

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

EDWARD ANTONIO GIL-SUAREZ	:	
	:	
<i>Petitioner,</i>	:	
	:	
v.	:	Civil Action No. 26-cv-1394 (Judge Leeson)
	:	
JAMAL L. JAMISON.,	:	
	:	
<i>Respondents.</i>	:	

**RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

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Dated: March 13, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the authority of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain him under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). This petition is distinguishable from the numerous petitions recently considered by this Court in the wake of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision in *Matter of Hurtado*, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which is not implicated here.¹ See e.g., *Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025 WL 3171639, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); *Anirudh v. McShane, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6458 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Bartle, J.); *Juarez Velazquez v. O'Neill, et al.*, No. 25-cv-6191 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025) (Henry, J.). The cases cited above and by Petitioner involved **aliens detained under 8 U.S.C.**

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) because they are removable and present in the United States without inspection and admission or parole.

However, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under **8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) [not 1225(b)(2)(A)]** because he was initially processed for **expedited removal** when he attempted to enter the United States without authorization. That Petitioner is no longer in expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and is now in standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a does not change the statutory basis for detention. Petitioner is returned to his "detention status" when his parole ends.

DHS processed Petitioner for expedited removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) after he entered the United States without inspection on or about August 16, 2023. See Exhibits 1 and 2, Forms I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, dated August 16, 2023 and March 2, 2026; see also Exhibit 3, Notice and Order of

¹ Similarly, the claims here would not implicate the recent class-certification and partial-summary-judgment rulings issued by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. See *Bautista v. Santacruz*, 2025 WL 3289861, *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (addressing arguments that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225, should apply to detention claims).

Expedited Removal, dated August 20, 2023. However, after the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) rendered a positive finding of credible fear, DHS paroled him from custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) to facilitate the removal process under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. *See* Exhibit 3 – Interim Notice Authorizing Parole, dated October 18, 2023. This parole has since terminated, meaning Petitioner has now returned to his detention status at the time of his parole—*i.e.*, mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)—during the remainder of his removal proceedings under § 1229a.² Thus, Petitioner’s detention comports with the INA, the bond regulations, and the Constitution, and the Court should accordingly deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. DETENTION FRAMEWORK UNDER THE INA

The INA provides a statutory scheme for the civil detention of aliens pending a decision during removal proceedings, as well as once a final order of removal has been entered. *See generally* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, 1231. The time and circumstances of entry, as well as the stage of the removal process, determines where an alien falls within this scheme and whether detention of the alien is discretionary or mandatory.

a. Applicants for Admission and Expedited Removal

An applicant for admission to the United States is defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States []

² Multiple district courts in this jurisdiction (including this Court) have rejected this argument. *See e.g. Talabadze v. Rose, et al.*, No. 26-cv-360 (E.D. Pa Jan. 30, 2026) (Perez, J.); *Seminario-Marcos v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-cv-421 (E.D. Pa Feb. 6, 2026) (Kearney, J.); *Vazquez-Diaz v. Rose, et al.*, No. 26-cv-342 (E.D. Pa Feb. 10, 2026) (Gallagher, J.); *Vargas-Quajada v. Jamison, et al.*, 26-cv-914 (E.D. Pa. Feb 17, 2026 (McHugh, J.); *Nawab Ali v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-cv-729 (E.D. Pa. Feb 19, 2026) (Quinones-Alejandro, J.); *Zavala Ulloa v. Jamison, et al.*, No. 26-cv-823 (E.D. Pa. Feb 20, 2026) (Marston, J.)

whether or not at a designated port of arrival. . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). As explained by the Supreme Court, “an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission,’ and an alien who is detained shortly after unlawful entry cannot be said to have ‘effected an entry’ into the United States.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020).

Put differently, an “alien who arrives at a ‘port of entry,’ *i.e.* a place where the alien may lawfully enter, must apply for admission. An alien [] who is caught trying to enter at some other spot is treated the same way.” *Id.* at 108. Such applicants for admission, “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are ‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” *Id.* at 139 (quoting *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, immigration officials have discretion to place aliens arriving in the United States in either expedited removal proceedings under Section 1225(b)(1) or full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Under either approach, § 1225 authorizes detention of such individuals “throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those proceedings begin.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 302 (2018).

