the parties can engage in *Zadvydas* burden-shifting related to the “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 299 (2018) (citation omitted); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701 (holding the inquiry is “[a]fter this 6-month period”); *Khalil Al Ellary v. Noem*, 2:26-cv-00112-KCD-DNF (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2026) (denying petition when alien had not been detained for six months). Before that time limit runs, neither *Zadvydas* nor any other binding precedent permit a challenge

based on reasonable foreseeability of removal. *See Akinwale*, 287 F.3d at 1051-52. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 700 (stating judicial review in foreign policy matters “require courts to listen with care when the Government’s foreign policy judgments, including, for example, the status of repatriation negotiations, are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise”).

CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully request Diaz Escandon’s petition be denied.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

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