

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Octavio Trejo Ramirez (A# [REDACTED]))
)
 Petitioner,)
)
 v.)
)
 Dawn Ceja, Warden,)
 Denver Contract Detention Facility (Aurora),)
)
 Robert Hagan, Director of Denver Field Office,)
 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,)
)
 Kristi Noem, Secretary,)
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security,)
)
 Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, and)
)
 Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director)
 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
)
 in their official capacities,)
)
 Respondents.)
 _____)

Case No. _____

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS**

INTRODUCTION

1. Octavio Trejo Ramirez (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a noncitizen alien present in the United States since August 2008. In July 2025, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers and has been in administrative detention at the Denver Contract Detention Facility operated by the GEO Group, located at 3130 Oakland Street, Aurora, Colorado 80010, ever since. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has

claimed Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

2. Petitioner is filing this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.). His current detention is unlawful because DHS and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

3. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

4. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. The following month, on December 18, the district court entered a final judgement declaring class members' detention authority and rights and vacating the federal policy used to deny bond hearings on a nationwide basis. *Id.* at ECF 94. Finally, on February 18, 2026, the district court granted the petitioner's

Motion to Enforce Judgement and vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)—the decision which Respondents have relied on as the basis for their new and largely unsubstantiated statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Id.*, at ECF 116.

5. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.

6. Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

- a. does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility. He was apprehended by immigration authorities in July 2025;
- b. entered the United States without inspection nearly eighteen years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival, *cf. id.*; and
- c. is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

7. After apprehending Petitioner, DHS placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS has charged Petitioner as being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

8. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.

9. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.

10. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). On February 11, 2026, Petition was denied bond on this jurisdictional ground.

11. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day, Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

12. Alternatively, the Court should order Petitioner’s release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

13. In addition, Petitioner’s detention is unconstitutional, as it is in violation of his due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and is in violation of immigration statutes governing mandatory detention. Accordingly, to vindicate Petitioner’s constitutional rights, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

14. Accordingly, in addition to the above requests based on *Maldonado Bautista*, Petitioner asks this Court to find that his constitutional rights have been violated by his current ICE detention and order his immediate release.

JURISDICTION

15. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

16. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution (Suspension Clause). Because Petitioner is currently in custody in this District, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction lies in this Court.

17. This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.*, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

18. Venue is proper because Petitioner is detained at Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, which is within the jurisdiction of this District. In addition, venue is proper in this District because Respondents are officers, employees, or agencies of the United States and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District and Petitioner resides in this District and no real property is involved in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

19. This venue is also consistent with the Supreme Court's recent directive that a habeas petition challenging removal under the Alien Enemies Act be filed in the petitioner's district of confinement. See *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. ____ (2025) (*per curiam*). Petitioner's custodial location in this District makes the District of Colorado the proper and only venue for this habeas action.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

20. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause (OSC) to the Respondents "forthwith," unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an OSC is issued, the Court must require Respondents to file a return “within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

21. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The Great Writ has been referred to as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added).

22. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that habeas jurisdiction remains available to test the legality of executive detention in immigration cases. In *Trump v. J.G.G.*, the Supreme Court held that challenges to removal under the Alien Enemies Act must be brought in habeas and that due process requires notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief. Likewise, in *Riley v. Bondi*, 604 U.S. (2025), the Court explained that Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal and that the thirty-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule.

PARTIES

23. Petitioner is a noncitizen alien currently administratively detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is confined at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado, operated by The GEO Group, Inc. Petitioner is in the immediate physical custody of the Warden and in the legal custody and control of ICE, acting via the Denver Field Office.

24. Respondent Dawn Ceja is sued in her official capacity as the Warden of Denver Contract Detention Facility. She has immediate physical custody of Petitioner pursuant to the

facility's contract with ICE to detain noncitizens. Respondent Dawn Ceja is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

25. Respondent Robert Hagan is sued in his official capacity as the Director of the Denver Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Respondent Hagan is a legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release Petitioner.

26. Respondent Kristi Noem is sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, Respondent Noem is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and oversees ICE, the component agency responsible for Petitioner's detention. Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

27. Respondent Pamela Bondi is sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the senior official of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In that capacity, she has the authority to adjudicate removal cases and to oversee the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration courts and the BIA. Respondent Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

28. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In that capacity, he is the legal custodian of Petitioner and has authority to release Petitioner, and he exercises supervisory authority over custody determinations and detention operations in Denver and nationwide.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

29. The Suspension Clause ensures that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may

require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Federal courts are authorized to grant habeas relief to any person held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

30. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that noncitizens are entitled to due process and may invoke habeas to challenge unlawful detention or removal. In *Trump v. J.G.G.*, the Court vacated removal orders entered under the Alien Enemies Act because detainees had not been afforded notice or an opportunity to seek habeas relief. The Court emphasized that the Alien Enemies Act provides for detention but does not itself confer exclusive jurisdiction; thus, habeas remains the proper vehicle to test the legality of such detention. In *Riley v. Bondi*, the Court held that BIA orders in withholding-only proceedings are not final removal orders and clarified that the thirty-day filing deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule. These decisions confirm that habeas jurisdiction lies in the district of confinement when other statutes do not provide an exclusive remedy.

31. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” *U.S. Const. amend. V*. This protection applies to all “persons” within the United States, including noncitizens. See *Trump v. J.G.G.*, 604 U.S. at 10 (due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before removal under the Alien Enemies Act). Additionally, due process forbids detention that is arbitrary or prolonged beyond a constitutionally permissible duration. The Supreme Court has instructed that immigration detention must bear a reasonable relation to its purpose and cannot continue indefinitely when removal is not reasonably foreseeable.

32. The INA and its implementing regulations prescribe procedures governing detention, removal, and applications for relief. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs pre-final-order detention and authorizes release on bond or parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs post-final-order detention and limits detention to a period reasonably necessary to effect removal. The implementing regulations, set forth in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, require DHS and the immigration courts to provide notice, hearings, and an opportunity to present evidence. Violations of these statutes or regulations, such as failing to conduct a timely custody review or refusing to consider release on bond, may render detention unlawful and warrant habeas relief.

33. The question of the legality of Petitioner’s detention revolves around 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a)—two statutes of the INA which govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal. “Section 1225 mandates detention pending removal proceedings, providing that, ‘if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.’” *Portillo Martinez v. Baltazar*, No. 26-cv-00106-PAB, 2026 WL 194163, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). If none of the statutory exceptions apply, § 1225 “mandates detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing.” *Id.* (citing *Hernandez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025)).

34. On the other hand, Section 1226 does not mandate detention. It states that a noncitizen may be arrested pending a decision on whether to remove the individual, and once arrested, the Attorney General may continue to detain or release the individual. *Id.* (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Section 1226 “sets forth ‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already

present in the United States.” *Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 306.

35. The crux of the issue is under which section Petitioner’s detention should be considered. Petitioner urges the Court to find that his detention decision is governed by § 1226(a), the default rule for detaining noncitizens that are already present in the United States; *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303. In this case and hundreds like it across the U.S., Respondents are utilizing an expanded interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to argue that the mandatory detention provision also applies to noncitizens who entered without inspection and remain unlawfully present.

36. This issue is one that has been extensively litigated by this Court and federal district courts across the United States. As noted by U.S. District Judge Nina Y. Wang, “federal district courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ ‘broad interpretation of section 1225(b)(2).’” *Loa Caballero*, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5 (collecting cases). Petitioner requests that the Court follow the overwhelming weight of authority from across the country in disagreeing with the government’s overbroad interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner also notes that this interpretation is based on the since-vacated BIA decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*.

37. This conclusion is supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). The *Jennings* Court held that “[i]n sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens *seeking admission* into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)” and that “[i]t also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

*already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under [] § 1226(a).” Portillo Martinez, 2026 WL 194163, at *3 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis in Portillo Martinez not in Jennings).*

38. Respondents may attempt to argue that the *Jennings* Court found that § 1225(b)(2) acts as a “catchall provision that applies to *all* ‘applicants for admission’ not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287) (emphasis added). “While it is true that Section 1225(b)(2) is broader than § 1225(b)(1), that does not mean that § 1225(b)(2) applies to all other noncitizens in the United States who have not been admitted.” *Portillo Martinez*, 2026 WL 194163, at *3 (quoting *Hernandez v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025)). Instead, *Jennings* should more properly be interpreted to “make [] clear that § 1225(b)(2)’s catchall provision—and in fact, all provisions of § 1225—apply to noncitizens seeking admission into the country, as opposed to those who are already in the country.” *Id.* (quoting *Hernandez*, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6).

39. In *Loa Caballero*, District Judge Wang provided a persuasive and in-depth analysis of the two relevant statutes. She notes that for § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision to apply, the noncitizen must be 1) “an applicant for admission,” 2) “seeking admission,” and 3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” *Loa Caballero*, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 (quoting *Martinez v. Hyde*, No. 25-cv-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir. Sep. 29, 2025)). And “[t]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ requires that the applicant must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the United States.”⁹ *Id.* If all “applicants for admission” were considered to be “seeking admission” to the United States, then “there would be

no need to include the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” *Id.* at *7 (citing *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025)).

40. The recent legislative history of §§ 1225 and 1226 supports this same interpretation; specifically, Congress’s recent 2025 amendment to § 1226, which applied mandatory detention for noncitizens in the United States that are charged with certain offenses. If these individuals were already subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, then this amendment would be wholly unnecessary. *See Portillo Martinez*, 2026 WL 194163, at *4-5 (citing *Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2637503, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (“If Congress amended Section 1226 to create mandatory detention for certain inadmissible noncitizens, it follows that those noncitizens were not already subject to mandatory detention.”)).

