

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Chay Thao,

Petitioner,

v.

Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of
Homeland Security;

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; and

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;

Respondents.

Civil No.: 0:26-cv-1760

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

**8 U.S.C. § 1231
28 U.S.C. § 2241**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner, Chay Thao, came to the United States in 1979 at the age of 9, as a refugee belonging to the Hmong ethnic minority of Laos, which were targeted by the government of Laos for their support for American troops during the Vietnam War and the Secret War in Laos during the same period.

2. Mr. Thao became a lawful permanent resident, retroactive to his date of entry. However, he was ordered removed in 2012, following a deportation agreement reached after a criminal conviction. Over the next decade-plus, Laos rarely accepted deportees and even more rarely Hmong deportees. Hmong refugees who were ordered deported were universally released on orders of supervision, with annual check-ins with

INS and then ICE. Mr. Thao was similarly released from immigration custody on an order of supervision, which, on information and belief, he complied with for 14 years.

3. Historically, when circumstances changed and ICE gained the ability to remove individuals on orders of supervision, ICE would call the individual in to the field office or wait until the next scheduled check-in appointment to take them into custody to execute removal. When it would likely take some time to obtain travel documents from the country of citizenship, ICE would not detain the individual at that time but instead have them complete an application for travel documents.

4. While ICE has recently been able to remove some Hmong refugees to Laos, it has recently stopped observed the proper procedures for revoking their release and has instead chosen to arrest Hmong individuals at their homes or on the streets and indefinitely detain them.

5. On December 11, 2025, ICE agents arrested Mr. Thao outside his home in St. Paul. As he parked his car off the alley, agents swarmed his car and pulled him out. The agents claimed to have a warrant for his arrest, but have never produced one. It remains unclear whether ICE was targeting Mr. Thao for arrest, or if the agents happened upon him while looking for any noncitizens to arrest.

6. While Mr. Thao turned out to have a final unexecuted order for removal, ICE has arbitrarily arrested other Hmong residents in Minnesota. On January 18, 2026, ICE agents used a battering ram to enter a home in Saint Paul, Minnesota, and arrested an elderly Hmong man who was a naturalized U.S. citizen, dragging him out of his house into

the cold in just shorts and Crocs shoes.¹ Local elected officials have “received reports of federal law enforcement officers going door-to-door asking people where the Asian people live.”² Thus, agents appearing at his workplace is not enough to conclude it was a targeted enforcement action. Further, on information and belief, agents did not present Mr. Thao any type of warrant or other paperwork, at the time of arrest.

7. ICE’s detention of Mr. Thao is facially unlawful. Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is authorized for the purpose of executing the removal of a noncitizen with an unexecuted final order of removal. It does not authorize detention for other purposes, even for a noncitizen with an unexecuted final order of removal.

8. Detention here was not targeted at a noncitizen known to have an unexecuted order with plans to execute removal, but rather an entire class of people, based on their race, ethnicity, and country of origin. While ICE has been able to remove some Hmong to Laos, there is no indication that it can or will execute the removal of Mr. Thao in the reasonably foreseeable future. Indeed, on information and belief, ICE does not have any valid travel document for Mr. Thao. Further, the regulatory procedure for revocation of Mr. Thao’s order of supervision was not followed, and there were less restrictive

¹ See Maria Cardona, *ICE Broke into Minnesota Home, Forced Barely Clothed Man Outside into the Snow*, Reuters (Jan. 20, 2026, at 11:51 CST), <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/ice-broke-into-minnesota-home-dragged-barely-clothed-man-into-snow-2026-01-20/>.

² Lydia Morrell, *St. Paul Mayor Kaohly Her Reports ICE Agents Asking, “Where the Asian People Live”*, KARE 11 (Jan. 16, 2026, at 11:47 CST), <https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/ice-in-minnesota/st-paul-mayor-kaohly-her-reports-ice-agents-asking-where-the-asian-people-live/89-10880612-bb5f-4bd2-978b-786ae8760afb>.

alternatives to initiate the removal process. As a result, Respondents' detention of Mr. Thao under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is unlawful and violates agency regulations, § 1231 itself, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

9. Without the intervention of this Court, Petitioner believes that Respondents will continue to detain him indefinitely, without regard for the mandates of the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the agencies' own rules and regulations.

