

custody, and prohibits his transfer outside of Minnesota.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Mr. Juan Galarza Vivar, a 35-year-old citizen and national of Ecuador resides in Minnesota with his spouse and four U.S. citizen children. He initially entered the United States in approximately 2009 and has remained in the country since then. On February 12, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by federal agents while in Bloomington, Minnesota. His location is not currently known. He, on information and belief, is now being held at the Fort Snelling Federal Building in Fort Snelling, Minnesota in ICE custody, as he was arrested in Bloomington, Minnesota. He lives with his wife and children and holds stable employment.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Mr. Galarza Vivar does not have a removal order. Mr. Galarza Vivar is challenging the constitutionality of the statutory framework by which the Respondents are detaining him without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner asserts that because he was detained in the interior, that if any detention is appropriate, it must be under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

I. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief.

To obtain a temporary restraining order, a petitioner-plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland*, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). Under similar circumstances, courts within this Circuit have granted petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where, as here, the petitioner has been present in the United States for many years, was unlawfully detained in the interior by the Department of Homeland Security under § 1225 and sought immediate release.

In a similar case where the Petitioner had been present in the United States for a lengthy period, this Court found that detaining her under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) was unlawful and inapplicable - holding that § 1225(b)(2) did not authorize her interior arrest and detention. *See Rivera Zumba v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-cv-14626 (KSH), D.N.J. (Sept. 26, 2025) (Hayden, U.S.D.J.). Another recent decision by this Court held that detention under 1225(b)(2)(A) amounts to detention in violation of the laws of the U.S. *Mugliza Castillo v. Lyons*, No. 2:25-cv-16219 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 3, 2025) (Farbiarz, J.).

Mr. Galarza Vivar is likely to succeed on the merits, especially given that ICE had been processing non-citizens in Mr. Galarza Vivar's same circumstance under § 1226(a) for decades. Mr. Galarza Vivar's detention is unlawful under § 1225(b)(2) and a textbook violation of his Due Process rights.

II. Mr. Juan Galarza Vivar will likely succeed on the merits.

Mr. Galarza Vivar seeks his immediate release because he is unlawfully and unconstitutionally deemed ineligible for bond based on an erroneous finding that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). A plain reading of the statute makes clear that Mr. Galarza Vivar who has been apprehended in the interior, cannot be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), but rather, must be detained under § 1226(a).

In examining the relevant provisions of §§ 1225 and 1226, the Court considers “whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). The Court’s “job is to interpret the words consistent with their ‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” *Wis. Cent. Ltd v. U.S.*, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018) (quoting *Perrin v. U.S.*, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); *see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019) (If courts could “freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings, we would risk amending legislation” and “upsetting reliance interests in the settled meaning of a statute”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Of course,

the words of a statute “cannot be construed in a vacuum”. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (quoting *Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury*, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). In *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, the Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between Section 1225 and Section 1226. 583 U.S. 281 (2018). The Supreme Court noted that Section 1225(b) applies primarily to “aliens seeking entry into the United States.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297. The statute itself contemplates “arriving,” “seeking,” the present tense of someone at the port of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible. *Kostak v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01093, slip op. at 6 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025) (Edwards, J.) (citing *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018)).

For non-citizens already present inside the United States, “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting the Attorney General to release them on bond, ‘except as provided in subsection (c) of this section.’” *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 303. A line must be drawn between how §§ 1225 and 1226 function when it comes to detention of noncitizens, and it is straightforward: detention authority under §1225 is exercised at or near the port of entry for those seeking admission, and detention authority under §1226 must be used when a non-citizen is arrested in the interior of the United States. *See Martinez v. Hyde*, – F.Supp.3d –, 2025 WL 2084238 at *4 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (The line historically drawn between these two sections, making sense of their text and overall statutory scheme, is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens “seeking admission into the country,” whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens “already in the country.”); *see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested

during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”); *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (holding that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governs detention of a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for 15 years).

At Mr. Galarza Vivar’s arrest on February 12, 2026, he was not apprehended while seeking admission at the port of entry. Instead, he was in Bloomington, Minnesota and apprehended by federal officers. Therefore, Mr. Galarza Vivar should not have been detained under § 1225(b)(2).

III. Mr. Juan Galarza Vivar will Suffer Irreparable Harm

The harm that flows from the violation of Mr. Galarza Vivar’s constitutional rights is unquestionably irreparable. *See K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist.*, 710 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 2013). The deprivation of an alien’s liberty is, in and of itself, irreparable harm. *See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs*, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Irreparable harm is virtually presumed in cases like this one where an individual is detained without due process. *Torres-Jurado v. Biden*, No. 19 CIV. 3595 (AT), 2023 WL 7130898, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2023). (“[B]efore the Government unilaterally takes away that which is sacred; it must provide a meaningful process.”).

IV. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest

The “public interest is best served by ensuring the constitutional rights of persons within the United States are upheld.” *See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs*, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). As discussed above, the abrupt detention without bond of Mr. Galarza Vivar likely violated federal law and his due process. “There is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action,” and “there is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” *League of Women Voters of United States v.*

Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Here, Mr. Galarza Vivar's continued detention without bond is in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and far outweighs any burden the Respondents would suffer. He faces unlawful detention and the risk of removal without due process, which would include exposure to harm in his home country. Furthermore, he has a wife and four U.S. citizen children. He is the main bread winner and provides financially for his family. He has pending immigration relief in the form of a U visa. These are harms that cannot be remedied after the fact. By contrast, the government asserts only generalized interests in enforcement and administrative efficiency, which do not outweigh the concrete, individualized harms at stake, especially as here where the challenged action appears unlawful. The public interest is served by ensuring constitutional compliance, preventing wrongful removal, and maintaining family unity. Courts have repeatedly held that protecting individuals from unlawful or procedurally defective immigration actions aligns squarely with the public interest.

V. The Court Has Authority to Grant Mr. Juan Galarza Vivar 's Immediate Release Pending the Adjudication of His Habeas Petition.

As a general matter, writs of habeas corpus are used to request release from custody. *Wilkinson v. Dotson*, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). A habeas court has “the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.” *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (noting that at “common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy”).

The Petitioner has been detained since February 12, 2026. His family is waiting for his return home. Therefore, Petitioner argues that release from detention is the appropriate relief in this case. Alternatively, Petitioner respectfully asks that this Court prevent his transfer while the instant Habeas pends.

B. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the instant writ and order his immediate release from ICE custody.

Respectfully submitted,

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