In 1996, Congress amended § 1225(b) to add “expedited removal” procedures for certain applicants for admission. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, Tit. III, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-579 (1996); *see also Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 109–11 (describing the expedited removal process). Section 1225(b)(1) now provides that an applicant for admission is subject to expedited removal if the applicant is: (i) inadmissible because he or she lacks valid documents or is inadmissible due to fraud; (ii) has not “been physically present in the

United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility”; or (iii) is among those whom the Secretary of DHS has designated for expedited removal. For these individuals, once an immigration officer determines that they are inadmissible, the officer must “order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 109.

b. Credible Fear Determinations

If, however, the alien expresses a fear of persecution or torture in their home country, an asylum officer must determine whether the alien has a credible fear. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3(b)(4). If an asylum officer makes a positive finding of credible fear, the individual is placed into removal proceedings to pursue asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. *Id.*

As explained by the Supreme Court, “[a]n alien subject to expedited removal thus has an opportunity at three levels to obtain an asylum hearing, and the applicant will obtain one unless the asylum officer, a supervisor, and an immigration judge all find that the applicant has not asserted a credible fear.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 110–11 (“As a practical matter, then, the great majority of asylum seekers who fall within the category subject to expedited removal do not receive expedited removal and are instead afforded the same procedural rights as other aliens.”). An individual subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1), however, including an individual undergoing further review of their asylum claim, “is not entitled to immediate release” regardless of whether their asylum claim is reviewed fully or in an expedited manner. *Id.* at 111. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302. Rather, § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) provides for mandatory detention of individuals during the credible fear review process and until removal from the United States. (“Any

alien subject to the procedures under this clause *shall be detained* pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.”) (emphasis added).

c. Parole for Applicants for Admission

While an applicant for admission is not entitled to release or a bond hearing by statute or regulation, the Secretary, acting through Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has discretion to release applicants for admission from custody on humanitarian parole. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Such a parole is done “temporarily under such conditions as [the Secretary] may prescribe [and] only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)(A).

Parole is not an “admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(B), 1182(d)(5)(A). As noted above, “aliens who arrive at ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are ‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139 (quoting *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 215) (emphasis added); *see also Leng May Ma v. Barber*, 357 U.S. 185, 188–90 (1958). In other words, an applicant for admission paroled into the United States “remain[s] constructively detained at the border, *i.e.* legally unadmitted, while their status is being resolved by immigration officials.” *Ibragimov v. Gonzales*, 476 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2007); *see also Duarte v. Mayorkas*, 27 F.4th 1044, 1059 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A] paroled alien is legally equivalent to an alien that is held in custody at the border while their application for admission is processed.”).

ICE may terminate a parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) when, “in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, “the purposes of such parole . . . have been served.” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). As one example, when a Notice to Appear (NTA)—the charging document that initiates proceedings—is served on the parolee, this serves as written notice of termination of parole. *See Matter of Arambula-Bravo*, 28 I & N Dec. 388, 395 (BIA 2021) (“A charging document presumptively terminates parole because an intent to remove a noncitizen necessarily reflects a determination that the continued presence of that individual is no longer warranted.”). No pre-termination hearing is required. *See Ofosu v. McElroy*, 98 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that parole “may be ended without hearings or special forms.”); *Ahrens v. Rojas*, 292 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1961) (“Neither the statute nor the regulation provides for a hearing on revocation of parole.”). Further, at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized, “[p]arole shall be automatically terminated without written notice.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii).

d. Return to Custody After Parole Expiration or Termination

After parole is terminated, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall *continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission* to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) (explaining that after automatic termination, the alien “shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole”). Once parole is terminated, “[a]ny further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 [8 U.S.C. § 1225] or 240 [8 U.S.C. § 1229a] of the Act.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); *see Ahrens*, 292 F.2d at 410 (noting that after parole termination, “the plaintiff’s status was the same as if he had been stopped at the border.”). The grant of parole and its termination is committed to the broad discretion of the Secretary. *See Samirah v. O’Connell*, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003)

(holding DHS’s authority to “grant or revoke” parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) is a matter of agency discretion barred from review by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); *Hassan v. Chertoff*, 593 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela entered the United States without inspection on or about August 16, 2023. *See* Exhibits 1 and 2. Given his time, manner, and place of entry, CBP determined that Petitioner was inadmissible to the United States and thereafter placed him into expedited removal proceedings on August 20, 2023. *See* Exhibit 3, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. However, after Petitioner claimed a fear of return to his home country, DHS referred Petitioner to USCIS for completion of a credible fear interview. *Id.* Following that interview, USCIS rendered a positive finding of credible fear and placed Petitioner into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Petition, ECF 1, at paragraph 22. On October 18, 2023, ICE exercised its discretion to parole Petitioner from its custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); that parole was valid for one year. *See* Exhibit 3. ICE detained Petitioner on March 2, 2026, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), pending completion of his removal proceedings. Petition, at ECF 1, paragraph 21, and Form I-213, dated March 2, 2026, at Exhibit 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy.” *Shinn v. Ramirez*, 596 U.S. 366, 377 (2022). The petitioner bears the burden of showing his confinement is unlawful. *Hawk v. Olson*, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945); *accord Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (habeas petitioner “carries the burden of proof”); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Judicial review of immigration matters, including of detention issues, is limited. *INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre*, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC)*, 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999); *Miller v. Albright*, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998); *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); *Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong*, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”). The Supreme Court has “underscore[d] the limited scope of inquiry into immigration legislation,” and “has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.” *Fiallo*, 430 U.S. at 792 (internal quotation omitted); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 79–82 (1976); *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

