

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN**

**Manuel Alejandro  
AGUILAR MENDOZA,**

**Petitioner,**

**v.**

**Kevin RAYCRAFT, in his official  
capacity as Field Office Director of  
Enforcement and Removal  
Operations, Detroit Field Office,  
Immigration and Customs  
Enforcement; Julie MASSENGILL, in  
her official capacity as Jail  
Administrator of the Monroe County  
Jail; Kristi NOEM, in her official  
capacity as Secretary, U.S.  
Department of Homeland Security;  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela  
BONDI, in her official capacity as U.S.  
Attorney General; EXECUTIVE  
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION  
REVIEW,**

**Respondents.**

**Case No. 2:26-cv-10355**

**Hon.**

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS**

## INTRODUCTION

1. This petition arises from the U.S. government's new policy—which contradicts both the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and decades of agency practice—of erroneously interpreting the INA to mandate detention without the possibility of bond for noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection, even if they have been residing here for years.

2. This policy has led to the unlawful detention of countless noncitizens nationwide. Hundreds of habeas corpus petitions for their release have been filed in jurisdictions across the country, including many in the Eastern District of Michigan. Virtually every merits decision in those cases has found for the petitioners, either granting them a bond hearing or ordering their immediate release.

3. Petitioner Manuel Alejandro Aguilar Mendoza has been unlawfully detained without the possibility of bond in furtherance of this policy. Petitioner came to the United States 3 years ago and has lived here ever since.

4. Petitioner was taken into immigration custody following a routine traffic stop. Respondents placed Petitioner in civil immigration removal proceedings, alleging that he had entered the United States without inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

5. Petitioner is currently in the physical custody of Respondents at Monroe County Jail, which falls under the purview of the Detroit Field Office of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which has responsibility for immigration detention centers in Michigan and Ohio.

6. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for release on conditional parole or bond, Petitioner is entitled to a bond determination. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are residing in the United States but are charged as inadmissible for having initially entered the United States without inspection. In accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) have for decades provided bond determinations and bond hearings to people like Petitioner who have been living in the United States but allegedly entered without inspection.

7. However, pursuant to a new governmental policy announced on July 8, 2025,<sup>1</sup> Petitioner is now being unlawfully detained without bond. The new policy instructs all ICE employees to no longer apply 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to people charged with being inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who initially entered the United States without inspection. Instead, under the new policy, ICE employees are to subject people like Petitioner to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A)—a provision that has historically been applied only to recent

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<sup>1</sup> ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission (Jul. 8, 2025), <https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission> [<https://perma.cc/8SP7-TDDD>].

arrivals at the U.S. border—no matter how long they have resided in the United States.

8. Detaining Petitioner without bond is plainly contrary to the statutory framework of the INA and contrary to both agency regulations and decades of consistent agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner. It also violates Petitioner’s right to due process by depriving him of his liberty without any consideration of whether such a deprivation is warranted.

9. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be immediately released from custody unless Petitioner is provided with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) that meets constitutional and statutory requirements for due process within seven days.

10. Petitioner is not challenging any discretionary denial of bond; he is challenging the legal determination that he is not eligible for bond under § 1226(a) in the first place.

### **JURISDICTION**

11. Petitioner Manuel Alejandro Aguilar Mendoza is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Monroe County Jail in Monroe, Michigan.

12. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

13. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

### **VENUE**

14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Petitioner is detained in an immigration detention facility at the direction of, and is in the immediate custody of, Respondent Kevin Raycraft. *See Roman v. Ashcroft*, 340 F.3d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2003).

15. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees, officers, and agencies of the United States, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims and relevant facts occurred in the Eastern District.

### **REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243**

16. The Court must grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a

return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

17. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law . . . affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

### **PARTIES**

18. Petitioner Manuel Alejandro Aguilar Mendoza is a citizen of Honduras who has resided in the United States since 2022. He has been in immigration detention since October 16, 2025, and is currently detained at Monroe County Jail. After taking custody of Petitioner, ICE did not set bond. Petitioner’s immigration counsel advised him that seeking a bond hearing would be futile, as judges at the Detroit Immigration Court are currently deeming individuals who allegedly entered without inspection subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

19. Respondent Kevin Raycraft is the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. As such, Director Raycraft

is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in his official capacity.

20. Respondent Julie Massengill is the jail administrator of the Monroe County Jail where Petitioner is detained by ICE. The Monroe County Jail holds immigration detainees pursuant to a contract with ICE.

21. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the INA and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

22. Respondent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA, including the detention and removal of noncitizens.

23. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates are component agencies. She is sued in her official capacity.

24. Respondent Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA in removal proceedings, including for custody redeterminations in bond hearings.

## FACTS

25. Petitioner Manuel Alejandro Aguilar Mendoza has resided in the United States since at least 2022 and lives in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Petitioner is 29 years old.

26. Prior to his detention, Petitioner was an active community member. He volunteered to help his elderly neighbors, shoveling their driveways and helping them with yard work. Petitioner has a community of friends in Jeffersonville, and he has a close relationship with his uncle, a United States citizen who lives in California.

