

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

SAMANPREET SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

FREDRICK W. STEVENS, in his official capacity as Seneca County Sheriff; **KEVIN RAYCRAFT**, in his official capacity as Detroit Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; **TODD LYONS**, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; **KRISTI NOEM**, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; and **PAMELA BONDI**, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,

Respondents.

Case No. 3:26-cv-133

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Samanpreet Singh fled political persecution in India and came to the United States in 2018 as an unaccompanied minor. Even though he is now over 18, the legal provisions pertaining to unaccompanied minors still apply to him. These provisions include a requirement that he be subjected to the least restrictive detention measures possible, and indeed, they do not provide for mandatory detention. *See, e.g., F.S.S.M. v. Wofford*, 2025 WL 3526671, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); *Garcia Ramirez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3563183, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2025); *A.C.J. v. Hermosillo*, 2026 WL 73857, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026). Nonetheless, on or about December 15, 2025, Respondents arrested

Mr. Singh and are holding him without bond at the Seneca County Jail under the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As courts have observed, the unaccompanied-minor detention provisions are incompatible with the mandatory detention requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), under which Respondents are purporting to detain Petitioner.

2. This case is one of thousands that have been filed nationwide stemming from the Government's unlawful detention of noncitizens under an inapplicable statute. Petitioner is an Indian national who fled persecution in his homeland and came to the United States as a refugee in 2018. He was considered such a low risk and so low-priority that he was previously released into the custody of his sponsor and his immigration removal case was taken off the immigration court's docket. ECF No. 1-1 (release); ECF No. 1-2 (Notice of Intent to Take Case Off of the Court's Calendar). Respondents are now purporting to detain him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), a statute that requires mandatory detention for "arriving aliens" who are "seeking admission" before an "examining immigration officer" at the border or a port of entry, even though he has lived in the U.S. for more than seven years. Respondents' position has been rejected by hundreds upon hundreds of district courts nationwide, as well as by the Seventh Circuit and numerous cases in this district. *Barco Mercado v. Francis*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (citing "350 cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States" who have rejected Respondents' position); *Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F.4th 1048, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2025) (finding that the Government was "not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that those individuals, whom ICE arrested without a warrant, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)"); *Echavarria Morales v. Noem*, 3:25-cv-2691, 2026 WL 100583 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026) (Pearson, J.); *Macias v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2642, 2025 WL 3525262 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9,

2025) (Polster, J.); *Lopez v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2449, 2025 WL 3280344 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2025) (Pearson, J.); *Chavez v. Dir. of Detroit Field Ofc.*, 4:25-cv-2061, 2025 WL 3187080 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025) (Lioi, C.J.); *E.V. v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 3122837 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2025) (Pearson, J.). In these cases, and hundreds of others like them, federal courts have ordered that the respondents either release individuals like Mr. Singh or provide them with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

3. Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings in 2018, when he was charged with entering the United States without inspection pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). ECF No. 1-3 (Notice to Appear). That case was taken off the immigration court’s calendar on April 18, 2023. On November 23, 2020, Mr. Singh filed a Form I-589 seeking asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and Convention Against Torture.

4. On July 8, 2025, DHS issued a new policy instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—*i.e.*, those who entered the United States without inspection—to be an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore subject to mandatory detention. Consistent with this policy, DHS has denied Petitioner release from immigration custody.

5. Petitioner’s detention on this basis violates the plain language of the INA. Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, given that he entered the United States over seven years ago and is not seeking admission at the border or a port of entry. Instead, if such individuals are subject to detention at all, it is only discretionary detention under § 1226(a), which allows for release on conditional parole or bond. That statute expressly applies to people who, like Petitioner, are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without inspection.

6. Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory text,

statutory framework, Congressional intent, decades of agency practice, and decisions of federal courts across the nation, including courts in this district, which apply § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner. Further, Respondents' detention of individuals like Petitioner without a bond hearing to determine whether they are a flight risk or danger to others violates their right to due process.

7. In addition, Mr. Singh entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor, or Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC), and was processed into the United States under the applicable provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which affords legal protections to UACs, including that UACs shall be placed in the least restrictive setting and are eligible for alternatives to detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A), (B). These protections expressly apply even after the UAC reaches the age of 18 and even if the UAC is now in the custody of DHS, requiring that DHS shall consider the least restrictive setting, considering the individual's danger to the community and flight risk. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B).

