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2 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
3 **MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA**

4 **IRVING MUNOZ BERRIOS**

5 Petitioner,

6 v.

7 **JASON STREEVAL**, Warden of Stewart  
8 Detention Center;

9 **SEAN ERVIN**, Field Office Director of  
10 Enforcement and Removal Operations, Atlanta  
11 Field Office (ERO Atlanta);

12 **TODD M. LYONS**, Senior Official Performing  
13 the Duties of Director, Immigration and  
14 Customs Enforcement;

15 **DAREN K. MARGOLIN**, Director, Executive  
16 Office For Immigration Review (EOIR);

17 **KRISTI NOEM**, Secretary, U.S. Department  
18 of Homeland Security(DHS);

19 **PAMELA BONDI**, U.S. Attorney General; in  
20 their official capacities,

21 Respondents.  
22  
23  
24

**Case No.**

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS**

1 INTRODUCTION

2 1. Petitioner, Mr. Irving Muñoz Berrios is a male from Mexico who entered the  
3 United States without inspection (EWI) over 20 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival.  
4 Mr. Muñoz Berrios was apprehended by immigration authorities on or around January 05, 2026.  
5 The Respondents keep Mr. Muñoz Berrios detained at the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin,  
6 Georgia.

7 2. Mr. Muñoz Berrios is a member of a nationwide class of noncitizens who are in  
8 immigration detention and being denied access to a bond hearing based on the government’s  
9 allegation that they entered the United States without admission or inspection (colloquially  
10 referred to as “entered without inspection” or “EWI”).

11 3. On November 25, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of  
12 California granted declaratory relief to the entire class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No.  
13 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.),<sup>1</sup> (*See, Exhibit. 1*) holding that the government is  
14 unlawfully subjecting them to mandatory (meaning no-bond) detention and that class members  
15 are eligible for release on bond under the immigration laws. Under the Court’s order, class  
16 members should be able to request a bond hearing in immigration court before an immigration

17  
18 <sup>1</sup> On November 20, 2025, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of  
19 individual plaintiffs holding that the government’s policy is inconsistent with the plain language of  
20 the *Immigration and Nationality Act* (“INA”), and that petitioners are properly subject to § 1226(a);  
21 and on November 25, 2025, , the Court certified a nationwide class and expressly “extend[ed] the  
22 same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.” *Maldonado*  
23 *Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861, at \*9,  
24 11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-  
25 Petitioners); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,  
26 2025 WL 3288403, at \*9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ proposed  
27 nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory judgment from Order  
28 Granting Petitioners’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). The declaratory judgment held that the  
29 Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied  
30 consideration for release on bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *Maldonado Bautista*, 2025 WL 3289861,  
31 at \*11.

1 judge (IJ) who must consider whether they are suitable for release on bond while their removal  
2 proceedings are pending.

3 4. Because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office  
4 for Immigration Review (EOIR) have refused to abide by the declaratory judgment issued on  
5 behalf of the certified class in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, Mr. Muñoz Berrios is likely to  
6 face many additional months in detention. Mr. Muñoz Berrios has no other option but to bring  
7 this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to enforce his rights a member of the Bond Eligible Class  
8 certified in *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, id.*

9 5. Mr. Muñoz Berrios also seeks relief from this Court, as a detainee under INA §  
10 1226(a), independent of any claim to class membership, because his continued, lengthy  
11 immigration related detention is anyhow unconstitutional due to the violation of his  
12 constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the violation of the  
13 *Administrative Procedure Act* (APA) unlawful denial of bond, and the violation of statutory  
14 rights under the INA for unlawful denial of bond hearings

15 6. Accordingly, to vindicate Mr. Muñoz Berrios' rights, as a member of the Bond  
16 Eligible Class in *Maldonado Bautista*, as well as under the Constitution of the United States, and  
17 his statutory rights under INA, this Court should grant the instant petition for a writ of habeas  
18 corpus.

19 7. Therefore, the Court should order Petitioner's release unless Respondents provide  
20 a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days.

21 **JURISDICTION**

22 8. This action arises under the Constitution and the *Immigration and Nationality Act*,  
23 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq*



1 15. Furthermore, Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United  
2 States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims  
3 occurred and continue to occur at the Atlanta Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and Removal  
4 Operations division (ERO Atlanta) within the Middle District of Georgia's District and Division.

5 **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

6 16. The federal habeas corpus statute provides that "[a] court, justice or judge  
7 entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the  
8 respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the  
9 application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

10 17. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting  
11 individuals from unlawful detention. Habeas corpus is "perhaps the most important writ known  
12 to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of  
13 illegal restraint or confinement." *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). "The  
14 application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who  
15 entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application."  
16 *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

17 18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, respectfully requests, and this  
18 Court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus "forthwith," as the legal issues have  
19 already been resolved for class members in *Maldonado Bautista*.

20 19. However, if pursuant to Section 2243, this Court issues an order to show cause  
21 (OSC), it must direct the respondents to file a return showing why the petition for a writ of  
22 habeas corpus filed by Mr. Muñoz Berrios pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should not be granted.

1 20. As provided by Section 2243, the writ or order to show cause must be returned by  
2 the respondents “within *three days* unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty  
3 days, is allowed.” *28 U.S.C. § 2243* (emphasis added).

4 21. Nonetheless, giving the Respondents additional time to respond is inappropriate  
5 in this case because Mr. Muñoz Berrios faces unjustified detention for an extended period of  
6 time without being able to challenge his detention at a bond hearing in immigration court while  
7 the immigration proceedings are pending. It is important to note, that should Mr. Muñoz Berrios  
8 continue to fight his case, respondents will not offer the opportunity for pre-removal release.