10. Petitioner was initially detained at the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, and moved to the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota, on the same day as his arrest. ICE has a well-documented habit of transferring Minnesota detainees out of state and repeatedly shuttling them around the country, seemingly to evade this District's jurisdiction.³ ICE may well transfer him outside of the State of Minnesota and the District of Minnesota, and to an unknown location, without even a moment's notice.

11. To remedy this unlawful detention, Mr. Thao seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of immediate release from detention on the conditions of the

³ See, e.g., Elizabeth Shockman, '*ICE Conveyor Belt*' Illegally Detaining, Moving Minnesota Children to Texas Faster Than Courts Can Respond, MPR News (Jan. 28, 2026, at 4:00 AM), <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/01/28/ice-detaining-moving-minnesota-children-to-texas-faster-than-courts-can-respond> (describing how a father and his two-year-old daughter were moved out of Minnesota 20 minutes after this Court ordered their release); Transcript of Show Cause Hearing at 19–27, *Segundo A.P.G. v. Bondi*, No. 26-CV-603 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2026) (describing how one detainee was ordered returned from Texas to Minnesota, but wound up in New Mexico and remained there despite additional orders from this Court), <https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1-QsB0RfJ8Zm6Ux8Exb0pen8wSNB3GWjM>

order of supervision in place before his arrest.

12. Further, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue an order enjoining Respondents from moving Petitioner outside of Minnesota so that Petitioner may consult with counsel while the Court is considering the petition, and so that there is no risk that removal of Petitioner from Minnesota will deprive this Court of jurisdiction over the petition, and ordering Respondents to immediately return Petitioner to Minnesota if he has been moved prior to issuance of such order.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), § 1361 (federal employee *mandamus* action), § 1651 (All Writs Act), and § 2241 (*habeas corpus*); Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Administrative Procedure Act); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act). Because Petitioner seeks to challenge his custody as a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, jurisdiction is proper in this court. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear *habeas* petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness of their detention. *See Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (“[T]he primary federal *habeas corpus* statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear these cases.”); *Moallin v. Cangemi*, 427 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920–21 (D. Minn. 2006).

14. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (e)(1), and 2241(d) because Petitioner is detained within this District, some of the Respondents reside and/or are headquartered within this District, and a substantial part of the events and

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred within this District.

PARTIES

15. Petitioner Chay Thao lives in the State of Minnesota. Mr. Thao is a native of Laos and a member of the Hmong ethnic minority. He has an administratively final order of removal, issued in 2012. He was arrested by federal agents on December 11, 2025, at his home in St. Paul, Minnesota, during Operation Metro Surge. He is currently detained at the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota.

16. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.⁴ In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration and implementation of federal immigration policies, including those that resulted in the arrest and detention of Petitioner.

17. Respondent Todd Lyons is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a sub-unit of the Department of Homeland Security. In that capacity, Acting Director Lyons is responsible for decisions

⁴ Just a few short hours ago, Respondent Kristi Noem was fired as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Ximena Bustillo, *Trump Fires Kristi Noem as DHS Chief, Names Sen. Markwayne Mullin to Replace Her*, Nat'l Pub. Radio (Mar. 5, 2026, at 1:20 P.M. CT), <https://www.npr.org/2026/03/05/nx-s1-5667546/kristi-noem-homeland-security-fired>. President Donald Trump's social media post announcing this development is not the picture of clarity on whether Noem retains her post until the end of March or whether she has been relieved already. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 5, 2026, at 12:41 P.M. CT), <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116178030946996760>. However, Secretary Noem still appears on DHS's website as the Secretary, and so appears to hold her post at this time. For the sake of expediency in this time-sensitive matter, Petitioner has named Secretary Noem as a respondent. However, as information develops and if the Court so orders, Petitioner will file an amended petition with a corrected caption.

related to the detention and removal of certain noncitizens, including Petitioner.

18. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the St. Paul Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Acting Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Petitioner. The St. Paul Field Office is located in Fort Snelling, Minnesota.

EXHAUSTION

19. No statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion applies to Petitioner's challenge to the unlawfulness of his detention. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Moreover, the judicially created "general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts" does not apply to Petitioner's present challenge, as there are no prescribed administrative remedies to which he could resort. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

OPERATION METRO SURGE

20. ICE, CBP, and other federal agencies began Operation Metro Surge on December 1, 2025. Operation Metro Surge is billed as the largest immigration enforcement operation in U.S. history.

21. Operation Metro Surge has nominally ended. On February 12, 2026, White House Border Czar Tom Homan announced that he "proposed, and President Trump has concurred, that this surge operation conclude." Samantha Fischer, *Homan Announces End*

To Operation Metro Surge: 'Mn Now Less Of A Sanctuary State', KARE 11 (Feb. 12, 2026, at 5:27 P.M. CST), <https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/ice-in-minnesota/homan-announces-end-to-operation-metro-surge/89-12276bb4-a329-450e-a06b-8da67430105e>.

Homan claims that some federal law enforcement will be reassigned out of Minnesota, but made clear some will remain to continue immigration enforcement and “ensure agitator activity continues to decline.” *Id.*

22. Some 3,000 federal agents have been deployed to Minnesota and have arrested, detained, assaulted, terrorized, and harassed untold numbers of Minnesotans, both U.S. citizens, immigrants in lawful status, and other noncitizens. At least 4,000 Minnesota residents have been arrested during this operation as of February 4, 2026.⁵ Agents affiliated with Operation Metro Surge have shot and killed two U.S.-born citizens, and shot a third person, a Venezuelan immigrant. Gabriel Brito, *By the Numbers: ICE in Minnesota*, Mpls St. Paul Mag. (Feb. 9, 2026), <https://mspmag.com/arts-and-culture/by-the-numbers-ice-in-minnesota>.

23. While not the largest ethnic group targeted by the Operation, federal agents have specifically targeted the Hmong community. ICE agents have arrested Hmong

⁵ *New Milestone in Operation Metro Surge: 4,000+ Criminal Illegals Removed from Minnesota Streets*, The White House (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/02/new-milestone-in-operation-metro-surge-4000-criminal-illegals-removed-from-minnesota-streets>. Allegedly, every single one of the over 4,000 people arrested are “criminal illegal aliens,” though a significant number of these are children, asylum-seekers, breastfeeding mothers, and others with no documented criminal history. *Id.*; see, e.g., Joe Augustine, *Records Undercut ICE Claims That MN Jails, Prisons Release 'Worst Of The Worst'*, FOX 9 (Jan. 24, 2026, 6:00 A.M. CST), <https://www.fox9.com/news/ice-blames-jails-releasing-worst-worst-many-havent-been-behind-bars-years>.

naturalized citizens, gone door-to-door in certain neighborhoods looking for Hmong individuals, and asked non-Hmong residents to tell them where the Hmong and Asians in their neighborhoods live. *See supra* notes 1 & 2.

PETITIONER CHAY THAO

24. Petitioner Chay Thao is a 56-year-old native of Laos and a member of the Hmong ethnic minority. Mr. Thao entered the United States in 1979 as a refugee, and received lawful permanent resident status retroactive to 1979.

25. In 2000, Mr. Thao was convicted of a felony. He pled guilty to felony unlawful intercourse, received a suspended sentence, and was sentenced to five years of probation. *See California v. Thao*, No. CR003492S (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2000).

26. Mr. Thao was ordered removed by an immigration judge on October 9, 2012. He served three months in ICE custody at that time and was released on an order of supervision. The U.S. Government has been unable to execute his removal order, and he has been under an order of supervision at all times since. On information and belief, he has been compliant with that order of supervision.

