


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Baltimore Division

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| Kirankumar Ashaben Chaudhari , |) |
| |) |
| <i>Petitioner,</i> |) |
| |) |
| v. |) Civil Action No. _____ |
| |) |
| Kristi Noem, <i>Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S.</i> |) |
| <i>Department of Homeland Security,</i> |) |
| |) |
| Todd Lyons, <i>Acting Director, U.S. Immigration</i> |) |
| <i>and Customs Enforcement,</i> |) |
| |) |
| Vernon Liggins, <i>Director, Baltimore Field Office</i> |) |
| <i>U.S. Immigration and Customs</i> |) |
| <i>Enforcement,</i> |) |
| |) |
| Pamela Bondi, <i>Attorney General, U.S. Department</i> |) |
| <i>of Justice</i> |) |
| |) |
| <i>Respondents.</i> |) |
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Kirankumar Ashaben Chaudhari (A# ) is a native and citizen of India. He entered the United States in or about 2023. Shortly after entry, Petitioner was apprehended by immigration authorities and then subsequently released on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). On or about February 11, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE, under facts and circumstances that place him squarely within ICE’s general detention authority 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under that statute, Petitioner is eligible to seek discretionary release on bond from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). However, due to a new policy announced by ICE in July 2025,

¹ Petitioner hereby waives the protections of Local Standing Order 2025-01. Petitioner does not have a final removal order and therefore is not at imminent risk of removal from the United States.

and a September 2025 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that overturns decades of settled law, Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). While § 1225(b) requires mandatory detention and does not allow release on bond, it only applies to noncitizens apprehended at the border “seeking admission.” Petitioner therefore brings this action to enjoin Respondents from subjecting him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and seeking an order to release Petitioner from custody and that Respondents provide him a discretionary bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) before an IJ within 7 days.


JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Federal Question Jurisdiction. In addition, the individual Respondents are United States officials. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).

2. This Court also has federal question jurisdiction, through the APA, to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). APA review of a final agency action may proceed, absent a special statutory review proceeding, by “any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. § 703.

3. Venue lies in this District because Petitioner is currently detained within the territorial jurisdiction of this division of this District; and each Respondent is an agency or officer of the United States sued in his or her official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

THE PARTIES

4. Petitioner Kirankumar Ashaben Chaudhari (A# ) is a citizen and native of India and is currently detained by Respondents Baltimore ERO-ICE Field Office Hold Room,

in Baltimore, MD within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

5. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). She is the cabinet-level secretary responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States.

6. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He is the head of the federal agency responsible for all immigration enforcement in the United States.

7. Respondent Vernon Liggins is the Acting Director of the Baltimore ICE ERO Field Office, where Petitioner is unlawfully detained. As the local ICE official overseeing enforcement operations in the region, he is responsible for Petitioner’s continued detention and any actions related to their removals. He is therefore the Petitioner’s immediate legal and physical custodian for the purpose of habeas jurisdiction.

8. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is the head of the U.S. Department of Justice, which oversees the Executive Office for Immigration Review, including the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Court judges, who decide removal cases and applications for bond as her designees.

9. All government Respondents are sued in their official capacities.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Immigration Detention Legal Framework

10. When a noncitizen is alleged to have violated immigration laws, they are generally placed into traditional removal proceedings, during which an immigration judge will determine whether they are removable and then whether they have a legal basis to remain in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

11. Detention is authorized for “certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under § 1226(a) and 1126(c).” *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). The statute provides that an individual may be subject to either discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) generally, or mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) if they have been arrested or convicted of certain crimes. Discretionary detention under § 1226(a) has been described as the “default” provision for immigration detention for those subject to traditional removal proceedings. *Id.* at 288. Under § 1226(a), “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) of this section,” the Attorney General “may release” an alien detained under § 1226(a) “on ...bond” or “conditional parole.” *Id.*

12. Alternatively, mandatory detention is authorized for “certain aliens *seeking admission* into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1225(b)(2),” [emphasis added]. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. Individuals inspected under § 1225(b) and determined to be “applicants for admission” may be subject to mandatory detention under two separate subsections. Applicants for admission include someone:

“present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for the purposes of this chapter to be an applicant for admission.”

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

13. The first subset, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), may be subject to expedited removal and mandatory detention if they are determined to be an “arriving alien,” and if they have not been physically present in the United States continuously for a two-year period immediately prior.

Regulations define an “arriving alien” as:

“an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-

entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport.”

8 C.F.R. § 1.2.

14. Otherwise, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) provides for the detention of “applicant for admission” specifically when “the examining immigration officer determines that an alien *seeking admission* is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title,” i.e. for traditional removal proceedings [emphasis added].

