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5
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8 Franklin SANCHEZ Henao

9 Petitioner,

10 v.

11 Cammilla WAMSLEY, Seattle Field Office
12 Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations,
United States Immigration and Customs
13 Enforcement (ICE); Bruce SCOTT, Warden,
Northwest ICE Processing Center; Kristi
14 NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of
Homeland Security; Pamela BONDI, United
15 States Attorney General; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
16 SECURITY;

17 Respondents.

Case No. 2:26-cv-707

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241

AGENCY FILE NO:



INTRODUCTION

1. This case challenges the unlawful re-detention of Franklin Sanchez Henao (Mr. Sanchez) a 51-year-old native of Colombia who came to the United States to seek asylum in with his wife and son in October of 2023.

2. Mr. Sanchez and his wife were social activists who worked to promote anti-gang activities for youth in impoverished areas of Bogota. They were engaged with two organizations in particular [REDACTED] which is a social work organization affiliated with their church, and [REDACTED] which is a foundation created by leaders in his church focused on community betterment. The Respondent and his wife volunteered in a neighborhood called [REDACTED] and the Respondent focused on mentoring children and adolescents and organizing recreational activities for them so that they did not become involved in illegal activity. He would organize physical training, film screenings, sports, and educational talks on various topics including on sex and "co-existence" with others.

5. Mr. Sanchez and his wife have complied with all hearing dates and other requirements imposed upon them by the respondents, nevertheless, Mr. Sanchez was called into the local ICE office and detained on January 23, 2026 for alleged "ATD" violations.

6. Before re-detaining him on January 23, Respondents did not provide Mr. Sanchez with any written notice explaining the basis for detention, nor was a warrant or other evidence

1 provided to counsel. The Respondents did not provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker
2 where ICE was required to justify the basis for re-detention or explain why Mr. Sanchez is a flight
3 risk or danger to the community.

4 7. As this Court has recently held in multiple cases, due process demands a hearing *prior*
5 to the government's decision to terminate a person's liberty. *See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d
6 --- No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 WL 2402130, at *2-6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Tesara v.*
7 *Wamsley*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP-TLF, 2025 WL 2637663, at *2-4 (W.D. Wash.
8 Sept. 12, 2025); *Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock*, No. 2:25-CV-01404-JNW-GJL, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7-
9 -9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); *Kumar v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-CV-01772-JHC-BAT, 2025 WL 2677089,
10 at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025); Report & Recommendation, *Lopez Reyes v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-
11 cv-01868-JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2025), Dkt. 13. Many other courts have recently held the
12 same.

13 8. By failing to provide such a hearing, Respondents have violated Mr. Sanchez's
14 constitutional right to due process.

15 9. Accordingly, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus
16 and order his immediate release. *See E.A. T.-B.* 2025 WL 2402130, at *6 (ordering immediate release
17 because "a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is
18 after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty"); *Ramirez Tesara*, at *4 (similar);
19 *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at *3-4 (similar); *Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *9 (similar).

20 JURISDICTION

21 10. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration
22 and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
23

1 11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus),
2 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution
3 (Suspension Clause).

4 12. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
5 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1651.

7 VENUE

8 13. Venue is proper because Mr. Sanchez is in Respondents' custody at the NWIPC in
9 Tacoma, Washington. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 493–
10 500 (1973), venue lies in the judicial district in which Mr. Sanchez currently is in custody.

11 14. Venue is also properly in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because
12 Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial
13 part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western District of
14 Washington.

15 REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

16 15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to
17 show cause (OSC) to the Respondents “forthwith,” unless Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
18 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within
19 three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

20 16. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional
21 law . . . affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
22 confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps the
23 attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt
action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th

1 Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); *see also Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson*, 216 F.2d 735, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1954)
2 (habeas corpus is “a speedy remedy, entitled by statute to special, preferential consideration to insure
3 expeditious hearing and determination”).

4 **PARTIES**

5 17. Mr. Sanchez is a 51-year-old native of Colombia. He is detained at the NWIPC.

