UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

Pedro Alexander MENDEZ-LAINEZ, Petitioner, v. Pamela Bondi, *et al.*, Respondents.	Civil Action No. 5:26-CV-00667-JKP

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CONSIDERING RECENT FIFTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

Federal Respondents provide the following response to Petitioner's habeas petition.[1] Any allegations that are not specifically admitted herein are denied. Petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought, including attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").[2] Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). This conclusion is appropriate under recent precedent, where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that aliens, like Petitioner, who entered the United States without inspection and who are not "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted," "shall be detained" under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) until the conclusion of their removal proceedings. *Buenrostro v. Bondi*, No. 25-20496, ---- F.4th ---- 2026 WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). The *Buenrostro* decision is binding precedent and requires that the Court deny this habeas petition.[3]

---

1 The Department of Justice represents only federal employees in this action.

2 *Barco v. Witte*, 65 F.4th 782 (5th Cir. 2023).

3 The *Buenrostro* decision is a published decision and precedential authority even though the mandate has yet to issue. *See, e.g., Martin v. Singletary*, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that even a stay in the issuance of a mandate does not impact the precedential value of published opinions); *Acute Care Ambul. Serv., L.L.C. v. Azar II*, No. 7:20-CV-00217, 2020 WL 7640206, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2020) (rejecting the argument that a Fifth Circuit decision is

BACKGROUND

Petitioner claims he is detained in ICE custody in Karnes City, Texas. ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. The habeas petition is silent as to when and how Petitioner purports to have entered the United States, but he claims to have been living in the United States since 2021. *Id.* ¶¶ 13, 15. Notably, he does not claim to have ever been inspected, admitted, or paroled into the United States. Petitioner was most recently apprehended by immigration authorities in January 2026. *Id.* ¶ 15. Petitioner does not state whether he is in removal proceedings, nor does he provide an alien number or confirm that he has been issued and served with a Notice to Appear ("NTA"). He claims his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") *Id.* ¶¶ 27–43. Petitioner filed this habeas petition on or about February 3, 2026.

PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO MANDATORY DETENTION

Petitioner seeks an order from this Court directing the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to immediately release Petitioner from immigration detention, or in the alternative, or to provide a bond hearing in immigration court. Neither relief is appropriate, and the Court should deny the petition under *Buenrostro-Mendez*. In *Buenrostro-Mendez*, the Fifth Circuit rejected the primary arguments that Petitioner here raises that detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and the Board of Immigration Appeal's ("BIA") decision in *Matter of Yajure-Hurtado,* 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), is unlawful. *Buenrostro-Mendez,* 2026 WL 323330 at * 1.

---

not controlling because "the mandate has yet to issue, and thus not properly relied upon as precedent."). As such, each pre-*Buenrostro* district court decision cited in this Court's Order to Show Cause is overruled as it relates to ICE's statutory authority to detain certain aliens on a mandatory basis under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

Petitioner's contention that detention should be governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 was rejected in *Buenrostro*. *Id.* To the extent Petitioner claims he is not properly categorized as an applicant for admission, "the text and context of § 1225 contradict the petitioner['s] reading of the statute." *Id.* at *9. The Fifth Circuit made clear that aliens present in the United States who have not been admitted by lawful means, remain "applicants for admission" who were "seeking admission." 2026 WL 323330 at *4. The court explained that "[w]hen a person applies for something, they are necessarily seeking it." *Id.* In so holding, the court rejected the reasoning that the phrase "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A) uses the present tense and thus applies only to individuals "currently and actively seeking to be admitted to the United States when [they are] apprehended." *Id.* at *3. The Fifth Circuit held that "the everyday meaning of the statute's terms confirms that being an 'applicant for admission' is not a condition independent from 'seeking admission.'" *Id.* at *4.

Buenrostro, recognizing that the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") controlled the analysis and outcome, also rejected arguments based on the Executive's past interpretation and application of § 1225 and § 1226. 2026 WL 323330 at * 8. "Years of consistent practice cannot vindicate an interpretation that is inconsistent with a statute's plain text." *Id.* (citing, *Pereira v. Sessions*, 585 U.S. 198, 204, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018)). The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government's interpretation and application of § 1225(b)(2)—the full enforcement of § 1225(b)(2)'s plain terms— "better honors" the intent of Congress's amendments to the INA to "put aliens seeking admission lawfully on equal footing with those who entered without inspection." *Id.* at * 9.

Respondents acknowledge that many courts in the Western District of Texas have ruled otherwise in previous habeas cases, but this significant, indeed, *binding* development in the Fifth

Circuit now warrants a different approach. "After reviewing carefully the relevant provisions and structure of the [INA], the statutory history, and Congressional intent" the Fifth Circuit concluded that the detention authority relied upon by the government is lawful. *Buenrostro*, at *1.

