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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

PEREZ PEREZ, Rolando,

Petitioner,

v.

Warden of FOLKSTON ICE PROCESSING
CENTER, *in their official capacity*
Respondent.

Case No.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS

Agency number: A 

INTRODUCTION

1
2 1. Petitioner Rolando Perez Perez (“Petitioner”) is in the physical custody of
3 Respondent at the Folkston D. Ray ICE Processing Center. He now faces unlawful detention
4 because the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Executive Office of
5 Immigration Review (“EOIR”) will conclude that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention.

6 2. Petitioner is charged with, inter alia, having entered the United States (“U.S.”)
7 without admission or inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

8 3. Based on this allegation in Petitioner’s removal proceedings, DHS will certainly
9 deny Petitioner release from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on
10 July 8, 2025, instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider
11 anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the U.S. without
12 admission or inspection—to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and
13 therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

14 4. Similarly, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA or
15 Board”) issued a precedent decision, binding on all immigration judges (“IJs”), holding that an IJ
16 has no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the U.S. without
17 admission. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board
18 determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and
19 therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

20 5. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the Immigration
21 and Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner
22 who previously entered and are now residing in the U.S. Instead, such individuals are subject to a
23 different statute, § 1226(a), that allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute
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1 expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered
2 the U.S. without inspection.

3 6. Respondents' new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory
4 framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like
5 Petitioner.

6 7. Moreover, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary
7 judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide
8 class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*,
9 No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
10 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado*
11 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at
12 *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond
13 Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting
14 Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

15 8. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained
16 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
17 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. The court then issued a final
18 judgment in favor of the class on December 18, 2025.

19 9. Nonetheless, the EOIR and its subagency the Immigration Court and the DHS,
20 have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that class
21 members be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

22 10. IJs have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed
23 by "leadership" that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even
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1 with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency's prior
2 decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

3 11. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released
4 unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven (7) days.

5 JURISDICTION

6 12. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the
7 Folkston D. Ray ICE Processing Center located in Folkston, Georgia.

8 13. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28
9 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States
10 Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

11 14. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory
12 Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

13 VENUE

14 15. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493-
15 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
16 the judicial district in which Petitioner currently is detained.

17 16. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because
18 Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the U.S., and because a substantial part of
19 the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Southern District of Georgia.

20 REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

21 17. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents
22 to show cause "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an
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1 order to show cause is issued, Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good
2 cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

3 18. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional
4 law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
5 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the
6 writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and
7 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208
8 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

9 PARTIES

10 19. Petitioner Rolando Perez Perez is a citizen of Guatemala who has been in
11 immigration detention since on or about May 10, 2025. Petitioner was detained and subsequently
12 turned over into ICE custody, who did not set bond, and Petitioner is unable to obtain review of
13 his custody by an IJ, pursuant to the Board’s decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N.
14 Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

15 20. Respondent Warden is employed by the GEO Group, Inc., as Warden of
16 the Folkston D. Ray James ICE Processing Center where Petitioner is detained. He has
17 immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

18 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

19 21. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of
20 noncitizens in removal proceedings.

21 22. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal
22 proceedings before an IJ. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally
23 entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d),
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1 while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are
2 subject to mandatory detention, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

3 23. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to
4 expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission
5 referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

6 24. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered
7 removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

8 25. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

9 26. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the
10 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
11 104–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section
12 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119–1,
13 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

14 27. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining
15 that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not considered detained
16 under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited
17 Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
18 Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

19 28. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without inspection
20 and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal
21 history rendered them ineligible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That practice was consistent
22 with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving”
23 were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)

(1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

29. On July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

30. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,”¹ claims that all persons who entered the U.S. without inspection shall now be subject to mandatory detention provision under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the U.S. for months, years, and even decades.

31. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in a published decision, *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the U.S. without admission or parole are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

32. Since Respondents adopted their new policies, dozens of federal courts have rejected their new interpretation of the INA’s detention authorities. Courts have likewise rejected *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, which adopts the same reading of the statute as ICE.

33. Even before ICE or the BIA introduced these nationwide policies, IJs in the Tacoma, Washington, immigration court stopped providing bond hearings for persons who entered the U.S. without inspection and who have since resided here. There, the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington found that such a reading of the INA is likely unlawful and that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not

¹ Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

1 apprehended upon arrival to the U.S. *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D.
2 Wash. 2025).