The plenary power of Congress and the Executive Branch over immigration necessarily encompasses immigration detention, because the authority to detain is elemental to the authority to deport and because public safety is at stake. *See Shaughnessy v. United States*, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.”); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018) (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings. Detention during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an

alien's status without running the risk of the alien's either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made.”).

Petitioner must make a strong showing to demonstrate that his continued detention violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. *See U.S. v. Five Gambling Devices*, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (“This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to Acts of Congress. This is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power”).

IV. ARGUMENT

As discussed below, Petitioner's detention is authorized by statute, regulation, and comports with the Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act. As such, this Court should deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

a. Petitioner's Detention is Authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)

Petitioner's argument that his detention violates the INA and accompanying regulations is without merit because ICE's current detention of Petitioner is authorized and, indeed, mandated by statute. Petitioner attempted to enter the United States without inspection in July 2021 and was not inspected, admitted, or paroled by an immigration officer at the time of that entry. *See* Exhibits 1 and 2. Petitioner was therefore an “applicant for admission” and was accordingly processed for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). *Id.*

i. Petitioner was properly processed for expedited removal

Petitioner was initially and properly processed for expedited removal, in

accordance with the regulations. However, Petitioner was not removed following this initial expedited removal processing, because he expressed a fear of return to Venezuela during his interview. *See* Exhibits 1 and 2. The fact that Petitioner is no longer in expedited removal proceedings does not preclude continued detention under § 1225(b)(1). To the contrary, when Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to Venezuela, he triggered the § 1225(b)(1)(B) process, which includes a referral for a credible fear interview and further (full removal) proceedings to consider any applications for relief from removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B). Until his removal proceedings under § 1229a are complete, which includes adjudication of his application for asylum application, or until he withdraws his application for admission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4), Petitioner remains in this process. And Congress has mandated that anyone going through this process “shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear and persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” *Id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); *see also id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); *Jennings*, 538 U.S. at 297, 302 (section 1225(b)(“mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until proceedings have concluded.”

ii. Petitioner’s release on parole does not preclude detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)

Importantly, ICE’s release of Petitioner on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) does not preclude detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). In this case, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was charged as being present in the United States without admission or parole. *See* Exhibit 3, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Following this unlawful entry, DHS made the discretionary decision to parole Petitioner from its custody under § 1182(d)(5)(A). *Id.* Importantly, this parole did not occur following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port of entry.

Therefore, Petitioner remains subject to the expedited removal provisions at § 1225(b)(1) and, in turn, mandatory detention.

Nor does ICE's release of Petitioner on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) convert DHS's detention authority from § 1225(b)(1) to § 1226 because, as noted above, parole "shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien." *Id.* § 1182(d)(5)(A). Rather, Congress was very explicit: "when the purposes of such parole have been served[,] the alien shall forthwith return or *be returned to the custody from which he was paroled* and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with *in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission* to the United States." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Regardless of the length of his parole, Petitioner remains "'treated' for due process purposes 'as if stopped at the border.'" *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 139–40 (noting that "even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years" "cannot be said to have 'effected an entry' and remain "on the threshold."). Petitioner therefore remains subject to the same detention authority (§ 1225(b)(1)) until his claim for asylum is fully adjudicated and he is either granted asylum or removed. *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 302; *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 111; *see also Woodley v. Rokosky*, Case No. 26-cv-00150 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026) (denying habeas petition and finding detention lawful under § 1225(b)(1) for alien initially processed for expedited removal, notwithstanding prior grant of parole under § 1182(d)(5); *Faqirzada v. Rokosky*, No. 25-cv-16639 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026) (same); *but see Talabadze v. Rose*, No. 26-cv-360 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2026) (Perez, J) (granting habeas petition and finding that a grant of parole under 1182(d)(5) forecloses mandatory detention under § 1225(b)).

That Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(1) receives further support from the Attorney General's decision in *Matter of M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019). In

M-S-, the Attorney General overruled as wrongly decided an earlier BIA case, *Matter of X-K-*, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2005), in which the BIA held that aliens transferred to full proceedings after establishing a credible fear were eligible for bond. 27 I&N Dec. at 513–14. The Attorney General explained that, by its plain language, applicants for admission transferred to full removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear remain ineligible for bond. *Id.* at 515. Instead, this category of applicants for admission “must be detained until [their] removal proceedings conclude, unless [they] are granted parole.” *Id.* at 509.

