IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CELIO RANULFO CASTRO-CASTRO,

Petitioner,

v.

PHILIP RHONEY,
in his official capacity as Deputy Field Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement;

TAMMY MARICH,
In her official capacity as Field Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement;

TODD LYONS,
In his official capacity as Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

KRISTI NOEM,
In her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security,

Respondent.

Civil Action No. 26-342

Immigration No. [redacted]

VERIFIED EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT **1**

THE PARTIES **2**

CUSTODY **3**

JURISDICTION & VENUE **3**

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 3

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 3

III. VENUE 4

LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITH RESPECT TO BOND **4**

FACTS **10**

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF **11**

COUNT 1: VIOLATION OF THE INA **11**

COUNT 2: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS **11**

COUNT 3: ENFORCEMENT OF COURT ORDER **12**

PRAYER FOR RELIEF **14**

VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242 ..... **16**

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Celio Ranulfo Castro-Castro ("Mr. Castro-Castro") is a citizen of Ecuador. He last entered the United States in 2009 without inspection. He was not encountered by authorities at that time. He has two US Citizen siblings and his step father is a green card holder. On or about February 15, 2026, he was detained by ICE near Machias, NY and was taken to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (BFDF) where he remains detained without bond.

2. Upon information and belief, a Notice to Appear has not yet been served upon Mr. Castro-Castro so he remains detained with no removal proceedings pending against him. If and when removal proceedings are commenced against Mr. Castro-Castor, he will be eligible for relief from removal in the form of an EOIR-42B Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Non-Permanent Residents as he has been in the United States for more than ten years prior to the commencement of removal proceedings and he has at least one qualifying relative who will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is removed from the United States. In addition, he has a pending asylum application that was filed in 2022. The matter is not currently scheduled for any hearings although Petitioner has been detained since February 15, 2026.

3. DHS and EOIR each have nationwide policies mandating the detention of all persons who entered without admission or parole, regardless of whether that person was apprehended upon arrival. Most recently, on September 5, 2025, in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that all persons who have entered the United States without admission or parole are now subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner.

4. This systemic misclassification of people arrested inside the United States is in clear violation of the law. These people are generally subject to the detention provisions of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226, which usually allows for release on bond and conditions during the pendency of immigration proceedings. It has been this way for decades. DHS and DOJ are now misclassifying these people as being subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which does not allow for release on bond. This misclassification is contrary to almost 30 years of settled law and practice, and it is unlawfully premised solely upon the manner in which the person initially entered the country—in some cases, decades ago.

5. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner requests an order requiring his release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days.

THE PARTIES

6. Petitioner Celio Ranulfo Castro Castro is detained in the custody of ICE. He is being held at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility in Batavia, New York. His custody and governmental actions related to his removal are likewise controlled by the Buffalo Field Office, which is located within this judicial district.

7. Respondent Philip Rhoney is the Buffalo, NY Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He is the local ICE official who has authority over the Petitioner. *See Vasquez v. Reno*, 233 F,3d 688, 690 (lst Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 43 (2001). Respondent Rhoney's office is at 250 Delaware Avenue, Floor 7, Buffalo, NY 14202 and/or at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, 4250 Federal Drive, Batavia, NY 14020.

8. Petitioner's custody within this judicial district and the governmental actions related to his potential removal from the district are likewise controlled by Respondents Marich, Lyons and Noem.

CUSTODY

9. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") at the BFDF. The Deportation Officer responsible for his case is stationed at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility ("BFDF"). The Petitioner is under the direct care, custody and control of Respondents and their agents.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

10. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104 - 208, 110 Stat. 1570, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 2241, Art. I, § 9, el. 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the Suspension Clause) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Petitioner is presently in custody under color of the authority of the United States, and such custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 5 U.S.C. § 702, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and the Court's equitable habeas authority.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Petitioner's immediate custodian (who is physically within the district).[1]

[1] Petitioner asserts this Court has personal jurisdiction over the additional Respondents, however, in the interests of brevity, the Petitioner will brief this if (1) any governmental acts challenged herein are found to relate to those Respondents (instead of the immediate custodian) and (2) the Government seeks to argue against personal jurisdiction.

