

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO**

Civil Action No.

RODOLFO CORONA ARCINIEGA,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, in her official capacity,  
ROBERT GUADIAN, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Field Office Director for  
the Colorado Field Office, in his official capacity,  
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official  
capacity, and  
JUAN BALTASAR, Warden of GEO Group Aurora Inc, in his official capacity,

Respondents.

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

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## INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, RODOLFO CORONA ARCINIEGA, is currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement "ICE" at GEO contract Detention facility 3130 N Oakland St., in Aurora, Colorado. Petitioner brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his ongoing and unlawful immigration detention by the Department of Homeland Security. Petitioner is a 54-year-old male native and citizen of Mexico with no criminal history, no prior immigration proceedings, and his last entry into the United States, which occurred in 2004. He was detained on November 28, 2025 and has remained in custody since that time. Petitioner is currently detained without any opportunity for release on bond, despite the absence of any individualized finding that he poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. Immigration authorities have taken the position that Petitioner is categorically ineligible for a bond hearing before an immigration judge, leaving habeas corpus as the only available mechanism to seek judicial review of the legality of his detention. As a result, Petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without a meaningful opportunity to contest the statutory basis for his confinement. Petitioner has strong ties to the community and no criminal record. Continued detention under these circumstances exceeds the government's statutory authority and violates fundamental principles of due process. Accordingly, this Court should grant the petition and order Petitioner's immediate release or, in the alternative, require the government to provide a prompt bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Habeas corpus is a fundamental legal mechanism that allows a person in government custody to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. Through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a detained individual asks a federal court to require the

government to justify the legal basis for continued confinement. If the detention is not authorized by statute or violates the Constitution, the court may order the person's release.

In the immigration context, habeas corpus is the primary vehicle through which noncitizens challenge unlawful detention by the Department of Homeland Security, including detention without statutory authority or in defiance of binding court judgments. Federal courts have long recognized that immigration detainees may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when they are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." As reflected in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, habeas relief is particularly appropriate where the government refuses to comply with a declaratory judgment that conclusively determines the statutory framework governing detention. When DHS or EOIR detains a class member contrary to such a judgment, continued detention is unlawful and warrants immediate judicial intervention through habeas corpus.

In the alternative, Petitioner brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial Class certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Aurora Geo Detention Facility. He now faces unlawful detention because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*.

1. On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf

of individual plaintiffs and on November 25, 2025, certified a nationwide class and extended declaratory judgment to the certified class. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at \*9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners' proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order Granting Petitioners' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

2. The declaratory judgment held that the Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*11.
3. Nonetheless, the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to abide by the declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be released on bond.
4. Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:
  - a. does not have lawful status in the United States and is currently detained at the Aurora Geo Detention Facility. He was apprehended by immigration authorities on November 28, 2025.
  - b. Last entered the United States without inspection in 2004 and was briefly

detained.

However, this Court should look to the most recent arrest to determine whether or not someone was apprehended “upon arrival.” In addition, the *Maldonado Bautista* court’s reasoning and language also indicate that the relevant inquiry for determining class membership should be a person’s most recent arrest.

Therefore, Petitioner argues, it is her most recent arrest that controls and Petitioner should be found to be a class member.

c. is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.

5. The Court should expeditiously grant this petition.
6. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Petitioner to unlawful detention despite her clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond Eligible Class member.
7. Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound to follow the agency’s prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
8. Because Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*, the Court should accordingly order that within one day,

Respondent DHS must release Petitioner.

9. Alternatively, the Court should order Petitioner's release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

In the alternative, if this Court does not designate Petitioner to be a class member, the same legal analysis dictates that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and must be granted a bond hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in or around 2004 and was briefly apprehended near the border. Importantly, he was not placed into expedited removal proceedings, was not ordered removed, and was released into the United States. After his release, Petitioner lived in the interior of the country without incident. He was later re-arrested by immigration authorities in November 2025, after his initial entry and release. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, detention authority turns not merely on manner of entry, but on the circumstances of the current arrest and custody. Section 1225(b) applies to noncitizens who are apprehended at or near the border and are in the process of seeking admission. Once a noncitizen is released into the United States and later re-arrested in the interior, that individual is no longer "seeking admission" within the meaning of § 1225(b). Instead, the statutory scheme treats such individuals as subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), which expressly provides for the possibility of release on bond following an individualized hearing.

Courts have repeatedly rejected the government's attempt to bootstrap a brief border apprehension into permanent mandatory detention authority. The relevant inquiry is the basis for the present detention, not the historical fact of an earlier encounter. Where, as here, DHS chose to release Petitioner after his initial apprehension and then later re-detained him well

inside the United States, § 1226(a) governs as a matter of statutory interpretation and due process. Recent district court decisions confirm that habeas relief remains available on this legal theory even where class membership is disputed. In *Del Valle Castillo v. Wamsley*, a case involving a regional class of detained individuals in Washington state, the court expressly held that “[t]he fact that Petitioners are not Bond Denial Class members does not prevent them from seeking habeas relief on similar legal grounds.” Order at \*4, *Del Valle Castillo v. Wamsley*, No. 2:25-cv-02054-TMC (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025). The court recognized that the statutory analysis governing detention under § 1226(a) applies independently of class certification and may be enforced through individual habeas petitions.