9 22. Thus, Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ period of detention is uncertain because of the backlog  
10 in the immigration courts. Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ ongoing, and prolonged detention carries the  
11 separation from his common law partner, his stepchildren, and other close family members. The  
12 harshness of detention could not only affect his physical health or expose him to psychological  
13 trauma, but it could also hinder communications with the undersigned attorney in preparation for  
14 his defense. Additionally, it could also be used to pressure him to accept abandon any claims of  
15 immigration relief and accept deportation.

16 23. Absent a grant of this petition for writ of habeas corpus or an issuance of an Order  
17 to show cause, the respondents will cause irreparable harm to Mr. Muñoz Berrios by subjecting  
18 him to an indefinite deprivation of his liberty and other fundamental rights.

19 **PARTIES**

20 24. Mr. **IRVING MUNOZ BERRIOS** is a citizen of Honduras that has resided in the  
21 United States since 2005. He was arrested while driving his vehicle at an ICE check in the  
22 middle of the road. He has been in immigration detention since around December 19, 2025.

1           24.     Respondent, Mr. **SEAN ERVIN**, Field Office Director of Enforcement and  
2 Removal Operations, is the Director of the, Atlanta Field Office of ICE's Enforcement and  
3 Removal Operations division (ERO Atlanta). As such, Mr. **Ervin**, Field Office Director of  
4 Enforcement and Removal Operations, is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for  
5 Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

6           25.     Respondent, **TODD M. LYONS**, is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of  
7 Director of the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement, is the federal agency responsible for  
8 custody decisions relating to non-citizens charged with being removable from the United States,  
9 including the arrest, detention, and custody status of non-citizens. Mr. Lyons has responsibility  
10 for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and is a legal  
11 custodian of Mr. Nolasco Gomez. He is sued in his official capacity.

12           26.     Respondent, **JASON STREEVAL**, is on information and belief, an employee of  
13 Core Civic, the private corporation which runs the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin,  
14 Georgia. contract facility where Petitioner is detained. On information and belief, Mr. Streeval's  
15 job title is Warden of the Stewart Detention Center. He has immediate physical custody of Mr.  
16 Muñoz Berrios. He is sued in his official capacity.

17           27.     Respondent, **DAREN K. MARGOLIN**, is the Director of the Executive Office  
18 for Immigration Review (EOIR), is the federal agency responsible for implementing and  
19 enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond  
20 hearings.

21           28.     Respondent, **KRISTI NOEM**, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  
22 Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and  
23

1 Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms.  
2 **Noem** has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

3 29. Respondent, **PAMELA BONDI**, is the Attorney General of the United States.  
4 She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration  
5 Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her  
6 official capacity.

7 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

8 30. Mr. Irving Muñoz Berrios is a 32-year-old man who was born in Mexico.

9 31. Mr. Muñoz Berrios entered the United States without inspection (EWI) back in  
10 2005.

11 32. Mr. Muñoz Berrios is a general construction worker and has no criminal history.

12 33. Mr. Muñoz Berrios has been married to a United States citizen for nine (9) years  
13 and has 2 United States citizen children and a United States citizen sister and other close friends  
14 living in the United States.

15 34. While in the United States, Mr. Muñoz Berrios has been involved in his  
16 community and a providing father for his children who suffer from severe medical conditions.

17 35. On or around December 19, 2025 Mr. Muñoz Berrios was wrongfully detained by  
18 ICE agents while driving his vehicle on his way to work in or around Chamblee Tucker, Georgia.

19 36. Mr. Villafuerte Cruz is in the physical custody of Respondents at the Stewart  
20 Detention Center in Lumpkin Georgia.

21 37. Mr. Villafuerte Cruz is a member of the Bond Eligible Class, as he:

- 22 a. **Does not have lawful status in the United States** and is currently detained at the  
23 Stewart Detention Center.

- 1           b. **entered the United States without inspection** over 20 years ago and **was not**  
2           **apprehended upon arrival**, *cf. id.*; and  
3           c. **is not subject nor detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.**

4           38. After apprehending Mr. Muñoz Berrios, DHS placed him in removal proceedings  
5 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. DHS issued a “Notice To Appear” (NTA) charging him as being  
6 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States  
7 without inspection, and under 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as not in possession of a valid  
8 unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document  
9 required by the Act (INA).

10           39. Respondents are bound by the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*, as it has the full  
11 “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Nevertheless, Respondents continue  
12 to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject Mr. Muñoz Berrios to  
13 unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond  
14 Eligible Class member.

15           40. Mr. Muñoz Berrios is scheduled to have a Master Hearing, which is merely the  
16 commencement of the removal proceedings, on February 25, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. It is important  
17 to note that the Executive Office for Immigration Review and its subagency the Immigration  
18 Court and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have blatantly refused to abide by the  
19 declaratory relief and have unlawfully ordered that Petitioner be denied the opportunity to be  
20 released on bond.

21           41. With this in mind, it is of extreme urgency that this Court issue a decision as early  
22 as practicable. This will allow the undersigned attorney to effectively argue for Mr. Muñoz  
23 Berrios’ release and ensure that the Immigration Judge afford Mr. Muñoz Berrios a bond hearing  
24 as ordered in the judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* and in accordance with his due process right.

1 42. Therefore, the Court should expeditiously grant this petition.  
2

3 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

4 **A. HABEAS CORPUS**

5 43. “Habeas relief is available when a person is ‘in custody in violation of the  
6 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-  
7 12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).  
8

9 44. The right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is intended to, at a  
10 minimum, provide “a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention.” *Rasul v. Bush*,  
11 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).

12 45. In the context of immigration, there are two main sources of authority for habeas  
13 corpus petition. The first, is the civil habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It provides that:

14 (a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,  
15 the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order  
of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district  
wherein the restraint complained of is had.

16 (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—

17 (1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States  
18 or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

19 (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of  
the United States . . . . 28 U.S. Code § 2241 - Power to grant writ.