15. An “arriving alien” or an applicant for admission “seeking admission” may only be released from detention on parole (which is a form of release on recognizance), under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288. There is no bond available to an arriving alien or applicant for admission seeking admission. *Id.* There is no such thing as a “parole bond” – a release must be either parole under § 1182(d)(5) or a bond (conditional parole) under § 1226(a). *Id.*

16. For a noncitizen subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), ICE makes an initial custody determination to either set a bond or hold the individual at no bond. The noncitizen may then seek a review of ICE’s initial custody determination before the IJ (a “custody review hearing”), who has the authority to modify ICE’s custody determination and set bond in a case in which ICE has designated no bond, lower bond when ICE has set a cash bond amount, or deny bond completely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

17. Custody review hearings are separate from hearings in the underlying removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). If a noncitizen is granted bond by the IJ, he must still appear in immigration court for the IJ to determine his removability and hear any claim for relief from removal. At a custody review hearing, once jurisdiction over bond is established, the IJ’s inquiry

is limited to whether the detainee is a danger to the community or a flight risk, and bond may only be granted when an IJ has determined that the detainee meets his burden of proof that he is neither. *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).

18. For decades, it has been Respondents' practice to afford § 1226(a) discretionary bond hearings and custody review hearings to those individuals who have been encountered neither at a point of entry nor seeking admission to the United States. *See Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2337099, at *10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), *report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa*, No. CV-25-02157-PHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025) ("Respondents' proposed application of § 1226 is also belied by the Department of Homeland Security's 'longstanding practice' of treating noncitizens taken into custody while living in the United States, including those detained and found inadmissible upon inspection and then released into the United States with the government's acquiescence, who have committed no crime after release, as detained under § 1226(a)." citing *Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)).

B. BIA Decision in *Matter of Q. Li*

19. On May 15, 2025, the BIA issued its decision in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), which held that an applicant for admission "who was arrested without a warrant while arriving in the United States and thereafter placed in removal proceedings, is detained under section 235(b)(2)(A), until the conclusion of removal proceedings." *Id.* at 71.

20. Q. Li was encountered upon entry into the United States, she was arrested by immigration officers, and paroled into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). *Id.* at 67. Part of the condition of her §1182(d)(5) parole was to report regularly to ICE. *Id.* Following a subsequent alert as to an international arrest warrant, she was taken back into custody, issued a Notice to

Appear commencing removal proceedings, and issued a new Notice of Custody Determination and detained. *Id.* She requested a custody redetermination before an IJ and was denied for lack of jurisdiction, because she was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). *Id.*

21. In particular, the BIA reasoned that the termination of parole restored Q. Li to her prior custody status. *Id.* at 69. (“When parole granted by DHS is terminated, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled.” INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).”). Additionally, Q. Li had been arrested without a warrant, and had never been subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authority. *Id.* at 70. Ultimately, the BIA agreed that she was subject to § 1225(b)(2) and ineligible for bond. *Id.* at 71.

22. While Respondents have attempted to apply *Q. Li* more broadly to individuals encountered at the interior of the country – or in the absence of a parole under § 1182(d)(5) – this argument has been consistently rejected. *See Valerio v. Joyce*, No. CV 25-17225 (ZNQ), 2025 WL 3251445, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2025); *Diaz Rudecindo v. Florentino*, No. CV 25-16942 (ES), 2025 WL 3470299, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025); *Leal-Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-02428-JRR, 2025 WL 2430025, at *9-11 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025); *Vasque Romero v. Noem*, No. CV 3:25-524, 2026 WL 116379, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026); *and Hasan v. Crawford*, 800 F. Supp. 3d 641, 657, n.11 (E.D. Va. 2025).

C. New ICE memo reinterpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

19. On July 8, 2025, Respondent ICE issued new interim guidance that announced a breathtakingly broad interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *See* ICE memorandum “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission.”² This memo concerns

² Available at <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission>.

the detention of “applicants for admission” as defined by § 1225(a)(1). “Effective immediately, it is the position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under INA § 235(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)].” *Id.* DHS is explicit that this new policy is a marked deviation from prior interpretation and treatment of affected noncitizens. *Id.* (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that “arriving aliens” have historically been treated.”)

20. In addition to the announcement re-interpreting § 1225(b)(2), the memo further clarifies that “[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond or other conditions under INA § 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237 [8 U.S.C. § 1227], with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].” *Id.*

21. Moreover, ICE maintains that “DHS does not take the position that prior releases of applicants for admission pursuant to INA § 236(a) were releases on parole under INA § 212(d)(5) based on this change in legal position.” *Id.* ICE fails to clarify under what legal authority, then, those prior releases were effectuated. Rather, ICE signals the resulting lack of “correct” paperwork is nonetheless permissible. *Id.* (“Accordingly, ERO and HIS are not required to ‘correct’ the release paperwork by issuing INA § 212(d)(5) parole paperwork.”)