The Fifth Circuit is not the only court to so hold. District courts around the country agree. *See Singh v. Noem*, No. 2:25-CV-00157-SCM, 2026 WL 74558 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2026) (Meredith, J.) (holding that Petitioner, as an applicant for admission, is properly detained without bond under § 1225); *Cruz Rodriguez v. Olson*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 1:25-CV-12961, 2026 WL 63613 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026) (Pacold, J.) (holding that Petitioner was an applicant for admission seeking entry and thus subject to mandatory detention without bond); *Naikpay v. Sukkar*, No. 2:25-CV-1167-KCD-DNF, 2026 WL 44820 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2026) (Dudek, J.) (holding that alien released on humanitarian parole and later re-apprehended remained an applicant for admission under § 1225); *Azizzadeh v. Rhoney*, No. 25-CV-1288 (JLS), 2026 WL 44324 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (Sinatra, Jr., J.) (holding that despite being in the United States, Petitioner is an applicant for admission and no bond hearing is required); *Zuniga v. Lyons*, No. 1:25-CV-221-H, 2025 WL 3755126 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2025) (Hendrix, J.) (holding that alien residing in U.S. for 25-years remains an applicant for admission and shall be detained by § 1225 without entitlement to a bond hearing); *Masis Lucero, v. Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations*, No. 1:25-CV-823, 2025 WL 3718730 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2025) (Cole, J.) (holding that § 1225 applies to noncitizens present in the US but never admitted and requires detention through the end of removal proceedings); *Padilla v. Galovich*, No. 25-CV-865-JDP, 2025 WL 3640960 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2025) (Peterson, J.) (holding that Petitioner, as an applicant for admission, is not entitled to a bond hearing under § 1225 despite an improper release on bond when he was transferred from expedited removal into asylum proceedings); *Liang v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-09322, 2025 WL 3641512

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (Vyskocil, J.)(holding that because no immigration officer has decided that Petitioner is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225); *P. B. v. Bergami*, No. 3:25-CV-02978-O, 2025 WL 3632752 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2025) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that Petitioner, still awaiting her asylum hearing, is an application for admission that is seeking admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225); *Delgado v. Noem*, No. 9:25-CV-00329, 2025 WL 3639439 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2025) (Truncale, J.) (holding that petitioner is validly detained pending removal proceedings under § 1225 and § 1226 and that habeas was an improper means to challenge custody redetermination decisions); *Garcia v. U.S. Attn'y Gen.*, No. 2:25-CV-1053-KCD-DNF, 2025 WL 3537592 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2025) (Dudek, J.) (holding that Petitioner, who was apprehended at the border, is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under §1225, and that one month of detention falls below the constitutional threshold for a potential due process violation); *Rodriguez v. Noem*, No. 9:25-CV-00320, 2025 WL 3639440 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025) (Truncale, J.) (holding that Petitioner is properly detained without a bond hearing as an applicant for admission subject to § 1225, that § 1226 would only permit a discretionary hearing, and that habeas relief is improper for the alleged procedural violation); *Oliveria v. Albarran*, No. 1:25-CV-01760 WBS AC, 2025 WL 3525923 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (Shubb, J.) (holding that because § 1225 authorizes mandatory detention and is silent on bond hearings, due process is satisfied by the statutory scheme itself); *Melgar v. Bondi*, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025) (Buescher, J.) (holding that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225, which does not require the alien to be actively seeking admission, even if he may also be subject to § 1226); *Candido v. Bondi*, No. 25-CV-867, 2025 WL 3484932 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (Sinatra Jr., J.) (holding that Petitioner is an application for admission that is seeking admission under § 1225 despite having lived illegal within

the United States since 2004); *Chen v. Almodovar*, No. 1:25-cv-08350, 2025 WL 3484855 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (Vyskocil, J.) (holding that a § 1225 "applicant for admission" includes both arriving aliens and aliens present in the United States that did not enter lawfully); *Topal v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-01612, 2025 WL 3486894 (W.D. La. Dec. 3, 2025) (Doughty, J.) (holding that Petitioner is unlikely to prevail on the merits of his relief because he is an applicant for admission properly detained under § 1225 that has never received permission to enter the United States); *Cruz v. Noem*, No. 8:25-CV-02566, 2025 WL 3482630 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (Blumenfeld Jr., J.) (holding that Petitioner's lengthy presence in the United States after failing to present himself for inspection cannot remove him from § 1225's mandatory-detention framework and that he is still "seeking admission"); *Suarez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00202-JMD, 2025 WL 3312168 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 2025) (Divine, J.) (holding that Petitioner is an alien, present in the United States, who has not been admitted, so § 1225 applies to him and detention without a bond hearing is mandatory); *Garcia v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 2:25-CV-1004-KCD-NPM, 2025 WL 3277163 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (Dudek, J.) (holding that release on recognizance following apprehension at the border does not alter Petitioner's legal classification as an applicant for admission) *Andrade v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01695, 2025 WL 3252707 (W.D. La. Nov. 21, 2025) (Joseph, J.) (holding that any alien physically present in the United States who has not been admitted is an "applicant for admission," regardless of how long they have been in the country or whether they ever intended to apply or enter properly); *Alonzo v. Noem*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (Shubb, J.) (holding that "applicant for admission" is a legal designation for purposes of the removal scheme that covers aliens present in the country but not yet admitted); *Valencia v. Chestnut*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (Shubb, J.) (holding that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed on his challenge to