41. Accordingly, the legislative history and statutory interpretations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a) support the conclusion that Petitioner should be detained under 1226(a), entitling him to a bond hearing, and so his current detention under 1225(b)(2) is thus unlawful.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

42. Petitioner is seeking a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting all other potential remedies for release. He was arrested and detained in July 2025 and was then entered into removal proceedings before the Aurora Immigration Court. On February 11, 2026, Petitioner appeared before the court for a bond hearing. At the hearing, bond was denied after the Immigration Judge found that the Aurora court did not have jurisdiction to hear the bond request because, while Petitioner did establish that he is a class member as defined in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, the court found that *Maldonado Bautista* does not apply outside the Central District of California, and denied on jurisdictional grounds based on the government’s

statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) that Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests to aliens present in the United States without admission—the interpretation which has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. As such, because Respondents are refusing to abide by the declaratory relief and have instructed Immigration Judges to not follow the orders set forth in *Maldonado Bautista*, Petitioner’s only remaining remedy to test the legality of his continued detention is a writ of habeas corpus.

43. The constitutional challenge presented under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 concerns the length and lawfulness of custody and cannot be resolved through any additional agency proceeding. In the alternative, if any discretionary DHS request were deemed available, exhaustion should be excused because further pursuit would be futile in light of the fact that Petitioner has already been denied bond, and continued detention would cause irreparable harm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

44. Petitioner is a 34-year-old citizen of Mexico who last entered the U.S. without inspection in August 2008. Over the course of his nearly two decades in the U.S., he has married a U.S. citizen and now has a 12-year-old U.S. citizen daughter. He has lived a quiet and uneventful life in Denver, Colorado working as a roofer to provide for his family. In July 2025, ICE agents arrested him while he was at work, and he has been in administrative custody ever since.

45. Shortly after his detention, Petitioner hired the legal services of undersigned counsel’s law firm. Upon review of his circumstances with counsel, he discovered his eligibility for cancellation of removal via Form EOIR-42B, *Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents*. Petitioner filed his EOIR-42B with

the Aurora Immigration Court on September 3, 2025. It was adjudicated by an Immigration Judge over the course of two merits hearings in November and December 2025. At his final hearing on December 15, Petitioner's application was approved and he was granted cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, post-conclusion voluntary departure. However, DHS chose to reserve appeal and later filed their appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals on January 12, 2026. While the appeal is pending, DHS has chosen to keep Petitioner in ICE custody – despite the adverse effects that his detention is having on his qualifying U.S. citizen relatives, who need Petitioner in their lives (hence, the grant of cancellation of removal).

46. Rather than choose to remain in detention while awaiting DHS's lengthy appeal process, Petitioner sought release on bond. His bond hearing was held on February 11, 2026. As mentioned *supra*, he was denied bond due to a purported lack of jurisdiction based on DHS's legally unsupported interpretation of mandatory detention statutes.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

Violation of the INA: Request for Relief Pursuant to *Maldonado Bautista*

47. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

48. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

49. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

50. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

51. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and are bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

52. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

COUNT TWO

Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and Implementing Regulations

53. The allegations in the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein.

54. Respondents have violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations. Specifically, Respondents have failed to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19 and 1236.1, each of which mandate the parameters of mandatory detention. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the U.S. who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the U.S. prior to being apprehended and placed into removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231. Respondents’ arguments to the contrary rely on statutory interpretation in the since-vacated BIA decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*. Petitioner was

residing in the U.S. for eighteen years before his detention by ICE and therefore should not be detained under § 1225(b)(2). Federal district courts affirmed this interpretation of the statutes in *Maldonado Bautista*. That same interpretation has been supported by this Court and hundreds of other federal district court decisions across the United States for the substantive reasons enumerated *supra* in the Legal Framework section of this petition.

55. Respondents are applying a clearly erroneous standard that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 and 1003.19. Accordingly, the application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA and implementing regulations. By ignoring these statutory and regulatory mandates, Respondents have unlawfully deprived Petitioner of the protections Congress and the Executive have provided.

COUNT THREE

Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

56. The allegations in the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein.

57. Respondents' detention of Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which regulates that the government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Supreme Court has affirmed that, "[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, U.S. at 690. Respondents have deprived Petitioner of liberty without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Although Petitioner was granted a bond hearing, bond was denied without ever hearing the merits of Petitioner's request—rather, he was denied bond on legally dubious jurisdictional

grounds stemming from Respondents' improper statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Thus far, he has not been granted a proper bond hearing under § 1226(a), the statute which should govern his current detention. Additionally, Petitioner's detention bears no reasonable relation to its purported purpose, especially because Petitioner has already been granted relief from removal but is being forced to remain in detention while Respondents' appeal that grant. As the Supreme Court explained in *Trump v. J.G.G.*, due process requires that noncitizens facing removal receive notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief. Respondents have failed to provide such protections. For these reasons, Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant the following:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause why this Petition should not be granted within three days, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
- (3) Declare that Petitioner's detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and/or 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 and 1003.19.
- (4) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner from ICE detention immediately.
- (5) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- (6) Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and on any other basis justified under law; and

(7) Grant any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Lawrence Walker
Lawrence Walker

VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242

I represent Petitioner, Octavio Trejo Ramirez, and submit this verification on his behalf. I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the factual statements made in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/Lawrence Walker
Lawrence Walker
Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on Octavio Trejo Ramirez, I filed the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS using the CM/ECF system which will electronically send notification of such filing to opposing counsel.

/s/Lawrence A. Walker
Lawrence Walker