20 46. The second basis of jurisdiction, is the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution,  
21 also known as the Great Writ. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of  
22 Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public  
23 Safety may require it.”).

1 **B. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, US CONSTITUTION**

2 47. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being  
3 “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V § 2.

4 48. In the immigration context, the Supreme Court extended these constitutional  
5 protections to all noncitizens within the United States, including those who entered unlawfully,  
6 declaring that “[noncitizens] who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be  
7 expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in  
8 due process of law.” *See, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953);  
9 *see also Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (There are literally millions of aliens within  
10 the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth  
11 Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property  
12 without due process of law.); *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that unlawfully  
13 present aliens were entitled to both due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth  
14 Amendment).

15 49. The Court reasoned that noncitizens physically present in the United States,  
16 regardless of their legal status, are recognized as persons guaranteed due process of law by the  
17 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. *Plyler*, 457 U.S. at 210 (citing *Mezei*, 345 U.S. at 212; *Wong*  
18 *Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).  
19 Thus, the Court determined, [e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary,  
20 or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. *Mathews*, 426 U.S. at 77; see also  
21 *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining that the Due Process Clause applies to  
22 all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,  
23 unlawful, temporary, or permanent). “The Due Process Clause extends to all ‘persons’ regardless  
24

1 of status, including non-citizens (whether here lawfully, unlawfully, temporarily, or  
2 permanently).” *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*9 (citing *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S.  
3 678, 690 (2001); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S.  
4 292, 306 (1993)).

5 50. Accordingly, notwithstanding Congress’s indisputably broad power to regulate  
6 immigration, fundamental due process requirements notably constrained that power with respect  
7 to aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. *See Kwong Hai Chew*, 344 U.S.  
8 590, 596–97 (1953) (explaining that a lawful permanent resident may not be deprived of his life,  
9 liberty or property without due process of law, and thus cannot be deported without notice of the  
10 nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal).

11 51. This fundamental due process protection applies to all noncitizens, including both  
12 removable and inadmissible noncitizens. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001)  
13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth removable and inadmissible [noncitizens] are entitled to be  
14 free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious”). It also protects noncitizens who have been  
15 ordered removed from the United States and who face continuing detention, *Diouf v. Napolitano*,  
16 634 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2011), as well as those noncitizens deemed “arriving” under  
17 the INA, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S.Ct. 830, 862 (2018). (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that  
18 “arriving” noncitizens enjoy due process protections against prolonged detention because they  
19 are “are held within the territory of the United States at an immigration detention facility” (citing  
20 *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); *see also Kwai Fun Wong v. United*  
21 *States*, 373 F.3d 952, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the “entry fiction” does not  
22 preclude substantive constitutional protection for noncitizens considered “arriving”).

1           52. As a matter of context, in the last two decades, the Supreme Court has addressed  
2 several challenges to the immigration detention scheme. For instance, in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533  
3 U.S. 678, 721 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that “Freedom from imprisonment—from  
4 government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the  
5 liberty” that the Due Process Clause protects. *Id.* at 690. The Supreme Court then held that the  
6 government must demonstrate that a noncitizen’s removal is reasonably likely to occur if the  
7 noncitizen remains detained for six months after the removal period specified in 8 U.S.C. §  
8 1231(a)(6). 533 U.S. at 701. In doing so, the Court recognized a presumption that detention  
9 longer than six months following a noncitizen’s removal period violates that noncitizen’s due  
10 process right to liberty. *Id.*

11           53. In *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the  
12 mandatory detention of a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on the petitioner’s  
13 concession of deportability and the Court’s understanding that detention under § 1226(c) is  
14 typically “brief.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 522 n.6, 528. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision  
15 in *Demore* did not foreclose a noncitizen’s right to challenge prolonged detention that does not  
16 provide protections that permit a noncitizen to challenge continued confinement.

17           54. To guarantee against such arbitrary detention and to guarantee the right to liberty,  
18 due process requires “adequate procedural protections” that ensure the government’s asserted  
19 justification for a noncitizen’s physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally  
20 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690 (internal quotation  
21 marks omitted).

22           55. Following *Zadvydas* and *Demore*, circuit court of appeals that confronted the  
23 issue found either that the INA or due process require a bond hearing or release for noncitizens  
24

1 subject to unreasonably prolonged detention pending removal proceedings. *See, e.g., Sopo v.*  
2 *U.S. Attorney Gen.*, 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016), *vacated as moot*, 890 F.3d 952 (11th Cir.  
3 2018); *Reid v. Donelan*, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); *Lora v. Shanahan*, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir.  
4 2015); *Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III)*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015); *Diop v.*  
5 *ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); *Ly v. Hansen*, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).

6 56. Later, in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court held that  
7 the Ninth Circuit erred by interpreting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1225(b) to require bond hearings  
8 as a matter of statutory construction. The Supreme Court concluded that §§1225(b), 1226(a), and  
9 1226(c) do not give detained [noncitizens] the right to periodic bond hearings during the course  
10 of their detention. Because the Ninth Circuit had not decided whether the Constitution itself  
11 requires bond hearings in cases of prolonged detention, the Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit  
12 to address the issue. *Id.* at 851. The Court’s majority opinion did not express any views on the  
13 constitutional question and left it to the lower courts to address the issue in the first instance.

14 57. In his dissent, Justice Breyer expressed that “to hold a [person] without bail is to  
15 deprive him of bodily “liberty...” “...where there is no bail proceeding, there has been no bail-  
16 related “process” at all.” citing *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U. S. 739–751 (1987). Justice  
17 Breyer also mentioned that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the  
18 liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”  
19 citing *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U. S. 71, 80 (1992); *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U. S. 510, 532 (2003)  
20 (Kennedy, J., concurring); *Zadvydas*, 533 U. S., at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). To Justice  
21 Breyer “[t]he Due Process Clause foresees eligibility for bail as part of due process” because  
22 “[b]ail is basic to our system of law.” *Jennings*, at 862, (citing *Salerno, supra*, at 748–  
23 751; *Schilb v. Kuebel*, 404 U. S. 357, 365 (1971); *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951)).