8. If there were any remaining doubt as to whether § 1225(b) governs Mr. Singh's detention, it was put to rest on December 18, 2025, when a district court in the Central District of California issued a final judgment in a nationwide class action, declaring that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to those who entered without inspection. *Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz*, 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).

9. Accordingly, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring his immediate release, or in the alternative, a bond hearing under § 1226(a), at which Respondents bear the burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his continued detention is warranted.

JURISDICTION

10. Petitioner is in the physical custody of Respondents. Petitioner is detained at the Seneca County Jail in Tiffin, Ohio, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

11. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause).

12. This Court may grant relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 *et seq.*, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

VENUE

13. Pursuant to *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, 410 U.S. 484, 493- 500 (1973), venue lies in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the judicial district in which Petitioner is currently detained.

14. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Respondents are employees or officers of the United States and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2243

15. The Court must grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus or order Respondents to show cause “forthwith,” unless the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If an order to show cause is issued, the Respondents must file a return “within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.” *Id.*

16. Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law” affording as it does a *swift* and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). “The application for the writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” *Yong v. I.N.S.*, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000).

PARTIES

17. Petitioner Samanpreet Singh is a citizen of India who has resided in the United States since on or about November 3, 2018. He has been in immigration detention since on or about December 15, 2025.

18. Respondent Kevin Raycraft is the ICE Field Office Director for the Detroit area, which includes Ohio. As such, Respondent Raycraft is Petitioner's immediate custodian and is responsible for Petitioner's detention and removal. He is named in her official capacity.

19. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and oversees ICE, which is responsible for Petitioner's detention. Ms. Noem has ultimate custodial authority over Petitioner and is sued in her official capacity.

20. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States. She is responsible for the Department of Justice, of which the Executive Office for Immigration Review and the immigration court system it operates is a component agency. She is sued in her official capacity.

21. Respondent Todd Lyons is the Acting Director of ICE. As the head of ICE, he is responsible for decisions related to the detention and removal of certain noncitizens, including Petitioner. As such, he is also a legal custodian of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

22. Respondent Fredrick W. Stevens is the Sheriff of Seneca County, Ohio, and in that capacity he oversees the Seneca County Jail, where Petitioner is currently detained. He is an immediate custodian of Petitioner. He is sued in his official capacity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

23. Petitioner Samanpreet Singh is a 24-year-old Indian national who fled his homeland

after experiencing persecution, physical violence, and death threats because of his family's membership in the 

24. Petitioner entered the United States on or around November 3, 2018. He was apprehended shortly after his arrival in the United States and DHS placed him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Petitioner's Notice to Appear charges him with being "an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled" pursuant to U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he entered the United States without inspection. ECF No. 1-3. Notably, despite Respondents' use of § 1225(b)(2) to detain him, the box stating "You are an arriving alien" is not checked on the NTA. *See, e.g., E.M. v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3157839 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025), at *7 (citing this as evidence that § 1226, not § 1225, applied to petitioner's detention); *Guaita Quinapanta v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3157867 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 2025), at *5 (same).

25. On February 17, 2023, the immigration court issued a "Notice of Intent to Take Case Off of the Court's Calendar," finding that Mr. Singh's case was not a priority because he was eligible to seek asylum before USCIS under the TVPRA. As of the time of filing this petition, Mr. Singh does not have any immigration hearings scheduled.

26. On or around December 15, 2025, immigration authorities arrested Petitioner. He has since been detained at the Seneca County Jail.

27. Petitioner has no criminal history. He is eligible and has applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

28. Pursuant to Respondents' new policy, discussed *infra*, Petitioner remains in mandatory detention. Absent relief from this Court, he faces the prospect of months, or even years, in immigration custody, separated from his family and community without ever receiving an individualized hearing justifying his detention in violation of the INA and Due Process.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

29. No statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion applies to Petitioner's case. *See, e.g., L.G. v. Choate*, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1181 (D. Colo. 2024) (noting that in habeas cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, "the government admits administrative exhaustion is not required by statute"). Moreover, the judicially created "general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts" does not apply to Petitioner's present challenge, as there are no prescribed administrative remedies to which he could resort. *McCarthy v. Madigan*, 503 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).