27. Petitioner was raised by a single mother and grandmother, who encouraged him to pursue his education and work hard. Petitioner cannot afford to call them in Honduras from detention very frequently, and he worries about the stress his detention is causing both of them.

28. Petitioner has no criminal history in the United States or abroad.

29. On October 16, 2025, Petitioner was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over by the Michigan State Police for an alleged traffic violation. During the stop, the officer contacted U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), who arrived at the scene and arrested Petitioner, presumably based on the belief that he was present in the United States without authorization. Petitioner was transported to

Marysville Border Patrol Station, and is now detained at Monroe County Jail in Monroe, Michigan.

30. DHS placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Detroit Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ICE has charged Petitioner with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

31. Following the initiation of removal proceedings, ICE either did not conduct a custody determination or chose to continue detaining Petitioner without providing an opportunity to post bond or be released under other conditions.

32. Petitioner's immigration counsel advised that seeking a bond hearing would be futile, as judges at the Detroit Immigration Court are currently deeming people who allegedly entered without inspection subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

33. Petitioner is clearly neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, as demonstrated by the following:

- Petitioner has strong connections with his community in Jeffersonville, Indiana.
- Petitioner's uncle, a United States citizen living in California, can vouch for his character.
- Petitioner has no criminal history.

34. Petitioner, who is actively working with his immigration attorney, has strong claims for immigration relief.

35. Without relief from this court, Petitioner faces the prospect of months—or even years—in immigration custody, separated from family and community.

### LEGAL FRAMEWORK

36. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

37. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens who are in removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. *See also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (explaining that § 1226(a) applies to those who are “already in the country” and are detained “pending the outcome of removal proceedings”). Under § 1226(a), individuals who are taken into immigration custody pending a decision on whether they are to be removed can be detained but are generally entitled to seek release on bond.<sup>2</sup> The bond may be set by ICE itself as part of an initial custody determination, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), and/or the individual may seek a bond hearing in immigration court at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). Section 1226(a) is the statute that, for decades, has been

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<sup>2</sup> Section § 1226 contains an exception for noncitizens who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes, who are subject to mandatory detention without bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That exception does not apply to Petitioner here.

applied to people like Petitioner who have been living in the United States and are charged with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

38. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of certain recently arrived noncitizens, namely those subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and other recent arrivals seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287, 289 (explaining that § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry” to noncitizens “seeking admission into the United States.”). Section 1225(b)(2) is the statute that Respondents have suddenly decided is applicable to people like Petitioner.

39. Third, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have already been ordered removed, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Section 1231 is not relevant here.

40. This case challenges Respondents’ erroneous decision that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention without bond under §1225(b)(2), rather than being bond-eligible under § 1226(a).

41. The detention provisions at § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 582–583, 585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

42. Following the 1996 enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not detained under § 1225 and that they were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination”).

43. Thus, in the three decades that followed, people who entered without inspection and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings received bond hearings if ICE chose to detain them, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

44. However, on July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” the Department of Justice, suddenly announced a new governmental policy that rejected the well-

established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of agency practice.

45. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months, years, and even for decades or since infancy.

46. In decision after decision, federal courts—both nationwide and here in the Eastern District of Michigan—have rejected Respondents’ sudden reinterpretation of the statutory scheme, and have instead held that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who are not apprehended upon arrival to the United States. *See, e.g., Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila.*, 25-cv-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at \*5-13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (cataloging **288 cases** granting habeas relief as of November 18, 2025); *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No. 25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3713987, at \*32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (granting relief to a nationwide class that includes the Petitioner here).

47. This list is undoubtedly incomplete. As the media has reported, “[f]ederal judges are increasingly exasperated by the Trump administration’s effort to lock up nearly everyone facing deportation proceedings . . . . The legal rejections

are so frequent that one judge compared the Trump administration's effort to Sisyphus rolling a rock uphill." Kyle Cheney, *Hundreds of Judges Reject Trump's Mandatory Detention Policy, With No End in Sight*, Politico (Jan. 5, 2026, at 5:55 AM ET), <https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/05/trump-administration-immigrants-mandatory-detention-00709494> (noting that more than 300 judges across over 1,600 cases have granted habeas petitions).

48. In recent months, the Eastern District of Michigan has repeatedly rejected Respondents' interpretation of the INA and granted writs of habeas corpus to detained noncitizens to whom Respondents denied a bond hearing. On August 29, 2025, Judge Brandy McMillion granted a writ of habeas corpus to an identically situated petitioner, concluding that "There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for . . . years and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border." *Lopez-Campos*, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784. And on September 9, 2025, Judge Robert White issued the same relief to another identically situated petitioner, reasoning that "the legislative history and agency guidance . . . in conjunction with the statutory interpretation" clearly entitles the petitioner to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). *Pizarro Reyes*, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at \*8. More recent decisions holding the same include: *Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13073, 2025

WL 2952796 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); *Romero Garcia v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13407, 2025 WL 3252286 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2025); *Hurado-Medlina v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13248, 2025 WL 3268896 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2025); *Ali Kadagan v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13602, No. 2025 WL 3268895 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2025); *Zambrano Paz v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13563, 2025 WL 3473361 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2025); *Brito Hidalgo v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13588, 2025 WL 3473360 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2025); *Lopez Herrera v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13627, 2025 WL 3473358 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2025); *Torres-Vasquez v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13571, 2025 WL 3473359 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2025); *Alvarez-Lopez v. US Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-cv-13098, 2025 WL 3525956 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); *Amaya v. Raycraft*, 25-cv-13539, 2025 WL 3530273 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); *Morales Rodriguez v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13560, 2025 WL 3543614 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); *Cervantes Morales v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-13434, 2025 WL 3543611 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025).

