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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

7
8 Elsa Carolina Mancía,
9 Petitioner,
10 v.
11 Pamela Bondi, et al.
12 Respondents.
13

No. 2:26-cv-01392-PHX-DWL (CDB)

**PETITIONER'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF RENEWED MOTION TO
ENFORCE HABEAS ORDER**

14 Petitioner Elsa Carolina Mancía, through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits
15 this Reply in support of her Renewed Motion to Enforce this Court's habeas orders.
16

17 **I. INTRODUCTION**

18 Respondents attempt to reduce this case to a mere disagreement with the Immigration
19 Judge's discretionary weighing of evidence. That framing is both inaccurate and misleading.
20 Petitioner does not ask this Court to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
21 Immigration Judge. Nor does Petitioner contend that every adverse bond determination gives
22 rise to a constitutional violation reviewable in habeas.
23

24 Instead, Petitioner challenges the constitutional adequacy of the proceeding itself and
25 the legal sufficiency of the purported bases for continued detention after this Court twice
26 ordered constitutionally compliant bond proceedings. That distinction is critical.
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28 This Court has already determined that the first bond hearing violated due process

1 because the Immigration Judge denied Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to obtain counsel
2 and present evidence. The Court therefore ordered a second constitutionally adequate hearing.
3 The issue now before the Court is whether the second hearing complied with the Constitution
4 and this Court's prior orders. It did not.

5 The Immigration Judge's second decision again failed to provide the individualized
6 and reasoned determination required by due process. Instead of meaningfully engaging with
7 the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that Petitioner is not a flight risk, the Immigration
8 Judge relied almost entirely on generalized immigration-related characteristics shared by broad
9 categories of noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), including manner of entry decades
10 ago, prior unauthorized employment, lapse of TPS, delayed adjustment filing, and prior
11 immigration proceedings.
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13 Those generalized characteristics cannot, as a matter of law, justify continued
14 detention where the record overwhelmingly demonstrates stability, compliance, family ties,
15 community ties, lack of criminal history, and strong incentives to appear.
16

17 Petitioner has resided in the United States for nearly three decades. She is the mother
18 of four United States citizen children. She has longstanding family and community ties, a stable
19 residence, extensive employment history, no criminal history whatsoever, and viable avenues
20 to lawful permanent residency through her United States citizen daughter. There is no evidence
21 that Petitioner has ever absconded, attempted to flee, or failed to appear for proceedings. In
22 fact, she has been in contact with Immigration Officials for the better part of three decades.
23

24 The Immigration Judge nevertheless concluded that no amount of bond or conditions
25 could reasonably assure appearance, while failing to meaningfully explain how those facts
26 collectively establish present flight risk. That is not merely discretionary weighing. It is legal
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1 error and a violation of due process.

2 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not bar habeas review where the challenge concerns “whether
3 the evidence itself could not, as a matter of law, have supported the IJ’s decision to deny bond,”
4 or whether the Immigration Judge “failed to apply the correct standard to the facts.” *Benipal v.*
5 *Rokosky*, No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM, Doc. 10 at 11–12 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2026), adopted in
6 full, Doc. 12 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026).

7
8 *Benipal* further recognized that due process requires a sufficiently reasoned and
9 individualized determination capable of meaningful judicial review. *Id.* at 12–16. Where a
10 reviewing court is “left to speculate concerning how the immigration judge viewed the
11 evidence in light of the applicable factors,” the court “must conclude that the immigration
12 judge failed to do so, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.” *Id.* at 16.

13
14 *Benipal* does not conflict with this Court’s prior order in *Fajardo-Cordova v.*
15 *McGregor*, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61081, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2026). Rather, it clarifies
16 the distinction already recognized there: courts may not second-guess discretionary weighing
17 of evidence, but they retain authority to remedy constitutional violations and legally
18 unsupported detention decisions. This case falls squarely on the constitutional side of that line.