30. DHS has taken the position that noncitizens like Petitioner, who entered without inspection, are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review has affirmed that view. In a published decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals recently held that "Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to [noncitizens] who are present in the United States without admission." *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Under the BIA's interpretation, Petitioner is ineligible for bond as a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection. Accordingly, there are no administrative remedies that he could exhaust before seeking habeas relief. *See Singh v. Lewis*, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025) ("[t]he United States has made clear their position on Section 1225, and it is being applied at all levels within the DHS. Therefore, it is unlikely that any administrative review would lead to the United States changing its position and precluding judicial review"); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 789 (E.D. Mich. 2025) ("Because exhaustion would be futile and unable to provide Lopez-Campos with the relief

he requests in a timely manner, the Court waives administrative exhaustion and will address the merits of the habeas petition.”).

31. As recently as January 13, 2026, Chief Immigration Judge Teresa L. Riley issued nationwide guidance instructing all immigration judges to continue to follow *Yajure Hurtado* and to ignore the Central District of California’s decision in *Maldonado Bautista*. See “Practice Alert: EOIR Issues Nationwide Guidance on *Maldonado Bautista*,” available at: <https://www.aila.org/library/practice-alert-eoir-issues-nationwide-guidance-on-maldonado-bautista>.

32. Administrative exhaustion is also not required because neither an immigration judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals can rule on a petitioner’s constitutional claims, such as the due process claims raised in this petition. See *Matter of R-A-V-P-*, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 804 n.2 (BIA 2020) (holding that IJs and the BIA lack authority to consider the constitutionality of the statutes or regulations governing immigration detention that they administer and are bound to follow); *Matter of C-*, 20 I&N Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations.”); see also *Gonzalez v. O’Connell*, 355 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues”).

33. As courts have held, the Government’s argument that petitioners should be forced to exhaust futile administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief “is Kafkaesque. Requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would be futile because Respondents’ position is that he is *statutorily precluded* from obtaining the relief he seeks.” *Delgado Avila v. Crowley*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3171175, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2025) (citing *Valencia v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3042520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025)).

34. Appealing the IJ's bond denial to the BIA, which will necessarily deny it pursuant to *Yajure Hurtado*, would be the quintessence of futility. The problem is exacerbated by the slowness of the immigration court process: bond appeals have "an average processing time of 204 days," while many cases take "a year or longer to resolve." *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025). To require Petitioner to file a bond appeal that is guaranteed to fail and then make him wait 6-12 months (or more) for that inevitable denial only underscores the nature of the futility here, given that Petitioner's immigration case would likely be over by that time anyway, leaving him without effective recourse to challenge his unlawful detention. *See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 779.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNACCOMPANIED MINORS

I. Protections for Unaccompanied Minors

35. Minors who arrive in the U.S. without a parent or other legal guardian are considered "unaccompanied minors" and receive special treatment under the immigration laws because of their vulnerable status. This includes their treatment in detention and numerous legal protections that guarantee they are not removed without due process and are able to pursue forms of relief from deportation for which they may be eligible.

36. Before 2002, the care and placement of unaccompanied minors in the United States was the responsibility of the Office of Juvenile Affairs in the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). *See F.L. v. Thompson*, 293 F. Supp. 2d 86, 96 (D.D.C. 2003). In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (HSA), which created DHS and its components, including U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and ICE. *See Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan Modification of January 30, 2003*, H.R. Doc. No. 108-32 (2003) (also set forth as a note to 6 U.S.C. § 542).

37. Congress transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the responsibility for the care of unaccompanied minors “who are in Federal custody by reason of their immigration status.” 6 U.S.C. § 279(a), (b)(1)(A). The HHS defined an unaccompanied minor as a child who: (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;¹ (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody. *Id.* § 279(g)(2). Congress also transferred to ORR the responsibility for making all placement decisions for unaccompanied minors and required ORR to coordinate those placement decisions with DHS and ensure that unaccompanied minors are released to the care of a suitable adult or other placement for their safety. *See id.* § 279(b)(1)(C), (D), (b)(2).