49. On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a precedential decision that rejected the overwhelming consensus of the federal courts. *See Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). That decision held that all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are ineligible for bond hearings before an IJ.

50. The *Yajure Hurtado* decision—like the government policy it seeks to uphold—defies the INA. As Judge Robert White wrote—after noting that federal district courts are not bound by agency interpretations of statutes—the BIA’s reasoning is unpersuasive and “at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory interpretation.” *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at \*7.

51. As court after court has explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

52. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under § 1229a to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

53. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez Vazquez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute

generally applies.” *Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256-57 (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)).

54. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

55. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (explaining that this mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.”).

56. Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people who have already entered and were long residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended by immigration authorities and detained. Because § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), is the applicable statute, Petitioner’s detention without eligibility for bond is unlawful.

57. Furthermore, Petitioner is part of a nationwide class of noncitizens that has obtained declaratory relief rejecting the government’s reading of the INA and the BIA’s reasoning in *Yajure Hurtado*. *See Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, No.

25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3713987, at \*12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). The court granted declaratory relief to “[a]ll noncitizens . . . who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.” *Id.* at \*32. The court also vacated the July 8 policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). *Id.* at \*22. Because the court in *Maldonado Bautista* entered final judgement as to these conclusions, *id.* at \*32, Respondents are bound by them.

58. Petitioner seeks relief from this Court because any months-long appeal to the BIA of an IJ’s decision denying bond would be futile. A new request for a bond hearing is likewise futile. First, the agency’s position is clear: both IJs and future panels of the BIA must follow the *Yajure Hurtado* decision. Further, the new governmental policy was issued “in coordination with DOJ,” which oversees the immigration courts, including the BIA—up to and including the ability of the Attorney General to modify or overrule decisions of the BIA, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). It is therefore unsurprising that the BIA has (erroneously) held that persons like Petitioner are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), rather than being bond-eligible under § 1226(a). Moreover, in the numerous identical habeas corpus petitions that have been filed nationwide, EOIR and the Attorney

General are often respondents and have consistently affirmed via briefing and oral argument that individuals like Petitioner are applicants for admission and subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See, e.g.,* Resp. to Pet., *Lopez Campos v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2025), Dkt. 9; Resp. to Pet., *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-cv-12546 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2025), Dkt. 4.

59. Second, by the time the BIA could even issue an appeal—a process that typically takes at least six months, *Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1245, and in many cases roughly a year, *id.*—the harm of Petitioner’s unlawful detention will be impossible to remediate. Nor will the downstream effects of continued detention be remediable: Petitioner’s family and community will be left without a caretaker and contributor for months.

60. Third, neither IJs nor the BIA have the authority to decide constitutional claims. *See Sterkaj v. Gonzales*, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, Petitioner claims not only that Respondents are unlawfully detaining him without bond hearings under an inapplicable statute, but also that such detention violates Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process if the government seeks to deprive him of his liberty.

## **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

### **COUNT I**

#### **Violation of the INA**

61. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

62. Respondents are unlawfully detaining Petitioner without bond pursuant to the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

63. Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Petitioner, who previously entered the country and has long been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents.

64. Instead, Petitioner should be subject to the detention provisions of § 1226(a) and is therefore entitled to a custody determination by ICE, and if custody is continued, to a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) by an immigration judge.

65. Respondents' application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner results in Petitioner's unlawful detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing and violates the INA.

## **COUNT II**

### **Violation of Due Process**

66. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

67. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. "Freedom from imprisonment—

from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

68. Regardless of whether the INA provides Petitioner with a bond hearing, Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

69. The government’s detention of Petitioner without an opportunity for a custody determination or bond hearing to decide whether he is a flight risk or danger violates Petitioner’s right to due process.

### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner from custody unless, within 7 days, Petitioner is provided with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) that meets constitutional and statutory requirements for due process;
- c. Enjoin Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the jurisdiction of this District pending these proceedings;
- d. Declare that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)— is the appropriate statutory provision that governs Petitioner’s detention and eligibility for bond because Petitioner is not a recent arrival

“seeking admission” to the United States, and instead was already residing in the United States when apprehended and charged as inadmissible for having allegedly entered the United States without inspection;

- e. Award Petitioner fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under law; and
- f. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February 2, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Molly Huffaker

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<b><u>Exhibit</u></b>	<b><u>Title/Description</u></b>
<b>A</b>	Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien
<b>B</b>	Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien
<b>C</b>	Form I-862, Notice to Appear