19
20 Accordingly, because Respondents again failed to provide the constitutionally
21 adequate bond proceeding required by this Court’s orders and the Due Process Clause, the
22 Court should grant the Renewed Motion to Enforce and order Petitioner’s immediate release.

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24 **II. THIS COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION BECAUSE PETITIONER**
25 **CHALLENGES THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADEQUACY OF**
26 **THE BOND DETERMINATION, NOT MERE DISCRETIONARY**
27 **WEIGHING**

28 Respondents repeatedly mischaracterize Petitioner’s claim as a disagreement with the
Immigration Judge’s discretionary weighing of the evidence. That is not the claim before this

1 Court.

2 Petitioner does not ask this Court to independently determine whether she should be
3 released on bond. Nor does Petitioner contend that every adverse custody determination under
4 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is reviewable in habeas. Instead, Petitioner challenges whether the
5 Immigration Judge's decision complied with the governing legal framework and constitutional
6 requirements at all. That distinction is dispositive.

7
8 Respondents correctly note that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) limits judicial review of
9 discretionary custody determinations. But § 1226(e) does not insulate constitutionally
10 defective proceedings or legally unsupported detention decisions from review.

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12 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, § 1226(e) does not preclude review of
13 constitutional claims, questions of law, or mixed questions involving the application of law to
14 undisputed facts. *Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011); *Martinez v. Clark*, 124
15 F.4th 775, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2024). Thus, while courts may not “second-guess” discretionary
16 weighing, courts retain authority to determine whether the Immigration Judge applied the
17 correct legal standard and whether the asserted evidence could legally support continued
18 detention.

19
20 The recently adopted Report and Recommendation in *Benipal* squarely addressed this
21 distinction. There, the court explained that habeas relief is appropriate where “the evidence
22 itself could not, as a matter of law, have supported the IJ’s decision to deny bond,” or where
23 the Immigration Judge “failed to apply the correct standard to the facts.” *Benipal v. Rokosky*,
24 No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM, Doc. 10 at 11–12 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2026), adopted in full, Doc.
25 12 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026).

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27 *Benipal* further recognized that due process requires a sufficiently reasoned and
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1 individualized determination capable of meaningful judicial review. *Id.* at 12–16. The court
2 explained that when a reviewing court is “left to speculate concerning how the immigration
3 judge viewed the evidence in light of the applicable factors,” the court “must conclude that the
4 immigration judge failed to do so, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.” *Id.* at 16. That is
5 precisely the problem here.

6
7 Respondents argue that the Immigration Judge conducted an “individualized” analysis
8 because the written decision listed several factors. But the mere recitation of factors does not
9 satisfy due process. As *Benipal* explained, immigration adjudicators “cannot reach their
10 decisions capriciously” and “must indicate how [they] weighed the factors involved and how
11 [they] arrived at [their] conclusion.” *Id.* at 14 (*quoting Sagaydak v. Gonzales*, 405 F.3d 1035,
12 1040 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Immigration Judge failed to do that here.

13
14 Rather than meaningfully engage with the substantial evidence demonstrating that
15 Petitioner is not a flight risk, the Immigration Judge relied primarily on generalized
16 immigration-related characteristics that apply to broad categories of noncitizens detained under
17 § 1226(a): entry without inspection decades ago, prior unauthorized employment, lapse of TPS,
18 delayed adjustment efforts, and prior immigration proceedings.

19
20 Those generalized characteristics do not rationally establish present flight risk in light
21 of the overwhelming contrary evidence before the Immigration Judge, including Petitioner’s
22 nearly three decades of residence in the United States, four United States citizen children,
23 stable residence, longstanding employment history, lack of criminal history, extensive
24 community ties, and lack of any evidence that she has ever absconded or attempted to flee
25 proceedings.

26
27 Petitioner’s claim therefore does not seek improper reweighing of evidence. Instead,
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1 Petitioner challenges whether the Immigration Judge's reasoning satisfies the constitutional
2 requirement of an individualized and legally sufficient determination supported by meaningful
3 analysis and capable of judicial review. That claim is properly before this Court.