III. VENUE

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S.484, 493-500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, the judicial district in which Petitioner is being detained. Petitioner is being detained at the BFDF and his detention falls under the jurisdiction of the ICE Field Office of Buffalo, New York, which encompasses the area where Petitioner is being detained, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITH RESPECT TO BOND

14. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

15. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens in standard removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (IJ). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Individuals in § 1226(a) detention are generally entitled to a bond hearing at the outset of their detention, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d), while noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes are subject to mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

16. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and for other recent arrivals seeking admission referred to under § 1225(b)(2).

17. Last, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)–(b).

18. This case concerns the detention provisions at §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2).

19. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-–208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009–582 to 3009–583, 3009–585. Section 1226

was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

20. Following the enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without admission or parole were not considered detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).

21. Thus, in the decades that followed, most people who entered without admission or parole and were placed in standard removal proceedings received bond hearings, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed "arriving" were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply "restates" the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

22. On July 8, 2025, ICE, "in coordination with" the Department of Justice, announced a new policy that rejected this well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of practice.

23. The new policy, entitled "Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission," claims that all persons who entered the United States without admission or parole shall now be deemed "applicants for admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and therefore are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended, and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even decades.

24. On September 5, 2025, the BIA adopted this same position in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. There, the Board held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are considered applicants for admission who are seeking admission and are ineligible for IJ bond hearings.

25. Dozens of federal courts have rejected Respondents' new interpretation of the INA's detention authorities, including all but one judge sitting in this Court who has made a decision on this issue thus far. See, e.g.,*Tacuri Guaman v. Rhoney,* No. 26-cv-126-LJV (W.D.N.Y January 29, 2026); *Guaman Castro v. Rhoney,* No. 25-cv-06812-MAV (W.D.N.Y. January 12, 2026); *Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden*, No. 25-CV-960-LJV (W.D.N.Y. November 4, 2025); *Da Cunha v. Freden*, 25-CV-06532-MAV, ECF No. 25 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2025); *Quituizaca Quituisaca v. Bondi*, 25-cv-6527-EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025); *Najeem v. Freden*, 25-cv-6584-EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025); *Mendoza v. Bondi*, 25-cv-954-EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025); *Martinez v. Bondi*, 25-cv-6508-EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025); *Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Diaz Martinez v. Hyde*, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2084238 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025); *Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); *Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem*, No. 5:25-cv-01789-ODW (DFMx), 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); *Samb v. Joyce*, No. 25 CIV. 6373 (DEH), 2025 WL 2398831 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025); *Ramirez Clavijo*

v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2466670 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486-BRM-EAS, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); *Vasquez Garcia v. Noem*, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MM, 2025 WL 2549431 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); *Zaragoza Mosqueda v. Noem*, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); see also, e.g., *Palma Perez v. Berg*, No. 8:25CV494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that "[t]he Court tends to agree" that § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2) authorizes detention); *Jacinto v. Trump*, No. 4:25-cv-03161-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2402271 at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025) (same); *Anicasio v. Kramer*, No. 4:25-cv-03158-JFB-RCC, 2025 WL 2374224 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) (same).

26. Courts have uniformly rejected DHS's and EOIR's new interpretation because it defies the INA. As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court and others have explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

27. Subsection 1226(a) applies by default to all persons "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." These removal hearings are held under § 1229a, to "decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen]."

28. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without admission or parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)'s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded

a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, "[w]hen Congress creates 'specific exceptions' to a statute's applicability, it 'proves' that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies." *Rodriguez Vazquez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

29. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

30. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute's entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are "seeking admission" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that this mandatory detention scheme applies "at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible." *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).

31. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people like Petitioner, who has already entered and was residing in the United States at the time he was apprehended.

32. On November 25, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (CDCA Nov. 25, 2025), certifying a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing based on the government's allegation that they entered the United States without admission or inspection (colloquially referred to as "entered without inspection" or "EWI"). The Court granted declaratory relief to the entire class, holding that the government is

unlawfully subjecting them to mandatory (meaning no-bond) detention and that class members are eligible for release on bond under the immigration laws. However, Department of Justice (DOJ) has instructed IJs to ignore the Court's order.

33. On December 18, 2025, the Court in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (CDCA Dec. 18, 2025) issued a final judgment and clarification[2] addressing the ongoing DOJ non-compliance with its order. On January 13, 2026, Chief Immigration Judge Terea L. Riley issued a nationwide guidance instructing all immigration judges that they should not follow the final judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* and instructed them to continue following *Yajure Hurtado* as binding precedent. See Exhibit A – AILA Practice Alert: EOIR Issues Nationwide Guidance on *Maldonado Bautista.*

34. On February 18, 2026, the Court in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (CDCA Feb. 18, 2026) issued an order granting Plaintiff Petitioner's Motion to Enforce Judgment addressing the ongoing DOJ non compliance with its initial November 25, 2025 order.[3]

35. In this decision, Judge Sunshine Sykes specifically vacated *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* as an untenable interpretation of the law with respect to bond eligibility for persons like Mr. Castro-Castro.

36. The *Maldonado Bautista* decision required that Respondent's notify potential class members of their inclusion in the bond only class but it remains to be seen whether or not the DOJ will continue to flout this decision and continue failing to provide bond hearings for persons similarly situated to Mr. Castro-Castro.

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[2] Available at: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.980210/gov.uscourts.cacd.980210.92.0.pdf

[3] Available at https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/lbvgmqqblvq/02182026bond.pdf

FACTS

37. Mr. Castro-Castro is a citizen of Ecuador. He last entered the United States in 2009 without inspection. He was not encountered by authorities at that time.

38. He has two US Citizen siblings.

39. He has a step-father who is a lawful permanent resident.

40. He is developmentally delayed.

41. On or about February 15, 2026, he was detained by ICE in Machias, NY after he was encountered stealing a radio worth $10.00 from a Dollar General. No criminal charges are currently pending.

42. After this encounter, ICE was contacted and he was later taken to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (BFDF) where he remains detained without bond.

43. A Notice to Appear has not yet been entered against Mr. Castro Castro so no removal proceedings are currently pending.

44. If and when he is placed into removal proceedings, he will be eligible for relief from removal in the form of an EOIR-42B Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Non-Permanent Residents.

45. He is also eligible for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture as he has filed an application that has been pending since 2022.

46. Mr. Castro-Castro has never been encountered by ICE prior to his encounter on February 15, 2026.

47. The matter is not currently scheduled for any hearings in immigration court although Mr. Castro-Castro has been detained since February 16, 2026.

48. Upon information and belief, ICE has issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner's detention without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

49. Without relief from this Court, Petitioner faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT 1: VIOLATION OF THE INA

50. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein, and does so for all additional counts.

51. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

52. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT 2: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

53. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein, and does so for all additional counts.

54. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,

detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

55. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

56. The government's detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether they are a flight risk or danger to others violates the right to due process.

57. The Immigration Courts, when they accept jurisdiction over bond, improperly place the burden of proof on the detained noncitizen. The Second Circuit has held that "shifting the burden of proof to the Government to justify continued detention promotes the Government's interest—one we believe to be paramount—in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose." *Velasco Lopez v. Decker*, 978 F. 3d 842, 853 (2d. Cir. 2020) (holding that requiring the Government to prove that [a detained noncitizen] is a danger to the community or a flight risk by clear and convincing evidence to justify his continued detention "strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state.").

COUNT 3: ENFORCEMENT OF COURT ORDER

58. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein, and does so for all additional counts.

