

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

J.B.C.O., J.E.C.M., minor child J.S.C.M.,  
A.J.H.G., A.D.B.A., and S.V.M.S., by and  
through their next friend E.K.M.P.,

Petitioners,

v.

Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department  
of Homeland Security,

Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

David Easterwood, Acting Director, St.  
Paul Field Office Immigration and  
Customs Enforcement.

Respondents.

Case No. 0:26-cv-424

**AMENDED PETITION  
FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS**

Expedited Handling Requested

**INTRODUCTION**

1. Petitioners J.B.C.O., J.E.C.M., minor child J.S.C.M., A.J.H.G., A.D.B.A., and S.V.M.S., by and through their next friend E.K.M.P., hereby file this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to release Petitioners from ICE detention, or in the alternative to provide a bond hearing pending the completion of any immigration proceedings.

## JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (federal employee mandamus action); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); Art. I, § 9, c. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (“Suspension Clause”); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver of sovereign immunity); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act).

3. Federal question jurisdiction exists because Petitioners seeks to challenge their custody as a violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

4. Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear habeas petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness or constitutionality of their detention by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510 516-17 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018); and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-63 (2019).

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Petitioners were apprehended within the District of Minnesota and immediately placed into federal immigration custody, the legality of which is the subject of the instant Petition.

6. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), because Respondents are operating in this district.

## PARTIES

7. Petitioner J.B.C.O. is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

8. Petitioner J.E.C.M. is a twenty-year-old citizen of Venezuela and resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

9. Petitioner J.S.C.M. is a twelve-year-old minor child, a citizen of Venezuela, and a resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

10. Petitioner A.J.H.G. is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

11. Petitioner A.D.B.A. is a citizen of Venezuela and resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

12. Petitioner S.V.M.S. is a nineteen-year-old citizen of Venezuela and resident of St. Paul, Minnesota. She is currently indefinitely detained by and under the direct control of Respondents without any scheduled release date.

13. Respondent Pamela Bondi is being sued in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the Department of Justice. Attorney General Bondi shares responsibility for implementation and enforcement of

the immigration detention statutes, along with Respondent Noem. Attorney General Bondi is a legal custodian of Petitioners.

14. Respondent Kristi Noem is being sued in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, Secretary Noem is responsible for the administration of the immigration laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), routinely transacts business in the District of Minnesota, supervises the Fort Snelling ICE Field Office, and is legally responsible for pursuing Petitioners' detention and removal. As such, Respondent Noem is a legal custodian of Petitioner.

15. Respondent Todd M. Lyons is the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Lyons is responsible for Petitioners' detention.

16. Respondent David Easterwood is being sued in his official capacity as the Acting Field Office Director for the Fort Snelling Field Office for ICE within DHS. In that capacity, Field Director Easterwood has supervisory authority over the ICE agents responsible for detaining Petitioners. The address for the Fort Snelling Field Office is 1 Federal Drive, Fort Snelling, Minnesota 55111.

#### **NEXT FRIEND**

17. E.K.M.P. brings this habeas corpus action as next friend of Petitioners who are currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

18. J.B.C.O. is her husband; J.E.C.M. and J.S.C.M. are her sons; A.J.H.G. is her brother-in-law, by A.J.H.G.'s marriage to J.B.C.O.'s sister; A.D.B.A. is a close

family friend who resides with her and her family; and S.V.M.S. is her son's girlfriend and the mother of E.K.M.P.'s three-month-old grandson.

19. A next friend does not become a party to the habeas action but instead prosecutes the case on behalf of the detained individual, who remains the real party in interest. *Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990).

20. Next-friend standing is appropriate where the detainee cannot prosecute the action on their own, due to lack of access to the courts or a similar disability. *Id.* at 163–64. Additionally, a next friend may bring a petition “only if the litigation actually involves the concerns of the real party in interest, and not simply the grievances of the next friend.” *Amerson v. Iowa, Dep't of Hum. Servs. by Palmer*, 59 F.3d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2254(a); *Whitmore*, 495 U.S. at 163–64).

21. Here, Petitioners are unable to prepare, sign, or file this petition because they are detained without reliable access to legal materials or translation services and face pending removal. In addition, J.S.C.M. is a minor child. These conditions justify the next friend's intervention.

22. Next friend E.K.M.P. has a significant relationship with all of the Petitioners, and is acting solely in the Petitioners' best interests, not to assert her own personal rights or interests. E.K.M.P. therefore satisfies the requirements for next-friend standing under *Whitmore* and *Amerson*, and this Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition.

## FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

23. Petitioners are all citizens of Venezuela who immigrated to the United States through Temporary Protected Status. They all share a home in St. Paul, Minnesota, and currently each Petitioner has a pending asylum claim.

