IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

YANSY CAROLINA BLANCO DE VILLATORO,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00493-ABA

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ENFORCE THIS COURT'S ORDER AND FOR RELEASE PENDING A CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE BOND HEARING

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Yansy Carolina Blanco de Villatoro respectfully moves this Court to enforce its Order of February 12, 2026, which directed the Government to provide Petitioner a bond hearing in compliance with 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d) "and any attendant process available pursuant to these provisions." (ECF No. 8, ¶ 5.) This Court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with that Order. (Id. ¶ 8.)

The bond hearing conducted on February 20, 2026, before Immigration Judge Thanos Kanellakos did not satisfy this Court's Order. The Immigration Judge did not conduct the individualized assessment required by law. He allowed a single negative factor—the procedural posture of Petitioner's merits case—to override every other consideration, stating on the record that "the Court could base its decision on that alone." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 36:2–36:3.) He acknowledged and then disregarded the multiple factors under Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) that favored release. The one additional basis for the flight-risk finding—three failed home visits from a Form I-213—is itself tainted by due process violations the Immigration Judge created: he pressured counsel into waiving Petitioner's appearance so she could not testify about the alleged violations; the Government introduced the I-213 after representing it would not present evidence related to the alleged "Alternative to Detention" violations; and the Immigration Judge denied a subpoena seeking the very records that would have put the I-213 in context.

The Government submission of the I-213 document during trial is only permissible as impeachment evidence. The Government cannot credibly characterize the I-213 as evidence "reserved for impeachment." Impeachment requires a witness to impeach. Petitioner was not present—because the Immigration Judge pressured counsel to waive her appearance after the

Government failed to produce her—and there was therefore no testimony to impeach. The Government engineered the absence of the witness and then introduced the very evidence that witness would have rebutted.

Petitioner does not ask this Court to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Immigration Judge. She asks the Court to determine whether the hearing it ordered was conducted in conformity with the applicable law—and whether a bond determination that fixates on one negative factor while disregarding every positive factor constitutes the individualized assessment that due process and this Court's Order require.

THE BOND DENIAL

The Immigration Judge found that Petitioner is not a danger to the community. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:6–27:7.) He nonetheless denied bond, finding Petitioner to be a flight risk on two stated bases:

> **First**, that her applications for relief had been denied and her case was on appeal to the BIA, placing her in a "much different procedural posture" from persons with pending relief. The Immigration Judge stated that "the Court could base its decision on that alone." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 28:5–28:7; 36:2–36:3.)
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> **Second**, that the I-213 reflected "three home visits that were failed." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 29:14–29:17.)

The Immigration Judge acknowledged several factors in Petitioner's favor: that she appeared at a check-in where she was arrested, which was "to her credit" (Ex. 1, Tr. at 29:20–29:21); the presence of community supporters in the courtroom (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:1–27:2); and that there was no danger finding. He also heard, without rebuttal, counsel's representations that Petitioner had attended all court hearings, filed her appeal timely, maintained 850 days of ATD compliance, had two minor dependent children, and had no criminal history. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 23:19–25:19.)

Any time the Immigration Judge referenced a positive factor, he immediately pivoted to the denial of the merits case or the ATD violations. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 12.) The result was a bond determination in which at least six Guerra factors weighed in favor of release, one factor was treated as independently dispositive, and the sole additional basis—three alleged failed home visits—entered the record under conditions that deprived Petitioner of any ability to challenge it.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a native and citizen of El Salvador. She was encountered by immigration officers in the Del Rio sector of the United States–Mexico border and placed in removal proceedings. Rather than detaining her, the Government released her on alternatives to detention ("ATD") on or about October 2023. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 24:6–24:7.)

Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. She appeared at all scheduled court hearings. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 23:21–23:22.) Her applications were denied following a full merits hearing before the Hyattsville Immigration Court. She filed a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:24–27:25.)

While her appeal was pending, Petitioner continued to comply with her ATD conditions. She reported to the ISAP office in Silver Spring, Maryland, as directed—and it was at that check-in that she was arrested by ICE on February 5, 2026. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 24:8–24:14; 25:11–25:14.)

DHS never issued a Form I-830 or any other written custody determination documenting the basis for Petitioner's redetention. ICE officers communicated informally to Petitioner's counsel that the basis was four alleged biometric violations, but refused to provide anything in writing. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 9.) DHS also never filed anything, in particular the Form I-830, with the immigration court or the Board of Immigration Appeals, notifying it that Petitioner had been transferred to a different jurisdiction—from Maryland to a detention facility in California City, California.