1 58. Since the Supreme Court's *Jennings* decision, lower courts have expressed that  
2 "...any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is  
3 unconstitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the  
4 government's arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so." *See, e.g., Rodriguez v.*  
5 *Marin*, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

6 59. In immigration cases, civil detention has been found to only permissible where it  
7 bears a "reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed." *Jackson v.*  
8 *Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). As concluded in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. at 690, due  
9 process thus requires "adequate procedural protections" to ensure that the government's asserted  
10 justification for a noncitizen's physical confinement "outweighs the individual's constitutionally  
11 protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." *Id.* at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted).

12 60. Also, and relevant here, in the immigration context, the Supreme Court has  
13 recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention: to mitigate the risks of danger to the  
14 community and to prevent flight. *Id.*; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528. The government may not detain a  
15 noncitizen based on any other justification.

16 61. Thus, where the government detains a noncitizen for a prolonged period or where  
17 the noncitizen pursues a substantial defense to removal or claim to relief, due process requires an  
18 individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether such a significant  
19 deprivation of liberty is reasonably related to its purpose. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J.,  
20 concurring) (stating that an "individualized determination as to [a noncitizen's] risk of flight and  
21 dangerousness" may be warranted "if the continued detention became unreasonable or  
22 unjustified"); *cf. Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (detention beyond the "initial  
23 commitment" requires additional safeguards); *McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst.*, 407 U.S. 245, 249-

1 50 (1972) (noting that “lesser safeguards may be appropriate” for “short-term confinement”);  
2 *Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978) (observing, in Eighth Amendment context, that  
3 “the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether [a] confinement meets  
4 constitutional standards”).

5 62. To determine if the prolonged detention of a noncitizen is reasonable, Courts have  
6 applied a reasonableness test, which involves three main factors. First, courts have evaluated  
7 whether the noncitizen has raised a “good faith” challenge to removal—that is, the challenge is  
8 “legitimately raised” and presents “real issues.” *Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison*, 783  
9 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2015). Second, reasonableness is a “function of the length of the  
10 detention,” with detention presumptively unreasonable if it lasts six months to a year. *Id.* at 477-  
11 78; *accord Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1217-18. In assessing the length of detention, delay attributable to  
12 the government weighs against finding the detention reasonable. *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1218. Third,  
13 courts consider the likelihood that detention will continue pending future proceedings. *Chavez-*  
14 *Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478 (finding detention unreasonable after ninth months of detention, when  
15 the parties could “have reasonably predicted that Chavez-Alvarez’s appeal would take a  
16 substantial amount of time, making his already lengthy detention considerably longer”); *Sopo*,  
17 825 F.3d at 128; *Reid*, 819 F.3d at 500.

18 63. Due process also requires certain minimal bond hearing procedures. First, the  
19 government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to justify continued  
20 detention. Second, the decisionmaker must consider available alternatives to detention. Finally, if  
21 the government cannot meet its burden, a decisionmaker must assess a noncitizen’s ability to pay  
22 a bond must when determining the appropriate conditions of release.

1           64. The requirement that the government bear the burden of proof by clear and  
2 convincing evidence is also supported by application of the three-factor balancing test from  
3 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Under the *Mathews* test, Courts consider (1)  
4 “the private interest that will be affected by the official action.” (2) “the risk of an erroneous  
5 deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved  
6 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement  
7 would entail.” *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. at 335.

8           65. Due process also requires that a neutral decisionmaker consider alternatives to  
9 detention. A primary purpose of immigration detention is to ensure a noncitizen’s appearance  
10 during removal proceedings. Detention is not reasonably related to this purpose if there are  
11 alternative conditions of release that could mitigate risk of flight. *See Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S.  
12 520, 538 (1979).

13           66. Courts have ruled that automatically stayed release from detention is a violation of  
14 the Fifth Amendment. *See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 781 F. Supp. 3d 886, 895 (D. Minn.  
15 2025) (finding that it “does not require any showing of dangerousness or flight risk. Nor is it  
16 subject to immediate review by an immigration judge. It operates by fiat and has the effect of  
17 prolonging detention even after a judicial officer has determined that release on bond is  
18 appropriate. That mechanism’s operation here—in the absence of any individualized  
19 justification—renders the continued detention arbitrary as applied. *Cf. Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at  
20 699–700, 121 S.Ct. 2491.

21           67. The “recent shift to use the mandatory detention framework under Section  
22 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also fundamentally unfair. In a nation of laws vetted and  
23  
24

1 implemented by Congress, we don't get to arbitrarily choose which laws we feel like following  
2 when they best suit our interests.” *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at \*10.

3 68. It is important to consider for asylum seekers detention is often lengthy and that  
4 immigration detainees face severe hardships while incarcerated. Immigration detainees are held  
5 in lock-down facilities, with limited freedom of movement and access to their families: “the  
6 circumstances of their detention are similar, so far as we can tell, to those in many prisons and  
7 jails.” *Jennings*, 138 S. Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting); *accord Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at  
8 478; *Ngo v. INS*, 192 F.3d 390, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1999); *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1218, 1221. “And in  
9 some cases[,] the conditions of their confinement are inappropriately poor.” *Jennings*, 138 S. Ct.  
10 at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector  
11 General (OIG), *DHS OIG Inspection Cites Concerns With Detainee Treatment and Care at ICE*  
12 *Detention Facilities* (2017) (reporting instances of invasive procedures, substandard care, and  
13 mistreatment, *e.g.*, indiscriminate strip searches, long waits for medical care and hygiene  
14 products, and, in the case of one detainee, a multiday lock down for sharing a cup of coffee with  
15 another detainee)).