Accordingly, even if this Court were to find that Petitioner does not qualify as a class member, the same legal analysis compels the conclusion that his current detention is authorized, if at all, only under § 1226(a). Because § 1226(a) requires an individualized custody determination and permits release on bond, Petitioner is entitled to a prompt bond hearing before an immigration judge. Continued detention without such a hearing is unlawful and warrants habeas relief.

### **Jurisdiction and Venue**

Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Aurora Geo Detention Facility. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause). This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

This Court has jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as Petitioner is in custody under the authority of the United States, and the detention is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado as Petitioner is detained within this district.

### **Factual Background**

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico, born on . He has no criminal history, and no history of prior immigration proceedings before the events giving rise to this petition. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in or around 2004. His entry was brief and occurred near the southern border, where he was apprehended by immigration authorities shortly after crossing. Petitioner was not ordered removed at that time. He was not placed into expedited removal proceedings, was not issued a final order of removal, and was not continuously detained. Instead, following his brief apprehension, Petitioner was released into the United States. After his release in 2004, Petitioner remained in the United States without further immigration enforcement action. During this period, Petitioner did not reenter the country, did not depart and return, and did not have any subsequent encounters with immigration authorities. He has no criminal arrests, convictions, or pending criminal charges. On November 28, 2025, after his initial entry and release, Petitioner was taken into custody by DHS and placed into immigration detention. He has remained detained since that date. DHS issued charging documents initiating removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner was charged as removable based on his entry without inspection. Upon detention, DHS determined that Petitioner would remain in custody and did not set bond.

Immigration authorities have taken the position that Petitioner is not eligible for bond consideration before an immigration judge and that he must remain detained pending the resolution of his removal proceedings. Other than an EOIR 42B, Petitioner has no prior applications filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or the Executive Office for Immigration Review. He does not have a criminal record and has not been accused of posing a danger to the community or a flight risk. As of the filing of this petition, Petitioner remains detained without having received a bond hearing or an individualized custody determination by an immigration judge.

#### **PARTIES**

1. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who has been in immigration detention since November 2025. After Petitioner was arrested, ICE did not set bond. Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2004.
2. Respondent ROBERT GUADIAN is the Director of the Denver Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, he is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.
3. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.
4. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.
5. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and

the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

6. Respondent JUAN BALTASAR is employed by GEO Group Aurora Inc as Warden of the Geo Aurora Ice Detention Facility, where Petitioner is detained. He has immediate physical custody of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

**CLAIM FOR RELIEF**  
**Violation of the INA:**  
**Request for Relief Pursuant to *Maldonado Bautista***

1. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

2. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

3. The order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

4. The order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

5. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

6. By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

7. In the alternative, even if this Court were to conclude that Petitioner is not a class member, the same legal analysis establishes that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that he is entitled to a bond hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in or around 2004 and was briefly apprehended near the border. He was not placed in expedited removal

proceedings, was not ordered removed, and was released into the United States. Petitioner thereafter lived in the interior of the country without incident until he was re-arrested by immigration authorities in 2025, after his initial entry and release. Under the INA, detention authority turns on the circumstances of the current arrest, not solely on manner of entry. Section 1225(b) applies to noncitizens apprehended at or near the border who are seeking admission, but once a noncitizen is released into the United States and later re-detained in the interior, § 1226(a) governs and permits release on bond following an individualized hearing. Courts have consistently rejected the government's attempt to rely on a brief, years-old border apprehension to justify mandatory detention. The relevant inquiry is the legal basis for the present detention, not a past encounter that ended in release. Where DHS chose to release Petitioner after his initial apprehension and later re-detained him in the interior, detention authority arises, if at all, under § 1226(a). District courts have further confirmed that habeas relief remains available on this theory even where class membership is disputed. In *Del Valle Castillo v. Wamsley*, the court held that “the fact that Petitioners are not Bond Denial Class members does not prevent them from seeking habeas relief on similar legal grounds.” No. 2:25-cv-02054-TMC, Dkt. 28 at \*4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025). Accordingly, even absent class membership, Petitioner is entitled to a prompt bond hearing, and continued detention without one is unlawful.

#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner;

- c. Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioner unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;
- d. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- e. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court order his immediate release from detention.

**Dated:** February 14, 2026

Respectfully submitted,  
/s/ Inga Bergel  
Inga Bergel, ESQ.  
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### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 14, 2026, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the District of Colorado using the CM/ECF system. All Participants in the case are registered with the CM/ECF and will be served by the CM/ECF system.

Respectfully submitted,

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