6 18. Respondent Camilla Wamsley is the Field Office Director for ICE’s Seattle Field
7 Office. The Seattle Field Office is responsible for local custody decisions relating to noncitizens
8 charged with being removable from the United States. The Seattle Field Office’s area of
9 responsibility includes Alaska, Oregon, and Washington. Respondent Wamsley is a legal custodian
10 of Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

11 19. Respondent Bruce Scott is employed by the private corporation The GEO Group,
12 Inc., as Warden of the NWIPC, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of
13 Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

14 20. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
15 (DHS). She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and
16 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner’s detention. Ms. Noem
17 has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

18 21. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States, and as such
19 has authority over the Department of Justice. She is sued in her official capacity.

20 22. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security is the federal agency that has
21 authority over the actions of ICE.
22
23

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

23. Mr. Sanchez came to the U.S. in October of 2023 to seek asylum. He was detained and released with a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court..

24. Mr. Sanchez attended his hearings and filed a timely asylum application. He did everything he was asked by the respondents in this case.

25. On January 23 Mr. Sanchez was called into the local ICE office where he was re-detained.

26. Mr. Sanchez has committed no crimes in the United States and is not otherwise accused or suspected of being a danger to the community.

27. Mr. Sanchez has fully complied with all hearings, filing deadlines, and other requirements imposed by the respondents.

28. Mr. Sanchez's final immigration hearing was held on February 27, 2026 at the Northwest ICE Processing Center. All forms of relief were denied and he was ordered removed to Colombia. The order is not final as he is within the 30 day appeal window and he anticipates filing an appeal in the following days.

29. Prior to Mr. Sanchez's re-arrest, he did not receive written notice of the reason for his re-detention.

30. Prior to Mr. Sanchez's re-arrest, ICE did not assess whether Mr. Sanchez presented a flight risk or danger to the community, or whether her re-arrest was justified for some other reason.

31. Prior to Mr. Sanchez's re-detention, he never received a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine if her re-detention is justified.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Due Process Principles

32. Due process requires that if DHS seeks to re-arrest a person like Mr. Sanchez—who has lived in the United States without incident since his release from immigration custody in 2023, the government must afford a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether any re-detention is justified, and whether the person is a flight risk or danger to the community.

33. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). As this Court recently recognized, this is the “the most elemental of liberty interests.” *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *3 (citation modified); *see also Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at *3 (stating that the petitioner had “an exceptionally strong interest in freedom from physical confinement”).

34. Consistent with this principle, individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest in their “continued liberty.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

35. Such liberty is protected by the Fifth Amendment because, “although indeterminate, [it] includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” such as the ability to be gainfully employed and live with family, “and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the [released individual] and often on others.” *Id.*

36. To protect against arbitrary re-detention and to ensure the right to liberty, due process requires “adequate procedural protections” that test whether the government’s asserted justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified).

1 37. Due process thus guarantees notice and an individualized hearing before a neutral
2 decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk before the revocation of an individual's release. *Goldberg*
3 *v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
4 opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner." (citation modified)); *see*
5 *also, e.g., Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at 485 (requiring "preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
6 probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed . . . a
7 violation of parole conditions" and that such determination be made "by someone not directly
8 involved in the case" (citation modified)).

9 38. Several courts, including this one, have recognized that these principles apply with
10 respect to the re-detention of the many noncitizens that DHS has arbitrarily begun taking back into
11 custody, often after such persons have been released for months and years.

12 39. For example, in *E.A. T.-B.*, this Court applied the *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319
13 (1976), framework to hold that even in a case where the government asserted that mandatory
14 detention initially applied, a person's re-detention could not occur absent a hearing. The Court did
15 the same in *Ramirez Tesara, Kumar*, and *Ledesma Gonzalez*. *See Ramirez Tesara*, 2025 WL 2637663, at
16 *2-3; *Kumar*, 2025 WL 2677089, at *2-3; *Ledesma Gonzalez*, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7-8.