4 **III. THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE'S FLIGHT-RISK DETERMINATION WAS**
5 **LEGALLY DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S**
6 **HABEAS ORDERS**

7 The Immigration Judge's second custody determination suffers from the same
8 fundamental constitutional defect identified by this Court in the first proceeding: the absence
9 of a genuinely individualized and reasoned determination supported by legally sufficient
10 evidence.

11 Although the second hearing provided Petitioner an opportunity to submit evidence
12 and argument, the resulting decision still failed to meaningfully engage with the governing
13 legal framework or the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that Petitioner is not a flight
14 risk.
15

16 Under *Matter of Guerra*, relevant flight-risk considerations include: fixed residence,
17 length of residence in the United States, family ties, employment history, appearance history,
18 criminal history, prior attempts to flee, immigration history, and manner of entry. *Matter of*
19 *Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006); *Matter of R-A-V-P-*, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 805
20 (BIA 2020). Virtually every meaningful *Guerra* factor favors release here.
21

22 Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously for nearly three decades. She
23 is the mother of four United States citizen children. She has longstanding family and
24 community ties, stable residence, extensive employment history, and no criminal history
25 whatsoever. There is no evidence that Petitioner has ever absconded, attempted to flee
26 proceedings, or failed to comply with court obligations. Petitioner also possesses viable
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1 avenues for immigration relief through her United States citizen daughter and has timely
2 appealed the denial of her immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (**Exhibit**
3 **A**)¹, further demonstrating both ongoing legal avenues for relief and strong incentives to appear
4 for future proceedings.

5 Despite these overwhelming equities, the Immigration Judge concluded that Petitioner
6 posed such a severe flight risk that no amount of bond or conditions of supervision could
7 reasonably assure appearance. The decision does not meaningfully explain that conclusion.

8 Instead, the Immigration Judge relied primarily on generalized immigration-related
9 circumstances shared by broad categories of noncitizens detained under § 1226(a), including
10 Petitioner's entry without inspection in 1997, prior unauthorized employment, lapse of TPS,
11 delayed pursuit of adjustment of status, and prior immigration proceedings.

12 But those generalized characteristics cannot substitute for an individualized present-
13 tense assessment of flight risk. If they could, nearly every long-term undocumented noncitizen
14 in removal proceedings would categorically qualify as a flight risk regardless of community
15 ties, compliance history, family stability, or eligibility for relief. That is not the individualized
16 determination required by *Guerra*, due process, or this Court's prior habeas orders.

17 Most critically, the Immigration Judge failed to explain how those generalized
18 circumstances outweighed the overwhelming evidence demonstrating stability and
19 compliance. The decision contains no meaningful analysis connecting the cited facts to the
20 extraordinary conclusion that no bond amount or conditions could reasonably ensure

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¹ Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26) with the Board of Immigration Appeals following the Immigration Judge's denial of relief. A copy of the EOIR electronic filing service notice is attached as Exhibit A. Because appeals typically require several days to be reflected in the EOIR Case Status ("ECAS") system, the appeal may not yet appear on the publicly accessible docket at the time of this filing. Nevertheless, the appeal has been timely filed and remains pending before the Board.

1 appearance. That absence of reasoning is constitutionally significant.