24. Next friend E.K.M.P. and Petitioner J.B.C.O. are married. They live with their two sons (Petitioner J.E.C.M., who is twenty-years-old, and Petitioner J.S.C.M. who is a twelve-year-old minor child), their brother-in-law (Petitioner A.J.H.G.), a close family friend (Petitioner A.D.B.A.), their elder son's girlfriend (Petitioner S.V.M.S.), and their three-month-old grandchild.

25. Petitioners J.B.C.O., J.E.C.M., and J.S.C.M. entered the United States in June 2023, and they currently have pending asylum applications.

26. Petitioners J.B.C.O. and J.E.C.M. have valid work permits.

27. Petitioner J.S.C.M. is an honor roll student known in the community for his quick wit, kindness, and willingness to help other students to learn English.

28. Petitioners J.E.C.M. and S.V.M.S. are the proud parents of a three-month-old baby.

29. Petitioner A.J.H.G. entered the United States in October 2023, and he currently has a pending asylum application.

30. Petitioner A.D.B.A. entered the United States in May 2023, and he currently has a pending asylum application.

31. Petitioner S.V.M.S. entered the United States in December 2023, and she currently has a pending asylum application.

32. Petitioners are respected and beloved members of their local community. Mere hours since agreeing to represent Petitioners *pro bono*, counsel already has received numerous letters of support from various community members, including neighbors and members of their church community, praising Petitioners' moral characters and positive contributions to their community.

33. On Thursday, January 15, 2026, at approximately 5:00 P.M., bounty hunters acting as agents of ICE and under the Respondents' authority raided Petitioners' home. They stormed the home with guns drawn, without notice or presentation of a warrant to justify the search or seizures, and without regard for the twelve-year-old and three-month-old minor children present. Petitioners were detained at gunpoint, arrested, and transported to an unknown location under incredibly traumatic circumstances and without any warrant or legal justification.

34. Petitioner J.S.C.M. suffers from asthma and has not been provided access to his inhaler while in Respondents' custody. Upon information and belief, he is currently detained with his father, who reports that J.S.C.M. now wakes in the night screaming as a result of his traumatic arrest and detention.

35. Petitioners A.J.H.G. and S.V.M.S. also suffer from asthma. It is unknown whether they have been provided access to necessary medicine while detained by Respondents.

36. Petitioners' home invasion and subsequent arrests are part of an operation in Hennepin and Ramsey counties called "Operation Metro Surge." This operation has involved hundreds of masked, unidentified individuals in unmarked vehicles (many

with illegally covered or mismatched license plates) holding themselves out as ICE agents but largely refusing to identify themselves by name or to present warrants, physically assaulting pedestrians, pepper spraying and arresting citizen observers, hitting passersby with vehicles, and generally attempting to take as many immigrants as possible into custody regardless of the constitutionality of their actions. *See, e.g., Compl., Tincher et. al. v. Noem*, No. 0:25-cv-04669. (D. Minn. 12/17/2025).

37. Since the operation began on December 1, 2025, the number of immigration officials in the twin city metro area has increased fourfold, and with them these new agents have brought a similarly massive increase in unconstitutional, unlawful, and downright violent behavior towards citizens and non-citizens alike. The people of Minnesota—of all races, nationalities, and citizenship status—are united in their shock and fear at the events of the past six weeks, and are begging for the attacks on their community to stop.

38. In addition to the surge of federal agents in the Twin Cities metropolitan area, ICE has also boosted these numbers by contracting with private “bounty hunters” to detain and arrest people they profile as not being citizens. *See Sam Biddle, 10 Companies Have Already Made \$1 Million As Ice Bounty Hunters*, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 23, 2025, 3:38 P.M.), <https://theintercept.com/2025/12/23/ice-bounty-hunters-track-immigrant-surveillance/>.

39. Since Operation Metro Surge began, reports of unconstitutional behavior by federal agents and deputized bounty hunters—including suspicionless seizures, warrantless arrests without probable cause, searches of homes without warrants,

unreasonable uses of force, and detention of immigrants with meritorious habeas claims—have reached unprecedented levels in flagrancy, manner, and scope.

40. Given the massive volume of perceived non-citizens being taken off the streets, Respondents are running out of physical space to continue detaining people. Detainees are being held in cramped quarters at the federal building, before being quickly sent to remote locations across Minnesota or to facilities as far away as El Paso, Texas, or New Mexico.

41. Respondents are transporting detained immigrants across the country with increasing frequency and magnitude, making it difficult if not impossible to identify the precise location of detained individuals, let alone facilitate access to counsel. *See, e.g., Ellie Roth, Observer: ICE Detainee Flights Increase at MSP as Enforcement Action Ramps Up*, MPR NEWS (Jan. 14, 2026 4:00 A.M.), <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/01/14/ice-detainee-flights-leaving-msp-increase-as-surge-continues>.