17 40. In applying the three *Mathews* factors, the *E.A. T.-B.* court held that the petitioner
18 had "undoubtedly [been] deprive[d] . . . of an established interest in his liberty," 2025 WL 2402130,
19 at *3, which, as noted, "is the most elemental of liberty interests," *id.* (citation modified). The Court
20 further explained that even if detention was mandatory, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty
21 without a hearing was high because a hearing serves to ensure that the purposes of detention—the
22 prevention of danger and flight risk—are properly served. *Id.* at *4-5. Finally, the Court explained
23 that "the Government's interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously released without a hearing is
low: although it would have required the expenditure of finite resources (money and time) to

1 provide Petitioner notice and hearing on [ISAP] violations before arresting and re-detaining him,
2 those costs are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.”
3 *Id.* at *5. As a result, this Court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at *6.

4 41. This Court applied a similar analysis in *Ramirez Tesara*. There, the Court reasoned
5 that the petitioner had a “weighty” interest in his liberty and was entitled to the “full protections of
6 the due process clause.” 2025 WL 2637663, at *3. When examining the value of additional
7 safeguards, the Court also noted that despite the government’s allegations of ISAP violations, “the
8 fact ‘that the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its
9 obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process.’” *Id.* at *4
10 (quoting *E.A. T.-B.*, 2025 WL 2402130, at *4). Finally, the Court reasoned that any government
11 interest in re-detention without a hearing was “minimal.” *Id.* Accordingly, there too, the Court
12 ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. *Id.* at *5.

13 42. The *Kumar* and *Ledesma Gonzalez* courts reached the same decision, again holding that
14 all three factors weighed in favor of affording the petitioner a bond hearing. 2025 WL 2677089, at
15 *3–4; 2025 WL 2841574, at *7–9; *see also* Report & Recommendation, *Lopez Reyes*, No. 2:25-cv-
16 01868-JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2025), Dkt. 13 (same).

17 43. This Court’s decisions in *E.A. T.-B.*, *Ramirez Tesara*, *Kumar*, and *Ledesma Gonzalez* are
18 consistent with many other district court decisions addressing similar situations. *See, e.g., Valdez v.*
19 *Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 4627 (GBD), 2025 WL 1707737 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (ordering immediate
20 release due to lack of pre-deprivation hearing); *Garro Pinchi v. Noem*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 5:25-CV-
21 05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (similar); *Maklad v. Murray*, No. 1:25-CV-
22 00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025) (similar); *Garvia v. Andrews*, No. 1:25-
23 CV-01006 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2420068 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (similar).

1 44. The same framework and principles apply here and compel Mr. Sanchez's immediate
2 release.

3 **CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
4 **Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process**
5 **Procedural Due Process**

6 45. Mr. Sanchez restates and realleges all the prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

7 46. Due process does not permit the government to re-detain Mr. Sanchez and strip him
8 of his liberty without written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to
9 determine whether re-detention is warranted based on danger or flight risk. *See Morrissey*, 408 U.S. at
487-88. Such written notice and a hearing must occur *prior* to any re-detention.

10 47. Respondents revoked Mr. Sanchez's release and deprived him of liberty without
11 providing him written notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker
12 prior to his re-detention.

13 48. Accordingly, Mr. Sanchez's re-detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
14 Amendment.

15 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

16 WHEREFORE, Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court:

- 17 (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 18 (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause within three days as
19 to why this Petition should not be granted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and ordering
20 that they not transfer Mr. Sanchez out of this district during the pendency of the court's
21 adjudication of this petition;
- 22 (3) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to Mr. Sanchez from custody
23 immediately and permanently enjoining his re-detention during the pendency of his
removal proceeding absent written notice and a hearing prior to re-detention where

1 Respondents must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is a flight risk or
2 danger to the community and that no alternatives to detention would mitigate those
3 risks;

4 (4) Declare that Mr. Sanchez's re-detention while removal proceedings are ongoing without
5 first providing an individualized determination before a neutral decisionmaker violates
6 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;

7 (5) Award Mr. Sanchez's attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
8 and on any other basis justified under law; and

9 (6) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

10 Dated: March 1, 2026

11 s/ Stephen C. Robbins

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