

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 26-cv-01062-SHL-DTS

LEINER LEONEL GUAILLAS
GUAMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

**FEDERAL RESPONDENTS’
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

PAMELA BONDI, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure a bond hearing in connection with Petitioner’s detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Federal Respondents acknowledge that this petition raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided. Those issues have been resolved in the government’s favor in *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, No. 25-20496, ___ F.4th ___ (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), and they are currently before the Eighth Circuit on expedited review in *Avila v. Bondi*, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir. docketed Nov. 10, 2025). For purposes of expediting these proceedings, the Federal Respondents assert all arguments raised by the government in *Buenrostro-Mendez* and in *Avila*, preserve those arguments for any appeal in this case, and respectfully request that the Court deny Petitioner’s habeas petition.

Attached to this response is a copy of the warrant for Petitioner’s arrest provided by ICE. The fact that Petitioner is detained pursuant to a warrant means that if the Court determines Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a) and not under § 1225(b)(2), then the

appropriate remedy is to order a custody redetermination hearing instead of immediate release. This approach would “comport[] with the general rule that ‘the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established’ and should be ‘no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff.’” *Fuentes v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3524455, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2025) (alterations omitted) (quoting *Nebraska v. Biden*, 52 F.4th 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2022)); *see also Trump v. CASA, Inc.*, 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025) (staying preliminary injunctions “to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue”). The result of this rule is that “[m]ost courts confronting claims analogous to” those raised by Petitioner “order a bond hearing, not immediate release, as a remedy.” *Fuentes*, 2025 WL 3524455, at *5 (collecting authority). Petitioner should not obtain a different outcome here.

Section 1226(a) does not grant “any *right* to release on bond.” *Matter of D-J-*, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 575 (original emphasis) (citing *Carlson v. Landon*, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952)). Instead, the statute provides that the government “*may* release the [noncitizen] on . . . bond of *at least* \$1,500” or on conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (emphasis added). Under this plain text, posting bond of “at least \$1,500” is a condition precedent to release. And whether a person is entitled to release on bond in the first place depends on if he can prove he “is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” *Miranda v. Garland*, 34 F.4th 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2022). Petitioner is not entitled to an order of immediate release from this Court, unmediated by the immigration court procedures ordinarily applicable to custody redetermination proceedings under § 1226(a).

Dated: February 9, 2026

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