the INA and Due Process clause because an "applicant for admission" is a legal designation not a description of present conduct); *Cabanas v. Bondi*, No. 4:25-cv-04830, 2025 WL 3171331 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025) (Eskridge, J.) (rejecting Petitioner's argument that she was not "seeking admission" given her decades-long residence in the United States); *Ramos v. Lyons*, No. 2:25-cv-09785, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (Wilson, J.) (holding that § 1225 applies to an alien who is physically present in the United States but not lawfully admitted, regardless of how long they have been physically present here); *Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (Divine, J.) (holding that § 1225 does not render the Laken Riley Act superfluous and that Petitioner is detained under § 1225 despite a long-established government practice of detaining under § 1226); *Kum v. Ross*, No. 6:25-CV-00451, 2025 WL 3113646 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2025), (Whitehurst, M.J.), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2025 WL 3113644 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2025) (Joseph, J.) (holding that since Petitioner, who was detained upon entering the United States, is an applicant for admission under § 1225(b), there is no statutory entitlement to release on bond or to a bond hearing); *Oliveira v. Patterson*, No. 6:25-cv-01463, 2025 WL 3095972 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025) (Joseph, J.) (holding that any alien physically present in the United States who has not been admitted is an "applicant for admission," regardless of how long they have been in the country or whether they intended to apply or enter properly); *Sandoval v. Acuna*, No. 6:25-cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) (Joseph, J.) (holding that any alien physically present in the United States who has not been admitted is an "applicant for admission," regardless of how long they have been in the country or whether they intended to apply or enter properly); *Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott*, No. 1:25-CV-00500-JAW, 2025 WL 3013081 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2025) (Woodcock, Jr., J.) (holding that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed on the merits because, upon the automatic expiration of his parole, he was restored to the § 1225

detention status held at the time of parole); *Chavez v. Noem*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (Bencivengo, J.) (holding that Petitioner, as an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted, is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory provision under the plain text of § 1225(b)).

Buenrostro is consistent with the decision of the BIA, the highest administrative body charged with interpreting and applying the immigration laws. *See Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. at 216. In *Hurtado*, the BIA examined the plain language of § 1225, the INA's statutory scheme, Supreme Court and BIA precedent, the legislative history of the INA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub L. No. 104-208, and DHS's prior practices. After doing so, the BIA held that "under a plain language reading of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like the respondent, who are present in the United States without admission." 29 I&N Dec. at 225.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

"A person seeking habeas relief must first exhaust available administrative remedies." *Hinojosa v. Horn*, 896 F. 3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing *United States v. Cleto*, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). Exhaustion has been a long-standing prerequisite to habeas relief. *Id.* There are approximately 3.74 million cases pending in immigration court. *See* https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/eoir-announces-significant-immigration-court-milestones (Sept. 4, 2025). Federal district courts are not intended nor equipped to be the reviewing court for all immigration bond determinations or decisions related to the institution of removal proceedings. 8 USC § 1226(e) (district courts do not have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions made by immigration judges regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or

denial of bond or parole). Challenges to bond decisions should be administratively exhausted before being presented in district court. *Hinojosa*, 896 F. 3d at 314; *see Cortez v. Lynch*, No. 1:25-CV-822, 2026 WL 82039 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2026) (McFarland, J.) (declining to review Petitioner's detention-based claims due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies); *Pastor v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off.*, No. 4:25-CV-02761, 2025 WL 3746495 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 24, 2025) (Calabrese, J.) (holding that petitioner must first pursue challenge before BIA for exhaustion and that such exhaustion is not futile); *Bartolon v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-CV-747, 2025 WL 3674604 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2025) (McFarland, J.) (holding that petitioner's failure to exhaust claims with BIA precluded judicial review of habeas claims); *Garibay-Robledo v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-177-H, 2025 WL 3264482 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025) (Hendrix, J.) (holding that petitioner does not demonstrate grounds for excusing exhaustion and must first advance his request for relief to BIA).