16 69. The above, is also a reality in Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ case. While in detention his  
17 freedom of movement is completely limited, he is unable to earn a living, is separated from his  
18 partner, stepchildren and other close friends. These conditions and obstacles only further  
19 underscore the serious due process concerns that prolonged immigration detention entails for Mr.  
20 Muñoz Berrios

21 70. Upon weighing the *Matthews* factors this Court should find that the Government’s  
22 interest in fewer bond hearings (the efficient processing on noncitizens for removal) is  
23 diminished. Additionally, since Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ detention will continue pending future  
24

1 immigration proceedings, this Court should find that the Government’s interest in denying him  
2 the opportunity for a bond hearing does not outweigh Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ liberty interest and it  
3 will also create a high risk of erroneous deprivation to said right.

4 71. The government’s decision that all noncitizens, like Mr. Muñoz Berrios, are to be  
5 mandatorily detained is arbitrary and affords to individuals like him no process, let alone due  
6 process. Therefore, it should be unconstitutional. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

7 **C. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”)**

8 72. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), codified in Chapter 12 of  
9 Title 8 of the United States Code, governs all aspects of immigration law. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101  
10 *et seq.* Forming the basis of current immigration laws of the United States, the INA addresses  
11 issues of admission qualifications for noncitizens, naturalization and loss of nationality, refugee  
12 assistance, and removal procedures for noncitizen terrorists. *Id. See also* Margaret C. Jasper,  
13 *The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952*, Legal Almanac: The Law of Immigration (2012).

14 73. Sections 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226 of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* (“INA”)  
15 govern how the executive branch evaluates inadmissible noncitizens. Logically speaking,  
16 inspection or apprehension of the noncitizen is a necessary precondition of removal. Only after  
17 a noncitizen is identified as inadmissible can removal proceedings happen.<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court  
18 has already distinguished these two provisions in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*. *See* 583 U.S. 281, 289  
19 (2018). The *Jennings* Court determined that the government may “detain certain aliens seeking  
20 admission into the country” under § 1225(b) while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain  
21

22 <sup>2</sup> *See also, Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al v. Ernesto Santacruz Jr et al.* 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, ---  
23 *F. Supp. 3d* ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). Amended Order Consolidating The  
24 Court’s Orders On Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, Class Certification, And Application For  
Reconsideration Or Clarification.

1 certain aliens *already in the country* pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” *Id.*  
2 (emphasis added).

3 74. Under § 1225, an “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen “present in the United  
4 States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).  
5 “[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States  
6 after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

7 75. Section 1225(b)(1) of INA authorizes expedited removal for certain “applicants  
8 for admission” in two categories. First, noncitizens “arriving in the United States” that are  
9 determined by an immigration officer to be inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to  
10 meet documents requirements. *Id.* at § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); *see also id.* at § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7).

11 76. Second, noncitizens that (a) are inadmissible because of misrepresentation or  
12 failure to meet documents requirements; (b) have not “been admitted or paroled into the United  
13 States”; (c) have not “affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that  
14 [they have] been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period  
15 immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (d) have been  
16 designated by the Attorney General for expedited removal. *Id.* at § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).

17 77. These two categories of noncitizens subject to § 1225(b)(1) are subject to  
18 mandatory detention “until certain proceedings have concluded.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 297.  
19 Individuals that fall into § 1225(b)(1) are “normally ordered removed ‘without further hearing or  
20 review’ pursuant to an expedited removal process” unless claiming asylum or a fear of  
21 persecution. *Jennings*, 53 U.S. at 287 (first quoting § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); then citing §  
22 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)).

1 78. Noncitizens who are “seeking admission” and not covered by the expedited  
2 removal provisions in § 1225(b)(1) are subject to Section 1225(b)(2). *See id.* at 287. This  
3 category would include, for example, noncitizens who are arriving in the United States, seek  
4 admission, and are inadmissible for some reason other than misrepresentation or failure to meet  
5 documents requirements. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)–(3).

6 79. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs mandatory detention of applicants for admission.  
7 Subject to limited exceptions, Section 1225(b)(2) provides that such noncitizens “shall be  
8 detained” for full removal proceedings under § 1229a “if the examining immigration officer  
9 determines” that the noncitizen “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” *Id.* at  
10 § 1225(b)(2)(A).<sup>3</sup>

11 80. On the other hand, Section 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and  
12 detaining aliens who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” This Section  
13 provides for discretionary detention. 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). *See, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53  
14 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022).

15 81. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained” “[o]n a warrant  
16 issued by the Attorney General” if their removal proceedings are pending. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).<sup>4</sup>

17 \_\_\_\_\_  
18 <sup>3</sup> (b) Inspection of applicants for admission

19 (2) Inspection of other aliens  
(A) In general

20 Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the  
21 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a  
22 doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.  
23 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

24 <sup>4</sup> (a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision  
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and  
pending such decision, the Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and  
(2) may release the alien on—

1 Detention pursuant to § 1226(a) is not mandatory. If the noncitizen was not charged with,  
2 arrested for, or convicted of certain criminal offenses enumerated in § 1226(c),<sup>5</sup> the government  
3 has discretion to release them on “bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and  
4 containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or ... conditional parole.” *Id.* at §  
5 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).

6 82. Beyond how noncitizens are identified as inadmissible, the one key distinction  
7 between these two Sections is that noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to receive  
8 bond hearings at the outset of detention. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1). *See also Jennings v. Rodriguez*,  
9 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018).

10 83. Not only does § 1226(a) provide several layers of review of the agency’s initial  
11 custody determination, but it also confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral  
12 decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to  
13 appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” *See, e.g.,*  
14 *Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that § 1226(a) and its  
15 implementing regulations “provide extensive procedural protections that are unavailable under  
16 other detention provision”.)