42. Upon information and belief, frequently moving detained immigrants from one federal judicial district to another serves as a means to frustrate meritorious legal claims for release and forum shop away from the District of Minnesota, where claims for relief that are the same or similar to those presented in the instant Petition frequently have been granted in whole or in part.

43. Upon information and belief, frequently moving detained immigrants with meritorious habeas claims also serves as a way to isolate them from their communities, their loved ones, and their counsel, in an attempt to demoralize people

and encourage them to waive their legal rights and sign voluntary deportation agreements.

44. Detaining Petitioners is an expensive, cruel, and pointless endeavor. Petitioners respectfully seeks the opportunity to return home—to each other and to their communities, to reunite mothers and children and loved ones—and continue following the legal processes set up by Congress and DHS for immigrants to seek status in this country.

#### **STANDARD OF LAW**

45. Courts have long recognized the significance of the habeas statute in protecting individuals from unlawful detention. The “Great Writ” has been referred to by US Courts as “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.” *Fay v. Noia*, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (emphasis added). A petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus when their custody violates the US Constitution or a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 22441(c)(3), which should be granted if the petitioner meets their burden of proof—a preponderance of evidence. *Aditya W. H. v. Trump*, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).

46. Detained immigrants petitioning under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 face no statutory exhaustion requirements. *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). Nor is a judicially imposed prudential exhaustion requirement appropriate where, as here: time is of the essence, facts are largely undisputed, and the parties’ disagreement is based on a legal conclusion. *Id.* at 967-68.

47. Other courts in the Eighth Circuit have similarly declined to require prudential exhaustion when evaluating a detained immigrant’s habeas corpus petition under similar circumstances—to address a question of statutory interpretation that does not require developing a factual record, and where the agency is demonstrably unlikely to reverse its course. *Giron Reyes v. Lyons*, 2025 WL 2712427 at \*3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025).

48. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [immigrants], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

49. In July of 2025, Respondent DHS began ignoring the decades-long consensus of how 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) should be interpreted, which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) articulated in a subsequent ruling. *Matter of Yajure Hurtado*, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5, 2025). Respondents suddenly claim that individuals who have been residing within the United States for more than two years are somehow metaphorically “seeking admission,” simply because they may have pending claims for asylum or other forms of status.

50. However, this Court and the majority around the country have made clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) only authorizes detention for noncitizens who are at the border seeking physical entry at the time of detention, not those who have lived within the United States for more than two years, and whose detention is discretionary and governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). *Eliseo A.A. v. Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ.

No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

51. Here, Petitioners all have been in the United States for well over two years. They were all detained within the United States, not at a border while seeking entry, and have pending asylum claims. Respondents wrongly assert 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2) as a basis for detaining Petitioners without hearings, when instead any detention could only be pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which here the Respondents do not purport to invoke.

## **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

### **COUNT ONE**

#### **Fifth Amendment Due Process**

*Respondents Deprive Petitioners of an adequate and meaningful process to challenge their ongoing confinement.*

52. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained above.

53. Petitioners have due process rights as residents of the United States. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

54. Federal courts use the three-part test in *Matthews v. Eldridge* to determine whether civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The elements of this test are: (1) the private interest that the official action affects; (2)

the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest in following the existing procedures, both in achieving their objectives and in the potential burdens of an alternate procedure. *Id.* at 335.

55. Here, all three factors favor the Petitioners.

56. First, Petitioners have a significant private interest at stake. A person's interest in freedom from physical detention is "the most elemental of liberty interests." *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 ("Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects."). Petitioner is wrongfully confined, a direct attack on Petitioners' liberty interests.

57. Second, Petitioners will continue to be deprived of this interest if the current procedure (detaining Petitioner without a legal basis) is followed. There is no rational explanation for detaining Petitioners. Respondents' purported basis for detaining Petitioners under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2) has been rejected time and time again in this court. *Ahmed A v. Bondi*, Case No. 25-4776 (JWB/DJF) (January 6, 2026); *Maldonado v. Olson*, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D. Minn. 2025); *Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi*, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at \*7–8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *R.E. v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3946-NEB, 2025 WL 3146312 (D. Minn. Nov. 4,

2025); *Herrera Avila v. Bondi*, No. 0:25-cv-3741 (JRT), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025).

58. Lastly, the Government has no legitimate interest in refusing to follow its own rules. Petitioners pose no safety threats to the community. Releasing Petitioners, or at a minimum holding a bond hearing, would in fact *save* the government the resources and expense of continued imprisonment.

59. The placement of Petitioners in detention pending the resolution of ongoing immigration proceedings violates their constitutional rights to due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.