The BIA’s decision in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), builds upon the Attorney General’s holding in *M-S-*. For aliens like Petitioner who are placed into expedited removal proceedings and later referred to an immigration judge for consideration of their asylum application, the BIA affirmed that § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) mandates their detention until the final adjudication of their asylum application, unless that alien is granted parole. *Id.* at 68 (citing *M-S-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 516). If that parole is granted and later terminated, the BIA held that the alien is then returned to custody under § 1225(b) pending completion of removal proceedings. *Id.* at 70. Thus, the termination of Petitioner’s parole—either through issuance of the NTA or expiration of his period of authorized parole—returned him to his initial custody status upon entry, *i.e.*, mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

iii. No written notice is required prior to revoking parole

If Petitioner argues that ICE improperly revoked his parole without first providing notice of such revocation, the Court should reject that argument. The regulations make clear that no written notice is required prior to terminating a prior discretionary parole decision under § 1182(d)(5)(A). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii)

(explaining that parole *shall be automatically terminated without written notice . . .* at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized . . . in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2), *except that no written notice shall be required*) (emphasis added). Only when termination of parole is not automatic under § 212.5(e)(1)—in other words, when an alien has not departed the United States or the period of parole has not expired—is notice required under § 212.5(e)(2). *But see Talabadze v. Rose*, No. 26-cv-360 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2026) (Perez, J.) (finding notice required prior to granting parole); *Vasquez Diaz v. Rose*, No. 26-cv-342 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2026) (Gallagher, J.) (same).

The Interim Notice Authorizing Parole issued to Petitioner confirms the above regulatory scheme. The parole document states:

Your parole authorization is valid for one year beginning from the date on this notice and *will automatically terminate* upon your departure or removal from the United States *or at the end of the one-year period* unless ICE provides you with an extension at its discretion. ICE may also terminate parole on notice prior to the automatic termination date. Parole is entirely within the discretion of ICE and can be terminated at any time and for any reason. Your parole is not valid for work authorization and is not an admission in lawful status.

See Exhibit 3. Petitioner signed this October 18, 2023 document, thus placing him on notice of the terms of his parole, including the terms of its revocation on October 18, 2024. *Id.* Accordingly, no notice or formal hearing is required when, as here, the time for which parole was authorized has expired, and the automatic termination of Petitioner’s parole was thus lawful.

Furthermore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a parole revocation decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), since it is plainly a discretionary “decision or action.” *Samirah* 335 F.3d at 549 (holding DHS’s authority to “grant or revoke” parole under §

1182(d)(5)(A) is a matter of agency discretion barred from review by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); *Hassan*, 593 F.3d at 789 (same). Moreover, to the extent Petitioner is alleging that revocation of parole requires a case-by-case analysis, the Court should reject this argument. While 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) requires that *grants* of parole be made on a case-by-case basis, it contains no parallel language with respect to terminations, and the language of § 1182(d)(5)(A) makes clear that such a determination is left entirely to the “opinion” of the DHS Secretary.

iv. Petitioner is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

To the extent Petitioner claims DHS is detaining him under § 1225(b)(2) pursuant to the BIA’s recent decision in *Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 216, and DHS’s new policy, the facts and procedural history of Petitioner’s case do not support such an allegation. As discussed above, Petitioner was processed for expedited removal upon entry into the United States and was subsequently found to have a credible fear of return to Venezuela, thus bringing him within the mandatory detention authority of § 1225(b)(1). Therefore, Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(1), not § 1225(b)(2). Because Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(1) and not eligible for a bond hearing, this Court should deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

b. Petitioner’s Detention is Constitutional

Petitioner’s argument that his detention violates procedural due process also lacks merit. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Further, applicants for admission like Petitioner lack any constitutional due process rights with respect to

admission aside from the rights provided by statute: “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 212, and, “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review [that] determination.” *United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). *See also Thuraissigiam* 591 U.S. at 140 (“[T]he Due Process Clause provides nothing more.”).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed “[its] century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry” in *Thuraissigiam*, explaining that an individual who illegally crosses the border—like Petitioner—is an applicant for admission and “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” 591 U.S. at 139–40. The *Thuraissigiam* Court explained that “[w]hile aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the Court held long ago that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien’s lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” *Id.* at 107.