38. In 2008, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) was enacted, requiring that “the care and custody of all unaccompanied [noncitizen] children, including responsibility for their detention, where appropriate, shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,” under whose purview the ORR operates. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1). The TVPRA also requires any other federal agency to transfer the custody of an unaccompanied minor to HHS within 72 hours, except in exceptional circumstances. *Id.* § 1232(b)(3).

II. Right to Removal Proceedings Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a

39. Pursuant to the TVPRA, any unaccompanied minor sought to be removed from the United States by the DHS, except for certain unaccompanied minors from contiguous countries,

¹ “The lack of lawful immigration status results from entering the country ‘without inspection’ (illegally), entering legally with fraudulent documents, or entering the country legally but overstaying the duration of admittance (i.e. a visa overstay).” Cong. Research Serv., *Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview*, n. 2 (Sept. 5, 2024), <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43599#ifn2>.

shall be (i) placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; (ii) eligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c at no cost to the child; and (iii) provided access to counsel in accordance with [8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5)]. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D).

40. Removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a provide the right to contest the basis for removal, present evidence, and apply for relief from removal. Thus, the TVPRA prohibits unaccompanied minors from placement in expedited removal proceedings, where they can be removed without a hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1232(a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(5)(D).

41. In 2013, the TVPRA was amended as to minors who reach the age of 18 after entry into the United States. This amendment requires unaccompanied minors transferred from HHS to DHS custody after turning 18 to be placed in the least restrictive setting available, including alternatives to detention and placement with a sponsor. *See* Senate Bill 47, passed into law on Mar. 7, 2013. This requirement demonstrates congressional intent to exempt unaccompanied minors, even those who have reached the age of majority, from the mandatory detention provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

42. Courts have found that unaccompanied minors like Mr. Singh, even after they reach the age of majority, are entitled to special treatment and are not subject to mandatory detention. *See, e.g., F.S.S.M. v. Wofford*, 2025 WL 3526671, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (“This requirement of placement in the least restrictive setting is in direct conflict with mandatory detention. Respondents make no attempt to reconcile the two, nor do they argue or present authority suggesting § 1225(b)(2) usurps the protections afforded by the TVPRA); *Garcia Ramirez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement*, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3563183, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (“Section 1232(c)(2)(B)’s entitlements extend to all former unaccompanied minors in ICE custody. And DHS and ICE must account for an age-out’s flight risk, danger to self, and

danger to community and then consider placement in the least restrictive setting available ... The statute calls for an individualized assessment of the proper placement for each former unaccompanied minor” (cleaned up); *A.C.J. v. Hermosillo*, 2026 WL 73857, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026) (“Petitioner argues that her re-detention at NWIPC ‘is not the least restrictive setting of detention nor does it effectuate her right to alternatives to detention as required by’ the statute. The Court tends to agree.”). Respondents’ detention of Mr. Singh at a county jail in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration, without any individualized assessment of whether this is the least restrictive alternative, violates his rights under the TVPRA.

ARGUMENT

I. Despite Respondents’ recent attempts to expand mandatory detention under § 1225(b), Petitioner in this case remains subject to discretionary detention and is eligible for release.

43. The INA prescribes three basic forms of detention for the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings.

44. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of noncitizens who are in removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; *see also Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (explaining that § 1226(a) applies to those who are “already in the country” and are detained “pending the outcome of removal proceedings”). Under § 1226(a), individuals who are taken into immigration custody pending a decision on whether they are to be removed can be detained, but are generally entitled to seek release on bond. The bond may be set by ICE itself as part of an initial custody determination, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), and/or the individual may seek a bond hearing in immigration court at the outset of their detention, *see* 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). Section 1226(a) is the statute that, for decades, has been applied to people like Petitioner, who has been living in the United States and is charged with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

45. Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category” of noncitizens from § 1226(a) for whom detention is mandatory, composed of individuals who have committed certain “enumerated ... criminal offenses [or] terrorist activities.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289 (citing § 1226(c)(1)). Among the individuals carved out and subject to mandatory detention are certain categories of “inadmissible” noncitizens. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). Reference to such inadmissible noncitizens makes clear that, by default, people who are applicants for admission but encountered in the interior are afforded a bond hearing under § 1226(a). Courts have confirmed this understanding of § 1226. *See Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)) (“When Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.”); *see also, e.g., Gomes v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (“inadmissibility on one of the three grounds specified in Section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i) is not by itself sufficient to except [a noncitizen] from Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework”).

