

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO**

Civil Action No. 26-cv-00482-RBJ

ALAIN NARANJO-DOMINGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden, Denver Contract Detention Facility;  
GEORGE VALDEZ, Acting Field Office Director, Denver, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity;  
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity;  
TODD LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity;  
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, in her official capacity;

Respondents.

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**RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF No. 7)**

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Respondents hereby respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 7), directing them to respond to the amended habeas petition.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This Court ordered Respondents to respond within 14 days of service of the petition upon them. ECF No. 7. Petitioner effectuated service on February 25, 2026. ECF No. 8. Respondents' response to the Order to Show Cause is due by March 11, 2026, and is therefore timely.

The central legal issue presented in this case concerns whether a noncitizen who is present in the United States and has not been admitted is subject to mandatory detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), or whether such a noncitizen is entitled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to seek a bond hearing. This issue is not materially different from an issue this Court has resolved in a prior ruling in another case. *See Cervantes Arredondo v. Baltazar*, No. 25-cv-03040-RBJ. Respondents respectfully disagree with that ruling. But to conserve resources and expedite this Court’s consideration of this case, while preserving legal arguments and reserving all of Respondents’ rights including the right to appeal, Respondents submit this abbreviated response.

When Petitioner was detained by ICE on May 27, 2025, he was present in the United States without having been admitted. *See* ECF No. 6 at 2-3. Respondents’ position is that Petitioner is, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) under the interpretation of that provision adopted by the Fifth Circuit in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4<sup>th</sup> 494, 502-08 (5th Cir. 2026). Respondents submit that this position is further supported by *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). The Court in *Jennings* explained that a noncitizen “who . . . ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). The Court then explained that *all* “applicants for admission” are subject to detention under either 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2)—both of which *require* detention. *See id.* (“Section 1225(b)(2) . . . serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”); *id.* at 297 (“Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until

certain proceedings have concluded”). Respondents submit that *Jennings* supports their position that all “applicants for admission”—who include noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States and have not been admitted—are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

The Fifth Circuit and some district courts in this circuit have agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of the statute. *See, e.g., Buenrostro-Mendez*, 2026 WL 323330, at \*5–10; *Montoya v. Holt*, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025). Many others have not, as noted above. It does not appear that this Court has, to date, issued an order that addresses the reasoning in *Buenrostro-Mendez*. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the issue. A decision in this district rejecting Respondents’ position on this issue has been appealed to the Tenth Circuit. *See Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, Civil Action No. 25-cv-02720-RMR (D. Colo.), *appeal docketed*, No. 25-1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025). That appeal remains pending.

Respondents acknowledge that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court adheres to that decision, as the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable from that case for purposes of the Court’s decision on the legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Thus, while Respondents do not consent to issuance of the writ and reserve the right to appeal, to expedite disposition of this case, Respondents hereby rely upon, and incorporate by reference, the legal arguments Respondents presented on this issue in *Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar*, Civil Action No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, ECF No. 26 at 10-19.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of that brief is attached as Exhibit A hereto.

Petitioner contends that he should be viewed as detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b). *See* ECF No. 6 at 7-9, 13. If the Court agrees and determines that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and grants the petition, the appropriate relief is for the Court to direct a bond hearing be conducted pursuant to § 1226(a) before an immigration judge. In particular, the Court should not order further relief beyond directing that Petitioner be granted a bond hearing under § 1226(a). It should not order immediate release, as multiple decisions in this district have recognized.<sup>3</sup>

This Court's ruling on the Section 1225(b) issue in this case should resolve this habeas petition. If the Court grants the petition on this ground, it should decline to address additional arguments. *See INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

In sum, Respondents submit that if the Court grants the petition and determines that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court should order that Respondents conduct such a bond hearing within seven days and should direct Respondents to

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<sup>3</sup> *See, e.g., Montanez de la Cruz v. Baltazar et al.*, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, ECF No. 15, at 8 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026) (“[B]ecause § 1226 authorizes detention, the Court does not find that petitioner’s immediate release is an appropriate remedy. Instead, the Court will order that a bond hearing be conducted.”); *Leyva Ramirez v. Baltasar et al.*, No. 26-cv-00199-NYW, ECF No. 23, at 7–8 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2026) (“[A] bond hearing before an immigration judge is sufficient to vindicate the procedural protections afforded by § 1226(a).”); *Perez Zepeda v. Hagan et al.*, No. 25-cv-3789-SKC-STV, ECF No. 18, at 17 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2026) (“[Section] 1226 does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to grant a noncitizen release on bond. . . . Additionally, the Court concludes that an immigration judge is in a better position to consider whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community.”).

file a status report within seven days of the bond hearing, confirming that it was held.

DATED: March 11, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

PETER MCNEILLY  
United States Attorney

*/s/ Michael C. Johnson*

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on March 11, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, using the district court's CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the district court's CM/ECF system.

*s/ Michael C. Johnson*  
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