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18  
19 (A) bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, an containing conditions  
20 prescribed by, the Attorney General... 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

21 <sup>5</sup> Known as the *Laken Riley Act*, subsection (c) of § 1226, provides for mandatory detention of  
22 noncitizens found inadmissible or deportable under certain provisions and who have been “charged with,”  
23 “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit “having committed” certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  
24 “[N]oncitizens arrested and detained under § 1226 have a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e.,  
a bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.” *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL  
2496379, at \*4 (citing 8 C.F.R. 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). “The IJ evaluates whether there is a risk of  
nonappearance or danger to the community.” *Id.* (citing *Matter of Guerra*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA  
2006)).

1 84. For decades the DHS had applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary release and  
2 review of detention “to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid  
3 documentation”—a practice codified by regulation. *See, e.g., Salcedo Aceros*, 2025 WL  
4 2737503, at \*3. However, last year the Government upended this long-held understanding of the  
5 law.

6 85. First, on July 8, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued  
7 an interim guidance memo stating that anyone who entered without inspection was ineligible for  
8 release on bond and could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court,  
9 regardless of how long an individual has lived in the United States.<sup>6</sup> As result, DHS attorneys  
10 started arguing, and some IJs started finding, that such individuals were not eligible for bond  
11 hearings in immigration court.

12 86. Then, on September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a  
13 precedential decision binding on all IJs, holding that an IJ had no authority to consider bond  
14 requests for any person who entered the United States without inspection. *See Matter of Yajure*  
15 *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The BIA determined that such individuals are subject  
16 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible for release on  
17 bond. In practice, DHS is not exercising this authority. As a result, thousands of people are  
18 facing months or years in detention without any individualized consideration for whether they  
19 should be detained.

20 87. But, as discussed above, the mandatory detention of applicants for admission  
21 applies after an examining immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission  
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23 <sup>6</sup> *See*, AILA Doc. No. 25071607, accessible through [https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-](https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission)  
24 [guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission](https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission) (last accessed on Friday, January  
16, 2026 at 6:27 pm.)

1 is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Additionally,  
2 it is important to note, that individuals who have not been inspected and authorized by an  
3 immigration officer lack the trait to be categorized as “applicants for admission” since statutory  
4 language of § 1225(b)(2) contemplates a determination by an “examining immigration officer”  
5 regarding a noncitizen’s admissibility. *See* § 1225(b)(2).<sup>7</sup>

6 88. However, the Government is now contending that anyone who entered without  
7 inspection remains an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and thus subject to  
8 mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2). *See e.g., Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, et al.*  
9 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (citing *Torres v. Barr*,  
10 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2020)).

11 89. In regard to this new interpretation, as of late 2025, several district courts have  
12 held that the Government’s new, and more expansive interpretation of mandatory detention  
13 under the INA is either incorrect or likely incorrect on the basis that this reading of the statute  
14 would render 1226(c) inoperable or moot. Several Courts have then rejected the government’s  
15 position and have held that such individuals are subject to § 1226(a) and thus eligible for a bond  
16 hearing. *See also e.g., Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock, et al.* 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL  
17 2782499 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025); *See e.g., Aguilar Merino v. Ripa*, 25-23845-CIV, 2025  
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20 <sup>7</sup> “...based on a plain reading of the language and aided by these standard canons of statutory  
21 construction, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens in the United States who have not been admitted  
22 (“applicants for admission” definition) AND who are attempting to obtain lawful admission to the United  
23 States. This interpretation is also consistent with the framework of § 1225, which focuses on the  
24 admission of aliens upon their arrival to the United States or upon an attempt to obtain admission after  
arrival...” *See J.A.M. v. Streeval*, No. 4:25-CV-342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025)  
citing *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (Kennedy, J.) (“In ascertaining the  
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, *as well as*  
*the language and design of the statute as a whole.*”) (emphasis added).

1 WL 2941609 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025), and *J.Y.L.C., v. Bostock, et al.*, 3:25-cv-02083-AB, (D.  
2 Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases rejecting *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*).

3 90. One of those recent cases where the Court rejected the government’s position, and  
4 relevant here, is *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp.*  
5 *3d ----, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 20250)*. On November 20, 2025, the District  
6 Court granted partial summary judgment for the four petitioners, holding that the government’s  
7 policy is inconsistent with the plain language of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* (“INA”),  
8 and that petitioners are properly subject to § 1226(a). *See e.g., J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-CV-*  
9 *342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025)* and *P.R.S. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-cv-330-*  
10 *CDL, 2025 WL 3269947 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025)*.

11 91. Then, on November 25, 2025, the Court certified all noncitizens in the United  
12 States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without  
13 inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be  
14 subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department  
15 of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination as “the Bond Eligible Class.” and  
16 expressly “extend[ed] the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible  
17 Class as a whole.” *Id.*, at \*9 (emphasis added).

18 92. As expressed above, Mr. Muñoz Berrios is a member of the *Maldonado Bautista*  
19 Bond Eligible Class.

20 **D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

21 93. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA commands a reviewing court to “hold unlawful *and*  
22 *set aside* agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, . . .  
23 or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).

1 94. APA claims are cognizable on habeas. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (providing that judicial  
2 review of agency action under the APA may proceed by “any applicable form of legal action,  
3 including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or  
4 habeas corpus”). The APA affords a right of review to a person who is “adversely affected or  
5 aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702.

6 95. Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Muñoz Berrios for a prolonged or  
7 otherwise indefinite period of time without a bond hearing is adversely and severely affecting his  
8 liberty and freedom.

9 **E. EXHAUSTION**

10 96. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA commands a reviewing court to “hold unlawful *and*  
11 *set aside* agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, . . .  
12 or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).