46. Second, the INA provides for mandatory detention of certain recently arrived noncitizens, namely those subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and other recent arrivals seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287, 289 (explaining that § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry” to noncitizens “seeking admission into the United States.”). Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 may not be released except “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit” under the parole authority provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). *See id.* at 300. Section 1225(b)(2) is the statute that Respondents have suddenly decided is applicable to people like Petitioner.

47. Section 1225 is split into two categories. Section 1225(b)(1) provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens charged with enumerated grounds of inadmissibility *and* placed in expedited removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Meanwhile, Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to recently arrived noncitizens seeking entry at a border or port of entry.

48. Lastly, the INA also provides for detention of noncitizens who have already been ordered removed, *see* 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Section 1231 is not relevant here.

49. The detention provisions of § 1226(a) and § 1225(b)(2) were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, §§ 302–03, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 582–583, 585. Section 1226(a) was most recently amended earlier this year by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025).

50. Following the 1996 enactment of the IIRIRA, EOIR drafted new regulations explaining that, in general, people who entered the country without inspection were not detained under § 1225 and were instead detained under § 1226(a). *See* Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”).

51. Thus, in the three decades that followed, people who entered without inspection and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings received bond hearings if ICE chose to detain them, unless their criminal history rendered them ineligible. That practice was consistent with many more decades of prior practice, in which noncitizens who were not deemed “arriving” were entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ or other hearing officer. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)

(1994); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229 (1996) (noting that § 1226(a) simply “restates” the detention authority previously found at § 1252(a)).

52. However, on July 8, 2025, ICE, “in coordination with” the Department of Justice, suddenly announced a new governmental policy that rejected the well-established understanding of the statutory framework and reversed decades of agency practice.

53. The new policy, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” claims that all persons who entered the United States without inspection are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The policy applies regardless of when a person is apprehended and affects those who have resided in the United States for months or even years.

54. In decision after decision, federal courts—both nationwide and here in the Northern District of Ohio—have rejected Respondents’ sudden reinterpretation of the statutory scheme, and have instead held that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to noncitizens who entered without inspection months or years before their detention. *See Echavarria Morales v. Noem*, 3:25-cv-2691, 2026 WL 100583 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026) (Pearson, J.); *Macias v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2642, 2025 WL 3525262 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2025) (Polster, J.); *Lopez v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2449, 2025 WL 3280344 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2025) (Pearson, J.); *Chavez v. Dir. of Detroit Field Ofc.*, 4:25-cv-2061, 2025 WL 3187080 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025) (Lioi, C.J.); *E.V. v. Raycraft*, 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 3122837 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2025) (Pearson, J.); *see also Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025); *Gomes v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 1869299 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); *Martinez v. Hyde*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211 (D. Mass. 2025); *Lopez Benitez v. Francis*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); *Maldonado v. Olson*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Minn. 2025); *Romero v. Hyde*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271 (D. Mass. 2025); *Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771 (E.D.

Mich. 2025); *Sampiao v. Hyde*, 2025 WL 2607924 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); *Beltran Barrera v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); *Chogllo Chafila v. Scott*, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025); *Alejandro v. Olson*, 2025 WL 2896348 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); *Ochoa v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2938779 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); *Barco Mercado*, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (collecting “350 cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States” who have rejected Respondents’ position)

55. This list is far from complete. As the media has reported, “Judges have ruled against the administration in more than 1,600 cases.” Kyle Cheney, *Hundreds of judges reject Trump’s mandatory detention policy, with no end in sight*, Politico (Jan. 5, 2026), <https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/05/trump-administration-immigrants-mandatory-detention-00709494>. The deluge of decisions continues to grow, with dozens of new opinions added to Westlaw daily.