2 As *Benipal* recognized, due process requires more than a conclusory invocation of
3 factors. Immigration adjudicators must explain “how [they] weighed the factors involved” and
4 “how [they] arrived at [their] conclusion.” *Benipal v. Rokosky*, No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM,
5 Doc. 10 at 14 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2026) (quoting *Sagaydak v. Gonzales*, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040
6 (9th Cir. 2005)), adopted in full, Doc. 12 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026). The court further explained
7 that where a reviewing court is “left to speculate concerning how the immigration judge viewed
8 the evidence in light of the applicable factors,” the court “must conclude that the immigration
9 judge failed to do so, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.” *Id.* at 16. That is exactly the
10 circumstance presented here.
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12 Indeed, *Benipal* is particularly instructive because the petitioner there had already lost
13 his underlying immigration case and remained detained pending appeal before the Board of
14 Immigration Appeals. *Id.* at 4–5. Even in that posture, the district court concluded that the
15 Immigration Judge’s unsupported flight-risk determination violated due process and warranted
16 habeas relief. *Id.* at 15–17. The district court adopted that reasoning in full and ordered
17 immediate release. Doc. 12. The same reasoning applies with equal force here.
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20 Petitioner’s continued detention cannot rest on vague references to decades-old
21 immigration circumstances untethered to any meaningful evidence of present flight risk. Nor
22 may the Government evade judicial review simply by labeling such reasoning “discretionary.”
23 Due process requires a genuine individualized determination supported by legally sufficient
24 reasoning and capable of meaningful judicial review. The Immigration Judge’s decision fails
25 that standard.
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27 The irrationality of the Immigration Judge’s conclusion is further underscored by
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1 Petitioner's longstanding and affirmative contact with immigration authorities. Petitioner
2 obtained Temporary Protected Status in or around 2001 and, for decades thereafter, remained
3 known to and documented by the federal government. She lived openly in the United States,
4 raised four United States citizen children, worked, maintained a stable residence, and continued
5 pursuing lawful immigration avenues.
6

7 If Petitioner truly intended to evade immigration authorities or abscond from
8 proceedings, she would not have affirmatively registered with the government for TPS,
9 maintained ongoing contact with immigration authorities for decades, or continued pursuing
10 immigration relief through available legal processes.
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12 The Immigration Judge never meaningfully explained how an individual who
13 voluntarily remained in contact with immigration authorities for nearly twenty-five years
14 suddenly became such an extraordinary flight risk that no amount of bond or supervision could
15 reasonably ensure appearance. That unexplained leap is precisely the type of unsupported and
16 legally deficient reasoning that due process forbids.
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18 **IV. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S HABEAS** 19 **ORDERS**

20 This Court has already determined that Petitioner was denied a constitutionally
21 adequate bond proceeding. In granting Petitioner's first motion to enforce, the Court held that
22 the prior hearing violated due process because Petitioner was denied a meaningful opportunity
23 to obtain counsel and present evidence. The Court therefore ordered Respondents to provide a
24 new constitutionally compliant hearing. Respondents did not comply with the substance of that
25 order.
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27 Although Petitioner was permitted to present evidence during the second hearing, the
28 Immigration Judge again failed to conduct the individualized constitutional analysis required

1 by due process and this Court's habeas rulings. Simply allowing evidence to be submitted does
2 not satisfy due process where the resulting decision fails to meaningfully engage with that
3 evidence or explain why continued detention remains justified. The constitutional violation
4 here is therefore not procedural in form alone; it is substantive in effect.

5 The Immigration Judge again relied on generalized immigration-related
6 characteristics while failing to meaningfully address the overwhelming evidence negating
7 flight risk. The resulting decision leaves this Court unable to determine how the Immigration
8 Judge concluded that Petitioner posed such a severe flight risk that no amount of bond or
9 supervision could reasonably ensure appearance.
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11 That failure is especially significant given the posture of this case. This is not an initial
12 habeas petition seeking a first constitutionally adequate hearing. This Court already intervened
13 once after determining that the prior proceeding failed to comport with due process. The second
14 hearing therefore occurred under the shadow of an express federal habeas order requiring
15 constitutional compliance. Yet the same fundamental defect persists: the absence of a reasoned
16 and genuinely individualized determination.
17

18 Respondents effectively ask this Court to conclude that once an Immigration Judge
19 utters the words "flight risk" and lists several generic factors, judicial review ends. That is not
20 the law. As *Benipal* recognized, courts retain authority to ensure that detention decisions
21 comply with constitutional requirements and are supported by legally sufficient reasoning
22 capable of meaningful review.
23

24 Nor does *Fajardo-Cordova* compel a different result. In *Fajardo-Cordova*, this Court
25 concluded that, *on the record presented there*, it could not determine that the legal framework
26 itself violated due process. Here, by contrast, the record demonstrates that the Immigration
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1 Judge relied on generalized factors untethered to any meaningful evidence of present flight risk
2 while failing to meaningfully engage with overwhelming contrary evidence. Moreover, unlike
3 *Fajardo-Cordova*, this case arises after this Court already found the initial hearing
4 constitutionally defective and ordered a compliant proceeding. That distinction matters.