“When an alien arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien is on U.S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country.” *Id.* at 139. The same “threshold” rule applies to individuals who are apprehended after trying “to enter the country illegally” since by statute, such individuals are also defined as applicants for admission. *Id.* at 139–40. And all applicants for admission, “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal,” “have no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute.” *Id.* at 107, 139. And the statute provides no more procedural protections than allowing an applicant for admission to seek relief from removal if he fears return to his home country, and to seek parole from

the agency. *Id.* During that process, however, applicants for admission may be detained without a bond hearing pending admission or removal without running afoul of the Constitution. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003)

Petitioner's recent detention pending his removal proceedings thus does not violate Due Process. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (detention less than six months presumed constitutional). The Third Circuit has recognized that there may come a time when mandatory civil detention without a bond hearing becomes unreasonable. *See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) (analyzing detention under § 1226(c)). However, at this time, Petitioner does not challenge the reasonableness of his detention under *German Santos*. Therefore, the Court should find that Petitioner's detention is constitutional and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: March 13, 2026

Counsel for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I filed the foregoing Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus via the Court's CM/ECF System, thereby making it available for viewing and download for all parties to the case.

Dated: March 13, 2026

/s/ Susan R. Becker
SUSAN R. BECKER
Assistant United States Attorney

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

EDWARD ANTONIO GIL-SUAREZ

Petitioner,

v.

JAMAL L. JAMISON., ET AL.

Respondents.

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Civil Action No. 26-cv-1394

Exhibit List

Exhibit 1: Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, dated Aug. 16, 2023

Exhibit 2: Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, dated March 2, 2026

Exhibit 3: Form I-860, Interim Notice Authorizing Parole, dated October 18, 2023 and expiring on October 18, 2024; and Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, dated Aug 20, 2023.

EXHIBIT

1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Subject ID :

Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien

Family Name (CAPS) GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO		First	Middle
Country of Citizenship VENEZUELA	Passport Number and Country of Issue	File Number	
U.S. Address			
Date, Place, Time, and Manner of Last Entry 08/16/2023 06:00, DLR, PWam		Passenger Boarded at	
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of Permanent Residence			
Date of Birth Age: 33	Date of Action 08/19/2023	Location Code DRS	
City, Province (State) and Country of Birth VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, VENEZUELA	AR ☒	Form: (Type and No.) Lifted ☐ Not Lifted ☐	
NIV Issuing Post and NIV Number	Social Security Account Name		
Date Visa Issued	Social Security Number		
Immigration Record NEGATIVE		Criminal Record	
Name, Address, and Nationality of Spouse (Maiden Name, if Appropriate)			Number and Nationality of Minor Children None
Father's Name, Nationality, and Address, if Known GIL SEGOVIA, RAMON ANTONIO NATIONALITY: VENEZUELA ADDRESS: VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, ZULIA, VENEZUELA		Mother's Present and Maiden Names, Nationality, and Address, if Known SUAREZ COY, GLEVIS JOSEFINA NATIONALITY: VENEZUELA ADDRESS: VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, ZULIA, VENEZUELA	
Monies Due/Property in U.S. Not in Immediate Possession None Claimed	Fingerprinted? ☒ Yes ☐ No	Systems Checks See Narrative	Charge Code Words(s) See Narrative
Name and Address of (Last)(Current) U.S. Employer	Type of Employment	Salary Hr	Employed from/to
Narrative (Outline particulars under which alien was located/apprehended. Include details not shown above regarding time, place and manner of last entry, attempted entry, or any other entry, and elements which establish administrative and/or criminal violation. Indicate means and route of travel to interior.) FIN: [REDACTED] Left Index fingerprint Right Index fingerprint			
			
FAMILY INFORMATION Father: GIL SEGOVIA, RAMON is a citizen of VENEZUELA. Mother: SUAREZ COY, GLEVIS is a citizen of VENEZUELA. Spouse: Subject is not married. Child: Subject does not have children or dependents.			
SCARS MARKS AND TATTOOS TATTOO CHEST - TATTOO CHEST TATTOO ARM, LEFT UPPER - TATTOO ARM, LEFT UPPER TATTOO FOREARM, LEFT - TATTOO ... (CONTINUED ON I-831)			
Alien has been advised of communication privileges _____ (Date/Initials)		ALEJANDRO AMADOR-JR Border Patrol Agent (Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)	
Distribution: ER/CF (EER) FIR VENEZUELA		Received: (Subject and Documents) (Report of Interview) Officer: ALEJANDRO AMADOR-JR on: August 19, 2023 (time) Disposition: Expedited Removal with Credible Fear Examining Officer: LYNN, WILLIAM	