56. The BIA’s *Yajure Hurtado* decision—like the government policy it seeks to uphold—defies the INA. As one court recently wrote, the BIA’s reasoning is unpersuasive and “a non-binding decision that [] deviat[es] from longstanding practice.” *Alejandro*, 2025 WL 2896348, at *6. *See also* *Sampiao*, 2025 WL 2607924, at *8 n.11 (noting court’s disagreement with BIA’s analysis in *Yajure Hurtado*); *Beltran Barrera*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *5 (same); *Chogllo Chafila*, 2025 WL 2688541, at *7-8 (same).

57. As court after court has explained, the plain text of the statutory provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.

58. Section 1226(a) applies by default to all persons “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” These removal hearings are held under

§ 1229a to “decid[e] the inadmissibility or deportability of a[] [noncitizen].”

59. The text of § 1226 also explicitly applies to people charged as being inadmissible, including those who entered without inspection. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Subparagraph (E)’s reference to such people makes clear that, by default, such people are afforded a bond hearing under subsection (a). As the *Rodriguez* court explained, “[w]hen Congress creates ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, the statute generally applies.” *Rodriguez*, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256-57 (citation omitted).

60. Section 1226 therefore leaves no doubt that it applies to people who face charges of being inadmissible to the United States, including those who are present without admission or parole.

61. By contrast, § 1225(b) applies to people arriving at U.S. ports of entry or who recently entered the United States. The statute’s entire framework is premised on inspections at the border of people who are “seeking admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). *See Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 287 (explaining that this mandatory-detention scheme applies “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether a[] [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.”).

62. The text of § 1225, along with its placement in the overall detention scheme of the INA, make clear that the terms “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2) do not include individuals who have entered without inspection and are apprehended when already inside the United States.

63. Section 1225 is titled: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible *arriving* aliens; referral for hearing.” (emphasis added). As courts have recognized, “[t]he added word of ‘arriving’ indicates that the statute governs ‘arriving’ noncitizens, not those

present already.” *Beltran Barrera v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (citing *Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025)). This limitation is particularly clear when compared to § 1226’s general title: “Apprehension and detention of aliens.”

64. Further, § 1225(b)(2)’s specific subheading, “Inspection of Other Aliens,” subsection 1225(b)(2)(B)’s mention of “crew[m]en” and “stowaway[s],” and § 1225(b)(2)(C)’s use of the present participle “arriving,” reinforce the limited scope of § 1225(b)(2)’s applicability to those who have recently arrived at a border or port of entry.

65. Finally, the term “seeking” in “seeking admission” “implies action – something that is currently occurring, and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.” *Lopez-Campos*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2025); *see also Beltran Barrera*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4. Noncitizens who have been present in the country for years are not “seeking admission.” *Lopez-Campos*, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 781; *Beltran Barrera*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4.

66. The INA’s entire framework is premised on § 1225 governing detention of “arriving [noncitizens]” while § 1226 “applies to [noncitizens] already present in the United States.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288, 301; *see also Lopez Benitez*, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 490-91 (“[T]he line historically drawn between sections 1225 and 1226, which makes sense of their text and the overall statutory scheme, is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’”) (cleaned up) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288-89); *Martinez*, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 222 (“The idea that a different detention scheme would apply to non-citizens ‘already in the country,’ as compared to those ‘seeking admission into the country,’ is consonant with the core logic of our

immigration system”) (cleaned up) (citing *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289).

67. A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that courts must interpret statutes to give meaning to all provisions and avoid reading out or rendering superfluous any single provision. *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“one of the most basic interpretive canons . . . [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant[.]”) (cleaned up). The government’s current reading of § 1225(b)(2) violates this principle.

68. Section 1226(c) includes carve-outs for certain categories of inadmissible noncitizens, who would otherwise fall under § 1226(a), that are instead subject to mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), (D), (E). The inclusion of these carve-outs in § 1226(c) indicates that, contrary to Respondents’ interpretation, there are noncitizens who have not been admitted and that are not governed by § 1225’s mandatory detention scheme. Indeed, if the government’s interpretation were correct, it would render these portions of § 1226(c) superfluous since those same individuals would already be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

69. The recent amendment to § 1226(c) confirms this statutory framework. Last year, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which added additional categories of § 1226(a) carve-outs that are now subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Specifically, the Laken Riley Act mandates detention of noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A) (noncitizens “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled”), 1182(a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation), or 1182(a)(7) (lacking valid documentation) and who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. *Id.* Again, if § 1225(b)(2) were already meant to subject these groups

of inadmissible noncitizens to mandatory detention, it would render this portion of the Act redundant. See *Beltran Barrera*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4; *Lopez-Campos*, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 783.