3 34. Subsequently, court after court has adopted the same reading of the INA's
4 detention authorities and rejected ICE and EOIR's new interpretation. *See, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*,
5 No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*,
6 No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025);
7 *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11,
8 2025), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
9 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025
10 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE,
11 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-
12 ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-
13 BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH),
14 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-06248-
15 BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-
16 02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-
17 JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-3051
18 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v.*
19 *Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025);
20 *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
21 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D.
22 Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D.
23 Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass.

1 Sept. 9, 2025); *see also, e.g., Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2
2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that “[t]he Court tends to agree” that § 1226(a) and not §
3 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL
4 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-
5 RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

6 35. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation because it
7 defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the
8 statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.
9 This District Court, in fact, has also rejected DHS’s and EOIR’s new interpretation, as well. *See,*
10 *e.g., Villa v. Normand*, 5:25-cv-89, consolidated cases.

11 36. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether
12 the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under
13 § 1229a, to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

14 37. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible,
15 including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph
16 (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond
17 hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress
18 creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions,
19 the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove*
20 *Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)); *see also Gomes*, 2025
21 WL 1869299, at *7.

22 38. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges
23 of being inadmissible to the U.S., including those who are present without admission or parole.
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1 39. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who
2 recently entered the U.S. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border
3 of people who are "seeking admission" to the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the
4 Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's
5 borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen]
6 seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

7 40. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
8 apply to people like Petitioner, who have already entered and were residing in the U.S. at the
9 time they were apprehended.

10 41. Finally, as mentioned above, on November 20, 2025, the district court granted
11 partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified
12 a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista*
13 *v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11
14 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-
15 Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d --
16 --, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners'
17 proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment
18 from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

19 42. Despite this declaratory judgment holding that the Bond Denial Class members
20 are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on
21 bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), class members are being blatantly refused bond hearings across the
22 country. *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11.

FACTS

43. Petitioner Rolando Perez Perez is a forty (40) year old national of Guatemala who has two entries into the U.S. but last entered without inspection on or about 2005.

44. Petitioner is married and has three children who are twelve (12), five (5), and two (2) years old respectively. Petitioner's two (2) youngest children are United States Citizens ("USC"). ICE detained Petitioner in Washington state, and then transferred him to Folkston.

45. DHS initiated a Notice to Appear ("NTA") and subsequently initiated removal proceedings before the Atlanta Immigration Court.

46. ICE has charged Petitioner with, inter alia, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the U.S. without inspection.

47. Petitioner's next immigration court date, a Master hearing, is scheduled for March 20, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., with an IJ at the Atlanta Immigration Court.

48. Pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, the IJ is jurisdictionally barred from granting Petitioner a bond during at the conclusion of a custody redetermination hearing. Additionally, despite being a member of the certified nationwide class pursuant to *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, the EOIR and its subagency the Immigration Court and the DHS have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief for class members similarly situated to this petitioner before the Atlanta Immigration Court and other Immigration Courts across the country.

49. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention. Without relief from this court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
Violation of the INA

50. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

51. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the U.S. who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the U.S. prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

52. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II
Violation of the Bond Regulations

53. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in preceding paragraphs.

54. In 1997, after Congress amended the INA through IIRIRA, EOIR and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule to interpret and apply IIRIRA. Specifically, under the heading of “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of [Noncitizens],” the agencies explained that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323 (emphasis added). The agencies thus made clear that individuals who had entered without

1 inspection were eligible for consideration for bond and bond hearings before IJs under 8 U.S.C. §
2 1226 and its implementing regulations.

3 55. Nonetheless, pursuant to *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, EOIR has a policy and
4 practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner.

5 56. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued
6 detention and violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.

7 **COUNT III**
8 **Violation of Due Process**

9 57. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every
10 allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

11 58. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due
12 process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
13 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the
14 Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

15 59. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official
16 restraint.

17 60. The government’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing
18 to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.

19 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

20 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 21 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 22 b. Order that Petitioner shall not be transferred outside the Southern District of
23 Georgia while this habeas petition is pending;
- 24

- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this
Petition should not be granted within three (3) days;
- d. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner;
- e. In the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) within seven (7) days;
- f. Declare that Petitioner's detention is unlawful;
- g. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under
law; and
- h. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 3, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matthew O. Boles
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Counsel for Petitioner

Verification

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

/s/ Matthew O. Boles

Date: March 3, 2026