27. He has not at any time recently, before his detention, been asked by ICE to come in to fill out an application for a travel document, and he does not have a passport from Laos. He has not been informed of the prospect of removal to any other country. He has also not been called in to the ICE field office.

28. On December 11, 2025, Mr. Thao was arrested outside his home. It is not clear if ICE intended to arrest him specifically, or if ICE had a warrant to arrest him.

29. ICE did not formally notified Mr. Thao that it was revoking his order of

supervision, nor did ICE identified any change in circumstance before his detention to justify revocation of his order of supervision.

30. Instead, ICE detained Mr. Thao for three days before revoking his Order of Supervision on December 14, 2025. This revocation did not identify any specific reasons for revoking his release. It merely stated that ICE made “a determination that there are changed circumstances in your file.” It also stated that “ICE will pursue new efforts to remove you to Laos.”

31. Mr. Thao was provided an informal interview once detained, but that interview took place on December 11, 2025, three days before his Order of Supervision was revoked.

32. On information and belief, ICE does not currently have a plan to remove Mr. Thao to Laos or any other country, nor has ICE obtained travel documents for Mr. Thao. Mr. Thao does not have a Laotian passport and has not filled out an application for a travel document.

33. Mr. Thao has not purposefully or intentionally acted to prevent his removal.

34. Mr. Thao has served 170 days in ICE detention after his order for removal. He served 86 days from October 9, 2012, to January 3, 2013, and has served 84 days from December 11, 2025, to the date of this filing, March 5, 2026.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

35. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, noncitizens with a final order of removal shall be removed from the United States within a period of 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

36. The beginning of the 90-day removal period is determined by the latest of

the following:

- (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.
- (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.
- (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

Id. at § 1231(a)(1)(B).

37. During the removal period, the noncitizen may be detained, and may not be released under any circumstances if found inadmissible or deportable on criminal or national security grounds. *Id.* at § 1231(a)(2).

38. If the noncitizen is not removed during the 90-day period, he or he "shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. The regulations shall include provisions requiring the alien

- (A) to appear before an immigration officer periodically for identification;
- (B) to submit, if necessary, to a medical and psychiatric examination at the expense of the United States Government;
- (C) to give information under oath about the alien's nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and other information the Attorney General considers appropriate; and
- (D) to obey reasonable written restrictions on the alien's conduct or activities that the Attorney General prescribes for the alien.

Id. at § 1231(a)(3).

39. The removal period may be extended beyond 90 days and the noncitizen may remain detained if the noncitizen frustrates his or her removal. *Id.* at § 1231(a)(1)(C).

40. Alternatively, the noncitizen may be detained beyond the 90 days if he is inadmissible under § 1182 or removable under various sections of § 1227, or determined to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal. *Id.* at

§ 1231(a)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a).

41. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of liberty . . . without due process of law.” “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). At a minimum, detention in the context of immigration must “bear[] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” *Id.* (citing *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). If “detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable,” detention becomes unreasonable and therefore violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process. *Id.*

42. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause also requires that Respondents follow procedures that are adequate to establish that detention is both statutorily and constitutionally valid. *See Cooper v. Oklahoma*, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (“[D]ue process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests at stake . . . are both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money.”).

43. Importantly, while *Zadvydas* has been read to permit 180 days of detention under § 1231 and any additional “period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States,” 533 U.S. at 689–90, it does not permit the Government to arbitrarily arrest a person subject to § 1231 whenever it can, simply because it can. Such detention under this section is permissible only with the intent and ability to execute

removal.

44. Even then, when a person is on an order of supervision with ICE, the preliminary steps toward removal can be accomplished without confinement. In the past, it has been common to call an individual into an ICE office to apply for a travel document and again when it is time for removal. *Zadvydas* also requires active, diligent efforts to carry out removal. It does not authorize the Government to detain a person for an extended period of time and *then* start the process.

45. Agency regulations also “control the federal government’s ability to detain, release, and revoke the release of noncitizens subject to orders of removal.” *Garrison G. v. Bondi*, No. 26-CV-172, 2026 WL 157677, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026).