Petitioner's counsel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On February 12, 2026, this Court granted the petition and ordered the Government to provide Petitioner a bond

hearing "within ten (10) days of Petitioner's filing such request with the Immigration Court," in compliance with the applicable regulations "and any attendant process." (ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 3–5.) The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Order. (Id. ¶ 8.)

The bond hearing was conducted on February 20, 2026, at 10:00 AM Eastern. Petitioner was detained in California City, California, three time zones behind. The Immigration Judge denied bond, finding no danger to the community but finding Petitioner to be a flight risk. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:6–31:14.)

In denying bond, the Immigration Judge stated that "as a detained matter, the appeal will proceed much more rapidly than it would as a non-detained matter" and that there would be "a decision in a much more timely fashion." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 28:13–28:22.) He also noted earlier in the hearing that the appeal would move faster "[p]robably because she was non-detained at the time. Now she's detained." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 12:1–12:2.) But as of the date of this filing, neither DHS nor the immigration court has filed anything in the EOIR Courts and Appeals System ("ECAS") to change Petitioner's case status from non-detained to detained—which is the administrative step required for the BIA to calendar the appeal on an expedited detained docket. Nor has DHS notified the immigration court of Petitioner's transfer to a facility in a different jurisdiction. The Immigration Judge's assurance that the appeal would resolve quickly is, as a practical matter, unsupported by any administrative action and one of many omissions that have deprived Petitioner of her due process in her bond proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Immigration Court and DHS Failed to Produce Petitioner

When the hearing commenced at 10:00 AM Eastern—7:00 AM Pacific—Petitioner was not present. The Immigration Judge asked counsel: "Are you authorized to waive the appearance of the Respondent?" Counsel answered: "I'm not." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 6:4–6:8; Jaskot Decl. ¶ 5.) Under the INA, a respondent "shall have the privilege of being present at the proceeding." INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).

The Immigration Judge acknowledged the logistical obstacles. He stated: "[W]e have no control over time zones" and "we have no control over personnel at 7:23 in the morning." He noted that contract personnel at the facility "may have a contract . . . that says, you don't start work until 8:00." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 8:5–8:19.)

Having identified the problem, the Immigration Judge made no effort to solve it. He stated that the facility was operated by a private company, that he had no ability to compel them to produce the respondent, and that he doubted they would be willing to do so at that hour. But he did not ask DHS—which contracts with the private company—to use its own contractual authority to arrange Petitioner's appearance. He did not explore whether the hearing could be rescheduled to later that day. He did not inquire whether a telephonic appearance was possible. He made no effort to contact anyone at the facility. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 6.)

Instead, the Immigration Judge steered the colloquy toward waiver. He told counsel: "[I]t's not uncommon for attorneys to waive the appearance of their clients under these circumstances." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 9:1–9:5.) He referenced a prior hearing in which the respondent "only had to

identify themselves." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 9:6–9:11.) He suggested that counsel "could always proffer what you believe the Respondent would have said." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 9:19–9:23.)

A critical factor in counsel's decision to waive was the Government's pre-hearing representation that it did not intend to introduce evidence. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 33:16–33:18; Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Based on the Immigration Judge's assurances and the Government's representation, counsel waived Petitioner's appearance "in the interest of following the federal court order and being expeditious." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 10:22–10:25; Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 7.)

B. The Government's Pre-Hearing Representation and the I-213 Surprise

Before the hearing, counsel spoke with DHS trial counsel about the anticipated scope of the proceeding. DHS counsel represented that she did not intend to introduce any evidence whatsoever. This was not a narrow concession—it was an unequivocal representation that the Government would not introduce evidence of any kind. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) DHS counsel subsequently confirmed on the record: "Respondent's Counsel asked me, was I going to present evidence? And I said, not that I had planned on." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 33:16–33:18.)

This representation was significant because counsel's reasons for seeking Petitioner's presence and filing the subpoena went directly to the "immigration violations" factor under Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). Counsel had spoken with Petitioner about the alleged ISAP violations. Her position was that she had no genuine violations; that the monitoring application was unreliable and frequently malfunctioned; and that ISAP acknowledged the technical issues. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 16:6–16:21; Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 8.) Counsel told the court: "This is why I wanted her here to testify, which is why I filed the subpoena." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 16:19–16:21.)

When DHS counsel represented that the Government would not present the ATD violation evidence, the reasonable inference was that the Government recognized the evidence could not withstand scrutiny. Counsel relied on that inference in curtailing his subpoena argument. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 12:20–13:1; Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 4.)