5 At some point, repeated reliance on legally insufficient reasoning ceases to be mere
6 discretionary weighing and becomes noncompliance with the Constitution and this Court's
7 habeas orders. That is what occurred here.

8 Accordingly, because Respondents failed to provide the constitutionally adequate and
9 genuinely individualized bond determination required by this Court's prior orders, further
10 remand would serve little purpose. Petitioner respectfully submits that the appropriate remedy
11 is immediate release under reasonable conditions of supervision, bond, or recognizance.

12 **V. IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY**

13 Respondents have now been afforded two opportunities to provide Petitioner a
14 constitutionally adequate custody determination.

15 The first hearing was constitutionally deficient because Petitioner was denied a
16 meaningful opportunity to obtain counsel and present evidence. This Court expressly so held.
17 Respondents were then ordered to provide a new hearing comporting with due process.

18 The second hearing failed for a different but equally fundamental reason: the
19 Immigration Judge again failed to provide a legally sufficient and genuinely individualized
20 determination supported by meaningful reasoning.

21 Under these circumstances, another remand would merely risk repeating the same
22 constitutional violation while prolonging unlawful detention.

23 Courts routinely recognize that immediate release is an appropriate remedy where
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1 repeated or constitutionally deficient bond proceedings fail to cure unlawful detention. *See*
2 *Benipal v. Rokosky*, No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM, Doc. 10 at 15–17 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2026),
3 adopted in full, Doc. 12 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026) (ordering release where the Immigration
4 Judge’s unsupported flight-risk determination violated due process); *Escalante Perez v.*
5 *Hernandez*, No. 26-cv-0956, 2026 WL 1004559, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 2026) (ordering
6 release where court could not determine how IJ concluded petitioner posed flight risk); *Zheng*
7 *v. Rokosky*, 2026 WL 800203, at *6 (D.N.J. 2026) (finding due process violation where IJ
8 provided “no analysis whatsoever” supporting flight-risk determination).
9

10 Immediate release is particularly appropriate here because the record overwhelmingly
11 demonstrates that Petitioner is neither a danger to the community nor a genuine flight risk.
12

13 Petitioner has no criminal history whatsoever. She has resided continuously in the
14 United States for nearly thirty years. She is the mother of four United States citizen children.
15 She maintained Temporary Protected Status beginning in approximately 2001 and remained in
16 contact with immigration authorities for decades thereafter. She has longstanding family and
17 community ties, stable residence, extensive employment history, pending appellate
18 proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and a viable path to lawful permanent
19 residency through her adult U.S. citizen daughter.
20

21 There is no evidence that Petitioner has ever absconded, attempted to flee proceedings,
22 or failed to comply with court obligations. Nor is there any meaningful explanation in the
23 record as to why conditions short of detention would be inadequate to reasonably ensure
24 appearance.
25

26 Continued detention under these circumstances no longer serves a legitimate
27 regulatory purpose. Instead, it has become arbitrary detention unsupported by constitutionally
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adequate findings.

The Due Process Clause does not permit indefinite or prolonged civil detention based on conclusory assertions untethered to meaningful individualized analysis. At minimum, due process requires a reasoned explanation demonstrating why continued detention is necessary. That never occurred here.

Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant the Renewed Motion to Enforce and order her immediate release under appropriate conditions of supervision, bond, or recognizance.

VI. FAJARDO-CORDOVA DOES NOT CONTROL THIS CASE

Respondents rely heavily on *Fajardo-Cordova v. McGregor*, but that decision does not compel denial here.