46. Government agencies must follow their own regulations. *United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954).

47. When a noncitizen is detained pursuant to § 1231 but there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, they are released pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g). There are two grounds to revoke that release: violation of the terms or conditions of supervised release or changed circumstances. *Id.* at § 241.13(i).

48. Re-detention based on changed circumstances can occur when ICE “determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” *Id.* at § 241.13(i)(2). ICE must “consider[] factors probative of the [noncitizen’s] future removal,” “including the [noncitizen’s] history of compliance efforts, ICE’s history in removing [noncitizens] to the country in question or third countries, and the State Department’s views on the prospects of removal of

[noncitizens] to those countries.” *Sarail A. v. Bondi*, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 784–85 (2025).

49. When ICE intends to revoke the release of a noncitizen, on either basis, it must “notify the noncitizen ‘of the reasons for revocation of his or her release’ and to conduct an initial informal interview promptly after the noncitizen’s return to custody to afford the noncitizen an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” *Garrison G.*, 2026 WL 157677, at *3 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3)). “Section 241.13 places the burden on ICE to establish that ‘changed circumstances’ justified the revocation of release.” *Id.*

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT ONE: VIOLATION OF 8 U.S.C. § 1231

50. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

51. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in order to execute a final order of removal, so long as removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.

52. Petitioner has already served 170 days in detention on the same order for removal. In 2013 and today, his removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.

53. Petitioner has a final order of removal to Laos, and was on an order of supervision prior to his arrest. To date, Respondents have not taken any steps or made any efforts to execute the removal order. Respondents have not indicated that there is a specific plan in place to remove Petitioner or that Laos will accept Petitioner, and the ability to carry out his removal is currently only speculative.

54. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 does not authorize further detention of Petitioner as he was not detained in order to execute his removal and his removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.

COUNT TWO: VIOLATION OF *ACCARDI* DOCTRINE

55. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

56. Under the *Accardi* doctrine, Mr. Thao has a right to set aside agency action that violated agency procedures, rules, or instructions. *See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (“If Petitioner can prove the allegation [that agency failed to follow its rules in a hearing] he should receive a new hearing”).

57. The detention of Mr. Thao violates the law because ICE did not comply with its own regulations under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.

58. Specifically, Respondents did not make a “reasoned determination to revoke his supervised release” considering factors probative of his future removal. *Garrison G. v. Bondi*, No. 26-CV-172, 2026 WL 157677, slip op. at 6, 8 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026). Instead, Respondents offered only conclusory statements about Petitioner’s removal, and “the government does not meet its burden when it makes conclusory assertions of likelihood of removal.” *Chou T. v. Noem*, No. 26-CV-1432, slip op. at 12 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2026), *R. & R. adopted*, (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2026).

COUNT THREE: FIFTH AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

59. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

60. *Mathews v. Eldridge* instructs courts to balance three factors to determine whether procedural due process is satisfied: (1) the private interest at issue; (2) the risk of

erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements entail. 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). All three factors favor Petitioner.

61. The first factor, the private interest at issue, favors Mr. Thao. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects." *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

62. The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and the probable value of procedural safeguards, favors Mr. Thao. While agency regulations prescribe the process that must be followed prior to revocation of supervised release, that process was not followed here. Further, agency press releases and social media posts make clear the arrest of Mr. Thao was not based on a procedurally permissible ground identified in agency regulations.

63. The third factor, the government's interest, also favors Mr. Thao. The government has no legitimate interest in detaining an individual based on their race or ethnicity, or where they have not violated a material term of their supervised release or there has been a change in conditions that would make removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to be substantially likely.

64. For these reasons, arresting and detaining Mr. Thao violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner asks this Court for the following relief:

1. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
2. Declare that Petitioner's current detention is unlawful;
3. Issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody;
4. Prohibit Respondents from transferring Petitioner from this District pending
resolution of this petition and without the Court's approval;
5. Award reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), upon such application; and
6. Grant any and all further relief this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: March 5, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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