22. Nationwide implementation of the ICE § 1225(b)(2) mass detention policy ensued.

D. Recent BIA decision *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*

23. On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which oversees all appeals of IJ decisions including custody redeterminations, upheld ICE’s re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2). *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

24. The BIA held that the respondent was an “applicant for admission” within the scope of § 1225(b), and therefore subject to mandatory detention.

25. The BIA characterized the issue before it as “one of statutory construction: Does the INA require that *all* applicants for admission, even those like the respondent who have entered without admission or inspection and have been residing in the United States for years without lawful status, be subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration proceedings, and thus the Immigration Judge lacks authority over a bond request filed by an alien in this category?” [emphasis added]. *Id.* at 220.

26. The BIA reasoned that individuals “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer.” *Id.* at 228.

27. The BIA acknowledged the decades of precedent preceding its decision that authorized release of individuals present without having been inspected and admitted or paroled under § 1226(a). *Id.* at 225, FN6 (“We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for aliens who entered the United States without inspection. However, we do not recall either DHS or its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously raising the current issue that is before us. In fact, the supplemental information for the 1997 Interim Rule titled ‘Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures,’ 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997), reflects that the Immigration and Naturalization Service took the position at that time that ‘[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.’”)

28. Ultimately, the BIA upheld the decision that the IJ lacked jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to consider the respondent for discretionary bond. *Id.* at 229.

29. The BIA decision is binding on all immigration judges nationwide.

30. Respondents' new policy and interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) stand to sweep millions of noncitizens into mandatory detention, without any consideration for release on bond (regardless of their ties to their community or lack of dangerousness or flight risk). *Rosado*, 2025 WL 2337099, at *11 ("It has been estimated that this novel interpretation would require the detention of millions of immigrants currently residing in the United States.")

FACTS

31. Petitioner is a citizen of India. Petitioner entered the United States in or about 2023, without inspection and between ports of entry along the U.S.–Mexico border. Upon information and belief, he and his family were detained for one day and then released on his own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *See* Ex. 1, Order of Release on Recognizance. Thereafter, a Notice to Appear was issued on November 19, 2023. *See* Ex. 2, Notice to Appear.

32. Petitioner thereafter relocated to the Maryland area with his wife and their three minor children, ages 15, 10, and 7. The family now resides in Waldorf, Maryland.

33. Petitioner has a pending Form I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, which was filed on April 26, 2024, and has not been adjudicated. Additionally, Petitioner is the derivative of a pending U-visa petition filed with USCIS. Upon information and belief, neither application has been denied, and both forms of relief remain pending before the appropriate agency.

34. Upon information and belief, on February 11, 2026, Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement during a scheduled ICE check-in, without forewarning.

ICE revoked Petitioner's release pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). Petitioner has remained in ICE custody since that date.

35. Petitioner is currently detained at the Baltimore ERO-ICE Field Office Hold Room.

36. Petitioner is in pending removal proceedings. His Individual Hearing is scheduled for May 15, 2026, and he is not subject to a final order of removal. See EOIR Automated Case Information, available at <https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation> (last visited on February 12, 2026):

← acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation

Name: CHAUDHARI, KIRANKUMAR CHELABHAI | A-Number: [REDACTED] | Docket Date: 11/20/2023

Next Hearing Information

Your upcoming **INDIVIDUAL** hearing is on **May 15, 2026 at 1:00 PM.**

JUDGE

Lee, June

COURT ADDRESS

3311 TOLEDO ROAD, SUITE 105
HYATTSVILLE, MD 20782

Court Decision and Motion Information

This case is pending.

BIA Case Information

No appeal was received for this case.

Court Contact Information

If you require further information regarding your case, or wish to file additional documents, please contact the immigration court.

COURT ADDRESS

3311 TOLEDO ROAD, SUITE 105
HYATTSVILLE, MD 20782

PHONE NUMBER

(301) 955-3600

37. As a result of Petitioner's detention, his family will suffer immediate and ongoing financial and emotional hardship. Petitioner is the primary breadwinner, and without his income,

the household will lack sufficient funds to meet basic living expenses, including rent, utilities, and food. His spouse will be left to shoulder the financial responsibilities alone. The children have already begun to experience emotional distress due to his sudden absence and fear for their father. If his detention continues, the financial pressure and emotional strain on the family will only worsen.

38. All Respondents consider that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216. Accordingly, it would be futile for Petitioner to request a bond from an Immigration Judge. Exhaustion of administrative remedies would therefore be futile.

**FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
No-Bond Detention in Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)**

39. Petitioner re-allege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs 1-38.

40. Since Petitioner is not an applicant for admission “seeking admission” or “an arriving alien” subject to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2), and has no disqualifying criminal arrests or convictions subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he is entitled to a bond redetermination hearing by an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

41. Respondents’ actions, as set forth herein, violate Petitioner’s statutory right to a bond redetermination hearing in front of an immigration judge.

**SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Detention in Violation of Due Process**

42. Petitioner re-allege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs 1-38.

43. Immigration detention is civil, not criminal, in nature. There are only two permissible reasons for immigration detention: to avoid flight risk, and to avoid danger to the community.

44. After entering the United States unlawfully, Petitioner went on to develop ties to the community over the course of several years. Petitioner is therefore a “person” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and have a liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.

45. Petitioner has a strong private interest in his liberty at stake. As held in *Lopez-Arevalo*, another case involving a detainee who was rearrested following a prior release, “the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government” is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]” 2025 WL 2691828, *10, quoting *Martinez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 and *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Moreover, “it is well-established that parolees have a strong interest in their conditional release, ... and courts have held they cannot be re-arrested without a due process hearing in which they can challenge their re-incarceration.” *Rodriguez Diaz v. Kaiser*, No. 25-CV-05071-TLT, 2025 WL 3011852, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025), citing *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481-2 (1972). Petitioner was released on recognizance by ICE. Accordingly, his liberty interest is *at least as great* as those serving criminal sentences on parole. *Id.* Moreover, Petitioner’s liberty interest has only grown in the time since his prior immigration detention in 2023. *Id.* at *10. *See also Lopez Arevalo*, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (same).

46. Next, the risk of erroneous deprivation of said liberty to Petitioner is high. Respondents have not provided a reason for Petitioner’s rearrest nor do they believe they are required to do so. *See* July 2025 ICE Memo, *supra* at ¶¶ 22-25. *See also Rodriguez Diaz*, 2025 WL 3011852, at *11, citing *Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser*, No. 25-cv-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 17, 2025). (“Respondents’ new position would grant ICE unlimited authority to disregard any bond determination made by an IJ for any reason, which is ‘a recipe for arbitrary

and erroneous deprivations of liberty.”). Moreover, seeking a bond hearing before an immigration judge without a ruling from this Court would be equally as futile as appeal to the BIA, as it is sure to be denied for lack of jurisdiction. *Lopez Arevalo*, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686. (“[G]iven the BIA’s interpretation of mandatory detention in *Yajure Hurtado*, that appeal is almost certainly a futile exercise.”); *See also Rodriguez-Diaz*, 2025 WL 3011852, at *12 (same).

47. The government could only present minimal interests in continuing to detain Petitioner without affording him a bond hearing. There is no current evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or that he is a danger to the community. Any resource arguments fall flat because the cost of a mere bond hearing is surely dwarfed by accruing expenditures to finance his ongoing detention. *Lopez-Arevalo*, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 687. Moreover, the costs of a bond hearing are those that the government has allotted for decades without issue in these contexts. *Id.* Most importantly, “Petitioner-Plaintiff is not asking the Court to enjoin detention altogether, he only requests that Respondents justify his re-detention at a pre-deprivation hearing.” *Rodriguez-Diaz*, 2025 WL 3011852, at *13. The same is true here.

48. Accordingly, all *Mathews* factors militate in favor of Petitioner, and Respondents’ actions in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing before a neutral and detached magistrate have therefore deprived Petitioner of his rights without due process of law.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Petitioner prays for judgment against Respondents and respectfully requests that the Court enters an order:

- a) Issuing an Order to Show Cause, ordering Respondents to justify the basis of Petitioner’s detention in fact and in law, forthwith;

- b) Enjoin Respondents from holding Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and denying them a bond hearing on that basis;
- c) Enjoin Respondents from re-arresting Petitioner subject to § 1225(b)(2);
- d) Order Petitioner's immediate release from custody;
- e) Order, in the alternative, Petitioner's immediate release and that Respondents conduct a bond hearing for Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days;
- f) Retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure Respondents' compliance with the Court's orders;
- g) Grant the writ of habeas corpus and order Respondents to release Petitioner forthwith, upon payment of the bond as ordered by the Immigration Judge; and
- h) Grant any other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Date: February 12, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

//s/ Leah Haynes

Leah Haynes, Esq.

D.Md. Bar no. 31800

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Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this date, I uploaded the foregoing, with all attachments thereto, to this court's CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all case participants. I furthermore will send a copy by certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, to:

Civil Process Clerk
U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Maryland
36 S. Charles Street,
4th Fl. Baltimore, MD 21201

Office of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW, Mail Stop 0485
Washington, DC 20528-0485

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the
United States
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
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Todd Lyons, ICE Acting Director
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
500 12th Street SW, Mail Stop 5902
Washington, DC 20536-5902

Vernon Liggins
c/o Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th Street SW, Mail Stop 5902
Washington, DC 20536-5902

Date: February 12, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

//s/ Leah Haynes
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