70. The mandatory-detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to people who have already entered and were long residing in the United States at the time they were apprehended by immigration authorities and detained. Because § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), is the applicable statute, Petitioner's detention without eligibility for bond is unlawful.

II. Petitioner's Detention Violates the INA

71. As discussed above, mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) applies only to recently arrived noncitizens seeking admission at a border or port of entry, not individuals who entered without inspection and were later detained inside the country.

72. Here, "there is nothing in the record to suggest that [Petitioner] ever attempted to gain lawful entry." *Lopez-Campos*, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 781. Petitioner entered without inspection and lived in the United States for over seven years before being detained. In addition, Petitioner's Notice to Appear indicates that he is a noncitizen present in the United States; the "arriving alien" box is not checked. Furthermore, he was previously released from custody under the TVPRA, which would not be possible if he were subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). As such, Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

73. Petitioner's ongoing detention is not authorized under § 1226(a), either. As discussed above, § 1226(a)'s discretionary detention framework requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination based on Petitioner's risk of flight or dangerousness. Here, where Mr. Singh has no criminal history and is not a flight risk, he would be eligible for bond under § 1226(a).

74. Lacking any statutory basis for his detention, Respondents must release Petitioner

or, in the alternative, promptly hold a bond hearing to determine whether he should remain in custody. At such a bond hearing, Respondents must bear the burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner's continuing detention is warranted. "When granting immigrant detainees' habeas petitions, an 'overwhelming consensus' of courts have placed the burden on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee poses a danger or flight risk." *Ochoa v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2938779 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025), at *8 (citing cases from the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits and several district courts); *see also L.G.*, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (recognizing that "the rights of noncitizens are not the same as citizens" but nonetheless concluding that due process requires the burden to be on the Government).

III. Applying the three-part test from *Mathews v. Eldridge*, Petitioner's detention violates his due process rights.

75. Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). To determine whether civil detention violates a noncitizen's Fifth Amendment due process rights, courts apply the three-part test in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

76. Under *Mathews*, courts weigh three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 335.

a. Private Interest

77. As to the first *Mathews* factor, "[t]he interest in being free from physical detention" is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 531 (2004).

Petitioner has been detained for over a month in conditions that are indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. This detention prevents him from going to work to support himself and deprives him of any privacy and freedom of movement. Courts in similar cases have not hesitated to find that the first *Mathews* factor weighs in favor of petitioners. *See, e.g., Delgado Avila*, 2025 WL 3171175, at *5; *Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2942648 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025), at *7 (“The first *Mathews* factor weighs strongly in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention.”); *Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem*, 2025 WL 2938779 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025), at *7 (“Ochoa Ochoa has a cognizable private interest in being freed from unlawful detention without any opportunity for a bond hearing”).

b. ***Risk of Erroneous Deprivation***

78. As to the second *Mathews* factor, courts must “assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate these risks.” *Gunaydin v. Trump*, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025). The current procedures cause an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest in remaining free from detention.

79. As discussed above, the statutory text and framework, congressional intent, the longstanding practice of the agency, and the decisions of many federal courts across the nation leave no doubt that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to recently arrived noncitizens seeking entry at a border or port of entry, not noncitizens who entered without inspection and were detained inside the country.

80. Here, Petitioner was not arriving at a border or port of entry when he was detained. Instead, he entered without inspection and lived in the United States for over seven years before being detained. As such, Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

81. Therefore, it is clear that the government's current procedure, subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), creates a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner's interest in being free from arbitrary confinement.