Despite this, Government counsel uploaded the Form I-213 during the hearing. The I-213 listed three "failed home visits" and multiple "missed biometric check-ins." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 29:14–29:17.) It listed only negative compliance events—no complete compliance history, no context, and no indication whether Petitioner received notice of the visits or whether the app malfunctions she reported accounted for the missed check-ins. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 10.)

No advance disclosure of the I-213 was provided. The Immigration Judge did not offer a recess or continuance. Counsel was not given the opportunity to reopen his subpoena argument in light of the Government's introduction of the very evidence it had represented it would not present. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 11.) At no point in the hearing, after the submission of Form I-213, did the Immigration Judge ask Counsel for Petitioner whether he objected to the introduction of the Form I-213 into the Bond Record. This is a critical inquiry as the timeliness of the submission is heavily dependent on whether the evidence is offered as related to the merits of the hearing or whether it serves as impeachment evidence. Evidence introduced during trial is typically reserved for impeachment purposes.

The Government cannot credibly characterize this as evidence "reserved for impeachment." The entire premise of impeachment is that a witness has testified and the opposing party introduces contradictory evidence. Here, there was no witness testimony to impeach. Petitioner was not present—her absence the direct result of the Immigration Judge's pressure to waive and the

Government's own representation. The Government cannot engineer the absence of a witness and then introduce surprise evidence that the absent witness would have rebutted.

C. The Subpoena and Its Denial

Counsel had filed an Application for Subpoena Duces Tecum seeking the complete ATD compliance records maintained by BI Incorporated, the private contractor operating ISAP on behalf of ICE. (Ex. 3.) These records would have shown Petitioner's full compliance history—not merely the cherry-picked failures reflected in the I-213.

The Immigration Judge did not rule on the subpoena before or during the hearing. Only after the bond denial, and after counsel moved to reconsider, did the Immigration Judge deny it. The stated reason: the court could not order DHS to produce records of a "private entity" because DHS is "not the custodian" of those records. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 37:9–37:13.)

Counsel pointed out the contradiction on the record: "If the Court is going to say that the records in the 213, the ATD violations cited by ICE that come from ISAP in the 213 are not in the government's possession for the purposes of a subpoena but are in the government's possession for the purposes of the 213 and are therefore reliable, it's the definition of having it both ways." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 37:15–37:24.)

ARGUMENT

I. This Court Has Jurisdiction and Authority to Enforce Its Order

This Court expressly retained jurisdiction "to enforce compliance with this Order." (ECF No. 8, ¶ 8.) A federal court possesses inherent authority to enforce its own orders. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978). Where a habeas court orders a bond hearing, it retains authority to ensure that the hearing satisfies constitutional requirements. See Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 350 (4th Cir. 2022).

This motion does not ask the Court to reweigh the Immigration Judge's factual findings or substitute its judgment on the merits of the bond determination. It asks the Court to determine whether the hearing it ordered was conducted in conformity with applicable law—and whether the result reflects an individualized assessment or a categorical one.

II. The Bond Hearing Did Not Comply with Applicable Law

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be "deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. This protection applies to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens in removal proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). At a minimum, due process requires "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

A. The Immigration Judge Did Not Conduct the Individualized Assessment Required by Law

An immigration judge conducting a bond hearing under INA § 236(a) must assess the totality of the circumstances by weighing the recognized bond factors. Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that this assessment must be individualized.

Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338 (4th Cir. 2022). The Guerra factors include: whether the respondent has a fixed address; family ties; record of appearance; criminal record; history of immigration violations; manner of entry; and the probability of obtaining relief. Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40.

The record establishes the following with respect to each factor:

1. Danger to the Community: None. The Immigration Judge found no danger. No criminal history, no arrests, no violent conduct. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:6–27:7; 24:23–24:25.) This factor weighs strongly in favor of release.

2. Record of Appearance: Perfect. Petitioner appeared at all scheduled hearings throughout her removal proceedings. She appeared at the hearing where her relief was denied, filed a timely appeal, and did not flee. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 23:21–23:22.) This factor weighs strongly in favor of release.

3. Compliance with Conditions of Release: 850 Days. Petitioner maintained approximately 850 days of ATD compliance, continuing even after her merits case was denied. She reported to ISAP as directed—and was arrested at that check-in. The Immigration Judge acknowledged this was "to her credit." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 25:11–25:14; 29:20–29:21.) This factor weighs strongly in favor of release.

4. Family Ties: Substantial. Petitioner is a single mother of two minor children suffering in her absence. Her bond packet included affidavits from her daughter and sister attesting to the impact of detention on the family. Community supporters appeared in the courtroom. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 23:19; 25:18–25:19; Ex. 2.) This factor weighs in favor of release.