In *Fajardo-Cordova*, this Court concluded that, “based on the current record,” it could not determine that the legal framework employed by the Immigration Judge itself violated due process. *Fajardo-Cordova v. McGregor*, No. CV-26-00585-PHX-DWL, Doc. 13 at 2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2026). Critically, the Court did not hold that all flight-risk determinations are insulated from review, nor did it hold that conclusory or legally unsupported detention decisions are categorically unreviewable under § 1226(e). This case is materially different.

Unlike *Fajardo-Cordova*, Petitioner here has no criminal history whatsoever, has remained in affirmative contact with immigration authorities for decades through TPS registration and related processes, has resided continuously in the United States for nearly thirty years, and has four United States citizen children. There is likewise no evidence that Petitioner has ever absconded, fled proceedings, or violated court obligations.

More importantly, this case arises after this Court already determined that the initial

1 custody proceeding violated due process and ordered a constitutionally compliant hearing. The
2 second hearing nevertheless resulted in the same fundamental constitutional defect: a failure
3 to provide a genuinely individualized and reasoned determination supported by legally
4 sufficient analysis.

5 Additionally, in *Benipal*, the court squarely addressed the precise issue presented here
6 and explained that habeas review remains available where “the evidence itself could not, as a
7 matter of law, have supported the IJ’s decision to deny bond,” or where the reviewing court is
8 left unable to determine how the Immigration Judge applied the governing factors. *Benipal v.*
9 *Rokosky*, No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM, Doc. 10 at 11–16 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2026), adopted in
10 full, Doc. 12 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026). That is precisely the circumstance presented here.

13 VII. CONCLUSION

14 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant the
15 Renewed Motion to Enforce.

16 Respondents were ordered to provide a constitutionally adequate and genuinely
17 individualized custody determination. They failed to do so. The Immigration Judge again relied
18 on generalized and legally insufficient reasoning while failing to meaningfully explain how
19 Petitioner—a mother of four United States citizen children who has lived openly in the United
20 States for nearly three decades, maintained longstanding ties to this community, remained in
21 contact with immigration authorities for decades through TPS registration and related
22 processes, and has never absconded or attempted to flee—suddenly became such an
23 extraordinary flight risk that no amount of bond or supervision could reasonably ensure
24 appearance. Due process requires more.

25 Because Respondents have now failed twice to provide the constitutionally adequate
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1 proceeding required by this Court's habeas orders and the Fifth Amendment, further remand
2 would only prolong unlawful detention without curing the underlying constitutional defect.

3 Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court order her immediate
4 release under reasonable conditions of supervision, bond, or recognizance, together with any
5 other relief the Court deems just and proper.
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7 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of May, 2026.

8
9 /s/ Spencer C. Lee
10 Spencer C. Lee
11 Attorney for Petitioner
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EXHIBIT A

Date Tue 5/19/2026 3:48 PM

To Emily Lund <emily@saguarolegal.com>

The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has received an electronic upload of the BIA appeal/motion package referenced below. BIA is evaluating the package for inclusion into the electronic Record of Proceedings (eROP). EOIR will notify you upon completion of the evaluation process.

- eFiled Document Name: E-26 with addendum.pdf
- Additional Document(s) Name:
 - Fee Waiver Request.pdf
 - E-27.pdf
- Document Category: EOIR-26, Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge
- Document Sub Category: Case Appeal
- Uploaded On: 05/19/2026
- Tracking Number: [REDACTED]
- A-Number: [REDACTED]
- Alien Name: FIGUEROA MANCIA, ELSA CAROLINA
- Charging Document Date: 11/14/2025
- Case Type: RMV
- BIA Case Type: Case Appeal
- Date the BIA Case was Filed: 05/19/2026

The documents associated with this filing may be viewed as follows:

Attorneys/Representatives you may view the documents in the EOIR Case Portal at this [link](#). Please note you will need your User ID and password to access the location.

DHS users you may view the documents in the EOIR DHS Portal at this [link](#).