## **COUNT TWO**

### **Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)**

*Petitioners' Ongoing Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is Unlawful because they are not Seeking Admission and therefore cannot be held under that Authority*

60. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained above.

61. Respondents violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by attempting to apply mandatory detention through 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), to Petitioners. Petitioners were nowhere near the border and were not “seeking admission” when their home was raided and they were detained.

62. Petitioners are detained, notwithstanding their pending proceedings in immigration court, without being afforded an opportunity to advocate for release as the law requires.

### COUNT THREE

#### **Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706**

#### *Detaining Petitioners Pursuant to an Unlawful Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) violates the Administrative Procedure Act*

63. Petitioners re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

64. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

65. The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

66. The mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all noncitizens residing in the United States who are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. As relevant here, it does not apply to those who previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings by Respondents. Such noncitizens could properly be detained under § 1226(a), but would then be eligible for release on bond unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.

67. Nonetheless, the Board has adopted a policy and practice of applying § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioners and others in the same position.

68. Respondents through its recent administrative decision failed to articulate any reasoned explanations for new interpretation of the Act. The Board's decision represents a change in the agencies' policies and positions that negates the plain language of the Act, the will of Congress, and decades of administrative precedent.

69. The application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioners is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law, and as such, it violates the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

### REMEDY

70. An available remedy for Respondents' unlawful conduct as outlined in this complaint is for Petitioners to be released.

71. Immigration detention is civil in nature, and as a result Congress must have expressly authorized it by statute, and the detention must be reasonably related to its statutory purpose. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting *Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).

72. A noncitizen seeking only to challenge the legality of their detention, not the substance of their removal proceedings in immigration court, may properly ask a federal court to find jurisdiction over such a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., *Mohammed H. v. Trump*, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn. 2025).

73. Since Section 1225 does not apply to noncitizens who are in Petitioners' situation—who have been detained while residing within the United States for more than two years, as opposed to those who are detained while in the process of physically entering the United States, the law that Respondents are using to detain Petitioners simply does not apply so as to authorize their detention. See *Eliseo A.A. v.*

*Olson*, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); *Mayamu K. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); *Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4584 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); *Xuseen A. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); *Vedat C. v. Bondi*, Civ. No. 25-4642 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 9 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).

74. When a habeas petitioner's detention is without legal basis, the typical remedy is release. *Munaf v. Geren*, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the "typical remedy" for "unlawful executive detention").

75. Respondents will no doubt argue, as they have in similar cases before this Court, that if the Court rules that Petitioners should have been detained pursuant to § 1226, instead of § 1225, then the remedy is a bond hearing as opposed to outright release. *See, e.g., Ahmed A.* Civ. No. 25-4776, Doc. No. 9. at 9-10. However, this Court rejected this argument, saying that:

[A] bond hearing presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory authority as a mere procedural irregularity rather than a substantive defect ... Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.

*Id.* at Doc. No. 10 at 6.

76. Here, where detention is unlawfully based on 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2), which does not apply to Petitioners, release is an appropriate remedy.

**REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE**

77. Within three days, unless good cause for a delay is shown, “[a] court, justice or judge entering a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

78. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court issue an Order to Show Cause directing Respondents to file a return within three days of the Court’s order, showing cause, if any, why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the following relief;

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- (2) Issue an Order requiring Respondents to show cause as to why Petitioners should not be released immediately, or in the alternative afforded a bond hearing;
- (3) Alternatively, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioners unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days; and
- (4) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.

Date: January 19, 2026

\_\_\_\_\_/s//Claire Nicole Glenn\_\_\_\_\_  
**Claire Nicole Glenn (she/her)**

Staff Attorney  
Climate Defense Project  
P.O. Box 7040  
Minneapolis, MN 55407  
651-343-4816  
claire@climatedefenseproject.org

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District of Columbia License No. 888242412  
Maryland License No. 1902280002  
Minnesota License No. 0402443

*Attorney for Petitioners*

**Verification**  
**Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242**

I am Petitioners' attorney and submit this verification on their behalves. I hereby verify that the factual statements made in the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, which knowledge comes from conversations with Petitioners' next friend, as well as my experience involving this and other habeas corpus petitions stemming from "Operation Metro Surge."

Date: January 19, 2026

\_\_\_\_//s//Claire Nicole Glenn\_\_\_\_\_

**Claire Nicole Glenn (she/her)**

Staff Attorney

Climate Defense Project

P.O. Box 7040

Minneapolis, MN 55407

651-343-4816

claire@climatedefenseproject.org

~ ~ ~

District of Columbia License No. 888242412

Maryland License No. 1902280002

Minnesota License No. 0402443

*Attorney for Petitioners*