Petitioner has either chosen not to seek bond before the immigration court, or Petitioner has received a bond determination from an immigration judge that Petitioner contests. Either way Petitioner must first seek relief with the immigration court or the BIA, fully exhausting administrative remedies before coming to this Court.

DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

To the extent Petitioner raises due process claims those should likewise be denied. Petitioner is receiving or has received due process afforded through removal proceedings in immigration court. In upholding the facial constitutionality of § 1225(b) the Supreme Court in *Thuraissigiam* found that applicants for admission are entitled only to the protections set forth by statute in the INA. *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,* 91 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (finding aliens who arrive at ports of entry are 'treated' for due process purposes 'as if stopped at the border' and 'only have rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute').

In addressing Petitioner's claims of potential abuse of detention pending removal proceedings, the Fifth Circuit found that *Zadvydas v. Davis* does not apply to detained aliens who are being given due process during removal proceedings. *Buenrostro*, at *9. District courts around the country have also dismissed due process concerns in similar contexts. *See Calderon Lopez v. Lyons*, No. 1:25-CV-226-H, 2026 WL 44683 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2026) (Hendrix, J.) (holding that nothing in the INA or Due Process Clause contradicts mandatory detention of applications for admission without bond under § 1225); *Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt*, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026) (Wyrick, J.) (holding that petitioner is unambiguously governed by § 1225 and his due process claim coming three months after arrest is denied as premature); *Montoya v.* Holt, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025) (Dishman, J) (holding that petitioner is unambiguously an applicant for admission and that detention without a bond hearing does not violate the Due Process Clause); *A.M. v. Joyce*, No. 2:25-CV-00615-LEW, 2025 WL 3706922 (D. Me. Dec. 22, 2025) (Walker, J.) (holding that petitioner's approximately one-month detention without a prompt bond hearing is consistent with the INA and the Due Process Clause); *Rivera Hernandez v. Noem*, No. 9:25-CV-00326, 2025 WL 3754434 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025) (Truncale, J.) (holding that § 1225, as the more specific statute, governs petitioner's detention, which does not violate due process as it has not been shown to be indefinite); *E.R.J.B. v. Wofford*, No. 1:25-CV-01843-WBS-SCR, 2025 WL 3683118 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (Shubb, J.) (holding that because § 1225 authorizes mandatory detention and is silent on bond hearings, due process is satisfied by the statutory scheme itself); *Coronado v. Sec'y, DHS*, No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 WL 3628229 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025) (Cole, J.) (holding that because petitioner was never lawfully admitted, detention is governed by § 1225 and bond hearings are unavailable as a matter of statute and due process); *Ugarte-Arenas v. Olson*, No. 25-C-1721,

2025 WL 3514451 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2025) (Griesbach, J.) (holding that petitioner, as an applicant for admission, is properly detained without a bond hearing under § 1225, which does not violate Due Process Clause); *Jimenez v. Thompson*, No. 4:25-CV-05026, 2025 WL 3265493 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025) (Eskridge, J.) (rejecting petitioner's argument that mandatory detention without bond hearing violates substantive due process); *Rojas v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-1437, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025) (Ludwig, J.) ((holding that petitioner is an applicant for admission despite his prior bond and that his detention does not violate due process because it is limited to the conclusion of his removal proceedings).

APA CHALLENGES MAY NOT BE ASSERTED IN HABEAS

In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner expressly challenges his civil detention. Such a challenge must be brought in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is what Petitioner has filed here. *See Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that when a detainee "is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus"). Petitioner, however, raises additional arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), none of which are cognizable in habeas, and none of which are covered under the $5 habeas filing fee. As such, those claims should be dismissed. *See Ndudzi v. Castro*, No. SA–20–CV–0492–JKP, 2020 WL 3317107 at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 18, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)). "When a filing contains both habeas and on-habeas claims, 'the district court should separate the claims and decide the [non-habeas] claims' separately from the habeas ones given the differences between the two types of claims. *Id* (collecting cases and further noting the "vast procedural differences between the two types of actions"). Given the differences, the Court should either sever the non-habeas claims or dismiss

them altogether without prejudice if severance is not warranted. *Id.* at *3; *see also Montoya v. Noem*, SA–CV–1410–FB (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026) (dismissing all non-habeas claims without prejudice under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6)).

CONCLUSION

This case fits squarely within the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in *Buenrostro*. The orderly legal administration of this issue is now properly before the federal appellate courts and is being given the urgency that questions of detention deserve. Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny this petition.

Dated: February 9, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Justin R. Simmons
United States Attorney

By: *Lacy L. McAndrew*
Lacy L. McAndrew
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 455017
601 N.W. Loop 410, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
(210) 384-7325 (direct)
(210) 384-7312 (fax)
Lacy.McAndrew@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Federal Respondents