5. Community Ties and Sponsor: Strong. Petitioner submitted an affidavit from Karen D. Cruz Carbajal, a United States citizen who offered to serve as her sponsor, along with her passport and W-2. Multiple community members submitted supporting affidavits. (Ex. 2.) This factor weighs in favor of release.

6. Criminal Record: None. Petitioner has no criminal history whatsoever. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 24:23–24:25.) This factor weighs in favor of release.

7. Manner of Entry: Neutral or Favorable. Petitioner was encountered in the Del Rio sector and placed in proceedings. The Government evaluated her and chose not to detain her, releasing her on ATD without requiring bond. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 24:6–24:7; 30:1–30:13.)

8. Probability of Obtaining Relief: Treated as Independently Dispositive. This is the sole factor the Immigration Judge treated as dispositive. He noted that Petitioner's applications had been denied and stated that "the Court could base its decision on that alone." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 36:2–36:3.) He did not inquire into the grounds of the BIA appeal or the likelihood of success. Counsel told the court: "I deeply disagree with Judge Matthews' decision in that case. I do believe that we're going to prevail in that appeal." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 23:2–23:5.) The Immigration Judge did not engage with this representation.

The record reflects at least six factors weighing in favor of release and one factor—the probability of relief—that the Immigration Judge treated as independently dispositive. When a court acknowledges every favorable factor and then overrides all of them with a single consideration it declares independently sufficient, the analysis is not individualized. It is categorical.

Moreover, the Immigration Judge's treatment of this factor created a de facto categorical bar Congress did not authorize. Under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), a detained noncitizen is eligible for release on bond. An order of removal becomes administratively final only when the BIA dismisses an appeal or the appeal period expires. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1. Petitioner has a timely appeal pending. She is bond-eligible. If every respondent who lost before an IJ and appealed to the BIA were effectively ineligible for bond, the statutory right under § 236(a) would be nullified for a substantial class of detained respondents.

In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)—which this Court cited in its habeas order—the Government represented that § 1226(a) bond hearings provide adequate procedural protections. A bond hearing that functions as a categorical denial based on procedural posture alone is not the adequate process Jennings assumed.

B. The Immigration Judge's Reliance on the Merits Posture Is Undermined by the Failure to Expedite the Appeal

The Immigration Judge justified his reliance on the merits posture by assuring counsel that "as a detained matter, the appeal will proceed much more rapidly than it would as a non-detained matter" and that there would be "a decision in a much more timely fashion—in other words, a period of some months." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 28:13–28:22.) He stated earlier: "Probably because she was non-detained at the time. Now she's detained." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 12:1–12:2.)

That assurance is hollow. As of the date of this filing, neither DHS nor the immigration court has filed anything in the EOIR Courts and Appeals System ("ECAS") to change Petitioner's case status from non-detained to detained. This administrative step is a prerequisite for the BIA to calendar the appeal on its expedited detained docket. Without it, the appeal will proceed at the same pace as any non-detained case—which is to say, not rapidly at all. Nor has DHS notified

the immigration court that Petitioner has been transferred from Maryland to a detention facility in California, a fact that may itself affect the BIA's handling of the appeal.

The Immigration Judge thus denied bond based in part on the premise that continued detention would be brief because the appeal would resolve quickly—while nothing in the administrative record reflects any effort by anyone to make that happen. If the merits posture is serious enough to justify indefinite detention without bond, the Government should at minimum be required to take the administrative steps necessary to resolve the appeal on an expedited basis. The failure to do so exposes the merits-posture rationale for what it is: a categorical bar, not an individualized assessment of flight risk.

C. The Single Additional Negative Factor Is Tainted by Procedural Failures the Immigration Judge Created

The Immigration Judge's flight-risk finding rested on two stated bases: the procedural posture of the merits case and three failed home visits reflected in the I-213. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 31:8–31:14.) Even setting aside the categorical-bar problem, the I-213 finding cannot sustain the bond denial because the Immigration Judge's own procedural failures deprived Petitioner of the ability to challenge that evidence.

1. The Immigration Judge pressured counsel into waiving Petitioner's appearance. At the outset, counsel told the court he was "not" authorized to waive. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 6:8.) The Immigration Judge did not attempt to produce her. Instead, he told counsel waiver was "not uncommon," suggested a proffer would suffice, and indicated the hearing needed to proceed. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 9:1–9:23; Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 6.) Petitioner had material testimony to offer—she disputed the alleged violations, contending the monitoring app was unreliable. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 8.) The Immigration Judge then

based his flight-risk finding in part on the very evidence Petitioner was not present to challenge.