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 08/16/2023
FOREARM, LEFT CURRENT CRIMINAL CHARGES ----- 08/16/2023 - 8 USC 1182 - ALIEN INADMISSIBILITY UNDER SECTION 212 CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES ----- 08/16/2023 - 212a7AiI - IMMIGRANT WITHOUT AN IMMIGRANT VISA RECORDS CHECKED ----- CIS checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. ABIS checked on 08/16/2023 with Negative result. IBIS checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. IAFIS checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. EARM checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. NCIC checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. TECS checked on 08/20/2023 with Negative result. NGI checked on 08/16/2023 with Negative result. RECORD OF DEPORTABLE/EXCLUDABLE ALIEN: ----- ZONES: ENTRY ZONE: DLR APPREHENSION ZONE: DZ8 ENCOUNTER: A Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Agent encountered the above subject near Del Rio, Texas. After a brief interview, it was determined that the subject had unlawfully entered the United States from Mexico by crossing the international boundary. Subject was not at the time inspected or admitted by an Immigration Officer at a port of entry as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Subject further admitted to being a citizen and national of Venezuela with no right to be in or remain in the United States legally. The subject was placed under arrest, advised of his rights, and transported to the Laredo Sector Enhanced Centralized Processing Center in Laredo, Texas for further processing. CRIMINAL HISTORY: No criminal history. IMMIGRATION HISTORY: No immigration history. HEALTH SCREEN: Subject was pre-screened for any health-related concerns by on-duty Emergency Medical Technician and/or Loyal Source Government Services (LSGS) staff and monitored while in custody. Subject did not show any health-related concerns that would require medical clearance at this time. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION: The Subject's right to communicate with a Consular Officer of the subject's native country was offered. Subject understood the right but declined to contact the Consular Officer at this time. Subject claimed fear if returned to Mexico or his native country of citizenship. DISPOSITION: Subject is being processed for Expedited Removal with Credible Fear under the Enhanced Expedited Removal (EER) Program. Service Form I-867 A/B was read and explained to the subject. The subject was served with forms M-444, I-296, I-860, I-867A/B, and the List of		
Signature ALEJANDRO AMADOR-JR	Title Border Patrol Agent	

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 08/16/2023
Free Legal Service Providers. Subject will be shown the Expedited Removal Spanish video and held in USBP custody pending an Asylum Officer interview. ADDENDUM: Subject was disenrolled from the EER program due to possible gang affiliation. Subject will be turned over to ICE/ERO for credible fear process. POINT OF CONTACT IN THE UNITED STATES: Name: [REDACTED] Phone #: [REDACTED] Address: [REDACTED] OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBERS ----- ALIEN- [REDACTED] Cedula (Foreign ID) - [REDACTED] ..COMMENT: CEDULA-ID-VENEZUELA		
Signature ALEJANDRO AMADOR-JR	Title Border Patrol Agent	

3 of 3 Pages

Exhibit 2

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Subject ID :

Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien

Family Name (CAPS) GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO		First	Middle
Country of Citizenship VENEZUELA	Passport Number and Country of Issue	File Number	
U.S. Address PENNSYLVANIA, 19013, UNITED STATES			
Date, Place, Time, and Manner of Last Entry 08/16/2023 06:51, DLR,		Passenger Boarded at MEXICO	
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of Permanent Residence			
Date of Birth Age: 35	Date of Action 03/02/2026	Location Code PHI/PHI	
City, Province (State) and Country of Birth VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, VENEZUELA	AR ☒ Form: (Type and No.) Lifted ☐ Not Lifted ☐		
NIV Issuing Post and NIV Number	Social Security Account Name		
Date Visa Issued	Social Security Number		
Immigration Record NEGATIVE		Criminal Record See Narrative	
Name, Address, and Nationality of Spouse (Maiden Name, if Appropriate)			Number and Nationality of Minor Children None
Father's Name, Nationality, and Address, if Known GIL SEGOVIA, RAMON ANTONIO NATIONALITY: VENEZUELA ADDRESS: VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, ZULIA, VENEZUELA		Mother's Present and Maiden Names, Nationality, and Address, if Known SUAREZ COY, GLEVIS JOSEFINA NATIONALITY: VENEZUELA ADDRESS: VALMORE RODRIGUEZ, ZULIA, VENEZUELA	
Monies Due/Property in U.S. Not in Immediate Possession None Claimed	Fingerprinted? ☒ Yes ☐ No	Systems Checks See Narrative	Charge Code Words(s) See Narrative
Name and Address of (Last)(Current) U.S. Employer	Type of Employment Unemployed or Retired	Salary Hr	Employed from/to
Narrative (Outline particulars under which alien was located/apprehended. Include details not shown above regarding time, place and manner of last entry, attempted entry, or any other entry, and elements which establish administrative and/or criminal violation. Indicate means and route of travel to interior.) FIN: [REDACTED] Left Index fingerprint Right Index fingerprint			
			
FAMILY INFORMATION Father: GIL SEGOVIA, RAMON is a citizen of VENEZUELA. Mother: SUAREZ COY, GLEVIS is a citizen of VENEZUELA. Spouse: Subject is not married. Child: Subject does not have children or dependents.			
SUBJECT HEALTH STATUS The subject does not claim good health. Please contact your local IHSC health care staff member for additional ... (CONTINUED ON I-831)			
Alien has been advised of communication privileges _____ (Date/Initials)		ALTON FEASTER Deportation Officer _____ (Signature and Title of Immigration Officer)	
Distribution:		Received: (Subject and Documents) (Report of Interview) Officer: ALTON FEASTER on: March 2, 2026 (time) Disposition: Other Examining Officer: DEMURGUIONDO, ASD8132	

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 03/02/2026
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information.

CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES

03/02/2026 - 212a6Ai - ALIEN PRESENT WITHOUT ADMISSION OR PAROLE - (PWAs) 03/02/2026 - 212a7AiI - IMMIGRANT WITHOUT AN IMMIGRANT VISA

RECORDS CHECKED

EARM checked on 03/02/2026 with Negative result.O checked on 03/02/2026 with Negative result.O checked on 03/02/2026 with Negative result.NCIC checked on 03/02/2026 with Negative result.

ARRESTED AT/NEAR

[REDACTED] UNITED STATES

RECORD OF DEPORTABLE/EXCLUDABLE ALIEN:

Edward GIL-SUAREZ is subject to President Donald Trump's Executive Order, titled "Protecting the American People Against Invasion," signed on January 20, 2025.

ENCOUNTER
On March 24, 2026, Edward GIL-SUAREZ, [REDACTED] a native and citizen of VENEZUELA reported to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Philadelphia Field Office for his scheduled check-in appointment. The Philadelphia Non-Detained Unit confirmed GIL-SUAREZ's identity, alienage, and removability and served him a with a Warrant, Form I-200, charging him under Section 212a6Ai and 212a7AiI of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Alienage & Removability:
GIL-SUAREZ is a citizen of VENEZUELA and a national of VENEZUELA by virtue of birth, who entered the United States illegally without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. Numerous checks using databases with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicated a June 4, 2026 upcoming court date, but shows no other pending appeals, waivers, or petitions.

Family/ Derivative Citizenship:
GIL-SUAREZ has not asserted any claim to United States citizenship, nor do any records indicate that he has obtained or derived such citizenship.

Immigration History:
The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) encountered GIL-SUAREZ on August 16, 2023, at Del Rio, TX, while attempting to illegally enter the United States without inspection by an immigration officer at a time and place other than as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The USBP processed GIL-SUAREZ for Expedited Removal with Credible Fear under the Enhanced Expedited Removal (EER) Program. Service Form I-867 A/B was read and explained to the GIL-SUAREZ. GIL-SUAREZ was served with forms M-444, I-296, I-860, I-867A/B, and the List of Free Legal Service Providers. GIL-SUAREZ was shown the Expedited Removal Spanish video and held in USBP custody pending an Asylum Officer interview. GIL-SUAREZ was provided with a Notice to Appear, Form I-862 charging him under Section 212a6Ai of the INA. The USBP released him from custody and instructed him to report to the closest ICE office near his intended residence. The USBP uploaded GIL-SUAREZ's NTA into ECAS to initiate his immigration proceedings.

Signature ALTON FEASTER	Title Deportation Officer
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Continuation Page for Form I-213

Alien's Name GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO	File Number [REDACTED] Event No: [REDACTED]	Date 03/02/2026
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On August 27, 2023 - October 19, 2023, GIL-SUAREZ was detained in ICE custody and paroled on October 19, 2023.
On October 12, 2023, GIL-SUAREZ's Credible Fear Persecution Expedited Removal cim was established by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
On March 1, 2024, GIL-SUAREZ filed an Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, Form I-589, with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
On April 13, 2025, GIL-SUAREZ's Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, Form I-589, with USCIS was administratively closed.

Criminal History:
GIL-SUAREZ has no previous criminal record and does not have any outstanding wants or warrants.

Health & Humanitarian:
GIL-SUAREZ denied any significant humanitarian concerns.

GIL-SUAREZ made a 5-minute phone call to his cousin, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

GIL-SUAREZ declined his right to speak with the VENEZUELA Consulate. Consular notifications are not mandatory.

GIL-SUAREZ did claim a fear of removal to VENEZUELA.

GIL-SUAREZ initially claimed no health issues or medications.

GIL-SUAREZ claims he is not married.

GIL-SUAREZ claims to have minor children in the U.S.

GIL-SUAREZ stated that he did not serve in the United States Military.

Foreign Identity and Travel Documents:
At the time of arrest, ERO was not able to obtain GIL-SUAREZ's foreign identity/travel document(s)

Disposition:
ICE served GIL-SUAREZ with a Warrant of Arrest, Form I-200 and a Bautista Notice, Appendix - Class Action Notice. Subject's I-830 and I-200 were uploaded into EARM.