13 97. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, “a party may not  
14 seek federal judicial review of an adverse administrative determination until the party has first  
15 sought all possible relief within the agency itself.” *Howell v. INS*, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir.  
16 1995) (quoting *Guitard v. U.S. Sec’y of Navy*, 967 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1992)).

17 98. However, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies, however, when the  
18 available remedies would “provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief” or when  
19 “administrative appeal would be futile.” *Beharry v. Ashcroft*, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003)  
20 (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting *Able v. United States*, 88 F.3d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1996)). *See also*  
21 *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 146-49 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds as*  
22 *stated in Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (noting that traditional exceptions include where  
23 exhaustion would cause “undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action” or

1 “irreparable harm” to the petitioner, where there is “some doubt as to whether the agency was  
2 empowered to grant effective relief,” or where it would be futile because “the administrative  
3 body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it”) (internal  
4 quotation marks omitted).

5 99. In the context of immigration, Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion.  
6 Where Congress has not explicitly spoken, requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies  
7 lies within “sound judicial discretion.” *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). In  
8 exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court has stated that “federal courts must balance the  
9 interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against  
10 countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” *Id.* at 146. Those institutional interests  
11 are “protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” *Id.* at 145.

12 100. The *McCarthy* Court also identified situations in which the interest of the  
13 individual weighs heavily against the institutional interests. *See id.* at 146–49. Relevant here, “an  
14 administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise  
15 predetermined the issue before it.” *Id.* at 148 (citing *Gibson v. Berryhill*, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.14  
16 (1973)).

17 101. Further, constitutional challenges have been found exempt from administrative  
18 exhaustion requirements. *See Khan v. Atty. Gen. of U.S.*, 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006)  
19 (internal alterations and quotations omitted) (“[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from  
20 the exhaustion requirement because the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate  
21 constitutional issues.”); *United States v. Gonzalez-Roque*, 301 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2002)  
22 (“[T]he BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues . . . .” (quoting  
23 *Vargas v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization*, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1987))).

1 102. As mentioned above, on July 8, 2025, the U.S. Immigration and Customs  
2 Enforcement (“ICE”) was instructed, via an interim guidance memo, that anyone who entered  
3 without inspection (EWIs) is ineligible for release on bond. Then, on September 5, 2025, the  
4 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that “[b]ased on the plain language of section  
5 235(b)(2)(A) of the [INA], Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant  
6 bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.” *See Matter of Yajure*  
7 *Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

8 103. In accordance with the July 8, 2025 interim guidance memo and the Board of  
9 Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, DHS’ attorneys have the  
10 practice of arguing, and Immigration Court IJs throughout the country, including those stationed  
11 at Stewart Detention Center, have started finding that individuals, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios,  
12 could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court, regardless of how  
13 long an individual has lived in the United States. As result, individuals, such as Mr. Muñoz  
14 Berrios, are denied bond hearings in immigration court.

15 104. Since the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is an administrative body located  
16 in the DOJ, which, of course, is part of the executive branch of the government. Its members are  
17 appointed by the Attorney General, and its decisions are binding on all immigration judges,  
18 *Yajure Hurtado* thus precludes an IJ from finding jurisdiction over noncitizens, like Mr. Muñoz  
19 Berrios, to hold a bond hearing. As such, this Court should find that the agency's position is  
20 already set and recourse to administrative remedies is very likely futile.

21 105. Additionally, Immigration judges have informed class members in bond hearings  
22 that they have been instructed by “leadership” that the declaratory judgment in *Maldonado*  
23 *Bautista* is not controlling, even with respect to class members, and that instead IJs remain bound

1 to follow the agency's prior decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA  
2 2025).

3 106. Since the government has already predetermined that anyone who entered without  
4 inspection (EWIs) is ineligible for release on bond, established a no-bond for EWIs policy, and  
5 has resorted to an across-the-board application of § 1225(b)(2), Mr. Muñoz Berrios had to  
6 proceed directly to filing this petition for writ of habeas corpus based on *Maldonado Bautista*  
7 class membership and for the violation to his statutory and constitutional rights.

8 107. Requiring exhaustion, in this case, would not further the ends of judicial  
9 efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of  
10 Mr. Muñoz Berrios' legal questions. It is important to consider that in detention cases, appeals to  
11 the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) can take months or years. Thus, requiring habeas  
12 petitioners, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios, to appeal to the BIA to prudentially exhaust is not  
13 efficient, would cause irreparable harm by continuing to deprive him of his liberty.

14 108. Thus, Mr. Muñoz Berrios' individual interest in having prompt access to this  
15 forum outweighs any institutional interests at stake.

16 109. Therefore, the Court should consider the merits of the Petition. This Court  
17 intervention, to enjoin the Respondents from preventing Mr. Muñoz Berrios from having a bond  
18 hearing pursuant to the holding in *Hurtado*, is necessary to enable him to avail himself of his  
19 administrative remedies.

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**CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

**COUNT 1: REQUEST FOR RELIEF PURSUANT  
TO *MALDONADO BAUTISTA***

110. Petitioner, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

111. As a member of the Bond Eligible Class, Mr. Muñoz Berrios is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

112. The Order granting partial summary judgment in *Maldonado Bautista* holds that Respondents violate the INA in applying the mandatory detention statute at § 1225(b)(2) to class members.

113. The Order granting class certification in *Maldonado Bautista* further orders that “[w]hen considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”

114. Respondents are parties to *Maldonado Bautista* and bound by the Court’s declaratory judgment, which has the full “force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

115. By denying Mr. Muñoz Berrios a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and wrongly asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Mr. Cruz Arcos’ statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in *Maldonado Bautista*.