59. On November 25, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (CDCA Nov. 25, 2025), certifying a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing based on the government's allegation that they entered the United States without admission or inspection (colloquially referred to as "entered without inspection" or "EWI"). The Court granted declaratory relief to the entire class, holding that the government is

unlawfully subjecting them to mandatory (meaning no-bond) detention and that class members are eligible for release on bond under the immigration laws.

60. Despite this, Immigration Judges nationwide are continuing to deny bond hearings to individuals who are clearly members of the certified class and to whom injunctive and/or declaratory relief has been granted declaring the bond denial policy unlawful.

61. A memorandum was issued by the Office of Immigration Litigation instructing IJs to "hold the position that Yajure Hurtado remains good law." See *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (CDCA Dec. 18, 2025), Document 92, at page 9 of 12, 5:25-cv-01873. Furthermore, the Chief Immigration Judge has instructed IJs to continue to apply *Yajure Hurtado.* Essentially, Respondents have willfully instructed IJs to disregard federal court order.

62. On December 18, 2025, the Court issued a final judgment in the matter. In doing so, the Court stated that it is "troubling" that "the emergence of the Respondents' direction to IJs that they should *disregard* this Court's orders" (Page 9). The Court stated that "Petitioners have provided evidence that the Office of Immigration Litigation issued a memorandum instructing IJs to 'hold the position that Yajure Hurtado remains good law.'" The Court went on to issue clarification "that the [Motion for Summary Judgment] Order declared the DHS Policy unlawful and granted vacatur under the APA" and entered final judgment, including classwide vacatur of the unlawful DHS policy.

63. On February 18, 2026, the Court issued an order granting the Motion to Enforce as the DOJ continued to flout its ruling. In its decision the Court specifically vacated *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* and required that Respondent's promptly inform detainees of their potential inclusion in the Bond Only Class.

64. Given Respondents' history of willfully disregarding the class-wide injunction in *Maldonado*, Petitioner asks this Court to enforce that Court's order, because Petitioner is a member of the nationwide "Bond Eligible" class and the *Maldonado* court has granted vacatur of the unlawful DHS "Bond Denial" policy, and to consider everything up to and including sanctions and contempt proceedings should the executive branch continue to direct its Immigration Judges to disregard federal law.

65. Petitioner is a member of the class but as IJs have been instructed to not follow the *Maldonado* ruling in the past and it is not clear whether they will follow this new *Maldonado* ruling, Petitioner argues that further exhaustion is futile at this point and asks this Court to issue an order directing the Immigration Court to hold a bond hearing.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court grant the following relief:

(1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;

(2) Issue a writ of habeas corpus clarifying that the statutory basis for Petitioner's detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Petitioner;

(3) Issue a writ of habeas corpus finding that Petitioner is a member of the nationwide class in *Maldonado Bautista*, and ordering that Petitioner be immediately released by Respondents pending the scheduling a bond hearing pursuant to the final judgment in that matter;

(4) Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner unless Respondents provides Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days at which the government bears the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk and

at which the immigration judge must consider non-bond alternatives to detention or, if setting a bond, the petitioner's ability to pay;

(5) Declare ICE's July 8 policy and the BIA's *Matter of Yajure Hurtado* decisions unlawful;

(6) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law;

(7) Prevent the Petitioner's removal outside of this judicial district until this action is decided;

(8) Issue a temporary stay of Petitioner's removal until this action is decided; and

(9) Fashion such additional relief as is necessary and appropriate, including declaratory relief or other interim relief necessary to vindicate Petitioners' rights under U.S. and international law.

Dated: February 24, 2026

/s/ Siana McLean

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VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner because I am the Petitioner's attorney. I have discussed with Petitioner the events described in this Petition, and have reviewed the online database to confirm that Petitioner is in the custody of ICE. On the basis of those discussions and investigations, I hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of our knowledge.

Dated: February 24, 2026

/s/ Siana McLean

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