I-77: [REDACTED]
DHS-589: [REDACTED]

OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBERS

ALIEN-[REDACTED]
Cedula (Foreign ID) - [REDACTED] (VENEZUELA)
..COMMENT: CEDULA-ID-VENEZUELA

Signature ALTON FEASTER	Title Deportation Officer
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EXHIBIT

3

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Date: OCTOBER 18, 2023

In Reference to: A # [REDACTED]

Name: GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO

INTERIM NOTICE AUTHORIZING PAROLE

This letter is to inform you that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has decided to parole you from its custody pursuant to its authority under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This notice is being issued to you in lieu of Form I-94, *Arrival-Departure Record*, see 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(2), and you should maintain a copy of this letter in your possession at all times.

Your parole authorization is valid for one year beginning from the date on this notice and will automatically terminate upon your departure or removal from the United States or at the end of the one-year period unless ICE provides you with an extension at its discretion. ICE may also terminate parole on notice prior to the automatic termination date. Parole is entirely within the discretion of ICE and can be terminated at any time and for any reason. Your parole is not valid for work authorization and is not an admission in lawful status.

Parole is conditioned on you complying with the terms and conditions of your release. You must notify ICE and the immigration judge of any address correction or address change. You must report for every scheduled hearing before the immigration court and every appointment as directed by ICE (including for removal from the United States should you become subject to a final removal order). You must not violate any local, State or Federal laws or ordinances. You must comply with any other specified conditions if identified separately.

I certify that I received a copy of this notice.

GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO

Alien Name

x Edward Gil

Alien Signature

OCTOBER 18, 2023

Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on today's date, I served the respondent a copy of this parole notice by the following method (as checked):

☒ In person ☐ Other: _____

L. Cardenas

ICE Official Name

L. Cardenas

ICE Official Signature

OCTOBER 18, 2023

Date

P. Brewster

Deciding Official Name

P. Brewster

Deciding Official Signature

OCTOBER 18, 2023

Date

Notice Authorizing Parole
Page 2

Continuation Page for Interim Notice Authorizing Parole

To: GIL-SUAREZ, EDWARD ANTONIO



Date: OCTOBER 18, 2023

File: A# [REDACTED]

Bond: (Parole with Reporting Requirements)


You have been released from service custody pending a final decision in your exclusion/deportation hearing. It is understood that you will be residing at the above address. As stated on the previous page, you are required to notify the Immigration Judge (at the address shown below) of any address correction or address change. When doing so, be sure to include your name and the File Number shown above in your written communication. The attached form, EOIR-33 can be used for this purpose.

Court Address
Office of the Immigration Judge

You must report in person to: Non-Detained Office/ATD Office phone: 856-787-3499

At: 532 FELLOWSHIP RD, SUITE A,
MT. LAUREL, NJ 08054

E.A.G.S.
2024
On: JANUARY 31, 2023 at 9:00am



U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Notice and Order of Expedited Removal**DETERMINATION OF INADMISSIBILITY**Event No: File No: A 

Date: August 20, 2023

In the Matter of: EDWARD ANTONIO GIL-SUAREZ

Pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)), the Department of Homeland Security has determined that you are inadmissible to the United States under section(s) 212(a) ☐ (6)(C)(i); ☐ (6)(C)(ii); ☒ (7)(A)(i)(I); ☐ (7)(A)(i)(II); ☐ (7)(B)(i)(I); and/or ☐ (7)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, as amended, and therefore are subject to removal, in that:

1. You are an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Immigration and Nationality Act; to wit, you are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled by an immigration office at a designated port of entry; you were apprehended within 100 air miles of the United States of America and Mexico border within 14 days of having illegally entered into the United States.

ALEJANDRO AMADOR-JR

Border Patrol Agent

Name and title of immigration officer (Print)

ALEJANDRO AMADOR JR

Date: 2023.08.20 00:54:56 -05:00
0867816426.CBP

Signature of immigration officer

**ORDER OF REMOVAL
UNDER SECTION 235(b)(1) OF THE ACT**

Based upon the determination set forth above and evidence presented during inspection or examination pursuant to section 235 of the Act, and by the authority contained in section 235(b)(1) of the Act, you are found to be inadmissible as charged and ordered removed from the United States.

Name and title of immigration officer (Print)_____
Signature of immigration officer_____
Name and title of supervisor (Print)_____
Signature of supervisor, if available

☐ Check here if supervisory concurrence was obtained by telephone or other means (no supervisor on duty).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I personally served the original of this notice upon the above-named person on _____
(Date)

Signature of immigration officer

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Notice and Order of Expedited Removal

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge receipt of this notification _____

Refused to Sign

Signature of alien