**COUNT 2: UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION IN  
VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT**

116. Petitioner, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

117. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the] Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

1 118. Civil immigration detention is only permissible where it bears a “reasonable  
2 relation to the purpose for which the individual was committed.” *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S.  
3 715, 738 (1972); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690. Those purposes are limited: preventing flight and  
4 protecting the community. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).

5 119. Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ immigration proceedings are at an early stage, and he could  
6 raise a “good faith” challenge to removal.

7 120. Additionally, there is no removal order. His removal is not imminent or  
8 reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ continued and prolonged detention does  
9 not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which it was committed. It is important to note  
10 that the reasonableness of his detention can only be established once the government satisfies its  
11 burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that community protection or flight  
12 risk concerns apply to him. This can only happen in a bond hearing, which the Respondents are  
13 not affording to Mr. Muñoz Berrios. *See Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972);  
14 *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

15 121. Furthermore, the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does  
16 not apply to noncitizens, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios, residing in the United States who are  
17 subject to the grounds of inadmissibility only because they previously entered the country  
18 without being admitted.

19 122. Mr. Muñoz Berrios is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to another  
20 detention provision, such as 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

21 123. However, in accordance with the BIA decision in *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, DHS  
22 attorneys have the practice of arguing and IJs throughout the country, including those stationed  
23 the Stewart Detention Center, have started finding that individuals, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios,

1 could not challenge their detention at a bond hearing in immigration court, regardless of how  
2 long an individual has lived in the United States. As result, individuals such as, Mr. Muñoz  
3 Berrios, are denied bond hearings in immigration court.

4 124. These cumulative actions render his detention even more constitutionally suspect,  
5 as they reflect punitive conduct rather than civil processing.

6 125. Respondents lack statutory authority to detain Mr. Muñoz Berrios under Section  
7 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to noncitizens in his circumstances. Accordingly,  
8 Mr. Muñoz Berrios' continued detention constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process  
9 of law. The Court should order his release.

10 **COUNT 3: VIOLATION OF INA AND ITS**  
11 **IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(A)**  
12 **UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF BOND HEARINGS**

13 126. Petitioner, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, herein incorporates all allegations and facts set  
14 forth in the paragraphs above.

15 127. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to  
16 noncitizens, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios, residing in the United States who are only subject to the  
17 grounds of inadmissibility because they previously entered the country without being admitted.

18 128. Mr. Muñoz Berrios is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to the any  
19 detention provisions proscribed in 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

20 129. The government's no-bond for EWIs policy and the incorrect, willful, and  
21 capricious application of § 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Muñoz Berrios violates the *Immigration and*  
22 *Nationality Act*.

1  
2 **COUNT 4: UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF BOND HEARING IN**  
3 **VIOLATION OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BAIL**

4 130. Petitioner, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the  
5 paragraphs above.

6 131. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and  
7 unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII cl. 4.2.

8 132. Bail is “basic to our system of law.” It not only “permits the unhampered  
9 preparation of a defense,” but also “prevent[s] the infliction of punishment prior to  
10 conviction.” *Jennings*, at 862, (Breyer, J., dissenting) citing *Salerno, supra*, at 748–  
11 751; *Schilb v. Kuebel*, 404 U. S. 357, 365 (1971); *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U. S. 1, 4 (1951).

12 133. The government’s categorical, incorrect, willful, and capricious application of §  
13 1225(b)(2) to Mr. Muñoz Berrios and continued detention without a bond hearing results in  
14 indefinite and unconstitutional imprisonment which surmounts to a cruel and unusual  
15 punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

16 134. For these reasons, Mr. Muñoz Berrios’ ongoing and prolonged detention without  
17 a bond hearing violates the Eighth Amendment.

18 **COUNT 5: CONTINUED DETENTION WITHOUT BOND**  
19 **HEARING IN VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE**  
20 **PROCEDURE ACT, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)**

21 135. Petitioner, Mr. Muñoz Berrios, herein incorporates all allegations and facts set  
22 forth in the paragraphs above.

23 136. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to  
24 noncitizens, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios, residing in the United States who are only subject to the

1 grounds of inadmissibility because they originally entered the United States without inspection.  
2 Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a), unless they are subject to another detention  
3 provision, such as § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c) or § 1231.

4 137. The Mr. Muñoz Berrios is detained under § 1226(a) and is not subject to the any  
5 detention provisions proscribed in 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

6 138. Nonetheless, IJs stationed at Stewart Detention Center have a policy and practice  
7 of applying § 1225(b)(2) and denying bond hearings to detainees, such as Mr. Muñoz Berrios.

8 139. Respondents continue to keep Mr. Muñoz Berrios detained under the wrong  
9 provision of INA. Such action against Mr. Muñoz Berrios is arbitrary, capricious, and not in  
10 accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

11 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

12 WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Irving Muñoz Berrios, prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- 13 a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 14 b. Issue an Order prohibiting the Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the  
15 district without the court's approval;
- 16 c. Issue a declaration that Respondents are detaining Petitioner in violation of the  
17 declaratory judgment issued in *Maldonado Bautista*;
- 18 d. Expedite consideration of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 because it is an  
19 action brought under chapter 153 (habeas corpus) of Title 28;
- 20 e. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release  
21 Petitioner; on his own recognizance, under parole, or on low bond or any other  
22 reasonable conditions of supervision;
- 23 f. Alternatively, issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, hold a hearing before this Court if  
24 warranted to determine if the Petitioner should be subject to mandatory detention

1 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); require Respondents to release Petitioner unless they  
2 provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days;

- 3 a. Issue a declaration that Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention violates the Due  
4 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.
- 5 a. Award Petitioner attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act  
6 (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under  
7 law; and
- 8 b. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

9 Respectfully submitted,

10 /s/ Michael Urbina

11 Michael Urbina

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13 *Counsel for Petitioner*

14 Dated: February 3, 2026

