

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Franklin Alberto SANCHEZ-Henao

Petitioner,

v.

Cammilla WAMSLEY, Seattle Field Office
Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations,
United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 2:26-cv-707

**TRAVERSE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
AND RESPONSE TO ANSWER**

Noting Date: March 17, 2026

TRAVERSE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS AND RESPONSE TO ANSWER
Case No. 2:26-cv-00707

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INTRODUCTION

This is a case about due process—specifically, the Constitution’s demand that the government not revoke an individual’s established liberty by unilateral fiat.

The petitioner lived in the community for over two years after being released by DHS. He filed his asylum application and was complying with the conditions of his release as best he could, yet he was called in and re-detained without a hearing or explanation.

The petitioners claim Mr. Sanchez has committed several “ATD violations” on April 29, 2025, July 22, 2025, and August 5, 2025. *See*, Declaration of Sheldon Benjamin at 2. They have failed to provide evidence of any such failure or to even explain what those failures would entail.

Despite trying his best to comply, Mr. Sanchez was detained in December and has remained in the respondent’s custody since that time. He was not provided written notice or the chance to present his case before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether re-detention was warranted based on individualized findings of flight or danger.

That is the constitutional defect at the center of this litigation. Due process protects “freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint,” and it requires notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before the government revokes a person’s established liberty. *Zadydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972). Courts in this District have repeatedly applied those principles to immigration re-detention and held that pre-deprivation process is required. *E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 2402130 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP-TLF, 2025 WL 2637663 (W.D. Wash.

1 Sept. 12, 2025); *Kumar v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-01772-JHC-BAT, 2025 WL 2677089 (W.D.
2 Wash. Sept. 17, 2025).

3 The Court should grant the Petition, order Petitioner's immediate release, and enter
4 prospective relief requiring Respondents to provide constitutionally sufficient pre
5 deprivation procedures before any future effort to re-detain Petitioner.

6 ARGUMENT

7 I. Respondents Re-Detained Petitioner Without the Process the Constitution 8 Requires—and They Do Not Dispute That Failure.

9 This case turns on a straightforward constitutional defect.

10 Respondents re-detained Petitioner after a prolonged period of liberty in the
11 community without affording him any pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral
12 decisionmaker at which ICE was required to justify the deprivation of liberty. Respondents
13 do not meaningfully contest that such process is constitutionally required.

14 The Supreme Court has long held that conditional liberty is liberty nonetheless.
15 When the government confers freedom from physical custody—whether styled as parole,
16 probation, or supervised release—it creates a protected liberty interest that cannot be
17 revoked without due process. *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481–84 (1972); *Gagnon v.*
18 *Scarbelli*, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); *Young v. Harper*, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997).

19 Morrissey explains why. Conditional liberty permits a person “to live and work in the
20 community,” to form relationships, and to rely on the government’s implicit assurance that
21 liberty will not be withdrawn absent cause. 408 U.S. at 482. Revocation “inflicts a grievous
22 loss” and therefore triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause. *Id.* at 481.

23 Courts applying Morrissey in the immigration context have reached the same
conclusion: release from immigration detention gives rise to a constitutionally protected

1 liberty interest inherent in the Due Process Clause itself. See *Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser*, No.
2 25-cv-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025); *Ortega v. Kaiser*, No. 25-
3 cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025).

4 The petitioner's experience fits squarely within this framework. He lived in the
5 community for more than two years without incident and did his best to comply with all the
6 conditions set by respondents. Nevertheless, he was detained and remains in custody.

7 **II. Under *Mathews v. Eldridge*, Due Process Required a Pre-Deprivation Hearing—
and Every Factor Favors Petitioner**

8 Whether due process requires particular procedures is assessed under *Mathews v.*
9 *Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which weighs the:

- 10 (1) Private interest affected;
11 (2) Risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards; and
12 (3) Government's interest.

13 *Id.* at 335. Each factor points decisively in one direction.

14 **1. Petitioner's Interest in Freedom from Physical Confinement Is Profound**

15 "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
16 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Due Process Clause
17 protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

18 Courts in this District have repeatedly recognized that re-detention after release
19 deprives a noncitizen of an already-vested liberty interest. *E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL
20 2402130, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2637663, at
21 *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2025). That interest is particularly weighty where, as here,
22 Petitioner had been living openly in the community in compliance with all government
23 requirements.

1 The D.C. Circuit has explained that “a person who is in fact free of physical
2 confinement—even if that freedom is lawfully revocable—has a liberty interest that entitles
3 him to constitutional due process before he is re-incarcerated.” *Hurd v. District of*
4 *Columbia*, 864 F.3d 671, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

5 Respondents’ Return does not grapple with this interest. The first Mathews factor
6 weighs heavily in Petitioner’s favor.

7 **2. Unilateral ICE Re-Detention Creates an Acute Risk of Error—Neutral**
8 **Review Substantially Reduces That Risk**

9 The risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial when ICE acts as investigator,
10 prosecutor, and jailer—revoking liberty based on its own unreviewed determinations.

11 This Court has already identified that precise danger in a series of recent re-detention
12 cases, holding that revocation of release without a pre-deprivation hearing presents an
13 unacceptably high risk of error. *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *4–5; *Ramirez Tesara*, 2025
14 WL 2637663, at *3–4; *Kumar v. Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2677089, at *3–4; *Ledesma Gonzalez v.*
15 *Wamsley*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7–9 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2025).

16 The Ninth Circuit has similarly recognized that DHS’s internal custody assessments
17 are not an adequate substitute for neutral adjudication. *Diouf v. Napolitano*, 634 F.3d 1081,
18 1092 (9th Cir. 2011).

19 Petitioner’s case illustrates the problem. ICE informed Mr. Sanchez of his ATD
20 violations only *after* he was detained, no assessment of flight risk or danger, and no
21 opportunity for Petitioner to contest the deprivation before it occurred.

22 **3. The Government’s Interest Does Not Justify Dispensing with Fundamental**
23 **Process**

The government’s interest in enforcing the immigration laws does not depend on
abandoning constitutional safeguards. Immigration custody hearings are routine,
administratively modest, and already embedded in the system. See *Ortega v. Bonnar*, 415 F.

1 Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 2025 WL 691664, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
2 3, 2025).

3 Nothing in Petitioner's history suggests that a brief, pre-deprivation hearing would
4 have impaired removal efforts or public safety. Indeed, such a hearing would have provided
5 Mr. Sanchez with the opportunity to access his ISAP app and show any communications or
6 proof of compliance.

7 All three Mathews factors converge: due process required a pre-deprivation hearing
8 before a neutral adjudicator at which Respondents bore the burden of justification.
9 Respondents provided none.

10 CONCLUSION

11 The Due Process Clause does not permit Respondents to re-detain Petitioner—after
12 years of established liberty in the community—without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing
13 before a neutral decisionmaker at which ICE must justify the deprivation of liberty by
14 individualized findings. Petitioner was seized in early December, and has remained detained
15 since, without the basic procedures the Constitution requires at the moment liberty is
16 revoked. The Court should grant the writ, order Petitioner's immediate release, and enter
17 prospective relief declaring that Petitioner's re-detention without a neutral, pre-deprivation
18 individualized determination violates the Due Process Clause.

19 Dated: March 17, 2026

20 s/ Stephen C. Robbins

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