2. The Government introduced surprise evidence after representing it would not. Government counsel represented before the hearing that she did not plan to present evidence. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Counsel relied on this in curtailing his subpoena argument. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 4.) The Government then introduced the I-213. No recess was offered. No opportunity to reopen the subpoena argument was provided. (Ex. 6, Jaskot Decl. ¶ 11.) The Government cannot characterize the I-213 as evidence "reserved for impeachment." There was no testimony to impeach. The entire premise of impeachment—contradicting a witness's testimony—is absent from this record.

3. The subpoena was denied on reasoning that contradicts the court's own reliance on the I-213. Counsel filed a subpoena seeking the complete ATD compliance records from BI Incorporated. (Ex. 3.) The Immigration Judge denied it after the bond denial, stating DHS is "not the custodian" of a "private entity's" records. (Ex. 1, Tr. at 37:9–37:13.) But the Immigration Judge simultaneously relied on the I-213—which derives its ATD violation data from that same contractor's records—and held it to be "an inherently reliable document." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 31:6–31:7.) The contractor's data was reliable enough to use against Petitioner but not obtainable by Petitioner to defend herself.

A flight-risk finding built on evidence the respondent could not challenge—because the court itself prevented her from doing so—does not satisfy due process.

D. The Immigration Judge Did Not Address Substantial Evidence in the Bond Packet

Petitioner submitted a bond packet containing multiple affidavits and supporting documents bearing directly on the recognized bond factors. (Ex. 2; Jaskot Decl. ¶ 13.) These included affidavits from Petitioner's proposed sponsor, a United States citizen, with her passport and W-2; affidavits from Petitioner's daughter and sister; and affidavits from multiple community members. The Immigration Judge's only acknowledgment was a reference to "the nice people who are here today." (Ex. 1, Tr. at 27:1–27:2.) He did not mention any submitted affidavit by name or substance.

E. Persuasive Authority Supports This Conclusion

In Mejia Orozco v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-1325 (E.D. Va.), Judge Trenga found an immigration judge's bond denial constitutionally deficient where the court failed to conduct an individualized assessment and instead relied principally on the procedural posture of the merits case. (Ex. 5.) The parallels to this case are direct.

F. The Burman Affidavit

The affidavit of retired Immigration Judge Paul Grussendorf Burman, who served on the immigration bench for twenty-seven years, attests that bond denials based solely on flight risk—in cases with no danger finding and no criminal history—were exceedingly rare. The standard practice was to address flight-risk concerns by setting a higher bond amount. (Ex. 4, Burman Aff. ¶¶ 5–9.)

Judge Burman's affidavit also addresses the institutional environment in which immigration judges currently operate, describing a climate in which bond grants carry professional risk. (Ex.

4, Burman Aff. ¶¶ 10–13.) The outcome here—a no-bond finding on flight risk alone, with this compliance record, these community ties, and no danger—is an aberration.

RELIEF REQUESTED

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Order the release of Petitioner pending a new, constitutionally adequate bond hearing; or in the alternative,
2. Order a new bond hearing with the following conditions:
    a. Petitioner must be afforded the opportunity to appear and testify, with scheduling that accounts for her detention location and time zone;
    b. The Government must disclose in advance any evidence it intends to rely on, including any I-213 or ATD records;
    c. The Immigration Judge must rule on any pending subpoena applications before proceeding to the merits of the bond determination;
    d. The Immigration Judge must conduct an individualized assessment applying all recognized bond factors, and may not treat the procedural posture of the merits case as independently dispositive.
3. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

S/ Luis Carlos Diaz

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25th day of February, 2026, a copy of the foregoing Motion, together with all exhibits, was served upon all counsel of record via the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system.

/S Luis Carlos Diaz

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EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit 1	Transcript of Bond Hearing Before Immigration Judge Thanos Kanellakos (February 20, 2026)
Exhibit 2	Petitioner's Bond Packet (Affidavits and Supporting Documents)
Exhibit 3	Application for Subpoena Duces Tecum
Exhibit 4	Affidavit of Retired Immigration Judge Paul Grussendorf Burman
Exhibit 5	Order, Mejia Orozco v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-1325 (E.D. Va.)
Exhibit 6	Declaration of Jared Jaskot, Esq.
Exhibit 7	Order, Maldonado Bautista et al v. Santacruz Jr. et al, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM
Exhibit 8	Proposed Rule Changes Interim Federal Registrar Vol. 91 No. 25 (February 6, 2026)