82. Additionally, there are reasonable alternatives available for Respondents to pursue. As discussed above, § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens facing charges of inadmissibility, including noncitizens like Petitioner who entered without inspection and were later detained while residing inside the country. As such, proper application of the INA's detention scheme allows for the possibility of detaining Petitioner under § 1226(a) but first requires a bond hearing to make an individualized determination of their risk of flight or dangerousness. Courts have held that without such a bond hearing, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a petitioner's freedom is high. *See Delgado Avila*, 2025 WL 3171175, at *5; *Singh v. Lewis*, 2025 WL 2699219, at *9 (“the risk of erroneously depriving him of his freedom is high if the IJ fails to assess his risk of flight or dangerousness.”); *Ochoa*, 2025 WL 2938779, at *7 (“there is a severe risk of erroneous deprivation”); *Sanchez Alvarez*, 2025 WL 2942648, at *8 (“The second *Mathews* factor also weighs in Petitioner's favor. An individualized bond hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an erroneous deprivation of his rights.”) (internal quote marks omitted).

c. Government Interest

83. As to the third *Mathews* factor, the government's interest in maintaining the current procedure is minimal here. The new interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) – that people like Petitioner who have resided in the United States for years are now subject to mandatory detention – flies in the face of the statutory text, statutory framework, congressional intent, almost three decades of prior practice, and the decisions of federal courts across the nation. Any government interest in

public safety or ensuring that Petitioner attends future immigration proceedings would be satisfied through proper application of § 1226(a), which requires a bond redetermination hearing where an immigration judge will consider Petitioner's individualized facts and circumstances to determine whether he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. *See, e.g., Sanchez Alvarez*, 2025 WL 2942648, at *8 ("Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially detaining someone who could convince a neutral adjudicator ... that his ongoing detention is not warranted") (cleaned up); *Ochoa*, 2025 WL 2938779, at *7 ("the government's interest is slight insofar as Ochoa Ochoa has been redetained without an individualized custody determination evaluating dangerousness and flight risk.").

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of the INA

84. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations of fact set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

85. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being detained and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Further, § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to those who previously entered the country, were designated as unaccompanied minors, placed in the custody of ORR, and released to sponsors prior to being apprehended and detained by DHS. Such noncitizens are detained under § 1226(a) and are eligible for release on bond.

86. Individuals designated as unaccompanied minors, like Mr. Singh, are not

“applicants for admission” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1225 because they must be placed in standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D), and cannot be paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

87. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates the INA.

COUNT II

Violation of the Due Process Clause (U.S. Const. amend. V)

88. Petitioner repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

89. The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the Clause protects.” *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.

90. Petitioner has a fundamental interest in liberty and being free from official restraint.

91. Petitioner entered the country without inspection and lived in the United States for over seven years before being detained. Such an individual may only be subject to detention, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for release on bond. Respondents now erroneously detain Petitioner under the mandatory provision in § 1225(b)(2).

92. Respondents’ detention of Petitioner without any neutral decisionmaker having determined that his continued detention is warranted because of danger or flight risk violates his due process rights.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief:

- a. Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- b. Enjoin Petitioner's removal outside the Northern District of Ohio pending resolution of this matter;
- c. Issue an Order to Show Cause ordering Respondents to show cause within three days as to why this Petition should not be granted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
- d. Issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents immediately release Petitioner;
- e. In the alternative, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Petitioner's immediate release unless Respondents provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days, at which Respondents bear the burden of justifying Petitioner's continued detention by clear and convincing evidence;
- f. Enjoin Respondents from denying bond on the basis of § 1225(b) or *Yajure Hurtado* and from invoking any automatic stay to prevent Petitioner's release;
- g. Enjoin Respondents from imposing any conditions of release, including but not limited to a GPS ankle monitor, unless approved by an immigration judge at the bond hearing;
- h. Enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without first affording him a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker;
- i. Declare that Petitioner's continued detention violates the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
- j. Award Petitioner his reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act or other applicable law;
- k. Grant any other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 20, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James D. Jenkins

James D. Jenkins (MO #57258, WA #63234)

P.O. Box 6373

Richmond, VA 23230

Tel.: (804) 873-8528

jjenkins@valancourtbooks.com

Counsel for Petitioner

**VERIFICATION BY SOMEONE ACTING ON PETITIONER'S BEHALF PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am submitting this verification on behalf of the Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242. I hereby verify that the factual allegations in this Petition are based on information provided to me by Petitioner's immigration attorney and Petitioner's sponsor as well as my own review of the documents cited herein, and that the statements made in the attached Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated: January 20, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James D. Jenkins

James D. Jenkins